*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions against Defendant for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 83). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.

This is a products liability case arising out of a fuel-fed fire that consumed the Plaintiffs’ 2007 Silverado C1500 crew cab truck (the “subject vehicle” or the “2007 Silverado”). Plaintiffs allege that the vehicle fire was not precipitated by a collision. Plaintiffs allege the fire originated in the undercarriage area where the subject vehicle's fuel storage tank and its fuel supply components—including an “EVAP Canister”—were located. Plaintiffs allege that the EVAP Canister on the subject vehicle was unprotected from road debris, such as rocks and pebbles, and may have been struck by such debris, precipitating the fire that consumed the 2007 Silverado.

On January 29, 2021, Plaintiffs took the deposition of Defendant's 30(b)(6) designee Mr. Manoj Modi. Plaintiffs frame their motion as follows:

(Dkt. No. 83-1 at 8). In sum, and as detailed herein, Plaintiffs argue that because Modi could not remember certain details pertaining to a “stone impingement test,” the above described sanctions are warranted. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ motion. (Dkt. No. 93). Plaintiff have filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 100).

Plaintiffs’ motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

Under Rule 30(b)(6), a party issuing a deposition notice “must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The responding entity, here the Defendant, then has an obligation to designate a person or persons prepared to testify “about information known or reasonably available to the organization” regarding those topics. Id. “If the persons designated by the corporation do not possess personal knowledge of the matters set out in the deposition notice, the corporation is obligated to prepare the designees so that they may give knowledgeable and binding answers for the corporation.” United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996). “Moreover, the designee must not only testify about facts within the corporation's knowledge, but also its subjective beliefs and opinions.” Id. “The corporation must provide its interpretation of documents and events.” Id. The purpose of this requirement is to “prevent the ‘sandbagging’ of an opponent by conducting a half-hearted inquiry before the deposition but a thorough and vigorous one before the trial. This would totally defeat the purpose of the discovery process.” Id. at 362.

*2 Producing an unprepared witness is “tantamount to a failure to appear” under Rule 37(d). Id. at 363; Black Horse Lane Ass'n L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 304 (3d Cir. 2000). However, cases that award sanctions under Rule 37(d) “involve[ ] extreme obfuscation and unpreparedness.” Preferred Carolinas Realty, Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-181, 2014 WL 1320133, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2014); see also 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 34.13[2][a] (3d. ed. 2014) (“[P]roducing a person who knows nothing about the subject matter of the litigation is the functional equivalent of having spurned the deposition altogether ... Courts applying this functional standard of Rule 30(b)(6) compliance need to be cautious before finding a violation.”) (emphasis added).

a) Modi's Testimony

During his deposition,[1] Modi was shown an exhibit, (Dkt. No. 83-4), which was a page from a larger spreadsheet. The exhibit depicted a chart wherein one entry was titled “Evap Emission Canister.” The entry's “Issue Description” read: “The evap canister did not meet component level DV test requirements. The issues were: the canister trap cracked during a stone impingement test, the CVS bracket did not adequately retain the CVS, and the liquid trap purge siphon tube did not function as intended. Retrofit will be required of IVER trucks.” (Id.).

Plaintiffs’ counsel questioned Modi about this entry. See Deposition Excerpts, (Dkt. No. 83-3 at 4). Modi explained in general terms what a stone impingement test was. (Id. at 5) (“Primarily, you know, rocks are thrown at the canisters and made sure that the canister is, you know, passes the requirement.”). Modi further testified that said test was run during the “development stage” and that “IVER” means “integration vehicle engineering release.” (Id. at 6) (testifying said test occurred “in the very early stage of development”). When asked if Defendant “changed the design or structure of the EVAP canister as a result of this stone impingement test,” Modi testified “I have to look at the details of that to understand exactly what was changed. But I am sure it was addressed to meet the requirement.” (Id. at 7). When Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Modi if he had reviewed “these stone impingement tests” in advance of his deposition, Modi testified “To be honest with you, sir, I was looking for a CTS document and there is a little bit of history I got to tell you on that. The EVAP canister design responsibility was in transition from [a] group called GM Powertrain to GM Chassis Group during the timeframe. I was not able to locate the component specification of the GMT900 canister but I have seen documents which are similar for other programs.” (Id. at 9). When asked how big the stones were which were shot at the EVAP canister, Modi testified “I do not remember that, sir. I will have to look at the other documents which I was just telling you about.” (Id.). When asked about the “force that was used to kick the stones up” Modi testified that he could not recall the speed. (Id. at 10). When asked whether he knew what angle the rocks were thrown at the EVAP canister from, Modi testified that he did “not remember” but that if “we want to go off the record and you let me try to get some more details on it, I will be happy to answer those questions because you are testing my memory of the documents relative to speed angle and those kind of things, you know.” (Id. at 10).

b) Analysis

*3 Here, considering the above, the Court finds that sanctions are not warranted. “Absolute perfection is not required of a 30(b)(6) witness.” See QBE Ins. Corp. v. Jorda Enterprises, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 676, 691 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that the “mere fact that a designee could not answer every question on a certain topic does not necessarily mean that the corporation failed to comply with its obligation”) (citing Costa v. County of Burlington, 254 F.R.D. 187, 191 (D.N.J. 2008)). Instead, “Rule 36 requires substantial compliance.” Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 363. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Modi was otherwise prepared for his deposition. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding sanctions appropriate under Rule 37 where 30(b)(6) deponent was “inadequately educated as to its full knowledge of the facts respecting each of the 11 noticed deposition topics”) (emphasis added); QBE Ins. Corp., 277 F.R.D. at 693, 697-98 (sanctions appropriate where plaintiff's 30(b)(6) deponent, inter alia, “testified he could not provide information on any of the 35-e discovery topics”); see also Briese Lichttechnik Vertriebs GmbH v. Langton, 272 F.R.D. 369, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that existence of “a number of questions to which [Rule 30(b)(6)] witnesses responded that they did not know the answer” failed to merit additional deposition where witnesses appeared otherwise adequately prepared). As shown supra, Modi was able to answer some questions regarding the stone impingement test. And while Modi could not remember certain details, he explicitly offered to obtain such information for Plaintiffs during the deposition. See (Dkt. No. 83-3 at 10); Risinger v. SOC, LLC, 306 F.R.D. 655, 663 (D. Nev. 2015) (noting that, although a party must make a good faith effort to prepare its designee, “Rule 30(b)(6) is not designed to be a memory contest”); see also Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 529 n. 7 (D. Md. 2005) (“There is no obligation to produce witnesses who know every single fact, only those that are relevant and material to the incident or incidents that underlie the suit”; further noting that a “rule of reason” applies in determining adequacy of preparation for a 30(b)(6) deposition).

In sum, while Modi's testimony on the stone impingement test was not perfect, the instant case does not reflect the type of “extreme unpreparedness” tantamount to a failure to appear that warrants sanctions under Rules 30 or 37.

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. (Dkt. No. 83).

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.