*1 The Court, in its discretion, denies Plaintiff's motion for sanctions brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(d)(2).[1] [49].

STATEMENT

On May 19, 2017, Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company removed the present lawsuit from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Chancery Division. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. In his Complaint, Plaintiff Kevin Greenwood brings three claims under the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). Before the Court is Plaintiff's Rule 30(d)(2) motion for sanctions in relation to the deposition of his former supervisor Anthony Schneider. For the following reasons, the Court, in its discretion, denies Plaintiff's motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

In general, a deponent must answer a question during a deposition after an objection has been noted on the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). There are only three reasons for instructing a deponent not to answer a question, namely, to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation imposed by the court, or to present a Rule 30(d)(2) motion for a protective order. See Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2007); Rojas v. X Motorsport, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 898, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2017). “Objections that are argumentative or that suggest an answer to a witness are called ‘speaking objections’ and are improper under Rule 30(c)(2).” Specht v. Google, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 596, 598 (N.D. Ill. 2010); see also LM Ins. Corp. v. ACEO, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 490, 491 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (coaching a witness during a deposition is prohibited under Rule 30(c)(2)). Under Rule 30(d)(2), the Court “may impose an appropriate sanction – including the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by any party – on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(2). District courts have broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 881 F.3d 550, 565 (7th Cir. 2018).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff bases his Rule 30(d)(2) motion on defense counsel's conduct when defending the February 6, 2018 deposition of Plaintiff's former supervisor Anthony Schneider. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's counsel made 217 objections during the course of the deposition, coached Schneider via improper speaking objections, and that counsel and Schneider took inappropriate breaks. Plaintiff, for example, highlights counsel's objections to routine questions, such as questions about deponent's chain of command. Plaintiff also points to objections in which defense counsel argued Plaintiff's counsel mischaracterized Schneider's testimony, after which defense counsel gave her own characterization. Indeed, after reading Schneider's deposition transcript, defense counsel's non-stop objections set a negative tone early in the deposition, which culminated in increasingly rude and argumentative exchanges throughout the deposition.

*2 In response, Defendant spends an inordinate amount of time supporting its argument that “Plaintiff's disingenuous arguments fly in the face of his own counsel's conduct at his deposition[.]” The Court notes that “tit for tat” arguments rarely win discovery motions. See, e.g., Pain Ctr. of SE Indiana, LLC v. Origin Healthcare Sols., LLC, No. 1:13-CV-133-RLY-DKL, 2014 WL 12756755, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 31, 2014); Mizyed v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 12-1016, 2013 WL 12242011, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2013); Alford v. Aaron Rents, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-683 MJR-DGW, 2010 WL 2765260, at *16 (S.D. Ill. May 17, 2010); Wilson v. Sundstrand Corp., No. 99 C 6944, 2003 WL 22012673, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2003). In other words, defense counsel's alleged misconduct is not excused because Plaintiff's counsel may have acted similarly at another deposition.

Defendant also explains that during one break, counsel discussed privilege with the deponent, which is proper under the rules. See Murray v. Nationwide Better Health, No. 10-3262, 2012 WL 3683397, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2012) (“Even the most restrictive of the cases that have addressed restrictions on conferences between a deponent and his lawyer during a deposition has allowed such conferences when the purpose of the conference is to decide whether to assert a privilege”); see also LM Ins.Corp., 275 F.R.D. at 491 (“Because a deposition generally proceeds as at trial, Rule 30(c)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have uniformly held that once a deposition starts, counsel has no right to confer during the deposition”). Defendant, however, does not explain why counsel and Schneider took other breaks during the deposition. See Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The fact-finding purpose of a deposition requires testimony from the witness, not from counsel, and without suggestions from counsel. Coaching and private conferences (on issues other than privilege) that would be inappropriate during trial testimony are not excused during a deposition merely because the judge is not in the room.”).

As Judge Easterbrook observed over a decade ago, “[m]ost depositions are taken without judicial supervision. Witnesses often want to avoid giving answers, and questioning may probe sensitive or emotionally fraught subjects, so unless counsel maintain professional detachment decorum can break down.” Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2007). From the tone of the parties' recent discovery motions, it is evident that there has been a breakdown in decorum during the discovery phase of this lawsuit. That being said, counsel's conduct does rise to the level where sanctions are warranted at this time. See, e.g., Rojas v. X Motorsport, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 898 (N.D. Ill. 2017); United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 302 F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Likewise, the Court denies Defendant's request for sanctions under Rule 37(a)(5)(B) as unsubstantiated. See M.G. Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer Agency, Inc., 845 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by legal authority.”).

As the Court stated in its March 5, 2018 discovery ruling, if the parties file any further discovery or sanctions motions, they must first file a joint statement providing the information required by Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 37.2. This joint statement must include the details of the arguments advanced by both sides and the steps taken to confer in good faith. Only then will the Court consider any further discovery motions in this matter. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 590, 591 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Autotech Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Automationdirect.Com, Inc., 05 C 5488, 2007 WL 2713352, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2007). Finally, the Court reminds the parties of their obligations under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.