*1 Before the Court is a Motion to Compel [Doc. #49] filed by plaintiff Andre Baugh. Defendant Voyager Indemnity Insurance Company (“Voyager”) opposes the motion. [Doc. #54]. Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows.

I. Background

The complaint alleges that, on or about July 10, 2019, wind and a rainstorm caused substantial damage to plaintiff's property. Plaintiff reported the loss to Voyager on or around August 29, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that Voyager wrongfully denied his claim for want of coverage on September 5, 2019. This delay in the denial was allegedly caused by Voyager's failure to conduct a proper and good faith investigation. Despite plaintiff's alleged efforts to mitigate his losses by installing a tarp over the property at his own expense, the property's condition deteriorated during the period between August 29, 2019 through September 5, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that the deterioration was due to Voyager's continued refusal to inspect the property or adjust the loss.

On or around September 6, 2019, Voyager agreed to inspect the property and sent Mr. Robertson of Ryze Claims Solutions to perform the task. Plaintiff alleges that Robertson refused to actually conduct an inspection at that time. Voyager then allowed no recovery to plaintiff and refused to inspect further without the tarp being removed. Plaintiff maintains that he only covered the property with the tarp because the policy issue by Voyager requires plaintiff to mitigate damages to his property when a loss occurs.

Plaintiff then retained his own public adjuster, Vincent Caracci, who estimated damages of $82,606.85 to the dwelling. Plaintiff provided a copy of Caracci's estimate and photo sheet to Voyager as proof of loss. Voyager refused to inspect the property unless Caracci was present – at plaintiff's cost. Plaintiff alleges that Voyager then revised its position and asserted that it would inspect the property with the tarp and without Caracci, but only if plaintiff made arrangements to repair the property.

On or around October 28, 2019, Voyager finally sent Robertson out again to inspect the property. Robertson estimated $14,243.95 in damages to the dwelling, leaving plaintiff with only $11,415.92 after depreciation. To date, Voyager has released to plaintiff the sum of $17,929.98, an amount that plaintiff alleges is woefully inadequate.

Plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended petition on March 13, 2020, in which he asserts breach of contract and bad faith under Louisiana Revised Statute §§ 22:1973 and 22:1892 against Voyager. The District Court has dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's bad faith misrepresentation claim under Section 22:1973(B)(1). [Doc. #61]. Plaintiff's claims for bad faith for failing to adequately compensate him under Section 22:1973(B)(5) and breach of contract claims survive.

II. Law and Analysis

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). Of note, with the 2015 amendment to Rule 26, it is now clear that “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. In assessing the proportionality of discovery, courts consider “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. The advisory committee comments to the 2015 amendment to Rule 26 make clear that the parties and the court have a collective responsibility to ensure that discovery is proportional. The party who claims that the information sought is important to resolve the issues in the case should be able “to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party understands them.” Id. advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. “The court's responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.” Id.

*2 On June 11, 2020, and after weeks of negotiations with Voyager, plaintiff propounded a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition on Voyager and set the corporate deposition on June 23, 2020. On June 15, 2020, Voyager served responses and objections to the notice on plaintiff, forcing plaintiff to cancel the corporate deposition. Plaintiff now moves to compel Voyager to testify on all 37 topics in the notice of deposition. Voyager, for its part, objects to many topics as irrelevant and the scope of the other topics.

Voyager admits that it will testify to Topic Nos. 1, 5, 6, 9-13, 16, 17, 20, 21, 29, 30, 34, 35, “33,” “34,” “34,” “36,” and “37.”[1] Voyager contends, however, that it will only testify on these topics “to the extent that they relate to the plaintiff's insurance claim.” [Doc. #54 at p. 4]. These topics involve the policy of creating the claim file, the policy for adjusting wind and water loss claims, the policy of using adjuster summaries and adjuster's reports, decisions on the underlying claim, the methods to calculate depreciation and damages, the use of pricelists, the policy for maintaining the files, the policy for setting a reserve, the policy for evaluating contractor's estimate of damages, the policy for overhead and profit, the policy for additional living expenses, the use of outside vendors, the policy for paying repairs expenses, the policy for mitigation and the payment thereof, the policy for using proceeds to make repairs, and communications with adjusters and co-defendant AmWins Access Insurance Services, L.L.C. about the claim. Plaintiff asks the Court to order Voyager to testify on these topics generally so that he may determine whether Voyager deviated from its general policies in this case.[2]

Having reviewed the topics, the Court finds that Voyager's limitations on testifying on these topics is warranted. This Court construes relevance broadly, but it remains anchored by the parties’ pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26 advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment (explaining that in analyzing relevance, the parties should “focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action,” but that “a variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action”). This Court has reviewed plaintiff's second supplemental and amended petition, [Doc. #43], and does not find the request to testify on these topics generally – as opposed to as they relate to plaintiff's claims – as proportional to the needs of the case given the claims and defenses alleged in this lawsuit. There is no allegation or defense relating to a deviation from Voyager's policies in this case. The claims and defenses here relate solely to plaintiff's wind and damage claim to his property. There is no allegation by plaintiff that Voyager treated another policyholder differently than him. There is simply no allegation that would require any sort of comparison between plaintiff, another policyholder, or other, different insurance policies. Weimar v. Lib. Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 17-584, 2018 WL 6070344 * 2 (M.D. La., November 19, 2018); Haydel v. State Farm, Civ. A. No. 07-939, 2009 WL 10679319, at *7-8 (M.D. La., July 16, 2009). A crucial issue in this lawsuit is whether Voyager acted in bad faith, and whether it action in bad faith vis-à-vis another policyholder is no relevant to whether it acted in bad faith here. Voyager's objection is sustained, and it need only testify on these topics as they relate to plaintiff's claims.

*3 Topic No. 2 seeks information from Voyager on the policies, practices, and procedures used to develop claims manuals, including additions, deletions, and other revisions of such material. Voyager argues that this request is overbroad and does not describe the information sought with particularity. Indeed, Voyager objects to all of the topics in the notice with the formulaic talisman “policy, practice, and procedure.” Voyager points to no discovery request in particular – apart from Topic No. 2 – nor does it explain how any other request with the language “policy, practice, and procedure” is automatically overbroad simply because of the inclusion of such language. Voyager's generalized objections “are text-book examples of what federal courts have routinely deemed to be improper objections.’ ” Wittmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. A. No. 17-9501, 2018 WL 1912163, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2018), on reconsideration, Civ. A. No. 17-9501, 2018 WL 2970873 (E.D. La. June 13, 2018) (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 512 (N.D. Iowa 2000)); see also McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (The “party resisting discovery must show specifically how ... each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.”) (citation omitted)). With regard to all other topics in the notice not specifically addressed by this Order – and apart from Topic No. 2 – this Court declines to uphold the generalized objection based on the language “policy, practice, and procedure.”

With respect to Topic No. 2, the Court will uphold the objection in part. The Court cannot see how any other claims manual apart from the one used to evaluate plaintiff's claim is proportional to the needs of the case. Plaintiff fails to explain how any other claims manual would have influenced Voyager's assessment of plaintiff's wind and water claim. With regard to the claims manual used to evaluate plaintiff's claim, Voyager shall respond to Topic No. 2. With regard to any other claims manual, it need not do so.

Topic Nos. 3, 4, 14, and 15 relate to Voyager's hiring, training, and personnel policies. Voyager maintains that these topics are disproportional to the needs of the case because plaintiff has already deposed Robertson and has all of the information regarding his qualifications. Plaintiff argues that the topics are proportional because there are issues surrounding the competency of its claims representatives and adjusters. Courts have found that training materials are proportional to the needs of a case in which a bad faith claim is asserted against an insurance company because it may lead to evidence relative to whether the claims representative or adjuster followed company policy. See King v. Americas Ins. Co., No. 15-4451, 2016 WL 2610016, at *3 (E.D. La. May 5, 2016). Accordingly, Voyager must produce a representative to testify as to the training materials only as they relate to any claim representative or adjuster who worked on plaintiff's claim.

Voyager next objects to Topic Nos. 24-28 and “35.” These topics seek information on Voyager's policies, practices, and procedures for what constitutes a proof of loss, the timeliness of evaluating a proof of loss and a claim, informing adjusters and claims representatives of Louisiana law regarding claims for wind and water loss, initiating a loss adjustment, and paying or not paying a claim for damage caused by wind and water. Voyager maintains that these topics relate to questions of law for a court to decide and are thus disproportional to the needs of the case. However, “[w]hether and when a satisfactory proof of loss was received is a question of fact.” Richardson v. GEICO Indem. Co., 48 So. 3d 307, 314 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Boudreaux v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 230, 236 (La. Ct. App. 2005)); see also Perfect Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 07-7642, 2010 WL 2835889, at *2 (E.D. La. July 15, 2010 (“Whether an insurer acted in good faith is a factual, not [a] legal, determination”).[3] Moreover, an insurer's conduct depends on the facts known to the insurer at the time of its action, and Louisiana courts have declined to assess bad-faith penalties when the insurer has a reasonable basis to defend the claim and acts in good-faith reliance on that defense. La. Bag Co. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 999 So. 2d 1104, 1114 La. 2008). Accordingly, these topics do not address legal conclusions, but the facts surrounding when and where Voyager and plaintiff performed certain actions. Voyager will testify to Topic Nos. 24-28 as they relate to plaintiff's claim. Voyager must also respond to Topic No. “35” as it relates to plaintiff's wind and water claim but not as it relates to any mold claim as plaintiff has asserted no claim for mold in his second amended complaint. [Doc. # 43].

*4 Topic No. 7 relates to Voyager's document retention policy. Plaintiff has not alleged any claim such as spoliation of evidence and has not alleged that Voyager failed to retain any documents. This topic is thus disproportional to the needs of the case. See Cangelosi v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 15-325, 2016 WL 4944131, at *7 (M.D. La. Sept. 15, 2016) (denying interrogatory seeking deleted or destroyed documents when plaintiff had not alleged spoliation claim and there was no evidence of spoliation). Topic Nos. 8 and 33 relate to the corporate structure of Voyager and its settlement authority. Voyager objects to these topics to the extent that they do not relate to plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, Voyager shall respond to these two topics to the extent that they relate to plaintiff's claim only.

Topic Nos. 13[4] and 19 relate to the pricelists used to assess the value of plaintiff's property and any “pricing department” within the corporate structure of Voyager. Part of the dispute here is the difference between Caracci's and Robertson's estimate of plaintiff's damages. [Doc. #43 at pp. 6-7]. While Voyager maintains that plaintiff has already deposed Robertson, who used his own computer software and pricing information, the Court finds that the pricelists used by Voyager are in the ordinary course of its business as they relate to plaintiff's claim and are proportional to the needs of the case.

With regard to “[t]he existence of any ‘pricing department’ in which Voyager assesses pricelists,” [Doc. #43-1 at p. 8], the topic is simply too vague and overbroad to inform Voyager's corporate representative of the questions to which he may need to respond. Whether the topic relates only to the “existence” of a pricing department – which would require no more than a “yes” or “no” answer – or whether plaintiff seeks to delve into the intricacies of that department is not known by the phrasing of the topic. The topic is thus too broad and too vague to require pre-deposition preparation by a corporate representative. The Court denies Topic No. 19 as vague and overbroad.

Topic No. 23 seeks information on Voyager's policies, practices, and procedures related to granting or denying an insured's inspection or re-inspection request. Voyager contends that plaintiff never sought a re-inspection, so this topic is disproportional to the needs of the case. But plaintiff did seek an inspection, and Voyager denied that request on numerous occasions. [Doc. #43 at p. 15]. To the extent that this request relates to the granting or denying of an inspection, Voyager must respond to this topic as the Court finds that it is proportional to the needs of the case. To the extent that the topic relates to a re-inspection, and if plaintiff never sought a re-inspection, Voyager need not respond to this topic.

Topic Nos. 31 and 32 relate to policies and procedures relating to mold claims. This Court has reviewed plaintiff's second amended complaint, [Doc. #43], and there is no claim for damages caused by mold. These topics are not proportional to the needs of the case.[5]

III. Conclusion

*5 For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Compel [Doc. #49] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 15th day of September, 2020.