*1 Before the Court is Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation's (“MC”) Renewed Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order. (Mot., Doc. 139.) Plaintiffs opposed and MC replied. (Opp., Doc. 143; Reply, Doc. 147.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES MC's Renewed Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a putative class action involving the 2007-2016 model years of the Mazda CX-9 vehicle and the 2009-2013 model years of the Mazda6 vehicle (the “Class Vehicles”). (FAC ¶ 3, Doc. 54.) According to the FAC, those vehicles incorporate the Mazda Cyclone Engine, which contains “a defect in design, manufacturing, materials and/or workmanship that causes the water pump to suddenly and prematurely fail well-before the end of the useful life of the engine.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs named two defendants in their FAC, (1) MC, and (2) Mazda Motor of America, Inc. d/b/a Mazda North American Operations (“MNAO”). (Id. ¶¶ 40-48.) MC is a Japanese Corporation, with its principal place of business located in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. (Id. ¶ 42; Opp. at 3; First Yamashina Decl. ¶ 2, Doc. 57-2.) MNAO is MC's United States subsidiary, a California corporation with its principal place of business in Irvine. (First Yamashina Decl.; MTD at 2-3, Doc. 57-1; FAC ¶ 40.) MC sought dismissal from this action under Rule 12(b)(2) on the grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. (MTD, Doc. 57.) On April 22, 2020, the Court held that Motion is abeyance pending the outcome of jurisdictional discovery, which the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to conduct “as to MC's relationship with MNAO and MC's participation in the distribution, sale, advertising, and marketing of the Class Vehicles in California, both at the present time and during model years 2007 through 2016.” (MTD Order at 14, Doc. 77.) That discovery included a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of an MC corporate representative. (See id.)

Plaintiffs noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of MC for July 31, 2020. (Magistrate Judge Order Re: Notice of Non-Compliance with Discovery Order at 1, Doc. 108.) Defendants objected to the deposition and the Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the parties' discovery dispute on June 16, 2020. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge directed MC to notify Plaintiffs, no later than June 22, 2020, how they would prefer to proceed with the deposition by selecting from among three options: (1) designation of a 30(b)(6) witness located in Japan to testify remotely; (2) designation of a 30(b)(6) witness located outside of Japan to testify remotely; or (3) designation of a 30(b)(6) witness who would travel to Irvine, California to testify in-person or remotely. (Id.)

Instead of selecting from those options, MC filed a motion seeking review of the Magistrate Judge's ruling, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and Central District of California Local Rule 72-2. (First Motion for Review, Doc. 103.) In that Motion, MC argued that each of the three options for proceeding with the deposition were either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. It asserted that (1) the first option, a remote deposition, is contrary to Japanese law (Mot. at 5-9); (2) the second option, a remote deposition of an MC witness located outside of Japan, is “not possible” and clearly erroneous because there are no appropriate MC employees currently outside of Japan and no plans for any MC employee to travel on or about July 31, 2020, for business to any of the countries in which MC's sixty-nine subsidiaries or the eighteen other companies in which MC has an equity interest are located (id. at 9); and (3) the third option, which requires an MC witness to travel to Irvine, California, is clearly erroneous in light of the current danger to international travelers posed by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (id. at 10-11).

*2 The Court observed that MC's argument that the second option is “not possible” rested entirely on new information contained in a declaration submitted with the First Motion for Review by MC Legal Affairs Department Staff Manager Osamu Yamashina. (Order Referring First Motion for Review at 2, Doc. 134; see First Motion for Review at 9; Second Yamashina Decl., Doc. 103-15.) This Court explained that it would not review a ruling of the Magistrate Judge where the request for review is based on new facts never presented to the Magistrate Judge. (Order Referring First Motion for Review at 2.) For that reason, the Court referred the First Motion for Review to the Magistrate Judge for resolution as a Motion for Reconsideration of her prior ruling. (Id.)

After consideration of MC's new facts, the Magistrate Judge denied reconsideration. (MJ Order Denying Reconsideration, Doc. 136 at 3.) She was “unconvinced that there is a not a single person outside of Japan (and thus not restricted against participating in a remote deposition) who could be designated and prepared by MC to testify about the jurisdictional topics in the deposition notice.” (Id.) The Magistrate Judge noted that Rule 30(b)(6) is expansive as to who may testify on behalf of an organization; it contemplates the designation of an organization's “officers, directors, or managing agents, or [ ] other persons who consent to testify on its behalf[.]” (Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)) (emphasis added by Magistrate Judge).) As such, MC could designate the America-based CEO of MNAO, Mashahiro Moro, who had been a former MC employee for a period of decades. (Id. at 2-3.) Additionally, Mr. Yamashina's new declaration “did not foreclose the possibility that a suitable MC employee [could] be traveling outside of Japan in the next month, but not on July 31.” (Id. at 3.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge could discern no basis to modify her prior order.

In response, MC filed its Renewed Motion for Review, requesting review of both the Magistrate Judge's original order as well as her denial of reconsideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A magistrate judge's decision on a non-dispositive matter “is entitled to great deference by the district court.” United States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2001). A district court may grant reconsideration of a such a decision only where it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)); Fed. R. Civ. P 72(a). The “clearly erroneous standard” is “ ‘significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed’ ” and a “decision is ‘contrary to law’ if it applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to consider an element of the applicable legal standard.” Harrington v. Allison, No. CV 17-5245 PA (KESx), 2019 WL 7877336, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (collecting cases) (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993); Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1989)).

III. DISCUSSION

As discussed above, the Magistrate Judge provided MC with three separate alternatives for completing the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to which Plaintiffs are entitled. Accordingly, to justify its requested relief — that this Court set aside the Magistrate Judge's orders — MC must demonstrate that all three options are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. But even assuming, arguendo, that MC's characterization of remote depositions from within Japan as impermissible under Japanese law renders that aspect of the Magistrate Judge's orders contrary to law within the meaning of Rule 72(a), MC has fallen far short of demonstrating that the other two options for completing the deposition are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

*3 With respect to the second option—a remote deposition of an MC witness located outside of Japan—MC argues that the Magistrate Judge is effectively requiring MC “to designate someone whom MC would not other select as its” 30(b)(6) representative. (Renewed Motion for Review at 11-13.) However, MC supports that argument with citation to caselaw establishing only that plaintiffs do not have the right to demand that any particular individual serve as a defendant's 30(b)(6) designee. (See id. at 11-13 (citing Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Innovacon, Inc., No. 16-CV-0698 CAB (NLS), 2018 WL 692259, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2018); Ilani v. Abraham, No. 2:17-cv-00692-APG-PAL, 2018 WL 10467640, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2018)).) As MC admits, Plaintiffs have made no such demand here and the Magistrate Judge required no specific individual to serve as a 30(b)(6) deponent. (Renewed Motion for Review at 12 n.11.) In denying reconsideration of her prior order, the Magistrate Judge doubted the veracity of MC's representation that it is incapable of identifying any suitable designee outside of Japan. In that vein, she identified, for sake of an example, at least one individual located in America, Moro, who appears well-suited to testifying on the relevant jurisdictional issues. (MJ Order Denying Reconsideration at 2-3.) She further explained that the recently submitted Yamashina Declaration fails to conclusively demonstrate that no suitable MC employees would be traveling outside Japan in the near future. (Id. at 3.) MC has thus offered no persuasive argument that the second option presented by the Magistrate Judge is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

As to the third option, MC argues only that “an in-person deposition of an MC representative in Irvine, California—is clearly erroneous and disproportionate to the needs of the case under the circumstances presented by COVID-19.” (Renewed Motion for Review at 13-15.) MC states that given the health risk posed by COVID-19, as well as the prevailing quarantine procedures applicable to international travelers, “[r]equiring MC's witness to travel from Japan to Irvine, California to appear for a deposition in the current environment, is impractical and unsafe.” (Id. at 13.) The sole article of legal authority cited in support of that contention is Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., No. 12cv604-GPC (KSC), 2012 WL 6086881, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012). (See id. at 13-15.) But there, the court explained that the plaintiffs had not “effectively articulated why the depositions” of a corporate defendant's Brazil-based officer and 30(b)(6) designee were “necessary at all.” Brady, 2012 WL 6086881, at *3. The parties had already agreed to proceed with the depositions of a related entity's USA-based Vice President and 30(b)(6) representative and the court further found that the information sought by the plaintiffs was alternatively obtainable by written discovery. (Id.) For these reasons, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs' request to compel the Brazil-based witnesses to travel to Florida for depositions was “unreasonable, expensive, and unduly burdensome.” Id. In contrast to a deposition which is not “necessary at all,” here, the Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs are entitled to the deposition at issue. Moreover, MC's argument is based on the false premise that is being “required” to send its designee from Japan to the United States. It is not. To the extent MC believes that such travel is unreasonable, expensive, unduly burdensome, or unsafe, it is free, per the second option, to designate a witness outside of Japan to participate in a remote deposition.

MC has failed to show that the Magistrate Judge's orders are clearly erroneous or contrary to law; she has provided MC with reasonable means of conducting the required deposition. For the foregoing reasons, MC's Renewed Motion for Review is DENIED.[1]

*4 CC: Magistrate Judge Karen E. Scott

MC also requests that “any Rule 30(b)(6) jurisdictional deposition [ ] be deferred or stayed until the earlier of the following: (1) the date when Plaintiffs reserve a deposition at the U.S. Embassy or consulate offices in Japan, or (2) when MC's designated witnesses may travel from Japan to Irvine, California and return to Japan without requiring to quarantine for 14-days after re-entering Japan.” (Renewed Motion for Review at 16-17.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds such a deferral or stay is not warranted and that request is therefore similarly DENIED.