8. Charter markets and sells various services, including television, Internet, and phone services, in California and nationwide.

9. Plaintiffs worked for Charter in California as salespersons. Harper worked for Charter from September 2017 to March 2018, and Sinclair worked for Charter from January 2015 to December 2016. Charter considered Plaintiffs to be “outside salespersons” during their entire employment and treated them as exempt employees. But Plaintiffs were not exempt outside salespersons. Plaintiffs were not asked or required to perform any “outside sales” activities during their training and they were thus misclassified as exempt during their training. Plaintiffs also were assigned numerous duties following their training that were not “outside sales” duties, the performance of which caused them not to spend a majority of their working hours each day or week performing outside sales. These non-outside sales duties included, but were not limited to, customer service and installation scheduling activities and work performed at Charter's offices or at a home office. They were thus misclassified as exempt following their training as well. During their employment, Plaintiffs worked with numerous other employees who were subject to Charter's same policies and practices and who were also misclassified as exempt outside salespersons, both during training and following training. Plaintiffs’ working experience gave them a thorough understanding of Charter's employment policies and practices with respect to employees who Charter classified as exempt outside salespersons.

10. During their employment, Plaintiffs and other employees (including but not limited to outside salespersons) were also eligible to receive and did receive incentive compensation in the form of commission wages. But Charter's commission payment practices and policies were unlawful. First, Charter did not give to Plaintiffs and other employees a signed copy of commission agreements that set forth the methods by which their commission wages would be computed and paid. Second, Charter did not obtain from Plaintiffs and other employees a signed receipt for any such agreements. Third, Charter failed to properly calculate and pay all commission wages that were due to Plaintiffs and other employees. And fourth, Charter paid commission wages on a monthly basis and/or weeks after the wages were earned instead of for the pay period in which they were earned.

*2 11. Plaintiffs personally experienced and witnessed Charter engaging in these unlawful and unfair business practices and Charter continues to engage in these unlawful and unfair business practices to this day.

Unpaid Minimum Wages Subclass

Unpaid Overtime Wages Subclass

Meal Period Subclass

Rest Break Subclass

Wage Statement Subclass

Termination Subclass

Underpaid Commission Subclass

No Signed Agreement Subclass

Wage Statement Subclass

Termination Subclass

a. whether Charter improperly classified Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons as exempt during training;

b. whether Charter improperly classified Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons as exempt after training;

c. whether Charter accurately kept track of Plaintiffs’ and other outside salespersons’ working hours;

d. whether Charter paid minimum wages for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons;

e. whether Charter paid overtime wages for all hours worked over 8 in a workday and 40 in a workweek by Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons;

f. whether Charter provided Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons with timely, uninterrupted, off-duty 30-minute meal periods each day they worked at least 5 hours in a workday, and a second meal period each day they worked at least 10 hours in a workday, or paid them an additional hour of pay at their regular rate on each day such meal periods were not provided;

g. whether Charter provided Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons with timely, uninterrupted, off-duty 10-minute rest breaks for every 4 hours of work, or major fraction thereof, or paid them an additional hour of pay at their regular rate on each day such rest periods were not provided;

h. whether Charter paid Plaintiffs and other outside salespersons all wages due upon termination, or paid waiting time penalties when such wages were not timely paid;

i. whether Plaintiffs and other employees who were eligible to be paid commission wages signed a written commission agreement, were given a signed copy of the agreement, and provided Charter with a signed receipt;

j. whether Plaintiffs and other employees who were eligible to be paid commission wages had wages underpaid, reduced, deducted, or clawed back based on terms they did not expressly agree to in a signed writing that was given to them;

k. whether Charter timely paid all commission wages in the pay periods in which they were earned; and

l. whether Charter paid Plaintiffs and other employees who were eligible for commission wages all wages due upon termination, or paid waiting time penalties when such wages were not timely paid.

Harper contends that he is entitled to discover all information and records relevant to his class and representative PAGA claims, including: class member contact information and position history; class member employment records such as wage statements, commission statements, training records, signed copies of commissions plans and signed receipts (if any exist), and similar records; and each version of an employee handbook, commission plan, timekeeping policy, and similar policies that Charter used during the relevant time period. Harper believes at least four positions are covered by his claims – Account Executive, Direct Sales Representative, Outside Sale Representative, and Retail Sales Associate – and he is seeking information and records for class members and aggrieved employees statewide for the period from November 2014 to the present.

Charter contends Harper is not entitled to any class-wide pre-certification discovery. Should this Court order any pre-certification discovery, it should be severely limited since Harper has not set forth a prima facie case for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and has not shown his discovery requests are likely to produce substantiation of his class allegations. Harper's discovery requests are also grossly overbroad, unduly burdensome, infringe on Constitutionally protected third party rights, and constitute a speculative fishing expedition. Based on extensive information and documents already produced by Charter and the evidence and allegations offered by Harper, Charter contends that if pre-certification discovery is allowed, at most, pre-certification class and representative PAGA discovery should be limited to Harper's specific position (Account Executive) and Harper's specific work location (Redding, California). Should Plaintiffs certify a class, the Court may then allow broader discovery regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’ case and Charter's defenses.

ECF No. 6, pg. 8.

Sinclair Interrogatories 4-21 and motion seek information related to (i) positions in California that Charter classified as “exempt” under the outside salesperson exemption since November 2014, (ii) positions in California that Charter considered eligible to earn commissions since November 2014, and (iii) the bases for certain of Charter's defenses.

*4 Charter denies Plaintiffs’ allegations and contends it has complied with all applicable laws. Charter further contends Sinclair is not entitled to engage in a pre-certification fishing expedition for class-wide discovery since Sinclair has not set forth a prima facie case for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and has not shown his discovery requests are likely to produce substantiation of his class allegations. Sinclair has not offered the prerequisite evidence or even specific allegations, of a class-wide violation encompassing the vague, ambiguous and undefined putative classes of employees he seeks to represent and about which he now seeks discovery.

ECF No. 84, pg. 6.

...Thus, to substantiate his class allegations, Plaintiff must produce evidence of some common class-wide policy, practice or treatment resulting in misclassification of all of the various positions in his “outside salesperson” class. But plaintiff has not offered any evidence of statewide policies, practices or treatment establishing such a class wide violation....