Laub v. Horbaczewski
Laub v. Horbaczewski
2019 WL 11029175 (C.D. Cal. 2019)
April 15, 2019
Stevenson, Karen L., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The court denied the Motion to Compel the disclosure of certain notes taken by an attorney, Post, during a meeting with her clients, Plaintiffs, and a third party, Horbaczewski. The court found that Plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing that the June 22 Notes were subject to attorney-client privilege and that additional inquiries were not warranted. The court declined to order any additional disclosures, such as billing records, and denied Defendants' Motion.
Additional Decisions
Justice Laub.
v.
Nicholas Horbaczewski, et al
v.
Nicholas Horbaczewski, et al
Case No. CV 17-6210-JAK-KSx
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed April 15, 2019
Counsel
Patrick M. Ryan, Stephen C. Steinberg, Joseph John Fraresso, Gabriella A. Wilkins, Chad DeVeaux, Bartko Zankel Bunzel and Miller PC, San Francisco, CA, for Justice Laub.Kenneth A. Kuwayti, Morrison and Foerster LLP, Paolo Alto, CA, Nicholas Rylan Fung, Morrison and Foerster LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Andrew Ditchfield, Pro Hac Vice, Brian M. Burnovski, Pro Hac Vice, Peter M. Bozzo, Pro Hac Vice, Davis Polk and Wardwell LLP, New York, NY, for Nicholas Horbaczewski, et al.
Stevenson, Karen L., United States Magistrate Judge
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF JUNE 22, 2015 NOTES [DKT. NO. 160]
*1 Before the Court for decision is Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of June 22, 2015 Notes (the “Motion”), which was filed on March 5, 2019. (Dkt. No. 160.) On March 18, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion along with a Declaration of Jennifer Post and Declaration of Joseph Fraresso in Support of the Opposition. (Dkt. No. 167.) On March 22, 2019, Defendants filed a Reply in support of the Motion. (Dkt. No. 168.) On March 27, 2019, the Court held oral argument on the Motion and took the matter under submission. (Dkt. No. 177.) For the reasons discussed below the Motion is DENIED.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Allegations of the Operative Complaint[1]
On July 10, 2017, Justice Laub (“Laub”) commenced this action against Nicholas Horbaczewski (“Horbaczewski”) and Drone Racing League, Inc., (“DRL”) (together, “Defendants”) in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County. On August 22, 2017, Defendants removed the action. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (TAC) on July 19, 2018. (Dkt. No. 62.) Plaintiffs seek to hold Horbaczewski liable for alleged promises and misrepresentations that Horbaczewski made to Plaintiffs during early discussions about the formation of the DRL, which, Plaintiffs allege, led them to believe they would be co-founders and partners in the DRL, each owning one third of the company. (Id. at ¶ 1.)
The TAC alleges that Plaintiff originally conceived of and began developing the idea for a televised drone racing league in 2014. (Id. at ¶ 2.) It alleges that Plaintiffs presented their ideas to a television production company in early January 2015. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege they were introduced to Horbaczewski as “a potential seed investor for their venture” in late-January 2015. (Id. at ¶ 3.) According to the TAC, Horbaczewski convinced Plaintiffs to “reject the lucrative TV production deal ... assign their rights to the TV show to the nascent DRL, share all of their ideas for the DRL, and to develop their efforts over the next several months toward developing the DRL with [Horbaczewski].” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that in meetings and phone calls in January – March 2015 they introduced Horbaczewski to drones and drone racing and shared their ideas to develop a televised drone racing league. (Id. at ¶ 20.) The TAC states that Plaintiffs documented their agreement to be partners in and co-founders of the DRL, with each owning a third of the company, in a business plan drafted between February 2015 and March 2015. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiffs allege that they attended “2-3 more meetings in Los Angeles, California” in April – June 2015 at which Plaintiffs asked Horbaczewski “for more formal documentation of their co-ownership of the DRL[.]” (Id. at ¶ 43.)
*2 The TAC alleges that unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Horbaczewski incorporated the DRL in April 2015 “without assigning any ownership interest to Plaintiffs” and “he deliberately concealed this fact from them[.]” (Id.) It also alleges that after “using Plaintiffs,” Horbaczewski “cut them loose in late 2015 without giving them any shares in the DRL, or any compensation whatsoever.” (Id.) The DRL has since become very successful, and Plaintiffs allege, “Horbaczewski has fabricated its origin in order to falsely portray himself as its sole originator[.]” (Id. at ¶ 4.)
The TAC asserts claims for breach of written contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and promissory estoppel. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-131 )
B. The Discovery Dispute Concerning June 22, 2015 Attorney Notes
The instant discovery dispute arises out of a June 22, 2015 meeting in Los Angeles, California that was attended by Plaintiffs, Horbaczewski, and Plaintiffs' corporate attorney Jennifer Post (“Post”). Specifically, the dispute concerns whether certain notes Post took at that meeting (June 22 Notes) are privileged. On November 9, 2018, the Court held an informal discovery conference with the parties regarding several discovery disputes, including whether the June 22 Notes were shielded from disclosure by the attorney client privilege. (Dkt. No. 86.) The Court ordered in camera review of the June 22 Notes taken during the meeting between Plaintiffs and Defendant Horbaczewski in order to determine whether any portion of the notes might not be subject to the privilege (the “November 9 Order”). (Id.)
On November 20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Review of Non-Dispositive Ruling Regarding Magistrate Judge Stevenson's Oral Order Dated November 9, 2018 (the “Motion for Review”). (Dkt. No. 91.) Plaintiffs sought review of the November 9 Order on the grounds that, in this diversity action, California state law governs privilege and expressly prohibits disclosure of a document for which privilege is claimed for the purpose of evaluating the claim of privilege. (Id. (citing Cal. Evid. Code 915(a)).) On February 8, 2019, Hon. John A. Kronstadt granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Review, vacating the November 9 Order as to the in camera review of the June 22 Notes and remanded the privilege dispute to this Court for resolution consistent with California law on privilege. (Dkt. No. 141.) Judge Kronstadt noted that in making the privilege assessment, “a court may require disclosure of certain other information, distinct from, but related to the disputed document itself. A court may also evaluate the evidence presented in support of the claimed privilege to determine whether a prima facie showing [of privilege] has been made.” (Id. at 8, citing Costco v. Sup. Court, 47 Cal. 4th 725, 740 (2009).)
On February 15, 2019, the Court held a telephonic discovery status conference regarding the privilege dispute and set a briefing schedule for the instant Motion. (Dkt. No. 148.)
II. THE MOTION
A. Post's Deposition Testimony about the June 22, 2015 Meeting
It is undisputed that Post hosted the June 22, 2015 meeting in Los Angeles at the offices of the law firm, Raines Feldman, where she worked at the time, and the meeting was attended by Plaintiffs Kanes, Laub, Defendant Horbaczewski, and Post. (Motion at 2.) At her deposition taken in this lawsuit, Post testified about that meeting as follows:
I believe the meeting lasted -- the entire meeting lasted approximately two hours. However, we met with [Horbaczewski] for some period of time. And then Dan [Kanes] met along with [Horbaczewski] for some period of time. And then we resumed the meeting as a group after that.
*3 (Declaration of Ken Kuywati (“Kuwayti Decl.), Ex 2 at 80:23-81:2-7.) When asked if she took notes at the portion of the meeting that she attended with Horbaczewski, Post testified: “I remember bringing a legal pad and taking some notes.” (Id., Ex. 2 at 81:20-25.)[2]
Post also testified that she recalled discussion at the meeting about valuation and capitalization of the company:
Q. Do you remember Mr. Horbaczewski at the meeting going to the whiteboard and drawing a pie chart?
A. I remember he went to the whiteboard. I don't remember if he drew a pie chart.
Q. Okay. What – what do you remember of what he did at the whiteboard:
A. My recollection is that he wrote down information about the capitalization the company.
(Id., Ex. 2 at 90:6-24.) While Post did not recall many details of what was said in the meeting, she did recall that Kanes “did not want to buy shares at the same price as the investors were paying,” but wanted to buy them at a lower price. (Id., Ex. 2 at 89:19-24.)
B. The Parties' Positions
Defendants argue that any June 22 Notes that Post took during the portion of the meeting attended by Horbaczewski, an adverse party, with Plaintiffs and Post are not privileged and should be disclosed in discovery. (Motion at 4.) Further, Defendants point out that Plaintiffs “allowed detailed questioning of Ms. Post and Mssrs. Laub and Kanes at their depositions regarding the meeting.” (Id.)
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' contention that all of the June 22 Notes are privileged by presenting evidence about the timing of the June 22, 2015 meeting that Defendants argue indicates there was no time for Plaintiffs to have met separately with Post during the two hour window when the June 22, 2015 meeting occurred. (Motion at 4.) Defendants point to email communications that indicate that (1) Laub, Kanes, and Horbaczewski all left the June 22 meeting together to get to a meeting with a costume designer that was scheduled for 4:30 p.m. that same day in the Downtown Arts District of Los Angeles and (2) that 4:30 p.m. meeting was pushed back specifically to accommodate the meeting with Post. (Motion at 4-5, citing Horbaczewski Declaration ¶ 8 and Ex. C).)
Defendants maintain that Post's testimony at deposition, where she testified that she “took some notes” during the portion of the June 22 Meeting at which Horbaczewski was present, is inconsistent with the declaration she provided in connection with the Motion, in which she states that all of the June 22 Notes reflect confidential attorney-client communications from separate discussions between her and Plaintiffs. (Reply at 1.) Therefore, Defendants argue, the Court should order disclosure of any June 22 Notes taken in Horbaczewski's presence or, in the alternative, order disclosure of additional information related to Plaintiffs' privilege claim. (Motion at 10-13.)
In the Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have satisfied their burden to establish a prima facie claim of privilege with respect to the entirety of the June 22 Notes as attorney-client communications. (Opposition at 2-3 [Dkt. No. 167].) Specifically, Plaintiffs point to the Declaration of Jennifer Post in which she states:
*4 I have reviewed my notes bearing the date June 22, 2015 that I understand were produced by Raines Feldman and provided to me via counsel for the Plaintiffs (“June 22, 2015 Notes”). Based on my best recollection, the entirety of the June 22, 2015 Notes reflect confidential attorney-client discussions that I had with Mr. Laub and Mr. Kanes, outside of Mr. Hobaczewski's presence, that were made in connection with, and in furtherance of, my representation of Mr. Kanes and Mr. Laub. I treated the June 22, 2015 Notes as a confidential document and never shared the June 22, 2015 Notes with Mr. Horbaczewski.
(Declaration of Jennifer A. Post ¶ 4 [Dkt. No. 167-1].) Plaintiffs state that “Plaintiff's counsel do not have any notes taken in Mr. Horbaczewski's presence as Defendants now seek.” (Opposition at 4.)
Plaintiffs characterize Defendants' assertions that there must be non-privileged portions of the June 22 Notes as “overreaching assertions,” based on “faulty assumptions and misconstrued testimony.” (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that even if Plaintiffs did not meet separately with Post after the June 22, 2015 meeting, “that does not mean Plaintiff did not meet separately at another time on June 22, 2015.” (Id.) Plaintiffs point to Post's deposition as evidence that “Ms. Post remembers multiple meetings occurring that day – one with just Plaintiffs, one with all of the parties, and one between just Mr. Kanes and Mr. Horbaczewski.” (Opposition at 4, citing Fraresso Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A at 81 2-19.)
On that basis, Plaintiffs maintain that no further action by the Court is warranted to evaluate Plaintiff's privilege claim. Citing Costco, Plaintiffs argue that they should not be ordered to produce redacted notes because even material that is not privileged, “such as the date and/or any names listed in the notes, is barred from disclosure under Costco.” (Opposition at 5 (citing Costco, 47 Cal. 4th at 734).) Likewise, Plaintiffs argue they should not be required to make any of the alternative disclosures that Defendants seek to determine whether the privilege applies to the June 22 Notes. (Id.) In particular, Plaintiffs argue that there is no basis to order a production of Post's billing records as a means to probe the nature of the services Post provided on the date of the June 22 meeting. (Id. at 6.) Finally, because Plaintiffs insist they have made a prima facie showing of privilege, neither a further deposition of Post nor affording Defendants an opportunity to cross-examine Post about the declaration she provided in support of the Opposition here is warranted. (Opposition at 7.)
In the Reply, Defendants maintain that further inquiry is necessary regarding Plaintiffs' privilege assertion as to the June 22 Notes because Post's declaration cannot be reconciled with her prior deposition testimony. (Reply at 1.) Defendants argue that based on “Plaintiffs' shifting privilege claim” they “should be permitted to take discovery to fully explore the issues raised by this new declaration.” (Id.) Defendants hypothesize that
if [Post's] declaration is correct, then other notes of the meeting with Mr. Horbaczewski must exist. And if all of Ms. Post's notes from the June 22 meeting were taken on the same legal pad, they should be adjacent to one another.
(Id.) Defendants contend that discovery into such issues is “expressly contemplated by the California Supreme Court's Costco decision, and the Court's February 12, Order remanding this issue for resolution.” (Id.) Specifically, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs and/or Raines Feldman should be required to search for and produce any other notes that may exist that pertain to the June 22 meeting with Mr. Horbaczewski.” (Id. at 4.) Moreover, Defendants ask the Court to require Plaintiffs to “make disclosures regarding whether the Post notes are self-contained or are part of a larger legal pad relating to the representation of Plaintiffs or other matters, how the notes were stores, whether there are any other notes dated June 22, 2015 pertaining to meetings with the parties” and “the date on the notes and any list of attendees at the meeting.” (Id. at 5-6.)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Law Governs Motions to Compel
*5 Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain discovery concerning any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As amended in December 2015, Rule 26(b)(1) identifies the following factors to be considered when determining if the proportionality requirement has been met: the importance of the issues at stake in the action; the amount in controversy; the parties' relative access to the relevant information; the parties' resources; the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues; and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. (Id.) Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. (Id.)
District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to compel, the Court has similarly broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallet, 296 F.3d at 751) (superseded by statue on other grounds).
B. State Law Governs Attorney-Client Privilege Analysis
“In diversity actions, questions of privilege are controlled by state law.” In re California Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989); Kandel v. Brother Intern. Corp., 683 F.Supp.2d 1075, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see FED. R. EVID. 501 (“in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision”)
In California, Evidence Code section 954 “confers a privilege on the client to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing confidential communications between client and lawyer[.]” Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 (2009).[3] In Costco, the California Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental purpose of the attorney-client privilege and its singular importance under California law:
Although the exercise of the privilege may occasionally result in the suppression of relevant evidence, the Legislature of this state has determined that these concerns are outweighed by the importance of preserving confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship. As this court has stated: The privilege is given on grounds of public policy in the belief that the benefits derived therefrom justify the risk that unjust decisions may sometimes result from the suppression of relevant evidence. The privilege is absolute and disclosure may not be ordered without regard to relevance, necessity or any particular circumstances peculiar to the case.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted)
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs Have Made A Prima Facie Showing that the June 22 Notes are Privileged
On the record presented here, the Court finds Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that the June 22 Notes are privileged. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs retained Post to advise them with respect to the DRL and that Post was acting in that capacity at the June 22, 2015 meetings, which were held at the offices of her former law firm, Raines Feldman. (See Motion at 1; Post Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Post also states that, on that date, she met privately with Kanes and Laub and also met with Kanes, Laub, and Horbaczewski. (Id. at ¶ 3.) In her declaration, Post states that ‘to the best of her recollection” all of her notes from that date reflect confidential discussions with Laub and Kanes outside of Hobarczewski's presence. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
*6 Defendants present no evidence to the contrary. Rather, they argue, based on the parties' later appointment, email communications, and the vagaries of Los Angeles traffic, it was not possible for Post to have had any private meetings with her clients during the two hours that the meetings occurred. (See Motion at 3-5.) Therefore, Defendants speculate that either Post took other notes on June 22 that have not been disclosed or the June 22 Notes must include nonprivileged portions that she took when Post was present with Kanes, Laub, and Horbaczewski. (Id.) But these suppositions are entirely speculative and do not undermine Plaintiffs' prima facie showing that the June 22 Notes are subject to attorney-client privilege under California Evidence Code section 954.
Even assuming Defendants are correct that there was not enough time for Plaintiff to have had a separate meeting with Plaintiffs within the two hour time frame on June 22, 2015, that does not mean she could not have had separate communications with her clients outside of Horbaczewski's presence on that date, for example during breaks in the meetings. Any notations about communications with her clients are indisputably privileged. See Cal. Evid. C. § 954.
B. Costco Precludes Disclosure of Facts Included in the June 22 Notes
The core of Defendants' argument is that any factual information reflected in the June 22 Notes that Post made during the meeting when Horbaczewski was present is not privileged and should be disclosed by an order compelling Plaintiffs to produce a redacted version of the June 22 Notes. This argument, urging disclosure of facts contained in an otherwise privileged document, fails.
In Costco, the California Supreme Court, observed that the importance of preserving the attorney-client privilege occasionally means that the “exercise of the privilege may occasionally result in the suppression of relevant evidence.” Costco, 47 Cal. 4th at 732. As a matter of public policy, the California Legislature determined that the benefits of preserving the attorney-client privilege outweigh the “risk that unjust decision may sometime result from the suppression of relevant evidence.” Id.
Indeed, in Costco, a discovery referee produced a heavily redacted version of an attorney's opinion letter prepared for the attorney's client based on the referee's conclusion that portions of the opinion letter involved “factual information” that was not protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine. Id. at 731.[4] The California Supreme Court found the referee's redactions to the otherwise privileged letter to be improper, concluding, “[t]he attorney-client privilege attaches to a confidential communication between the attorney and the client and bars discovery of the communication irrespective of whether it includes unprivileged material.” Id. at 734 (internal citation omitted). In light of Costco's unambiguous holding, Defendants' argument that the June 22 Notes should be disclosed with limited redactions is unavailing.
C. Defendants Urge Alternative Disclosures Based on Speculation
Based on their contention that Plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie demonstration of privilege with respect to the June 22 Notes, Defendants urge the Court to order various “alternative” disclosures to “evaluate the privilege claim.” (Motion at 10-12.) Besides producing a redacted version of the notes, as discussed above, Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs should be ordered to: (1) disclose “whether the Post notes are self-contained or are part of a larger legal pad relating to the representation of Plaintiffs or other matters”; (2) disclose “whether there are any other notes dated June 22, 2015 pertaining to meetings with the parties;” (3) produce the billing records relating to the June 22 meeting, including invoices and time notes; and (4) “disclose whether the notes disclose specific details about the capitalization structure or shareholders of DRL.” (Id. at 11-12.)
*7 The Court declines to order any of these additional disclosures. First, based on the record and consistent with California law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that the June 22 Notes are indeed privileged in their entirety. The additional inquiries permitted under Costco are to allow a court to evaluate whether a prima facie showing has been made to support the claimed privilege, not to extract factual information that may be contained in a privileged communication. Costco, 47 Cal. 4th at 740. Under California law, “[i]f the [court] determined the communications were made during the course of an attorney-client relationship the communications, including any reports of factual material, would be privileged, even though the factual material might be discoverable by some other means.” (Id.) Here, the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Post and Plaintiffs is undisputed, as is the fact that Post was acting as Plaintiffs' counsel in the June 22 meeting. There is nothing to suggest Plaintiffs waived the privilege.
Even if Plaintiffs had failed to make the requisite showing, the additional measures that Defendants seek go well beyond what would be needed to evaluate the privilege claim and would launch an entirely new tranche of collateral litigation regarding the nature of Ms. Post's representation of her clients, including, as Defendants' propose, a probe into her former law firm's billing records. These disclosures would meet neither the relevancy nor proportionality requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).[5]
Defendants cite S.E.C. v. Lavin as supporting their arguments that the Court must order additional disclosures to assess Plaintiffs' attorney client privilege claim. (Motion at 10 (citing S.E.C. v. Lavin 111 F.3d 921, 928.) Lavin is not dispositive here. Lavin involved the application of federal common law with respect to an assertion of the confidential marital communications privilege in the context of a subpoena enforcement proceeding. See Lavin, 111 F.3d at 925-26. Specifically, Lavin addressed the assertion of the marital privilege with respect to taped conversations that were in the possession of Mr. Lavin's employer. Id. at 923-24. Lavin did not address a claim of attorney client privilege under California law.
With respect to Defendants' argument that the Court should order a further deposition of Post, this request too is denied. There appears to be some inconsistency between Post's deposition testimony that she took “some notes” during the portion of the meeting attended by Post, Plaintiffs, and Horbaczewski, and her declaration provided in connection with the Motion where she states that at some point she met privately with her clients and all of her notes reflect client communications. However, under Costco, as discussed above, even if the June 22 Notes include some factual information, the notes remain privileged in their entirety. As the California Supreme Court emphasized, the California Legislature has made the policy determination that upholding the preeminence of the attorney-client privilege will sometimes result in the suppression of relevant evidence. Costco, 47 Cal. 4th at 732. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that further deposition testimony from Post is required to evaluate the privilege claim.
Accordingly, based on California privilege law as articulated in Costco, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of that the June 22 Notes are subject to attorney-client privilege in their entirety. Defendants' Motion is, therefore, DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Initials of Preparer gr
Footnotes
A detailed summary of the factual background of the litigation and the allegations of the TAC is outlined in Judge Kronstadt's February 8, 2019 Order that gave rise to these proceedings. (Dkt. No. 141.) Therefore, here, the Court only discusses the details relevant to the Motion.
Plaintiff also submitted this portion of the Post deposition transcript in support of their Opposition. (See Declaration of Joseph Fraresso (“Fraresso Decl.,”) Ex. A. )
Section 954 provides, in relevant part, “ the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer if the privilege is claimed by: (a) The holder of the privilege; (b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privilege; or (3) The person who was the lawyer at the time of the confidential communication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure.” (Cal. Evid. C. § 954.)
Here, the parties make no argument regarding the applicability of the attorney work product doctrine.
Some of the additional disclosures Defendants urge the Court to require would simply uncover duplicative information. For example, Defendants urge that the Plaintiffs should be ordered to disclose the date and names of participants at the June 22, 2015 meeting. (Motion at 11.) But they already have this information. There is no dispute about the date of the meeting or who attended.