Plaintiff Mark McDaniel, M.D., a veteran, initiated this action against Loyola University Medical Center (“LUMC”), its parent companies, and various physicians, alleging he was wrongfully terminated from LUMC's five-year orthopaedic residency program and exposed to a hostile work environment in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and his employment contract. According to plaintiff, his relationship with defendants turned sour towards the end of his fourth year of residency when he requested leave for three weeks of Air National Guard obligations as well as a separate ten-day medical leave. Plaintiff further claims that even before the requested leave, attending physicians at LUMC subverted his efforts to receive a fellowship position upon completion of his residency. Plaintiff was terminated from the residency program on September 17, 2012. For their part, defendants contend that misrepresentations in plaintiff's surgical case logs, his attendance, and his professionalism were the factors that lead to his termination.

According to plaintiff, data regarding residents' surgical case logs, attendance, etc., is submitted to the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”). Plaintiff subpoenaed documents from ACGME on July 31, 2014. ACGME submitted a letter to plaintiff objecting to the subpoena on August 6, 2014. ACGME's objection, in part, was based on the position that most responsive documents and information were in the possession of LUMC. ACGME further stated that the documents and information were held by ACGME in confidence per agreement with LUMC and pursuant to Illinois statute 735 ILCS 5/8-2101.

On September 8, 2014, plaintiff filed his motion to compel the production of documents from ACGME [84]. On September 23, 2014, the Honorable Judge Dow ordered counsel for parties and ACGME to meet and confer before filing a joint status report on the matter. According to the October 10, 2014 status report [98], counsel for plaintiff, defendants, and ACGME agreed that: (1) ACGME shall (a) produce non-confidential documents, (b) submit to LUMC documents and information that ACGME holds in confidence solely with LUMC in order that LUMC may decide whether to waive confidentiality as to all or parts of documents, and (c) submit to plaintiff and defendants a log of subpoena responsive documents and information that was not produced or submitted to LUMC; (2) plaintiff may pursue discovery from LUMC of documents and information submitted by ACGME; and (3) the final disposition of the motion to compel should be held in abeyance, pending notice by plaintiff that additional issues relating to the subpoena require attention by the Court.

*2 On November 6, 2014, LUMC produced documents to plaintiff. On November 13, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion to compel [105] ACGME documents from LUMC.[1] Despite all the briefing and confusion, the discovery dispute boils down to three documents: (1) correspondence dated February 20, 2014 from Dr. Derstine of ACGME to Dr. William Hopkinson of LUMC regarding continued accreditation of LUMC's Orthopaedic Surgery Residency Program; (2) the curriculum vitae of Dr. Karen Wu, which was submitted to ACGME's Residency Review Committee for Orthopaedic Surgery in 2014; and (3) correspondence dated July 31, 2014 from Dr. Derstine of ACGME to Dr. Wu of LUMC regarding information submitted by LUMC's Orthopaedic Surgery Residency Program. The three documents were generated in 2014.

Plaintiff asserts the documents are relevant to this matter because the information provided in 2014 for accreditation purposes included information concerning plaintiff's residency class. LUMC argues that because those documents were generated in 2014, well after plaintiff's 2012 termination from the residency program, they bear no relevancy to the issues in this case. LUMC further argues that the accreditation of LUMC's Orthopaedic Surgery Residency Program, particularly after plaintiff left the program, is not at issue here.

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to obtain discovery regarding “any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” “For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” including information that is not itself admissible but “is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “In ruling on motions to compel discovery, courts have consistently adopted a liberal interpretation of the discovery rules.” Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 450 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citation omitted); see Cannon v. Burge, No. 05 C 2192, 2010 WL 3714991, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2010) (“The federal discovery rules are liberal in order to assist in trial preparation and settlement.”). “Courts commonly look unfavorably upon significant restrictions placed upon the discovery process,” and the “burden rests upon the objecting party to show why a particular discovery request is improper.” Kodish, 235 F.R.D. at 450. With this standard in mind, we turn to the three documents at issue here.

As mentioned above, LUMC maintains that Dr. Wu's curriculum vitae is not relevant to this lawsuit. We agree. Plaintiff does not assert how Dr. Wu's curriculum vitae is relevant, nor could we find any sense of relevancy in the record. Dr. Wu is not a party to this litigation, and there is no reason to find that her curriculum vitae is relevant to the issues in this case. Therefore, the motion to compel with respect to Dr. Wu's curriculum vitae is denied.

Although this Court cannot predict the contents of the February 20, 2014 and July 31, 2014 correspondence, we agree that the documents may ultimately prove relevant to the issues in the case, namely LUMC's affirmative defense that plaintiff was terminated due to unethical and unprofessional behavior. According to LUMC's own answer to the complaint, plaintiff's falsified surgical case logs, attendance, and professionalism were factors in his termination. Plaintiff maintains that residents' surgical case logs, attendance, probation, and professionalism are reported to ACGME. It is further alleged that reporting on plaintiff's residency class at LUMC continued after plaintiff's September 17, 2012 termination. While the accreditation of LUMC's residency program is not at issue, the data that was reviewed for the accreditation encompasses plaintiff's residency class. It would be unjust to permit LUMC to withhold documents that may address the evaluations of other residents during the relevant time period.

*3 Of course, the decision as to the admissibility of the correspondence is for another day. Further, the veracity of any statements made within the correspondence will be determined by the finder of fact.

As for LUMC's position that certain documents are protected under the LUMC/ACGME confidentiality agreement, LUMC does not assert why the February 20, 2014 and July 31, 2014 correspondence should be considered protected under the confidentiality agreement. It is LUMC's burden to establish such a privilege exists. Kodish, 235 F.R.D. at 450. On the record before us, LUMC has not met this burden.

As such, plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part. By March 16, 2015, LUMC shall produce the February 20, 2014 and July 31, 2014 correspondence to plaintiff.

LUMC asserts that plaintiff prematurely filed the motion to compel before the defendant's 30-day period in which to respond to the document request, and as a result the motion should be denied. Although defendants were still within the window to answer discovery, LUMC already produced certain documents and has since indicated in its response and supplemental response that the documents at issue will not be voluntarily produced. Given that the parties have already met and conferred to discuss the discovery issues, the matter is now ripe for decision.