*1 Plaintiff Jaie Lee (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants Damon Lee and Grace Min, among others, including Damon Lee's company, Creative Global Investments, Inc. (“CGI”) (collectively, “Defendants”), carried out a fraudulent scheme to induce her to invest in a purported Coffee Bean franchise to be opened at Children's Hospital Los Angeles (“CHLA”). (Complaint, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1). On August 31, 2020, Damon Lee (in the singular, “Defendant”) filed a Motion to Quash[1] a subpoena that Plaintiff had served on CHLA to obtain information about Defendant's financial condition and business dealings with CHLA. (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 38-1). Pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation, (“Jt. Stip.,” Dkt. No. 38), including the declaration of Joshua J. Pollack in support of Plaintiff's opposition to the Motion. (“Pollack Decl.,” Dkt. No. 38-2). On September 14, 2020, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum, (“D Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 42), supported by the declaration of Daniel E. Park. (“Park Decl.,” Dkt. No. 42-1). On September 29, 2020, the Court held a telephonic hearing in which counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant and CHLA participated.[2] Following the hearing, Defendant filed a second supplemental memorandum in support of Defendant's objection to the proposed production of his personal financial information by CHLA. (“D Fin. Memo,” Dkt. No. 47). On September 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's second supplemental memorandum. (“P Opp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 50). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2016, Damon Lee, along with his girlfriend, Grace Min, and his son, Jeffrey Lee, engaged in a series of meetings with her to persuade her to invest in a purported business opportunity on the false pretense that they had been authorized to open a Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf (“CBTL”) franchise at CHLA. (Complaint ¶¶ 4-5). Plaintiff states that even though she delivered $600,000 to Defendants, there is no Coffee Bean franchise at CHLA and there are no plans to open one in the future. (Id. ¶ 6). This diversity action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment was filed on October 14, 2019.

Plaintiff served a subpoena on CHLA on August 7, 2020 seeking production of documents responsive to the following nine Requests for Production (“RFP”). (See Pollack Decl. ¶ 12 & Exh. F at 89-100).[3]

(Id. at 98-100).

III. THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

Defendant asserts that RFPs seeking documents related to his “assets, personal wealth and financial viability” are irrelevant and invade his privacy rights. (Jt. Stip. at 19-20; D. Supp. Memo. at 3; D. Fin. Memo. at 1-3). According to Defendant, his personal assets have no bearing on claims for fraud, and his interest in keeping his financial information private outweighs Plaintiff's need for it. (Jt. Stip. at 20). Defendant elsewhere appears to assert that any production of an individual's financial information is prohibited under California law. (D. Fin. Memo at 1). Defendant further contends that corporate information pertaining to “CGI CHLA” is not relevant, and even if it were, documents such as CGI CHLA's Articles of Information and Statement of Information are available from the California Secretary of State and are not properly sought from a nonparty. (Id. at 20-21). Furthermore, Defendant argues that RFPs about his businesses and finances are more properly directed to him, and in fact are generally duplicative of the discovery that has already been served on him. (Id. at 21; D. Supp. Memo. at 4). Defendant also maintains that because this dispute involves only the Coffee Bean franchise to be opened at CHLA, information concerning any other Coffee Bean franchise is irrelevant. (Jt. Stip. at 21-22).

*3 Even if some of the information sought might be relevant, Defendant complains that all nine of the RFPs are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not limited to a reasonable temporal scope. Defendant further contends that “a lot of requests are vaguely stated.” (Id. at 22-23). Because the RFPs are not narrowly tailored, non-party CHLA is required to guess at which documents are reasonably responsive, and the requests appear to be more of a fishing expedition than a targeted search for relevant information. (Id. at 23; D. Supp. Memo. at 5). Defendant also contends that the requested productions impose an undue burden on CHLA because there is a party source for the information. (Id. at 25). The only exception, i.e., the portion of RFP No. 6 seeking documents between CHLA and Coffee Bean, was served on Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf under a different subpoena, and a response was served. (Id.). Defendant states that he has already produced over two thousand pages of documents and has agreed to supplement the production. (Id.; D. Supp. Memo. at 5).

Plaintiff contends that the Motion should be denied because Defendant did not meet and confer prior to filing it, in violation of Local Rules 37-1 and 37-2. (Jt. Stip. at 25-26). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's contentions that he is a more appropriate source for the information requested are not trustworthy because Defendant has previously promised to produce all documents withheld on the ground of “confidentiality,” but still has not done so. (Id. at 26). Most importantly, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's motion should be denied because Defendant lacks standing to object to the subpoena. (Id. at 29). The subpoena was served on CHLA. Not only has CHLA not objected to the production, but CHLA's counsel has informed Plaintiff that CHLA is “working to respond to the subpoena” and is “search[ing] for responsive materials.”[4] (Id.). According to Plaintiff, the only objection that a party may properly assert to a subpoena is that the production invades a personal right or privilege held by the party, which does not apply to the vast majority of Defendant's objections. (Id. at 30). Even to the extent that certain information might, in some contexts, arguably implicate a privacy right, no such right or privilege has been shown here because whatever information CHLA may have about Defendant's finances and businesses was disclosed by Defendant during contract negotiations in the course of an arm's length business relationship; therefore, any potential privacy right or privilege has been waived.[5] (Id. at 31). Additionally, the fact that Defendant did not object to requests for similar information in Plaintiff's subpoena served on Coffee Bean strongly suggests that his privacy and privilege contentions are disingenuous. (Id. at 31-32). Plaintiff notes that any other privacy concerns Defendant might otherwise have are mooted by the Protective Order, which also governs third party discovery.[6] (Id. at 32).

Plaintiff further contends that Defendant's relevancy objections are baseless, even if he had standing to assert them. (Id.). For example, Defendant's financial condition is relevant to: uncovering whether Defendant was truthful when he held himself out to Plaintiff as a wealthy and successful businessman; tracing where Plaintiff's money went; determining whether money intended for the Coffee Bean franchise was spent on Defendant personally or to fund his other businesses; and ascertaining the basis for damages. (Id. at 32-33). The formation of CGI CHLA is relevant because whether or not this entity existed, when and how it was formed and how it operated have a bearing on whether Defendant had a legitimate purpose in soliciting Plaintiff's investment. (Id. at 33). Information about Defendant's other Coffee Bean stores is relevant because under the investment contract, Plaintiff had the option of transferring her investment to alternative Coffee Bean locations. (Id.). Defendant's assertion that the location of his other Coffee Bean stores is a “trade secret” is indefensible to the extent that he disclosed the information to CHLA, and even if the locations were a trade secret, such information is still discoverable pursuant to the Protective Order. (Id. at 33-34).

*4 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant does not have standing to object to the requests on the grounds that they are “burdensome” or “overly broad.” (Id. at 34). Even if Defendant did have standing to object to requests for information dating back to 2010 on those grounds, because his relationship with CHLA purportedly began in 2016, there should not be many, if any, documents to search for prior to that date, and thus the temporal scope of the RFPs poses no burden on the production. (Id. at 34). Although Defendant claims that RFP Nos. 2 and 6 are vague, he does not clarify why, or explain why he is the proper party to assert that objection. (Id. at 34-35). Plaintiff further asserts that the requests are not duplicative of the discovery requests served on Defendant because they seek documents and communications relating to CHLA's relationship and dealings with various persons and entities, which is information unique to CHLA. (Id. at 35). Furthermore, even if the requests were duplicative, Defendant has not made the production himself. (Id. at 36).

IV. STANDARDS

A. Scope of Permissible Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). A party seeking discovery from a third party may obtain a subpoena for the evidence pursuant to Rule 45. The standards in Rule 26(b) regarding the permissible scope of discovery “appl[y] to the discovery that may be sought pursuant to Rule 45.” AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1-1,058, 286 F.R.D. 39, 46 (D. D.C. 2012) (citing Watts v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

The right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. Discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C); Tedrow v. Boeing Employees Credit Union, 315 F.R.D. 358, 359 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (quoting same); see also Watts, 482 F.3d at 509 (limitations set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) apply to discovery served on non-parties by subpoena).

Rule 26(c) provides that “a party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the Rule, the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....” Id.; see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (court may enter a protective order only upon a showing of good cause).

“In addition to the discovery standards under Rule 26 that are incorporated by Rule 45, Rule 45 itself provides that ‘on timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that ... subjects a person to undue burden.’ ” In re Subpoena of DJO, LLC, 295 F.R.D. 494, 497 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv)). In determining whether a subpoena poses an undue burden, courts “ ‘weigh the burden to the subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the serving party.’ ” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 228 F.R.D. 111, 113 (D. Conn. 2005)). “[C]oncern for the unwanted burden thrust upon non-parties is a factor entitled to special weight in evaluating the balance of competing needs” in a Rule 45 inquiry. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998)); see also Misc. Docket Matter No. 1 v. Misc. Docket Matter No. 2, 197 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting same); Dart Industries Co., Inc. v. Westwood Chemical Co., 649 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1980) (“While discovery is a valuable right and should not be unnecessarily restricted, the ‘necessary’ restriction may be broader when a non-party is the target of discovery.”).

*5 However, “ ‘[o]rdinarily, a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.’ ” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting 9A Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2459 (3d ed. 2008)); see also California Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“The general rule ... is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.”). For example, “[p]ersonal rights claimed with respect to bank account records give a party sufficient standing to challenge a third party subpoena served upon financial institutions holding such information.” Schmulovich v. 1161 Rt. 9 LLC, 2007 WL 2362598, at *2 (D. N.J. Aug. 15, 2007); see also Arias–Zeballos v. Tan, 2007 WL 210112, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 25, 2007) (same).

In contrast, only the third party on which the subpoena is served has standing to object to alleged defects in the method of service and form of the subpoena. See, e.g., Ireh v. Nassau Univ. Med. Ctr., 2008 WL 11322922, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2008) (plaintiff's “standing to challenge the subpoena ... does not extend to procedural or technical matters relating to the form of the subpoena or its service”); Bell v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 2013 WL 4482907, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013) (“[P]laintiff does not have standing to object to the method of service as the subpoena was directed to a third party ....”); Deployment Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Pipes, 2011 WL 811579, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2011) (plaintiff lacks standing to move to quash third-party subpoenas based on “procedural objections” to the manner in which documents were required to be produced); Donahoo v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 211 F.R.D. 303, 306 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (defendant lacks standing to oppose third-party subpoena on the ground that it did not allow for a reasonable time to respond).

Similarly, only the party to which the subpoena is directed has standing to object to the requests on the grounds that they are irrelevant, vague, overbroad, duplicative, unduly burdensome, etc. See Eclat Pharms., LLC v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 2014 WL 12607663, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (denying motion to quash subpoenas “on the grounds that they are overbroad, not properly limited in time, and seek irrelevant and duplicative information” because “defendants do not have standing to move to quash the subpoenas served on the third parties on the proffered bases”); Dale Evans Parkway 2012, LLC v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2016 WL 7486606, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (“A party lacks standing to quash a subpoena on grounds that it is overbroad or unduly burdensome on a third party.”); Acosta v. Wellfleet Commc'ns, LLC, 2017 WL 5180425, at *5 (D. Nev. Nov. 8, 2017) (“A party has no standing to move to quash a subpoena on the ground that it is unduly burdensome when the non-party has not objected on that basis.”); Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int'l, Inc., 2015 WL 6507151, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015) (“As an initial matter, because [third party] Amazon has not objected to the Subpoena as modified, Defendants lack standing to quash or modify the Subpoena on the grounds that the Subpoena is overbroad or seeks irrelevant information.”).[7]

B. Right to Privacy

*6 In federal cases where diversity is the basis of jurisdiction, as here, courts must apply federal law to procedural issues. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Discovery is typically “a procedural matter ... governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Vratil, 96 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). When parties to a federal diversity action raise privilege issues during discovery litigation, however, state law privileges apply to the extent that state law provides the rule of decision. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In diversity actions, questions of privilege are controlled by state law.”). Therefore, a federal court sitting under diversity jurisdiction in California will apply California law as to the right of privacy. See Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“To the extent privacy is a matter of privilege under state law, federal courts will honor the privilege and protect the responding party from discovery.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The California Constitution guarantees all Californians the right to privacy. Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 16 (1994). “The right to privacy, however, is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, this right must be balanced against other important interests. On occasion [a party's] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent's right to a fair trial. Thus courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” John B. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1199 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

“The extent of any privacy rights of a business entity” under California law is “unsettled.” S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 186 Cal. App. 4th 383, 396 n.6 (2010). “While corporations do have a right to privacy, it is not a constitutional right. The corporate right to privacy is a lesser right than that held by human beings and is not considered a fundamental right.” SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. App. 4th 741, 756 (2015). “Because the corporate privacy right is not constitutionally protected,” determining whether a discovery request “infringe[s] that right is resolved by a balancing test. The discovery's relevance to the subject matter of the pending dispute and whether the discovery ‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is balanced against the corporate right of privacy.” Id. (quoting Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 4th 579, 595 (2006)). “Doubts about relevance generally are resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” SCC Acquisitions, 243 Cal. App. 4th at 756; see also Hecht, 137 Cal. App. 4th at 595 (assuming the existence of a corporation's right to privacy in its financial information, but finding that the right is not an absolute bar to discovery of internal financial records).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Failure to Comply with Local Rule 37-1 and this Court's Discovery Procedures

Pursuant to Local Rule 37-1, the first step a party wishing to challenge a discovery request must take, before any briefing begins or oral arguments are raised before the court, even in an informal discovery conference, is to send a letter to opposing counsel requesting to meet and confer. “The moving party's letter must identify each issue and/or discovery request in dispute, state briefly as to each such issue/request the moving party's position (and provide any legal authority the moving party believes is dispositive of the dispute as to that issue/request), and specify the terms of the discovery order to be sought.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-1. The conference must take place within ten days after the moving party sends the letter requesting the conference. Id.

*7 Furthermore, under this Court's procedures, available on the Court's website at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-pedro-v-castillo, if the parties determine that they have reached an impasse after conducting the conference of counsel, the moving party is required to email the undersigned's CRD with a request for an informal telephonic conference to discuss the discovery dispute. The procedures expressly caution:

Id. ¶ 1(b)(iii). Only after an informal discovery conference is held may a moving party serve its portion of the joint stipulation required by Local Rule 37-2 on opposing counsel. These rules are intended to eliminate or minimize the scope of any dispute and avoid unnecessary expenditures of time and money, in furtherance of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which provides that the rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. For these goals to be met, the parties must meet and confer in good faith, meaning that each side must be willing to listen to opposing counsel and adjust its position, particularly when it is plain that there is no reasonable legal basis for the party's contentions.

Here, counsel for Defendant completely disregarded both the conference of counsel requirements set forth in Local Rule 37-1 and this Court's discovery procedures. Instead, on August 19, 2020, at 3:51 p.m., Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel an email identifying certain requests in the CHLA subpoena that Defendant found objectionable and briefly stating, without citation to legal authority, the basis for the objections. However, instead of requesting a conference of counsel within the next ten days as required by the Local Rules, the email demanded: “Please let us know by end of day today whether you agree to withdraw these categories from the Subpoena. Otherwise, we will file a Motion to Quash Subpoena tomorrow.” (Pollack Decl., Exh. H). Plaintiff's counsel responded the following morning, August 20, 2020. Counsel explained that under the Local Rules, a party may not file a motion to quash without first meeting and conferring with the opposing party, and offered to discuss the issues raised by Defendant on either August 21 or August 24. (Id., Exh. I). Instead of agreeing to confer on one of those dates, Defendant's counsel stated, “It doesn't take hours to see if you'll agree to modify or withdraw [the requests]” and again demanded an immediate response. (Id. Ex. J). The email further stated that another lawyer at the firm, Cai Wei, “is available now to discuss,” which Defendant's counsel argued incorrectly at the hearing was an adequate offer to meet and confer. (Id.). Without further communicating with Plaintiff, Defendant's counsel then served a draft Joint Stipulation the same day, August 20, 2020, at 7:11 p.m., after the close of business. (Id. Ex. K.). The instant Motion was filed on August 31, 2020 without a request for an informal telephonic discovery conference.

It is obvious that a stark “take it or leave it” demand that opposing counsel withdraw a discovery request is not an invitation to meet and confer about the merits of the dispute, and as such, fails to comply with Local Rule 37-1. It is equally obvious that a demand that opposing counsel do so immediately, without affording counsel the courtesy of the ten-day window to arrange for the conference of counsel, fails to comply with Local Rule 37-1. In brief, Defense counsel's emails, by their tone and substance, simply cannot be construed as a “good faith” effort to resolve a discovery dispute. A demand that opposing counsel make himself “available now to discuss” a dispute, without even acknowledging that opposing counsel offered to meet and confer within the ten-day period contemplated by the Local Rules, or recognizing that counsel for one side simply does not have the right to dictate the opposing counsel's schedule or availability, is utterly inappropriate and indefensible.[8] Furthermore, Defense counsel's contention at the hearing that Plaintiff's counsel could have met and conferred at any time after Defense counsel delivered Defendant's portion of the Joint Stipulation to him ignores one of the main purposes of the meet and confer requirement, which is to minimize the need for briefing issues that might be resolved without the time and expense of a formal motion. A post-submission conference of counsel does not satisfy the meet and confer requirement. Additionally, Defense counsel did not even attempt to arrange for an informal telephonic discovery conference before serving his portion of the Joint Stipulation on Plaintiff's counsel, despite this Court's express procedures.

*8 Because counsel utterly refused to comply with the discovery requirements set forth in Local Rule 37-1 and this Court's procedures, even after being reminded of them by Plaintiff's counsel, the instant Motion is subject to dismissal on that ground alone. However, because the fact discovery cut-off is imminent and expeditious resolution of this dispute is in all parties' interest, the Court will exercise its discretion to address the dispute on the merits. Counsel are warned that any future failure to abide by the Central District's Local Rules and this Court's procedures will result in a summary dismissal of the motion with prejudice.

B. Defendant Lacks Standing to Object to the CHLA Subpoena Except to the Extent It Seeks Documents Over Which Defendant Has a Personal Right or Privilege, Which Does Not Apply Here

Defendant lacks standing to assert nearly all of the objections raised in the Motion to Quash. Defendant is not burdened by the temporal scope of the subpoena or the alleged overbreadth of the requests; Defendant is not required to “guess” what information purportedly ambiguous RFPs are seeking; and Defendant is not inconvenienced if CHLA is asked to produced documents that are duplicative or obtainable from other sources. If CHLA finds that the RFPs are not narrowly tailored or are so ambiguous that it cannot reasonably understand what documents would be responsive, or that gathering and producing the documents would subject it to an undue burden, it was incumbent on CHLA either to serve objections to the RFPs on Plaintiff and, if possible, negotiate with Plaintiff to narrow or clarify the scope of the information requested, or to move to quash the subpoena. CHLA did not pursue either option here, and affirmed at the hearing that it does not currently have any objections to the subpoena as served. It is simply not Defendant's place to attempt to raise those arguments on CHLA's behalf when CHLA itself does not have any objections.

Defendant's relevance objections are equally unavailing. First, the weight of authority in this Circuit holds that a party may not assert relevancy objections to a subpoena served on a third party. But even if the Court were to follow the line of authority finding that a party may assert relevancy objections under Rule 26(c) if the party believes that its own interests are jeopardized by requests for irrelevant information, Defendant's relevancy objections would still fail. Defendant's financial condition is clearly relevant to whether Defendant accurately represented to Plaintiff that he was a well-to-do business person, and to Plaintiff's calculation of damages. Furthermore, Plaintiff has raised an unjust enrichment claim and is clearly entitled to trace where her money went, particularly because Defendant is apparently holding himself out as judgment-proof. Defendant's business arrangements with CHLA, if any, are relevant to the truthfulness of his representations about the status of negotiations with CHLA. Information about Defendant's other Coffee Bean franchises is relevant to the truthfulness of Defendant's assurance that if the CHLA venture did not go through, Plaintiff would have the option of investing in another CGI venture.

In a similar vein, even if Defendant had standing to assert that CHLA's production was burdensome to CHLA (an objection CHLA itself has not asserted), Defendant's argument that the RFPs are burdensome because they are duplicative of RFPs propounded on him is not persuasive. This is a fraud action. Plaintiff is entitled to test the accuracy of Defendant's discovery responses by seeking the same or similar information from other, neutral sources, at least to the extent that the requests on the third parties do not become overly burdensome to the third party. Because CHLA has neither served objections to the subpoena on Plaintiff nor sought protection from this Court, and indeed affirmatively represented to the Court that it is not challenging the subpoena, Plaintiff does not appear to have burdened CHLA.

*9 Finally, Defendant's privacy claims ring hollow. CHLA is not a financial institution entrusted with keeping Defendant's assets and maintaining their confidentiality; in its dealings with Defendant about the opening of a Coffee Bean franchise on the CHLA campus, CHLA is simply a business entity negotiating at arm's length with another business entity. As such, in the absence of a non-disclosure agreement between Defendant and CHLA governing their negotiations, Defendant waived any right to the privacy of the information he provided to CHLA. In sum, information that CHLA may have about Defendant's financial condition and business ventures is presumably in CHLA's possession because Defendant provided it, or because it is available from publicly-accessible sources. In neither instance may Defendant credibly claim a right to privacy over the information.

However, even if Defendant could assert a privacy right over the information and documents he provided to CHLA, the right to privacy in California is not absolute and may be overcome on a showing of need. Plaintiff is entitled to explore CHLA's evidence regarding potential commercial ventures with Defendant and his businesses, and to obtain documents in CHLA's possession about Defendant's solvency, even if only to test the accuracy and completeness of Defendant's productions. Whatever information CHLA produces will be subject to the Protective Order in this case. Therefore, even if the information Plaintiff seeks properly fell within Defendant's right to privacy, which the Court does not find, in light of the Protective Order, Plaintiff's need for the information would outweigh Defendant's interest in keeping the information confidential. Accordingly, Defendant's purported privacy interests do not provide a ground for quashing the subpoena.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Quash is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. The Deputy Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order to counsel for CHLA at cblake@jmll.com.

Defendant Damon Lee is bringing the Motion to Quash on his own behalf; no other Defendants have joined in the Motion.

In the Order setting a briefing schedule on the Motion, the Court ordered the parties to serve a copy of the briefing schedule on CHLA. The Order expressly provided CHLA an opportunity to file a supplemental memorandum expressing its position on the Motion to Quash and to participate in the hearing. (Dkt. No. 41 at 2). CHLA did not file a supplemental memorandum but did attend the telephonic hearing.

Pursuant to Local Rule 11-3.3, all documents submitted to the Court “shall be numbered consecutively at the bottom of the page.” This requirement encompasses exhibits, which should be numbered as though they, and the declaration to which they are attached, form a single, consecutively paginated document. Citations to the declaration and its attached exhibits will therefore refer to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers for Dkt. No. 38-2 on the Court's docket.

As further noted below, at the hearing, counsel for CHLA expressly stated that CHLA does not oppose the subpoena.

At the hearing, Plaintiff noted that Defendant has been asked, repeatedly, for any evidence showing that information that Defendant provided to CHLA during the course of their negotiations was submitted pursuant to a Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”). However, despite the express invitations, Defendant has not done so.

Plaintiff further notes in her opposition that the parties have agreed to amend the Protective Order to provide for an “attorney's eyes only” level of confidentiality, which will provide further protection from disclosure of highly sensitive information.

Some lower courts in this Circuit, while recognizing the general principle that a party lacks standing under Rule 45 to quash a third-party subpoena unless the party claims a personal right or privilege in the subpoenaed documents, have nevertheless concluded that a party can move for a protective order under Rule 26(c) “if it believes its own interests are jeopardized by discovery sought from a third party ... regarding subpoenas issued to non-parties which seek irrelevant information.” In re REMEC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 2282647, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2008); Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Axsys Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 12658480, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2015) (subscribing to the view of standing expressed in In re REMEC). As further discussed below, Plaintiff has adequately shown that the information sought by the subpoena is relevant to the claims and defenses in this action; accordingly, the Court need not decide whether to adopt the limited exception to standing on relevancy grounds in this alternative line of authority.

The Court directs counsel to consult the Central District's Civility and Professionalism Guidelines, in particular Part B governing “Lawyer's Duties to Other Counsel,” at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/attorneys/admissions/civility-and-professionalism-guidelines. Part B.8 of the Guidelines provides in relevant part, “Before filing a motion with the court, we will engage in more than a mere pro forma discussion of its purpose in an effort to resolve the issue with opposing counsel.” Part A.4 further provides that “We will treat adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and due consideration.” The Court expects all attorneys litigating in the Central District to abide by the Guidelines.