*1 Written opinion by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason: For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to compel the production of 30(b)(6) witness [257] is denied. Status hearing scheduled for October 13, 2016 at 10:00 a.m.

The background of this matter has been discussed in previous Court orders and party motions. In brief, plaintiff Mark McDaniel, M.D. (“plaintiff”) brought this action alleging that he was wrongfully terminated from Loyola University Medical Center's (“LUMC”) orthopaedic residency program and exposed to a hostile work environment. Defendants LUMC, CHE Trinity, Inc., Loyola University of Chicago, Dr. William Hopkinson, Dr. Terry Light, Dr. William Cannon, Dr. Dane Salazar, and Dr. Alexander Ghanayem (collectively referred to as “defendants”) contend that misrepresentations in plaintiff's surgical case logs, his poor attendance, and his lack of professionalism were the factors that led to his termination.

Oral fact discovery was set to close on March 30, 2016. (Dkt. 167). On March 28, 2016, this Court granted parties' agreed motion to extend discovery, ordering oral discovery to close on July 29, 2016. (Dkt. 230). On July 25, 2016, plaintiff issued a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition to CHE Trinity (“CHE”), noticing the deposition for 11:00 a.m. on July 28, 2016. The parties met and conferred on July 26, and CHE tendered written objections to the notice on July 27. On July 29, plaintiff filed a motion to compel the production of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. (Dkt. 257).

In his motion to compel, plaintiff seeks CHE's production of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to address nine topics outlined in the notice. According to plaintiff, his counsel previously informed opposing counsel that a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice would be issued after the depositions of Dr. William Hopkinson and Caterina Goslawski in an effort to narrow the scope of the topics. It is plaintiff's position that he was in compliance with the Local Rules because he attempted to schedule the deposition prior to the July 29 close of discovery and sought to find a mutually agreeable resolution with CHE.

In its response, CHE argues that the notice was untimely in that it gave the defendant less than three days' notice for identifying the appropriate Rule 30(b)(6) witness(es), determining the availability of the witness(es) and attorneys, and preparing the witness(es) for deposition. (Dkt. 275). Additionally, CHE claims that the nine topics listed on the notice of deposition were overly broad, duplicative, and unduly burdensome.

In reply, plaintiff asserts that any delay is the fault of CHE because of its response in the form of written objections. (Dkt. 279). Plaintiff further contends that the topics outlined in the 30(b)(6) notice were proper. This Court agrees with CHE.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 requires a party to give reasonable written notice of a deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). Whether notice is reasonable is case-specific and fact-intensive. C & F Packing Co., Inc. v. Doskocil Companies, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 662, 678–79 (N.D.Ill.1989) (“[C]ounsel is entitled, when possible, to a date which does not conflict with other obligations and to an opportunity to prepare for the deposition.”); Peterson v. Union Pacific R. Co., No. 06-CV-3084, 2007 WL 2701268, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2007); Nieman v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., No. 11-CV-3404, 2012 WL 5471949, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 320, 327 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The time between the notice and the deposition in comparison to the time required for preparation and travel is a relevant factor to consider. Peterson, 2007 WL 2701268, at *2; Nieman, 2012 WL 5471949, at *2. Further, “[a] Rule 30(b)(6) witness often requires additional preparation because the witness is not testifying as to his personal knowledge, but is testifying on behalf of the corporation as to matters known or reasonably known to the corporation.” Nieman, 2012 WL 5471949, at *2.

Analysis

*2 In this case, plaintiff gave CHE three days' notice in which CHE was required to determine the appropriate witness(es) for nine broad topics and prepare the witness(es) for deposition. Plaintiff has known since the discovery extension was granted on March 28, 2016 that oral discovery closed on July 29, 2016, and yet plaintiff waited until four days before the close of oral discovery to seek a deposition on nine topics. Notably, plaintiff's own counsel previously acknowledged that scheduling depositions can take some time. In an email dated May 4, 2016, plaintiff's counsel, Kristi Browne, discussed eight depositions to be noticed up and stated “[o]bviously the sooner we have notices of these depositions, the sooner we can work on scheduling.” (Resp. at Ex. B). Plaintiff's counsel's actions here, however, show a complete disregard for scheduling. While her email comment was in reference to eight depositions, the deposition notice at issue is with respect to nine complex topics that could require numerous witnesses. The arbitrary July 28 date designated by plaintiff was only selected in an effort to avoid the July 29 close of oral fact discovery, a deadline plaintiff knew was fast approaching.

Plaintiff's claim that he “diligently pursued this deposition” (Reply at 10) is unpersuasive given the timing of plaintiff's notice. A diligent effort over the course of a few days does not make up for the initial delay. Plaintiff was asked as early as May 4, 2016 for the Rule 30(b)(6) topics so that CHE could work on scheduling depositions. (Resp. at Ex. B). Plaintiff, however, has failed to provide any support for the delay in noticing the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition aside from the vague statement that prior depositions needed to be completed in order for plaintiff to narrow the topics of the 30(b)(6) request. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the prior depositions indeed resulted in narrowed Rule 30(b)(6) topics. The topics are not so narrowly tailored that plaintiff is justified in waiting two weeks after the last depositions and four days before oral discovery closed to issue the notice. Plaintiff faults CHE for waiting two days to tender written objections, yet his counsel waited almost two weeks after the last depositions to tender the notice at issue.

It was unreasonable to expect CHE to be able to identify the appropriate witness(es) on the topics and prepare for the deposition(s) within three days. See Peterson, 2007 WL 2701268, at *2 (court finding that four days' notice for a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to be deposed on the day discovery closed was not reasonable as required under Rule 31(b)(1)); see also Nieman, 2012 WL 5471949, at *2 (finding seven business days to designate and prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) witness was not reasonable given the extensive topics listed in the notice, and finding that plaintiff had no reason to wait until the end of fact discovery to notice the deposition); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. at 327 (ruling that deposition notices served slightly more than two weeks before the close of discovery was unreasonable given the complex issues of the case, the notice for the deposition hours before the discovery cut-off, and the likelihood that “schedules of the deponents and a number of lawyers would be unable to accommodate the belatedly filed notices.”).

Further, plaintiff's attempts to shift the blame to CHE are also without merit. The Court disagrees with plaintiff's statement that “[a] common sense review of the events resulting in this motion clearly shows that any unreasonableness is attributable to Defendants.” (Reply at 3). The parties met and conferred regarding the notice of deposition on July 26. CHE tendered written objections to the notice of deposition the following day, within two days of receiving the notice. In defending the broad nature of certain requests, plaintiff blames CHE for providing written objections instead of seeking additional clarifications from plaintiff. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendants “fail[ure] to engage Plaintiff's counsel in a timely manner” (Reply at 4) caused further delays. This Court encourages parties to meet and confer in an attempt to resolve issues; nonetheless, CHE was within its right to tender written objections after the meet and confer failed to alleviate all of its concerns. Moreover, plaintiff cannot issue broad requests with the assumption that a meet and confer would direct CHE towards the specific issues plaintiff would like addressed. The notice should be narrowly tailored in the first place so that time is not wasted speculating and clarifying what is indeed being sought.

*3 Given the contentious nature of this lawsuit, it is not surprising that CHE provided written documentation regarding its positions. The written objections were an appropriate response to the notice of deposition once the meet and confer failed to resolve all issues relating to the notice, and they were tendered in a timely manner. Had there been more time before the close of discovery, plaintiff would not likely have taken such issue with the timing of the written objections. Instead, plaintiff's actions created an urgency that plaintiff expected defendants to accommodate. See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. at 327 (finding that the conditions giving rise to the issue were attributable to plaintiff waiting until the last minute to notice the depositions).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) notice on the eve of fact discovery was untimely and denies plaintiff's motion to compel the production of 30(b)(6) witness.[1]

The additional objections raised by CHE regarding the substance of the requests need not be addressed at this time given the Court's finding that the notice as a whole was untimely.