A. Interrogatories

Rule 33 governs the use of interrogatories as a discovery device in federal courts. The purpose of interrogatories is “to facilitate trial preparation, to provide facts, to narrow the issues, and to reduce the chance of surprise.” Rickles, Inc. v. Frances Denney Corp., 508 F. Supp. 4, 7 n.1 (D. Mass. 1980); see also Citibank, N.A. v. Savage (In re Savage), 303 B.R. 766, 773 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003) (“The purpose of interrogatories is to allow the parties to prepare for trial and inform the parties what evidence they must meet.”); Essex Ins. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Safety Equip. Co./Interstate Fire & Safety Cleaning Co., 263 F.R.D. 72, 75 (D. Conn. 2009) (“One important purpose of interrogatories is to ‘obtain information necessary to use other discovery devices effectively, including identifying witnesses whose depositions should be taken ....’ ”) (quoting 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 33.03 (3d ed. 2004)).

Overly broad and unduly burdensome interrogatories “are an abuse of the discovery process” and are routinely denied. See, e.g., Lucero v. Valdez, 240 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D. N.M. 2007) (interrogatories requiring responding party to state “each and every fact” supporting the party's contentions impermissibly overbroad); see also Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting generally that district courts “need not condone the use of discovery to engage in ‘fishing expedition[s]’ ”). At the same time, parties have “an obligation to construe ... discovery requests in a reasonable manner.” Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 618-19 (D. Colo. 2007). Accordingly, “[r]espondents should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized in interrogatories.” Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 310 (D. Kan. 1996); see also McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D. Kan. 2000) (“A party responding to discovery requests should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized ....”) (internal quotation marks omitted); King-Hardy v. Bloomfield Board of Education, 2002 WL 32506294, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2002) (responding party must give discovery requests a reasonable construction, rather than strain to find ambiguity).

*2 A responding party must respond to interrogatories under oath and to the fullest extent possible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). Any objections must be stated with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981). “The answers to interrogatories must be responsive, full, complete and unevasive.” Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 684 (D. Kan. 1991) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Chubb Integrated Systems Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 61 (D. D.C. 1984) (“We remind the parties that they have a duty to provide true, explicit, responsive, complete and candid answers to interrogatories.”). A party answering interrogatories cannot limit its answers to matters within its own knowledge and ignore information reasonably available to it or under its control. Essex Builders Group, Inc. v. Amerisure Insurance Co., 230 F.R.D. 682, 685 (M.D. Fla. 2005). While a responding party is not generally required to conduct extensive research to answer an interrogatory, a reasonable effort to respond must be made. Gorrell v. Sneath, 292 F.R.D. 629, 632 (E.D. Cal. 2013). “If a party is unable to supply the requested information, the party may not simply refuse to answer, but must state under oath that he is unable to provide the information and set forth the efforts he used to obtain the information.” Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In 1993, Rule 33(a)(1) was revised to set a presumptive limit of twenty-five on the number of interrogatories each party may propound. Safeco of America v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 443 (C.D. Cal. 1998). As revised, the Rule provides: “Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (emphasis added). “Determining whether an interrogatory counts as a separate question requires a pragmatic approach.” Waterbury v. Scribner, 2008 WL 2018432 at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2008). “[O]nce a subpart of an interrogatory introduces a line of inquiry that is separate and distinct from the inquiry made by the portion of the interrogatory that precedes it, the subpart must be considered a separate interrogatory no matter how it is designated.” Willingham v. Ashcroft, 226 F.R.D. 57, 59 (D. D.C. 2005).

(Jt. Stip. at 5-6).

As phrased, Interrogatory No. 1 is occasionally confusing and seemingly contains numerous subparts. For example, it is unclear what information Plaintiff is seeking about Defendant's “personal” relationship with Damon Lee, CGI, and CGI affiliates. Additionally, the interrogatory appears to contain several distinct subparts, including, at a minimum, questions about Defendant's contracts with Damon Lee; her contracts with CGI; her contracts with CGI subsidiaries; her investments or ownership interests in businesses owned or operated by Damon Lee; Damon Lee's investments or ownership interests in businesses owned or operated by Defendant; and CGI's investments or ownership interests in businesses owned or operated by Defendant. Plaintiff complains that Defendant has not provided sufficient details and should be required to identify the documents to which she refers by bates number. (Jt. Stip. at 6). Plaintiff's MTC is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Interrogatory No. 1. Defendant must supplement her response to Interrogatory No. 1 by identifying the Coffee Bean location in which she invested $100,000 and the bates numbers of the documents summarily referred to in the response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1) (providing that where the burden of determining the answer to an interrogatory by reference to documents “will be substantially the same for either party,” the responding party may answer by “specifying the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could”). In all other respects, the MTC is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 6).

Plaintiff complains that Defendant fails to provide sufficient details about her travels and notes that her reference to “a trip” seems to contradict her document production, which evidences more than one trip to Korea. (Jt. Stip. at 7) (citing Pollack Decl., Exhs. 12-13). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 2 is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff must supplement her response to Interrogatory No. 2 by providing the date(s) of her trip(s) and by clarifying whether she took more than one trip to Korea during the period at issue. In all other respects, the MTC is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 7).

Plaintiff collectively objects to Defendant's responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4 on the grounds that it fails to specify the date of the meeting and does not describe any other meetings. (Jt. Stip. at 7-8). Plaintiff further argues that the responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4 seemingly contradict Defendant's representation that Plaintiff met Damon Lee socially through her. (Id. at 8) (citing Pollack Decl., Exh. 14 at 4). Plaintiff's MTC is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4. Defendant must supplement her responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4 by providing an exact or approximate date for the meeting at the Shilla Hotel. Defendant shall also confirm whether this is the only meeting with Plaintiff (Interrogatory No. 3) and with Damon Lee (Interrogatory No. 4) that she recalls. If Defendant recalls any other meeting with Plaintiff and/or Damon Lee, individually or together, the amended response shall reflect the date and the contents of the additional meeting(s) to the extent known. In all other respects, the MTC is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 8).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 5 is inadequate because although Defendant admits that she submitted a bankruptcy claim, she does not describe the claim or the factual basis for the claim, or her discussions with Damon Lee or anyone else about the claim. Similarly, Plaintiff complains that Defendant does not “describe” her declaration in the bankruptcy proceedings. (Jt. Stip. at 8-9). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 5 is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant adequately identifies her claim, and it is entirely unclear what Plaintiff means by the demand that Defendant “describe” her declaration in those proceedings, as the declaration would seemingly speak for itself. However, Defendant shall supplement her response to Interrogatory No. 5 to reflect whether she recalls ever having discussed her claim in the bankruptcy proceedings with Damon Lee. In all other respects, the MTC is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 9).

Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to provide sufficient details about the deed of trust and the “factual basis” for the lien. (Jt. Stip. at 10). Plaintiff further contends that Defendant fails to identify the documents referred to in the response with specificity. (Id.). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 6 is GRANTED IN PART. It is difficult to follow all of the myriad clauses in the Interrogatory and determine specifically what information Plaintiff may be seeking, and to that extent, no further substantive response is required. However, Defendant shall supplement her response to Interrogatory No. 6 by identifying the documents referred to in the response by bates number. In all other respects, the MTC is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 10).

Plaintiff complains that Defendant fails to provide a description of her discussion(s) with Damon Lee or of the issues they discussed. (Jt. Stip. at 10-11). Plaintiff also contends that Defendant has failed to identify the documents referred to in the response. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 7 is GRANTED IN PART. The demand that Defendant describe “her knowledge” about certain bankruptcy cases is impermissibly vague and requires no further response. However, Defendant shall supplement her response to Interrogatory No. 7 by identifying the documents referred to in the response by bates number. In all other respects, the MTC is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 11).

Plaintiff contends that “uncontroverted evidence” shows that Defendant participated in meetings in September 2016, was present at the “negotiations and execution,” and had a CGI email address through which she was copied on documents related to the investment. (Jt. Stip. at 11). Plaintiff further notes that Defendant's document production includes copies of checks and receipts that Defendant received from CGI. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff may not like Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 8, but the Court cannot force Defendant to provide a response that Plaintiff might believe is more consistent with documentary evidence. If Plaintiff believes that this discovery response contradicts other evidence in the case, the she may challenge the veracity of her response at trial, where Defendant's credibility may be tested. Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 8 is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 12).

Plaintiff argues that although Defendant admits that Damon Lee asked her to help transfer Plaintiff's investment money from Korea to the US, Defendant fails to provide any details about how she actually helped transfer the money, or about the manner, dates, and amounts of the transfer(s). (Id.). According to Plaintiff, Defendant “should not be permitted to make an unsubstantiated contention but purport no recollection.” (Id. at 13). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 9 is DENIED. The Court cannot force Plaintiff to recall matters she claims not to recall. To the extent that Defendant's recollections are selective, that raises a matter of credibility to be resolved by the trier of fact.

(Jt. Stip. at 13).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants' identical responses to Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11 are necessarily “incomplete and deficient” because the interrogatories ask for information about payments made in different directions -- payments made by Defendant to Damon Lee (Interrogatory No. 11) and payments received by Defendant from Damon Lee (Interrogatory No. 10). (Id.). Plaintiff further contends that Defendant must identify the documents to which she refers with specificity, and that if she is referring to the “hodge-podge of random checks” produced at MIN_0000010 through MIN_0000059, she must specifically indicate which checks are for payments to her and which checks constitute the transfer of Plaintiff's money, which checks are from personal accounts and which checks are from corporate accounts, and which checks are to/from Damon Lee and which checks are to/from CGI. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatories 10 and 11 is GRANTED IN PART. The reference in the responses to payments that Defendant “made to and received from” Damon Lee and CGI seemingly encompass both directions of cash flow contemplated by the two interrogatories. However, the Court agrees that Defendant's vague reference to “documents” does not provide the degree of detail required by Rule 33(d). The Court further finds that Defendant's obligation to identify documents with specificity will not be satisfied in the response to this interrogatory by a global reference to a range of documents, without any indication of the person/entity to whom and from whom the checks were made, the personal and/or corporate accounts to which and from which the funds were transferred, and which payments involved Damon Lee and which payments involved CGI. Accordingly, Defendant must supplement her responses to Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11 to provide that information, including specifically the identification of which payments constituted the transfer of Plaintiff's funds, and where those payments were directed. Defendant shall refer to the documents in her supplemental response by bates number.

(Jt. Stip. at 14).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 12 is insufficient because she does not identify the “news media” to which she refers, the date(s) when she learned from the news media that Damon Lee was indicted and convicted, or any documents that she may have relating to Damon Lee's indictment and conviction. (Id.). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 12 is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff's demand for a description of “the circumstances” under which Defendant learned of Damon Lee's indictment and conviction is vague and ambiguous, and as such, Defendant's representation that she learned of those events from “the news media,” as opposed to word of mouth from friends or family or first-hand from Damon Lee himself, is sufficiently responsive. Although inartfully phrased, Defendant's statement that “she has no interest or knowledge of this, otherwise” appears to mean that she does not recall any further details about the event. However, Plaintiff is entitled to learn if Defendant has any documents relating to Damon Lee's indictment and/or conviction in Korea. Defendant shall supplement her response to indicate whether she has any such documents, and if so, what they are. Defendant shall also identify the date, or approximate date, when she learned that Damon Lee had been indicted and later convicted.

(Jt. Stip. at 14-15).

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's assertion that she has no knowledge of “the lawsuit filed by Bryan J. Song” is not credible because Bryan Song was listed as a judgment creditor in CGI's bankruptcy proceedings, and Defendant herself is “named as a defendant in one of the lawsuits filed by Bryan Song.” (Id. at 15). Plaintiff's MTC a further response to Interrogatory No. 13 is DENIED. Plaintiff does not identify “the lawsuit filed by Bryan J. Song” in the interrogatory itself by case name, case number, or even court, and the term is not defined in the definitions preceding the interrogatories. (See Pollack Decl., Exh. 3 at 1-6). Furthermore, the reference in the Joint Stipulation to “one of the lawsuits filed by Bryan Song” in the MTC suggests that there may be multiple lawsuits. Defendant is not required to guess what Plaintiff means by “the lawsuit.” Defendant is not required to guess what information Plaintiff is seeking to elicit.

(Jt. Stip. at 15).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 14 is inadequate because instead of listing all of her personal and commercial assets, she merely identifies three companies in which she has an ownership interest. (Id.). Plaintiff further notes that the list does not even include her interest in Damon Lee's Coffee Bean business, in which she has admitted to being an investor. (Id.). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to Interrogatory No. 14 is GRANTED. Defendant has utterly failed to identify any personal assets, and the explanation that she “owned 33% [of GraceKelly Décor] and shared with two other partners” seems curiously phrased in the past tense. Defendant shall supplement her response to Interrogatory No. 14 to include a list of her personal assets, if any, and to clarify whether she presently retains an interest in GraceKelly Décor. If Defendant does not have any additional appreciable assets, she shall affirmatively so state.

B. Requests for Admission

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Several courts contend that unlike interrogatories, document requests, and depositions, requests for admission “are not a discovery device at all, ‘since [they] presuppose[ ] that the party proceeding under [Rule 36] knows the facts or has the document and merely wishes its opponent to concede their genuineness.’ ” Pasternak v. Dow Kim, 2011 WL 4552389 at *5 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting 8B Wright, Miller, & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2253 at 324); accord Bouchard v. United States, 241 F.R.D. 72, 76 (D. Me. 2007). Other courts emphasize that requests for admission do function as “discovery devices” to the extent that they allow the requesting party to determine the responding party's contentions. Safeco of America v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 443 (C.D. Cal. 1998). However they are characterized, one primary purpose of requests for admission is to narrow the issues for trial by identifying and eliminating those matters on which the parties agree. Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee notes (1970 Amendment) (“Rule 36 serves two vital purposes, both of which are designed to reduce trial time. Admissions are sought, first to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case, and secondly, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.”).

However, because requests for admission clarify not only those issues upon which the parties agree but also those which are “genuinely contested,” where issues in dispute “are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly reasonable response.” United Coal Companies v. Powell Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967 (3rd Cir. 1988). The Rule specifically provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “If the party requesting the admission later proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter requested, the court may order the party that denied the request to pay the costs of her opponent in making that proof.” McFadden v. Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 243 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D. D.C. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2)).

(Jt. Stip. at 19).

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's denials of RFA Nos. 3 and 4 are improper because they purportedly contradict her representation in response to Interrogatory No. 1 that she “invested $100,000 on one of the coffee bean locations.” (Id.) (citing Pollack Decl., Exh. 10 at 2). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to RFA Nos. 3 and 4 is DENIED. It is not clear that Defendant's responses to RFA Nos. 3 and 4 necessarily contradict Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 1. However, even if the denials of RFA Nos. 3 and 4 were false, Rule 36 does not provide a remedy for a false representation, and as such, the Court cannot compel Defendant to provide an admission that Plaintiff deems more consistent with the evidence. See Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 11:2074 (2011) (“If the request [for admission] is completely denied, a motion to determine the sufficiency of the denial is improper.”); 7 Moore's Federal Practice § 36.12 (2011) (“Rule 36 does not authorize the court to make determinations on the accuracy of responses before trial.”); Wright, et al., 8B Federal Practice and Procedure § 2263 (3d ed.) (“[T]he propounding party may not challenge the denial [of an RFA] on the ground that it is unsupported by the evidence.”) see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, adv. comm. notes (1970) (“Rule 36 does not lack a sanction for false answers; Rule 37(c) furnishes an appropriate deterrent.”).[4]

(Jt. Stip. at 16-17).

*10 Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's supplemental response to RFA 25 is somewhat difficult to understand, and appears to be based, at least in part, on the misguided belief that an RFA response must be more fulsome than a simple “admit” or “deny,” even with an explanation, can support. After noting that Defendant's denial seemingly is in tension with other representations she has made, which, as the Court has explained above, is generally not a proper ground for objecting to an RFA response, Plaintiff states:

(Id. at 17). It is unclear how or why Plaintiff believes that a single RFA concerning the receipt of “Jiae Lee's investment money” can fairly be deemed to encompass so many purported transactions or require any of the explanations that Plaintiff seems to demand. Defendant has denied the RFA with a qualification explaining why. The validity of a qualified answer to an RFA must await trial to see if the requesting party is forced to prove what was not admitted and can show that there was no good reason for the opponent's failure to admit. National Semiconductor Corp. v. Ramtron International Corp., 265 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74-75 (D. D.C. 2003). Plaintiff's MTC with respect to RFA No. 25 is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 17-18).

Plaintiff objects to Defendant's supplemental response to RFA No. 27 on the ground it is purportedly unclear whether (1) Defendant is merely stating the amount that Damon Lee owes her, but is denying that the Deed of Trust secures that amount, or (2) Defendant is admitting that the Deed of Trust in fact secures the debt (whatever its amount). (Id. at 18). The Court agrees that Defendant's supplemental response is inartfully phrased. However, it appears that by admitting “in part” that the Deed of Trust secures the debt Damon Lee owes her, while simultaneously explaining that the “deed of trust was also for the Jiae Lee monies,” Defendant's qualified supplemental response appears to be stating that the Deed of Trust encompasses both the debt that Damon Lee owes Defendant and Plaintiff's investment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's MTC a supplemental response to RFA No. 27 is DENIED.

(Jt. Stip. at 18).

Plaintiff claims that Defendant's qualified supplemental response to RFA No. 32 “makes no sense” because “[e]ven if there are multiple notes comprising [the] promissory note, they either are or are not for debt that Damon Lee owes [Defendant].” (Id. at 19). Plaintiff further states that “[i]f any of the promissory notes cited by the Grace Min Deed of Trust are not for debt that Damon Lee owes Grace Min, then she must qualify her answer by specifically identifying the promissory notes that underlie the Grace Min Deed of Trust.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). Defendant's response to RFA No. 32 is not clear, even with her supplemental response. The question, as posed, was whether the promissory note cited in the Grace Min Deed of Trust was for a debt Damon Lee owed Defendant. As such, her unclear answer, “admit in that there were more than one promissory note,” does not reveal whether the promissory note was for a debt owed to Defendant by Damon Lee. For this reason, Plaintiff's MTC with respect to RFA No. 32 is GRANTED, and Defendant is ordered to supplement her response and answer whether any promissory note cited in the deed of trust was for a debt owed to her by Damon Lee.

C. Requests for Production of Documents

*11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 requires production of documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Upon receipt of a properly served request, a responding party is required to conduct a “reasonable search” for responsive documents. See Hock Foods, Inc. v. William Blair & Co., L.L.C., 2011 WL 884446 at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2011); Jackson v. Woodford, 2007 WL 2238363 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (requiring defendants to conduct a reasonable search for documents responsive to requests for production); A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 189 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (a party has an “affirmative duty” to seek information “reasonably available” to it in responding to discovery requests) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “while parties must impose a reasonable construction on discovery requests and conduct a reasonable search when responding to the requests, the Federal Rules do not demand perfection.” Reinsdorf v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 604, 615 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Prasad v. George Washington Univ., 323 F.R.D. 88, 93 (D. D.C. 2017) (quoting Reinsdorf); see also Agerbrink v. Model Service LLC, 2017 WL 933095, at *5 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 8, 2017) (“The standard for evaluating discovery is reasonableness, not perfection.”) (collecting cases).

Furthermore, even though a responding party has an affirmative duty to search for responsive documents, the court cannot order a party to produce documents that do not exist. A mere suspicion that additional documents must exist is an insufficient basis to grant a motion to compel. See, e.g., Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329 (D. D.C. 2003) (requesting party's suspicion that responding party failed to produce responsive documents does not justify compelled inspection); Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 194 F.R.D. 305, 311 (D. D.C. 2000) (a party's mere suspicion that its opponent must have documents that it claims not to have does not warrant granting a motion to compel). Rather, the moving party must have a colorable basis for its belief that relevant, responsive documents exist and are being improperly withheld. See Carter v. Dawson, 2010 WL 4483814, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (defendants' assertion that they are unable to locate responsive documents does not provide a ground for granting a motion to compel “unless Plaintiff can identify a specific document that Defendants have withheld”); Ayala v. Tapia, 1991 WL 241873, at *2 (D. D.C. Nov. 1, 1991) (denying motion to compel where moving party could not identify documents that were withheld).

Plaintiff does not seek a supplemental response to any particular RFP, but instead complains that because Defendant has made only “a grand production of 10 documents and less than 80 pages in this case,” her search for responsive documents must necessarily have been unreasonable. (Jt. Stip. at 19). In particular, Plaintiff complains that it was only after Defendant admitted in her deposition that she had not checked her emails, text messages, or even her computer for responsive materials that she served a supplemental RFP response, stating “After the deposition, I search [sic] my computer and could not find any more e-mails, also I could not locate any more text messages between Grace Min and Jiae Lee other than those produced by Jiae Lee.” (Pollack Decl., Exh. 9 at 3; see also Jt. Stip. at 20). Plaintiff maintains that this supplemental response is inadequate because it does not suggest a “diligent search,” as Defendant has not produced “a single email” from her CGI email address, or any communications with the Chair of the Creditor's Committee, even though she has elsewhere acknowledged that “[t]here may be some emails,” and also does not reflect that Defendant searched for text messages with Damon Lee. (Id. at 20-21). Plaintiff further notes that even though Kakao Talk (a popular Korean chat application) functions as a “continuous chat,” and Defendant has already produced some Kakao messages, the only way that Defendant would be able to produce some text messages with Plaintiff and not others would be if she intentionally deleted them. (Id. at 23). Additionally, Plaintiff states that given Defendant's involvement with Damon Lee, Plaintiff, and CGI, “it is simply incredulous that[ ] she has no documentation of communications with Damon Lee that are relevant to the issues in this case. (Id. at 24). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that Defendant “should be ordered to conduct a proper search of her computer, phone and any other device or files where responsive documents may be held.” (Id. at 23-24).

*12 The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaints about Defendant's production appears based on the contention that Defendant “must have” additional documents of one kind or another. However, Defendant's supplemental response to Plaintiff's production request affirms that Defendant (1) searched her computer; (2) searched her emails and could find no additional responsive documents; and (3) searched her text messages and could find no additional texts between Defendant and Plaintiff other than those produced by Plaintiff. (Pollack Decl., Exh. 9 at 3). As such, Plaintiff's belief that Defendant “must have” additional documents is not, for the most part, a sufficient ground for an order compelling the production of documents. However, whether through inadvertence or inartful drafting, Defendant's supplemental response does not reflect that Defendant conducted a search for text messages with Damon Lee. Furthermore, the mere fact that one party has produced certain documents -- such as Plaintiff's text messages with Defendant -- does not relieve Defendant from the obligation to produce her own copies of documents that are in her possession, custody or control, even if Defendant's production is redundant of Plaintiff's, in whole or in part. Accordingly, Plaintiff's MTC supplemental responses to her requests for production of documents is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is ORDERED to conduct a search for text messages responsive to Plaintiff's production requests on any device where such messages may be found and to serve, within fourteen days of the date of this order, supplemental written responses and documents, if any, reflecting or constituting any text messages responsive to the RFPs between Defendant and either Damon Lee, Plaintiff, or any other person or party. If no such documents exist, Defendant shall describe in the supplemental response the devices searched and explain how the search was conducted.

D. Deposition

Plaintiff argues that Defendant should be required to sit for another deposition at Defendant's expense so that Plaintiff may examine her “on any new document productions and contentions, and the factual allegations that [Defendant] purports to inject in this case through her post-cut-off Rog responses and supplements.” (Jt. Stip. at 24). Plaintiff also contends that another deposition of Defendant is warranted due to discovery abuses by her co-defendant, Damon Lee. (Id.). The Court disagrees. The vast majority of the supplemental responses ordered by the Court involve correction of references to documents in Defendant's interrogatory responses. It is doubtful that these supplemental responses will generate information warranting yet another deposition. Additionally, if Defendant identifies and produces any additional text messages in response to the requests for production, it is likely that the documents will speak for themselves. The time and expense of an additional deposition of Defendant at this stage of the proceedings would not be proportional to the needs of this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's MTC a supplemental deposition of Defendant Grace Min is DENIED.

A. Sanctions for Failure to Preserve Evidence

Plaintiff seeks unspecified “sanctions” against Defendant for her purported failure to preserve evidence. (Jt. Stip. at 25). However, Plaintiff appears to base her spoliation argument on Defendant's alleged failure to preserve evidence from 2016, 2017 and 2018, even though Plaintiff admits that Defendant did not have notice of this litigation until 2019. (Id.). Plaintiff cites absolutely no authority for the proposition that a party is obligated to preserve evidence before receiving notice that litigation may reasonably be anticipated, and presents no evidence conclusively showing that Defendant destroyed evidence after receiving notice. Accordingly, as the Court will explain briefly below, even if Plaintiff had told the Court what kind of sanctions she believes are warranted here, which she did not, the request for spoliation sanctions would be, and hereby is, DENIED.

Spoliation is “the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence[,] in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake IV”) (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)). The authority to impose sanctions for spoliation arises from a court's inherent power to control the judicial process. Medical Laboratory Mgmt. Consultants v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir. 2002). The exercise of a court's inherent powers must be applied with “restraint and discretion” and only to the degree necessary to redress the abuse. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991).

The bare fact that evidence has been altered or destroyed “does not necessarily mean that the party has engaged in sanction-worthy spoliation.” Ashton v. Knight Transp., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 772, 799-800 (N.D. Tex. 2011). To determine whether to impose sanctions for spoliation, the majority of courts, including many courts in this Circuit, apply “the three-part test set forth by Judge Scheindlin in Zubulake IV for determining whether to grant an adverse inference spoliation instruction.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Apple I”). According to Zubulake IV,

Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220 (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin'l Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)). “After considering these factors, a court must then consider all available sanctions and determine the appropriate one.” Apple I, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. The party seeking spoliation sanctions has the burden of establishing the elements of a spoliation claim. Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet Communication, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (S.D. N.Y. 2011).

The first factor a court will consider, the obligation to preserve evidence, “arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216. “When evidence is destroyed in bad faith (i.e., intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate relevance.” Id. at 220. “By contrast, when the destruction is negligent, relevance must be proven by the party seeking the sanctions.” Id. However, to show relevance, “[i]t is not enough for the innocent party to show that the destroyed evidence would have been responsive to a document request.” Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D. N.Y. 2010). Courts generally agree that “relevance” for spoliation purposes “is a two-pronged finding of relevance and prejudice” because “for the court to issue sanctions, the absence of the evidence must be prejudicial to the party alleging spoliation of evidence.” Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 531 (D. Md. 2010); Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 616 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Courts recognize that a showing that the lost information is relevant and prejudicial is an important check on spoliation allegations and sanctions motions.”) (citing cases). The prejudice inquiry “looks to whether the [spoliating party's] actions impaired [the non-spoliating party's] ability to go to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Leon v. IDS Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (“The innocent party must also show that the evidence would have been helpful in proving its claims or defenses -- i.e., that the innocent party is prejudiced without that evidence.”).

Plaintiff's argument for some sort of vague spoliation sanctions fails to make any showing warranting any degree of sanctions. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant destroyed relevant evidence after receiving notice that litigation was imminent, and contrary to Plaintiff's unsupported assertion, Defendant's admission that she does not have a policy regarding retention or destruction of documents does not constitute a per se violation of the duty to preserve. (Jt. Stip. at 26). It is certainly not sufficient to establish a willful violation. However, even if the alleged destruction of documents was merely negligent, Plaintiff has not shown the prejudice necessary to warrant sanctions. Whatever the documents may be that Plaintiff believes Defendant failed to preserve, Plaintiff has not shown that they were critical to the litigation of her case and that her ability to go to trial has been materially impaired. Accordingly, the Court declines to impose spoliation sanctions.

B. Request for Rule 37 Sanctions

*14 Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred in bringing this motion as sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. (Jt. Stip. at 26-27). Rule 37 provides in relevant part:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Conversely, if the discovery motion is denied, the court must require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in opposing the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). Finally, if the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B).

However, if the non-prevailing party can demonstrate “substantial justification” for its motion, nondisclosure, or opposition, Rule 37 provides that the court must deny sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii). “There is no bright line standard for ‘substantial justification,’ and courts must use discretion when deciding whether opposition to a motion to compel is substantially justified.” Brown v. State of Iowa, 152 F.R.D. 168, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1993). “[C]ourts have generally focused on ‘the quality of the justification and the genuineness of the dispute [and whether] an impartial observer would agree that a party had good reason to withhold discovery[ ]’ when determining whether opposition is substantially justified.” Id. (quoting Alvarez v. Wallace, 107 F.R.D. 658, 662 (W.D. Tex. 1985)).

Here, the Court has granted Plaintiff's Motion to Compel only in part and has found that several of Plaintiff's challenges to Defendant's discovery responses are not well taken. Accordingly, because both parties bear some responsibility for the instant dispute, the Court finds that sanctions are not warranted under Rule 37, and Plaintiff's request for sanctions under Rule 37 is DENIED.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant shall produce supplemental responses and documents as required by this order within fourteen days of the date of this order. The request for sanctions for failure to preserve evidence is DENIED. The request for attorney's fees under Rule 37 is DENIED.

Exhibits 15, 16, 18 and 20 to Pollack's declaration are separately filed under seal at Dkt. No. 81.

The Court incorporates by reference as though fully set forth herein the summary of the claims and allegations in this action and the standard for the scope of permissible discovery set forth in Parts I and II of the Court's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions Regarding Defendants' Discovery Violations and Abuses. (Dkt. No. 112 at 2-4).

References to “Defendant” in the singular throughout the remainder of this order refer only to Defendant Grace Min. Other Defendants will be referred to by name as warranted.

Rule 37(c)(2) provides in relevant part: