*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Waring's (“Plaintiff's”) Motion to Compel, filed in the joint stipulation format pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, on March 31, 2020 (the “Motion” or “Joint Stip.”). (Dkt. No. 28-29.) Plaintiff requests an order compelling Defendant Geodis Logistics LLC (“Defendant” or “Geodis”) to: (1) compel Defendant's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness to testify pursuant to categories listed in the notice of deposition; and (2) produce documents responsive to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents (“RFP”) No. 69. (Joint Stip. at 24.) The parties also submit a Declaration of Justin Hanassab, Plaintiff's counsel, in support of the Motion with supporting exhibits (Dkt. No. 29-1 (“Hanassab Decl.”)); a Declaration of Story E. Cunningham-White, Defendant's counsel, in support of Geodis's opposition to the Motion with supporting exhibits (Dkt. No. 29-2 (“Cunningham Decl.”)); and a Declaration of Robert Balgemann, Geodis's Senior Vice President of Operations, in support of Geodis's opposition to the Motion (Dkt. No. 29-3 (“Balgemann Decl.”)). On April 13, 2020, the Court, finding the matter suitable for decision without oral argument, vacated the hearing on the Motion and took the matter under submission. (Dkt. No. 30.)

For the reasons outlined below, the Motion is DENIED.

I. The Complaint and the Answer

Plaintiff filed his complaint in Superior Court, Los Angeles County on April 19, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10-26 (CM/ECF pdf pag.) (the “Complaint”).) On May 21, 2019, Defendant removed the action to federal court based on the parties' diversity of citizenship (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-7). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Complaint alleges the following. In 2014, Plaintiff, who had over 20 years of experience in the supply chain and business operations industries, was hired by Geodis as Senior Director of Operations. (Complaint ¶ 12.) Geodis is a third-party logistics company that provides transportation, warehousing, and supply-chain management services for several complaints; it operates the primary distribution centers in North America for large corporations, such as Apple, Inc. (“Apple”). (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was responsible for distributing many Apple products through various supply channels; he worked closely with Apple and was skilled at his job. (Id.) Plaintiff performed his job duties “in an exemplary manner” and consistently received excellent performance reviews, consequently receiving high merit-based bonuses. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Between July and December 2018, several members of Plaintiff's family were diagnosed with or experienced symptoms of severe physical and mental health conditions. (Id. at ¶ 15.) In December 2018, Plaintiff himself was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, which triggered a myriad of physical symptoms. (Id.) Due to these health issues, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence from work under the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) to care for himself and his ailing family members. (Id.) Plaintiff's leave was approved on December 13, 2018. (Id.)

*2 On or around February 21, 2019, Plaintiff returned to work; within hours of returning, Plaintiff met with his supervisors, who informed him that his employment with Geodis was being terminated effective immediately due to “performance issues.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Later, Balgemann privately told Plaintiff, “you should not have gone on leave.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that Defendant feared he would be distracted and inattentive at work due to his personal circumstances and, thus, Defendant unlawfully terminated his employment due to his disability, association with disabled family members, and in retaliation for taking CFRA-approved leave. (Id. at ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action: (1) disability discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12900, et seq. (California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)); (2) disability-based associational discrimination in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to prevent discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k); (4) retaliation for taking CFRA leave in violation of FEHA; (5) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code. § 12940(a), (i), (m), and (n); (6) failure to engage in interactive process in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (i), (m), and (n); (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Complaint ¶ 18-98.) Plaintiff seeks general and specific damages; pre-and post-judgment interest on damages; exemplary and punitive damages; attorneys' fees; civil penalties; medical expenses and related expenses; and any further relief the Court deems just and proper. (Id. at p. 26 (CM/ECF pdf. pag.).)

On May 16, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint in California state court, that it attached to the Notice of Removal. (Dkt. No. 1 at 36-41 (CM/ECF pdf. pag.) (the “Answer”).)

II. Discovery Efforts Preceding the Motion

The parties' initial discovery cut-off date was set as December 23, 2019, but was later advanced to March 23, 2020. (Dkt. No. 13, 23.) On September 20, 2019, Plaintiff served on Defendant his second set of RFPs, which encompassed RFP Nos. 63 to 127, along with a meet and confer letter. (Hanassab Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) RFP No. 69 sought personnel files of James Strickland, the Geodis employee who was promoted to Plaintiff's position after Plaintiff's termination. (Id. at ¶ 2, Ex. 1 ¶ 69.) On November 14, 2019, Defendant produced responsive documents but did not include any personnel evaluations, performance improvement plans, or other documents related to Strickland's job performance. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

On January 2, 2020, Plaintiff served on Defendant a Notice of Deposition pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), listing categories he expected Defendant to testify to, along with various RFPs. (Id. ¶ 6, Ex. 4.) Category 17 related to the policies and procedures regarding Geodis's promotions of managers, and Category 25 concerned Geodis's relationship to Apple. (Id. at Ex. 4, ¶¶ 17, 25; Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5.) On January 23, 2020, Defendant filed objections to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition. (Hanassab Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 5.) During a meet-and-confer between the parties, defense counsel stated that Defendant would not produce additional documents responsive to Plaintiff's RFP No. 69 (i.e., documents relating to Strickland's job performance) because they were not relevant. (Id. at ¶ 9.) In February and March 2020, the parties had further meet and confer communications. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11; Cunningham Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff agreed to narrow some of the Rule 30(b)(6) categories, but the parties could not resolve their disputes concerning Categories 17 and 25. (Hanassab Decl. ¶ 11; Cunningham Decl. ¶ 2.)

*3 Following the parties' inability to resolve the RFP and Rule 30(b)(6) disputes, the parties prepared and filed the instant Motion.

PLAINTIFF'S CATEGORY NO. 17

The policies, procedures and processes in effect at any time during PLAINTIFF'S employment regarding selection of PERSONS for managerial positions, whether as new hires or as transfers from within, including for the position held by PLAINTIFF before his termination.

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO CATEGORY NO. 17

Defendant objects to this Category on the ground[s] that it seeks information that is neither relevant to either party's claim or defense nor proportional to the needs of the case[;] ... it does not describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested[;] ... it is vague and ambiguous[; and] ... it is overly broad.

PLAINTIFF'S CATEGORY NO. 25

The Apple division supervised by PLAINTIFF during his employment by [Defendant], including the following: [Defendant's] contractual obligations to Apple and policies, practices and procedures put in place to carry out same and the profitability or lack thereof of the Apple contract(s) to [Defendant].

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO CATEGORY NO 25

Defendant objects to this Category on the ground[s] that it seeks confidential and/or proprietary information[;] ... it does not describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested[;] ... it seeks information that is neither relevant to either party's claim or defense nor proportional to the needs of the case[;] ... it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible as written[;] ... it is overly broad and unduly burdensome and harassing[; and] ... it seeks confidential and/or proprietary information.

PLAINTIFF'S RFP NO. 69

The complete personnel file(s) of James Strickland including employment application, resume, job description, performance evaluations, written warnings, complaints and reprimands.

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO RFP NO. 69

Responding party objects to this Request on the ground that the terms “[a]ny and all,” “Complaints” are vague, ambiguous, overbroad and burdensome[;] ... it is overbroad in time and scope[; and] ... it seeks evidence that is neither relevant to any party's claim or defense nor proportional to the needs of the case as outlined in Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Plaintiff's Positions

Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant to present a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to testify to Categories 17 and 25 and to produce documents responsive to RFP No. 69. (Joint Stip. at 1.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant's objections to Categories 17 and 25 and RFP No. 69 are boilerplate non-specific objections that provide no factual basis for the arguments asserted. (Id. at 9-10, 17, 21.) Plaintiff further argues that the discovery is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.

As to Category 17, Plaintiff contends that the discovery is relevant because Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff was terminated because of supposed performance issues is inconsistent with the fact that Strickland, who was promoted to Plaintiff's position, had the same performance issues. (Id. at 10.) Moreover, Plaintiff maintains that his performance issues were, at least in part, a product of the hire and promotion of another employee, who was promoted over Plaintiff to a position for which Plaintiff applied. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Category 17 seeks evidence of policies and procedures regarding the selection of employees for managerial positions, which is relevant to whether Plaintiff's termination was pretextual. (Id.)

*4 With respect to Category 25, Plaintiff argues that because he managed Defendant's account with Apple, the discovery is germane to his duties and responsibilities in relation to Defendant's contractual obligations vis-à-vis Apple, the policies and procedures governing those obligations, and whether Plaintiff satisfactorily carried out his duties and responsibilities. (Id. at 17.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends the information is relevant whether Plaintiff was terminated because of his disability and need to take leave from work to address his and his family members' medical conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff emphasizes that any sensitive or confidential information encompassed by Category 25 is protected by the parties' protective order. (Id. at 16.)

As to RFP No. 69, Plaintiff argues Strickland's personnel file is relevant because Strickland is a similarly situated comparator to Plaintiff in all material respects, and the evidence goes to whether Plaintiff's termination was pretextual. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff maintains that although Strickland was Plaintiff's subordinate, they shared many of the same responsibilities and had similar performance issues, but Plaintiff was terminated while Strickland was promoted. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff argues that the evidence is proportional to the needs of the case because Defendant already produced some of Strickland's personnel file, but withheld several documents as irrelevant. (Id. at 22-23.) Plaintiff also argues that proportionality factors are satisfied because he brings his action under remedial statutes embodying broad public policy concerns, the amount in controversy here is substantial, Defendant has far greater access to relevant information than Plaintiff, and Defendant has the resources to respond to Plaintiff's discovery request. (Id. at 23.)

II. Defendant's Positions

A. Category 17

Defendant first notes that it has no universal policies, practices or procedures outlining how it hires or promotes managers. (Id. at 10.) Thus, it cannot produce a witness to testify about non-existent subject matter. (Id. at 10-11.) Second, Defendant contends that Category 17 is irrelevant because this case does not involve a claim for failure to promote. (Id. at 11.) Defendant contends that Strickland is not a proper comparator to Plaintiff because the two were not similarly situated in all material respects. (Id. at 11-12.) Strickland was Plaintiff's subordinate who was promoted to Plaintiff's position after Plaintiff's termination, they performed different roles and functions, and they never competed for the same position. (Id. at 12; Balgemann Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.)

Defendant emphasizes that the factors supporting Strickland's promotion to Plaintiff's former position after Plaintiff's termination have no bearing on the reason for Plaintiff's termination (the issue in this case). (Joint Stip. at 12.) Additionally, Plaintiff already deposed two witnesses involved in Strickland's promotion, Plaintiff had the opportunity to question those witnesses about the promotion, and one of the witnesses (Balgemann) actually testified about it. (Id. at 13-14.) Therefore, any additional testimony would be duplicative. (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues that information about whether another employee was promoted to a position to which Plaintiff also applied is irrelevant because the other employee was promoted more than a year before Plaintiff requested leave. (Id. at 14.)

Third, Defendant contends that Category 17 is overly broad and unduly burdensome. (Id. at 14-15.) Defendant emphasizes that although Plaintiff's counsel agreed during the parties' meet and confer conferences that he would narrow the scope of this category, he did not do so, and now Plaintiff seeks information that Defendant already explained it could not provide. (Id. at 15.) Finally, Defendant argues it would be unduly burdensome to produce a witness to testify to the circumstances surrounding the promotion of every manager it ever employed. (Id.)

B. Category 25

*5 Defendant argues that Category 25 seeks irrelevant, confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information. (Id. at 17-20.) Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to disclosure of every facet of Defendant's relationship with Apple, which includes information that derives independent economic value from not being known to the public and that is protected by various security mechanisms due to its sensitive nature. (Id. at 18.) The information about Defendant's relationship with Apple is not relevant to the reason Plaintiff was terminated (his management issues) or to Defendant's defenses. (Id.) Defendant also contends that the information Plaintiff seeks infringes on its and non-party Apple's privacy rights. (Id. at 19.)

Defendant argues that information about Defendant's relationship with Apple is irrelevant to Plaintiff's job duties and related policies and procedures. (Id.) Defendant, as Plaintiff's employer, established Plaintiff's job responsibilities; Apple did not. (Id.) Moreover, Defendant already produced witnesses who have testified about Plaintiff's job responsibilities and performance issues, as well as voluminous records on the issue. (Id.)

Finally, Defendant argues that the parties' stipulated protective order does not entitle Plaintiff to any confidential information he desires, particularly when the information is not relevant. (Id. at 19-20.) Defendant's contract with Apple has a robust confidentiality provision, and Apple is not a party to the protective order that governs this action; thus, Defendant maintains, the confidentiality of the information about Apple that Plaintiff requests must be preserved. (Id. at 20.)

C. RFP No. 69

Defendant contends that non-party Strickland's performance review is not relevant to this lawsuit because Strickland was not a comparator to Plaintiff, therefore, how he performed during the time he reported to Plaintiff has no bearing on whether the reasons given for Plaintiff's termination were pretextual. (Id. at 23-24.)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, a party may obtain discovery concerning any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As amended in 2015, Rule 26(b)(1) identifies six factors to be considered when determining if the proportionality requirement has been met, namely, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Id. Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id.

Rule 37 provides that “[a] party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3). The party seeking to compel production of documents under Rule 34 has the “burden of informing the court why the opposing party's objections are not justified or why the opposing party's responses are deficient.” Best Lockers, LLC v. Am. Locker Grp., Inc., Case. No. SACV 12-403-CJC (ANx), 2013 WL 12131586, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013).

District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to compel, the Court has similarly broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallet, 296 F.3d at 751).

A. THE MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE

As an initial matter, the discovery cut-off in this case passed on March 23, 2020. (See Dkt. Nos. 13, 23.) The Motion was not filed until March 31, 2020. The Magistrate Judge has no authority to advance the discovery deadline set by the District Judge. United States v. Celgene Corp., No. CV 10-3165 GHK (SS), 2015 WL 9661172, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015) (magistrate judge cannot order discovery after the discovery cut-off). Nor is there any indication that the parties either sought or obtained any extension of the discovery cut-of before filing the Motion. Accordingly, the Motion is untimely on its face and must be denied on that basis.

*6 Furthermore, the Court has specific pre-motion procedures for discovery disputes that requires the parties to engage in a pre-motion conference prior to filing any discovery motion. These procedures are publicly available on the Central District's website. See http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-karen-l-stevenson (last visited September 27, 2020). There is no indication that the parties complied with the Court's procedures before filing the instant Motion. This, too, is a ground to deny the Motion.

Even setting aside these procedural defects, the Motion must be denied for the substantive reasons outlined below.[1]

B. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY ON THE MERITS

I. Category 17

Having thoroughly reviewed the Motion and the parties related affidavits, the Court concludes that, even if the Motion were timely, the testimony Plaintiff seeks to compel regarding Category 17 is not relevant to his claims or proportional to the needs of the case. The primary issue here is whether the reason offered by Defendant for Plaintiff's termination (i.e., performance issues) was pretextual, and whether his termination was actually the product of discrimination or retaliation for taking leave. Category 17 seeks information about the policies and procedures regarding selection of individuals for managerial positions, including for Plaintiff's position. Assuming Defendant even has uniform policies, procedures, and processes in place establishing guidelines for filling all managerial positions (which it denies), it is not clear how those policies and procedures would have relevance to Plaintiff's challenge to Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant failed to promote him to a managerial position and Defendant's guidelines and practices regarding promotions are wholly irrelevant.

Further, Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that Strickland is a true comparator to Plaintiff. To be considered a proper comparator, Plaintiff must show that he and Strickland were “similarly situated in all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 2006). “The employees' roles need not be identical,” they need not have the same supervisor, and whether they “are similarly situated is ordinarily a question of fact.” Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). In general, “individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004) (disparate treatment claim). Indeed, it appears from the records here that Strickland was Plaintiff's subordinate and, contrary to Plaintiff's contention otherwise, the two had different duties. Plaintiff was the Senior Director of Operations, who headed one of Defendant's facilities, oversaw the entire facility, and managed three lines of business. (Joint Stip. at 12.) Strickland managed only one line of business and focused on day-to-day managerial tasks. (Balgemann Decl. ¶ 4.) Thus, while Plaintiff's and Strickland's roles may have been similar in some respects, the evidence before the Court indicates that Strickland and Plaintiff were not similarly situated as required to find true that Strickland was a true comparator.

*7 The testimony Plaintiff seeks through Category 17 is also not proportional to the needs of the case. As noted, the Court is not persuaded that testimony about Defendant's overall policies and procedures regarding managerial promotion decisions is proportionate in light of the primary claims an defenses at issue in the case, namely, whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment on improper grounds. Thus, Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to the testimony encompassed by Category 17 and the Court DENIES the Motion to compel Defendant to produce a witness to testify to that category.

II. Category 25

Much of the testimony that Plaintiff seeks in Category 25 is also irrelevant to the issues in this case and none of it is proportional to the needs of the case. Category 25 seeks testimony about Defendant's contractual relationship with Apple, the policies and procedures Defendant put in place to carry out that contractual relationship, and the profitability of the Apple contract to Defendant. (Joint Stip. at 15.) Evidence about Defendant's contractual relationship with Apple and the profitability of Apple's contract with Defendant is wholly irrelevant to claims and defenses at issue in this case and disproportionate to the needs of the case. None of this information has any bearing on whether Defendant discriminated or retaliated against Plaintiff. Defendant argues that the reasons for Plaintiff's termination concerned his mismanagement of Defendant's facility. The terms and specifications of Geodis's contract with Apple and/or the profitability of that contract have nothing to do with Plaintiff's alleged mismanagement or any other performance issue(s) that Defendant asserts led to his termination.

Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that testimony about Defendant's contractual relationship with Apple or the profitability of that contract is important to resolve the issues involved in this litigation. Defendant's argument that disclosure of the information Plaintiff seeks would also implicate important confidentiality and privacy concerns for non-party Apple militates strongly against disclosure. Information about the contract between Geodis and Apple and the profitability of that relationship is not publicly accessible and Defendant likely derives economic value from the information not being known to the public. Additionally, “[w]hile discovery is a valuable right and should not be unnecessarily restricted, the necessary restriction may be broader when a nonparty is the target of discovery.” Dart Indus. Co., Inc. v. Westwood Chem. Co., Inc., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, as Defendant points out, the contract between Defendant and Apple has a “robust” confidentiality provision, which, in the absence of any showing that the information is relevant, further weighs against an order compelling the testimony about that contract. (Balgemann Decl. ¶ 11.)

The Court recognizes that a small portion of the testimony sought in Category 25 may be relevant to Plaintiff's claims insofar as Plaintiff seeks testimony about the policies and procedures Defendant enacted to carry out its contractual relationship with Apple. As the Geodis employee responsible for managing aspects of Defendant's relationship with Apple, Defendant's policies and procedures vis-à-vis that relationship would be relevant to whether Plaintiff adequately performed his job, i.e., at least part of the purported basis for his termination. But despite the potential relevance, further testimony about the adequacy of Plaintiff's job performance is not proportional to the needs of the case because Defendant has already produced several witnesses, who testified about Plaintiff's job responsibilities and duties, and it has provided additional documents pertaining to Plaintiff's job function. (Joint Stip. at 19; Cunningham Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11, Ex. B at 167-68, 210, 221, 226-43, 265-69.) Thus, additional testimony about Defendant's specific policies concerning its relationship with Apple would likely be duplicative of what has already been produced and to the extent the testimony would pertain to aspects of Defendant's policies that were not within Plaintiff's management responsibilities, that information is neither relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case nor proportionate to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

*8 Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's request to compel Defendant to produce a witness to testify on Category 25.

III. RFP No. 69

The Court finds that Strickland's complete personnel file is not relevant or proportional to the needs of the case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request to compel production of the documents in Strickland's personnel file.

Plaintiff's request for non-party Strickland's personnel file is based on the argument that Strickland is a similarly situated comparator to Plaintiff. But as discussed supra, Strickland is not a true comparator to Plaintiff because they were not similarly situated in all material respects. He neither had a “similar job[ ]” nor “display[ed] similar conduct” to Plaintiff. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 1157.

Furthermore, Strickland's performance during the time he was in a subordinate role to Plaintiff has no bearing whatsoever on whether Plaintiff's termination for performance issues was pretextual in this case. Therefore, his personnel file is not relevant or discoverable. Indeed, courts have recognized an important interest in preserving the confidentiality of information in employee personnel files. See Detroit Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 301, 319 n.16 (1979); see also Tumbling v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 262 F.R.D. 509, 517 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Nakagawa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2008 WL 1808902, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995) (other employees' personnel files not discoverable when plaintiff failed to show those other workers' circumstances were similar to plaintiff's, because of other employees' privacy interests). Because the Court fails to see how Strickland's personnel file is relevant to the issues in this case, there is no reason to risk infringing on Strickland's privacy by ordering disclosure of his personnel file.

For the foregoing procedural and substantive reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Given the disruptions caused by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and the length of time that the Motion has been pending, in the interest of justice, the Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties' arguments, exhibits, and declarations and also discusses in this Order the merits of the parties' arguments.