*1 Before the Court is Vestas's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Assets (“MTC”) filed on September 4, 2020. Dkt. No. 51. United States District Judge James Wesley Hendrix referred this motion to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for resolution. Dkt. No. 56. Defendants filed a Response on September 24, 2020. Dkt. No. 57. Vestas, on October 9, 2020, filed a notice indicating that it would not file a reply brief. Dkt. No. 64. Thus, the motion has been fully briefed.

I. THE DISPUTED DISCOVERY REQUESTS

Vestas is suing Defendant Arturo Salazar, III (“Salazar”), a former Vestas employee, and others, alleging they stole more than $600,000 from Vestas between 2016 and 2019. See Dkt. No. 1. Through this motion, Vestas seeks to compel more complete responses to discovery requests it propounded to Salazar regarding his assets.

Vestas argues that such discovery is relevant both to demonstrating the theft through tracing the funds and to recovering the funds before they can be further dissipated.[1] Although the motion could be clearer, the Court has identified the following discovery requests as being the subject of this motion: Interrogatories Nos. 9 and 10, and Requests for Production Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. The Court will consider each disputed discovery request below.

A. Interrogatory No. 9

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

Vestas propounded Interrogatory No. 9 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-1. Salazar filed an initial response on May 18, 2020, and a supplemental response on May 31, 2020. Dkt. Nos. 51-2 and 51-3.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

*2 Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the general scope of discovery as being any nonprivileged matter that is both relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and “proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Interrogatory No. 9 meets each test of Rule 26(b). The information sought is highly relevant to Vestas's claims, it meets the proportionality test, and no valid objections based on privilege were made by Salazar's counsel. To the extent Salazar believes that he asserted a privilege through his objection that the interrogatory was “ambiguous, overly broad, and burdensome,” he did not. Such boilerplate objections “[do] not preserve or accomplish anything other than waiver and subjecting the responding party to sanctions ....” Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 581 (N.D. Tex. 2018). A party resisting discovery on such bases is required to specifically demonstrate how the discovery request is ambiguous, overly broad, or burdensome, including, as appropriate, supporting the objection with affidavits or other evidence. See Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2014); see also S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“A party asserting undue burden typically must present an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding to the discovery request.”).

Here, the only attempt Salazar makes to demonstrate how the interrogatory is ambiguous, overly broad, or burdensome is in his Response to the MTC almost six months after Vestas served the interrogatory on him. While the Court assumes that some extension to respond and/or object was granted to Salazar by Vestas—given that Salazar's response was not filed until almost two months after it was served—the parties do not provide any details of such extension(s) to the Court, if they existed. Regardless, the Court further assumes that whatever extended deadline Salazar had to interpose objections to this interrogatory long since passed by the time he filed his Response to the MTC. Hence, the objections he asserted in that Response were waived.

Even if the Court considered the objections asserted by Salazar in his Response to the MTC, it would overrule them. Salazar's effort to demonstrate the overly broad and intrusive nature of the interrogatory in that Response consists of his assertion that “Plaintiff requests “every” individual who has received a transfer of funds, money or assets from 2016-2019. It lacks tailoring. The interrogatory thus would require Arturo Salazar to disclose such matters as house payments, mortgage payments, daily personal expense payments.” Dkt. No. 57 at 2. First of all, this characterization of Interrogatory No. 9 is inaccurate. The interrogatory is expressly limited to transfers of amounts exceeding $1,000. See Dkt. No. 51-1 at 6. And to the extent Salazar made “daily personal expense payments” in excess of $1,000, the Court finds that such payments are highly relevant, likely to be in a manageable quantity, and fair game for discovery in this case.

Although Salazar complains in his Response to Vestas's MTC of having to disclose “house payments, mortgage payments,” he already disclosed information about his mortgage payment in his supplemental response to the interrogatory four months prior to raising this issue in his Response to Vestas's MTC. See Dkt. No. 51-3 at 3 (Salazar stating in his supplemental response that he transfers $1,400 per month to Security Service Credit Union for his home mortgage). Regardless, the Court finds that the amounts Salazar paid towards debt on exempt assets such as his home mortgage are particularly relevant in the context of the claims in this lawsuit.

For this reason, the Court orders that Salazar fully respond to this interrogatory consistent with Section III of this Order, including clearly stating whether he made any additional payments toward his mortgage beyond the minimum required monthly payment. Accordingly, Vestas's MTC regarding Interrogatory No. 9 is GRANTED.

B. Interrogatory No. 10

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

*3 Vestas propounded Interrogatory No. 10 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-1. Salazar filed a response on May 18, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-2. Although Salazar supplemented his discovery responses on May 31, 2020, he did not supplement his response to Interrogatory No. 10. Dkt. No. 51-3.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

Salazar complains in his Response, apparently for the first time, that Interrogatory No. 10 is overly broad and intrusive because it would force him to evaluate the cost of “personal effects, clothing, household appliances and other everyday items.” Dkt. No. 57 at 2. The Court overrules this objection on at least three bases.

First, Salazar did not object to Interrogatory No. 10 until his Response to the MTC, by which time he inexcusably waived any objection he could have otherwise successfully interposed. See In re United States, 864 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[A]s a general rule, when a party fails to object timely to interrogatories, production requests, or other discovery efforts, objections thereto are waived.”); accord Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 582; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”).

Second, to the extent Salazar attempts to interpose objections in his Response based on Interrogatory No. 10 being “overly broad and intrusive,” those boilerplate objections are invalid and overruled for the reasons explained above in connection with Interrogatory No. 9. See Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 581; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.”).

Finally, to the extent Salazar complains that deciding which of his “personal effects, clothing, household appliances and other everyday items” are valued at over $1,000 is too burdensome, the objection is overruled. Despite Salazar's characterization of this interrogatory, it only requires disclosing those items worth more than $1,000. The Court finds that this interrogatory is appropriately limited given the context of the claims in this lawsuit. Moreover, “[t]he fact that an interrogatory calls for a thorough response — one that will take time and effort to answer — does not make it improper.” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 579.

For these reasons, Vestas's MTC regarding Interrogatory No. 10 is GRANTED.

C. Request for Production No. 9:

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

Vestas propounded Request for Production No. 9 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-4. Salazar filed an initial response on April 29, 2020. Id. Although Salazar supplemented his discovery responses on June 1, 2020, he did not supplement his response to Request for Production No. 9. Dkt. No. 51-5.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

Salazar, without objecting, claims that he has “no written communication” responsive to this request. However, the request encompasses more than merely written communication. Specifically, the definitions preceding this request provides that:

Dkt. No. 51-4 at 5. This section also defines the term “Document” to include electronically stored information. Id. Again, Salazar objected to neither the request itself nor the definitions modifying the request.

Accordingly, Vestas's MTC regarding Request for Production No. 9 is GRANTED. To the extent Salazar has any Communications, as this term is defined above, in his possession, custody, or control, he is ordered to produce it to Vestas's counsel consistent with Section III of this Order.

D. Request for Production No. 10

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

Vestas propounded Request for Production No. 10 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-4. Salazar filed an initial response on April 29, 2020, and a supplemental response on June 1, 2020. Dkt. Nos. 51-4 and 51-5.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

Salazar's boilerplate objections to this request as being “overly intrusive, overly broad and overly burdensome” fail for the reasons explained above and are overruled. In his Response to the MTC, Salazar argues that “[t]he defense has produce [sic] two years [sic] worth of bank records that are in Mr. Salazar's hands. The request is overly broad based on the time period of five years. The Defense contends that it has provided the name and identifying information of Arturo Salazar's bank.” Dkt. No. 57 at 2. This attempt to explain how the request is overly broad is late, and thus waived. See Henderson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV 15-0669, 2016 WL 5936889, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 11, 2016) (citing In re United States, 864 F.2d at 1156 (“Although Rule 34 does not provide that untimely objections are waived, the Fifth Circuit has found that the waiver provision applies equally to Rule 34.”)). Indeed, “even where the responding party has timely served some objections to a Rule 34(a) request, this waiver extends to any grounds not stated in a timely objection.” Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 582 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B)).

*5 Moreover, this late objection in Salazar's Response to the MTC is only slightly less boilerplate than the original objection, and ultimately lacks merit regardless. The mere fact that a request covers a span of five years does not in and of itself make the request overly broad. Considered in the context of the facts as alleged in this lawsuit, the Court finds that the five-year period is appropriate.

Therefore, Vestas's MTC regarding Request for Production No. 10 is GRANTED.

E. Request for Production No. 11

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

Vestas propounded Request for Production No. 11 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-4. Salazar filed an initial response on April 29, 2020, and a supplemental response on June 1, 2020. Dkt. Nos. 51-4 and 51-5.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

Vestas argues in its MTC that Salazar “took the position that because he does not ‘currently’ have a PayPal, Square, or Venmo account, he would not produce historical records from any accounts he previously had.” Dkt. No. 51 at 3. As evidence of this, Vestas refers the Court to Salazar's response and supplemental response to this request. Id. While Vestas's characterization of Salazar's position is not borne out by Salazar's responses to this request, the Court is concerned that Salazar may be interpreting his responsibility in connection with this request too narrowly. Salazar is obligated to produce information responsive to this request even if he “does not currently possess” it, so long as he has control over it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).

“Rule 34's definition of ‘possession, custody, or control,’ includes more than actual possession or control of the materials; it also contemplates a party's legal right or practical ability to obtain the materials from a nonparty to the action.” Mir v. L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, L.P., 319 F.R.D. 220, 230 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Bossier City, No. CV 15-1822, 2016 WL 3951216, at *3 (W.D. La. July 20, 2016)); see also 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: § 2210 (2d ed. 1994) (“Inspection can be had if the party to whom the request is made has the legal right to obtain the document, even though in fact it has no copy.”).

Here, Vestas's MTC regarding Request for Production No. 11 is GRANTED to the extent that Salazar has possession, custody, or control over information responsive to this request. That includes any historical information that, while Salazar may not actually possess it, he has the legal right or practical ability to obtain it.

F. Request for Production No. 12

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

Vestas propounded Request for Production No. 12 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-4. Salazar filed an initial response on April 29, 2020. Id. Although Salazar supplemented his discovery responses on June 1, 2020, he did not supplement his response to Interrogatory No. 12. Dkt. No. 51-5.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

As with Request for Production No. 11, Vestas's argument regarding Request for Production No. 12 is that Salazar “took the position that because he does not ‘currently’ have a PayPal, Square, or Venmo account, he would not produce historical records from any accounts he previously had.” Dkt. No. 51 at 3. This characterization of Salazar's position is less accurate than the characterization of his position on Request for Production No. 11. Here, Salazar simply says there was no Venmo account. And Vestas has not offered any evidence with its MTC to support otherwise. However, as with Request for Production No. 11, Vestas's MTC regarding this request is GRANTED to the extent that Salazar has possession, custody, or control over information responsive to this request. That includes any historical information that, while Salazar may not actually possess it, he has the legal right or practical ability to obtain it.

G. Request for Production No. 13

1. Disputed Request and Responses:

Vestas propounded Request for Production No. 13 on March 31, 2020. Dkt. No. 51-4. Salazar filed an initial response on April 29, 2020. Id. Although Salazar supplemented his discovery responses on June 1, 2020, he did not supplement his response to Request for Production No. 13. Dkt. No. 51-5.

2. Discussion and Analysis:

For the reasons explained above in connection with Request for Production No. 11, Vestas's MTC regarding this request is GRANTED to the extent that Salazar has possession, custody, or control over information responsive to this request. That includes any historical information that, while Salazar may not actually possess it, he has the legal right or practical ability to obtain it.

II. SALAZAR'S RESPONSE TO MTC

Salazar advances additional arguments in his Response to Vestas's MTC. Specifically, he invokes the “unclean hands” doctrine, objects to Vestas's “overly broad” discovery requests, advances some variation of a proportionality argument, and, finally, he also suggests what appears to be an argument that the information sought by Vestas is equally available to Vestas as it is to Salazar, at least insofar as the invoice records are concerned. Dkt. No. 57 at 1–4. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the Court OVERRULES each argument or objection advanced by Salazar's Response to the MTC.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose obligations on parties engaging in discovery and provide a remedy for discovery abuse or misconduct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 26, 37. Under the Federal Rules, a party may not refuse to comply with an opposing party's discovery request simply because he believes that the opposing party has not fully complied with his discovery requests to him. Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 581 (citation omitted). A party's obligation to respond to discovery is independent of any other party's discovery obligations. Put another way, the failure of one cannot justify the failure of the other. It is worth noting that, in a process overwhelmingly governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the equitable doctrine of unclean hands has virtually “no place in the analysis of a motion to compel brought pursuant to the federal discovery rules.” Pub. Health Equip. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Clarke Mosquito Control Prods. Inc., No. SA-08-CV-0895, 2011 WL 2470059, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2011) (denying motion to compel based on allegation of unclean hands).

*7 Salazar's unclean hands argument offers next to nothing in terms of a plausible excuse for his failure to adhere to his discovery obligations imposed by the Federal Rules. Moreover, the Court recently denied Salazar's MTC, and in doing so, expressed concern over the conduct of Salazar's counsel in advancing that motion. See Dkt. No. 63. Thus, any “clean hands” argument on the part of Salazar rings not only hollow, but ironic.

With respect to Salazar's other arguments in his Response, the Court squarely addressed his boilerplate objections to Vestas's “overly broad” discovery requests and likewise found that the information sought by Vestas was both relevant and proportional. To the extent Salazar's additional objections in his Response to the MTC are not addressed above, raising them for the first time in his Response to the MTC makes them untimely and waived.

III. ORDER TO RESPOND AND CERTIFY

Salazar is ORDERED to serve, through his counsel, a response to each of the seven (7) discovery requests set forth above within ten (10) days of this Order, regardless of whether Salazar has additional information to produce. If Salazar has no additional information to produce in response to a particular request, he is to so state and provide as much specificity as possible regarding why he has no additional information to produce. These responses must be signed by both Salazar and his counsel. Counsel's signature will constitute his certification under Rule 26(g) that the responses are each complete and correct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). No further objections are to be made in connection with any of the above discovery requests.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons and to the extent stated above, Vestas's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Assets (Dkt. No. 51) is GRANTED. Salazar and Counsel are ORDERED to serve complete and correct responses within ten (10) days of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of October, 2020.