*1 Pending before the Court are four motions to compel (collectively, “Motions to Compel” or “Defendant's Motions”) filed by Defendant City of El Segundo (“Defendant” or “the City”) which were originally noticed for hearing on June 1, 2021 at 9:30 a.m. and have been submitted for decision: (1) Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Further Response to Interrogatory Number One (“First Interrogatory Motion”) (Docket No. 52);[1] (2) Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Discovery Responses to Interrogatories (Set Two) (“Second Interrogatory Motion”) (Docket No. 53);[2] (3) Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Discovery Responses to Request for Production (Set Three) (“First Document Motion”) (Docket No. 54);[3] and (4) Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Discovery Responses to Request for Production (Set Four) (“Second Document Motion”) (Docket No. 55).[4]

Based on the Court's consideration of the parties' submissions in connection with Defendant's Motions and the pertinent facts and law, the Court grants the Motions to Compel, except to the extent they seek the imposition of monetary sanctions.

II. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was employed as a Police Officer with the El Segundo Police Department, until he resigned effective August 14, 2020. Plaintiff went on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act on May 25, 2020 and was scheduled to return to work on August 14, 2020. (Third Amended Complaint (alternatively, “TAC”) ¶ 111). Prior to his resignation, Plaintiff was President of the Board of Directors for the El Segundo Peace Officers' Association (ESPOA).

*2 Plaintiff alleges that in 2014, he began publicly speaking out against proposed budget cuts that might impact the City's police department, created and distributed mailers and videos opposing the cuts, and spoke at and held rallies at City Council meetings. (TAC ¶¶ 27-30). Plaintiff alleges that shortly after he and the ESPOA began opposing budget cuts, Defendant began a pattern of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation against him and other ESPOA Board members. (TAC ¶ 31).

Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges that myriad disputes arose between him and/or the ESPOA on the one hand, and members of the Police Department's “Command Staff,” on the other, concerning the following issues: (1) implementation of the Body Camera and In-Car Video policies by Lieutenant Ray Garcia in January 2019 (TAC ¶¶ 38-39); (2) the use of unmarked cars in February 2019 (TAC ¶¶ 40-44); and (3) an allegation that Captain Carlos Mendoza had leaked sergeant promotion exam questions in October 2019 (TAC ¶¶ 57-61).

Unrelated to any ESPOA business, Plaintiff also alleges personal grievances related to two separate incidents involving: (1) a Team Building Workshop in May 2019; and (2) his annual evaluation meeting with Lieutenant Dan Kim in November 2019. During the May 2019 Team Building Workshop, Plaintiff assumed that Lt. Jeff Leyman was referring to Plaintiff or other ESPOA Board members when Leyman announced he intended to retire early because a group of officers were spreading lies about him [Leyman]. According to Plaintiff, he wanted to address the issue and offered to attend a Command Staff meeting as President of the ESPOA, but Captain Mendoza declined the offer and told Plaintiff that “all members of Command Staff would back Lt. Leyman no matter who [was] right or wrong and further indicated that he would not want to be alone in that room.” (TAC ¶¶ 45-55). Plaintiff alleges that he “reasonably interpreted [Captain] Mendoza's statement as intimidation and/or a threat of physical violence and/or career suicide should Plaintiff continue to press the matter and insist on attending a Command Staff meeting and on directly addressing Command Staff concerning Plaintiff's legitimate concerns.” (TAC ¶ 56).

In November 2019, Plaintiff alleges that he felt threatened and intimidated during a meeting with his supervisor, Lt. Dan Kim, to discuss Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the “meets standards” rating in his annual performance evaluation. (TAC ¶¶ 64-70). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that during the meeting, “[i]n a very threatening and intimidating tone, Lt. Kim told Plaintiff that Lt. Kim was not done talking and told Plaintiff to ‘sit down.’ Plaintiff advised Lt. Kim that he did not feel comfortable anymore and that Plaintiff wanted to leave. Plaintiff then stood up from the chair and attempted to leave the room. Lt. Kim raised his voice even louder and said, ‘sit down,’ which Plaintiff interpreted as an official order and, in fear of insubordination, complied with Lt. Kim's order.” (TAC ¶ 70).

Plaintiff further alleges that on December 12, 2019, he made a written complaint to the City's Human Resources Director, David Serrano, concerning his evaluation meeting with Lt. Kim, but an investigation was not conducted, and instead he was issued a false “write-up.” (TAC ¶ 79). Since filing such written complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered the following adverse employment actions: (1) he was verbally disciplined for trivial matters (TAC ¶ 81); (2) he was constantly isolated for normal communication within the Community Engagement Division (TAC ¶ 81); (3) his work schedule was adjusted, which impacted his overtime hours (TAC ¶ 81); (4) he was held out of School Resource Officer related activities where El Segundo Elected Officials are involved (TAC ¶ 81); (5) he was denied promotion (TAC ¶ 84); and (6) he was denied additional work opportunities and assignment to earn overtime or other premium pay (TAC ¶ 85).

*3 In addition, Plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against for his speech and association rights as follows: (1) he was constructively forced to leave the SWAT team (TAC ¶ 118, v.); (2) he was instructed that he could not be promoted to sergeant until he resigned his position on the ESPOA Board (TAC ¶ 118, ix.); (3) Command Staff was told that Plaintiff is not loyal to the Police Department and Plaintiff and ESPOA Board members were referred to as “gang-members,” “organizational terrorists,” “rogues,” “liars,” and “the group trying to get Chief Whalen Fired” (TAC ¶ 118, xiii.); and (4) an illegal audit of Plaintiff's Body Worn Camera footage was ordered and permitted in an attempt to discover and/or manufacture false and untrue disciplinary charges against him, although he was never actually disciplined (TAC ¶ 118, xvii.).

Plaintiff further alleges that on or about March 24, 2020, Chief Whalen issued a directive to Plaintiff, in his capacity as President of the ESPOA, prohibiting Plaintiff from communicating with ESPOA members on how to process COVID-19 exposure notices. (TAC ¶ 89).

B. Procedural History

On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint. (Docket No. 1). On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 13). On August 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 20). On September 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 26). On November 3, 2020, the District Judge dismissed portions of the Third Amended Complaint, leaving claims for relief for: (1) retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the City; (2) municipal liability – ratification (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the City; (3) municipal liability – unconstitutional custom or policy (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the City; (4) discrimination for participation in employee representative organization (California Government Code § 3506) against the City;[5] and (5) retaliation for exercise of lawful action as elected representative of employee bargaining unit (California Government Code § 3502.1) against the City.[6] (Docket Nos. 35-36). In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against and subject to a threat of violence for exercising his free speech and public employee union association rights.

On November 18, 2020, the City filed an Answer to the Third Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 37).

On October 1, 2020, the City propounded its Interrogatories (Set One), which contained Interrogatory No. 1, among other interrogatories.[7] (Docket No. 52 at 7; Docket No. 52-1 at 2, ¶ 2; Docket No. 63-1 at 5).

*4 On November 30, 2020, Plaintiff initially responded to the City's Interrogatories (Set One). (Docket No. 52-1 at 2, ¶ 2). As the City viewed Plaintiff's responses to be deficient, on January 19, 2021, Defendant's counsel sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff's counsel. (Docket No. 52-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 52-1 at 6-8).

Also on January 19, 2021, the City propounded Request for Production (Set Three), which apparently contained RFP Nos. 75 and 88-97.[8] (Docket No. 54 at 6-8; Docket 54-1 at 2, ¶ 2; Docket No. 63-1 at 7).

Between January 26, 2021 and March 15, 2021, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel multiple emails inquiring about the status of Plaintiff's supplemental responses to the City's Interrogatories (Set One). (Docket No. 52-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 52-1 at 10-24).

On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff's counsel advised two of Defendant's attorneys via email that Aleksandra Urban – who was not then identified as an attorney and who to date, is not listed on the docket as an attorney of record – “handled all of the E-discovery for [Plaintiff's counsel's] office.” (Docket No. 52-1 at 12-13).[9]

On February 17, 2021, the City propounded its Interrogatories (Set Two), which contained Interrogatory Nos. 9-13,[10] and its Request for Production (Set Four), which contained RFP Nos. 98-111.[11] (Docket No. 53 at 6; Docket No. 53-1 at 2, ¶ 2; Docket No. 55 at 6-8; Docket No. 55-1 at 2, ¶ 2).[12]

*5 On March 19, 2021, Plaintiff provided supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1-3 in the City's Interrogatories (Set One). (Docket No. 52-1 at 2, ¶ 5).

On March 24, 2021 – having received what Defendant viewed to be a deficient supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 in its Interrogatories (Set One) and no responses to Interrogatories (Set Two), Request for Production (Set Three), and Request for Production (Set Four) – Defendant's counsel sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff's counsel.[13] (Docket No. 52-1 at 3, ¶ 8; Docket No. 52-1 at 26-29; Docket No. 53-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 53-1 at 6-9; Docket No. 54-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 54-1 at 6-9; Docket No. 55-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket 55-1 at 6-9; Docket No. 63-1 at 9; Docket No. 64-1 at 6-10; Docket No. 65-1 at 5-9; Docket No. 66-1 at 6-10). On March 31, 2021 – upon receipt of Plaintiff's counsel's request for an additional three weeks until April 21, 2021 to provide the outstanding discovery – Defendant's counsel agreed to grant Plaintiff one additional week to respond, i.e., until April 7, 2021.[14] (Docket No. 52-1 at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8; Docket No. 52-1 at 31-32; Docket No. 53-1 at 2, ¶¶ 4, 5; Docket No. 53-1 at 11-12; Docket No. 54-1 at 2, ¶¶ 4, 5; Docket No. 54-1 at 11-12; Docket No. 55-1 at ¶¶ 4, 5; Docket No. 55-1 at 11-12). On April 20, 2021 – having received no further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 in its Interrogatories (Set One) and no responses to its Interrogatories (Set Two), Request for Production (Set Three), and Request for Production (Set Four) – Defendant's counsel's assistant sent Plaintiff's counsel Defendant's portions of Joint Stipulations/supporting documents relating to Interrogatory No. 1 in its Interrogatories (Set One), Interrogatories (Set Two), Request for Production (Set Three), and Request for Production (Set Four).[15] (Docket No. 52-1 at 3, ¶ 9; Docket No. 52-1 at 34-82; Docket No. 53-1 at 3, ¶ 6; Docket No. 54-1 at 3, ¶ 6; Docket No. 55-1 at 3, ¶ 6). As the deadline for Plaintiff to provide his portion of the Joint Stipulations/supporting documents expired without provision of the same, Defendant filed Defendant's Motions without such Joint Stipulations on May 4, 2021. (Docket No. 52-1 at 3, ¶¶ 10, 11; Docket No. 53-1 at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8; Docket No. 54-1 at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8; Docket No. 55-1 at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8).

*6 On May 5, 2021, Defendant's counsel and Plaintiff's counsel telephonically conferred and Defendant's counsel thereafter confirmed the substance of such conference via email.[16] (Docket No. 63-1 at 3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 63-1 at 15; Docket No. 64-1 at 3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 64-1 at 16; Docket No. 65-1 at 2-3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 65-1 at 15; Docket No. 66-1 at 3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 66-1 at 16). Plaintiff's counsel essentially advised Defendant's counsel that they would work to answer all discovery raised in Defendant's Motions to obviate the need for court intervention and Defendant's counsel essentially indicated that Defendant may withdraw Defendant's Motions upon receipt of Plaintiff's answers to the outstanding discovery, depending on the answers received. (Docket No. 60-1 at 2, ¶¶ 3, 4; Docket No. 60-2 at 2, ¶¶ 6, 7; Docket No. 63-1 at 3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 63-1 at 15; Docket No. 64-1 at 3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 64-1 at 16; Docket No. 65-1 at 2-3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 65-1 at 15; Docket No. 66-1 at 3, ¶ 5; Docket No. 66-1 at 16).

As of May 18, 2021, Plaintiff had not provided a further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 in Interrogatories (Set One) or any responses to the Interrogatories (Set Two), Request for Production (Set Three), or the Request for Production (Set Four). (Docket No. 63-1 at 3, ¶ 6; Docket No. 64-1 at 3, ¶ 6; Docket No. 65-1 at 3, ¶ 6; Docket No. 66-1 at 3, ¶ 6).

The deadline to complete discovery is July 6, 2021. (Docket No. 44). Any motion challenging the adequacy of responses to discovery must be heard sufficiently in advance of such date to permit the responses to be obtained before that date if the motion is granted. (Docket No. 22 at 4).

III. Pertinent Law

A. Governing Local Rules

Local Rules 37-1, et seq. govern the filing of motions to compel discovery in the Central District of California. Such rules essentially contemplate that when a discovery dispute exists, the following shall occur: (1) the moving party will send the opposing party a meet and confer letter which comports with Local Rule 37-1,[17] with the opposing party having ten days to confer; (2) thereafter, if the parties are unable to resolve their differences, the moving party shall send the moving party's portion of a joint stipulation which comports with Local Rule 37-2.1 & 37-2.2 (and all supporting documents) to the opposing party, with the opposing party having seven days to insert its position and return the joint stipulation (and all supporting documents) to the moving party; (3) the moving party shall then sign the joint stipulation and send the joint stipulation to the opposing party who must sign and return the joint stipulation by the end of the next business day; (4) the moving party shall then file the joint stipulation along with a notice of motion, setting the matter for hearing not sooner than 21 days later/the court's next subsequent regular hearing date; and (5) the parties may file supplemental memoranda not later than fourteen days before the hearing date. See Local Rules 37-1, 37-2, 37-2.1, 37-2.2, 37-2.3, 37-3. Alternatively, in the event that the opposing party fails to fulfill any of its foregoing obligations, Local Rule 37-2.4 allows the moving party to file a motion (not a joint stipulation) with a declaration attesting to the opposing party's failure, along with a notice of motion, setting the matter for not sooner than 28 days later/the court's next subsequent regular hearing date, with the opposing party's opposition due 21 days before the hearing date and the moving party's reply due 14 days before the hearing date.[18] See Local Rule 37-2.4. Local Rule 37-4 provides that the failure of any counsel to comply with or cooperate in the foregoing procedures may result in the imposition of sanctions

B. Discovery Law

*7 Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information within the foregoing scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories within the scope of Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). A party must respond to interrogatories by answer or objection; the ground for the objection must be stated with specificity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3)-(4). General or boilerplate objections are improper – especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections. A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). A motion to compel may be granted if a party provides an evasive or incomplete interrogatory response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), 37(a)(4).

Pursuant to Rule 34, any party may serve on any other party a request for the production or inspection of documents within the scope of Rule 26(b) which are in the responding party's possession, custody or control. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Documents are deemed to be within a party's possession, custody or control if the party has actual possession, custody or control thereof or the legal right to obtain the property on demand. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 517 U.S. 1205 (1996). Accordingly, a party has an obligation to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of its responses to discovery, and based on that inquiry, a party responding to a Rule 34 production request is under an affirmative duty to seek that information reasonably available to it from its employees, agents, or others subject to its control. A. Farber and Partners, Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 189 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Unless excused by a protective order, in response to a request for the production of documents a party must, within 30 days of service thereof and as to each item or category, either: (1) state that the inspection will be permitted/production will be made; or (2) state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons, and state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A)-(C). If the responding party states that it will produce documents, such production must be completed no later than the time specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).

If a party fails timely to object to discovery requests, such a failure generally constitutes a waiver of any objections which a party might have to the requests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (any ground not stated in timely objection to interrogatory waived unless court, for good cause, excuses failure);[19] Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”) (citation omitted), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 948 (1992); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronic Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 952254, *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (“Objections not interposed in a timely initial response may not be held in reserve and interposed after the period allowed for response ... ”) (citation omitted); Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 409-10 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (court declined to consider objections that were not asserted in responding party's original discovery responses based upon party's failure timely to make such objections).

*8 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit has rejected a per se waiver rule that deems a privilege waived if a privilege log is not produced within Rule 34's time limit. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont. (“Burlington”), 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 939 (2005). Instead, using the Rule 34 deadline as a default guideline, a district court should make a case-by-case determination, taking into account the following factors: (1) the degree to which the objection or assertion of privilege enables the litigant seeking discovery and the court to evaluate whether each of the withheld documents is privileged (where providing particulars typically contained in a privilege log is presumptively sufficient and boilerplate objections are presumptively insufficient); (2) the timeliness of the objection and accompanying information about the withheld documents (where service within the Rule 34 deadline as a default guideline, is sufficient); (3) the magnitude of the document production; and (4) other particular circumstances of the litigation that make responding to discovery unusually easy or unusually hard. Id. These factors should be applied in the context of a holistic reasonableness analysis, intended to forestall needless waste of time and resources, as well as tactical manipulation of the rules and the discovery process. Id. They should not be applied as a mechanistic determination of whether the information is provided in a particular format. Id.

Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5), if a party's discovery motion is granted, the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard,[20] order a party whose conduct necessitated the motion to pay the moving party's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees unless the moving party filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action, the opposing party's conduct was substantially justified, or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

IV. Discussion

A. First Interrogatory Motion

The First Interrogatory Motion seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to provide a further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1. Plaintiff argues that such motion constitutes “an abuse of the discovery process” and is “unnecessary” because “Plaintiff has already agreed to supplement.” (Docket No. 60 at 2). The First Interrogatory Motion is granted for the reasons explained below.

Interrogatory No. 1 essentially called for Plaintiff to identify each and every adverse employment action Plaintiff claims he was subjected to in this lawsuit and, for purposes of such interrogatory, defined “adverse employment action” as “any termination, suspension, demotion, reprimand, loss of pay, failure or refusal to promote, or other action or failure to act that [Plaintiff] claims adversely effects [Plaintiff's] employment-related rights or interests.” (Docket No. 52 at 7).

Plaintiff's initial response to Interrogatory No. 1 (1) incorporated Plaintiff's general objections;[21] (2) further objected to the term “adverse employment action” as defined because such term assertedly referred to a series of events and may involve a pattern of actions that alone may not individually constitute harassment, discrimination, or retaliation, but when taken as a whole establish prohibited conduct, and as a whole may be considered adverse under the particular circumstances of this case, and referred the City to the operative complaint; and (3) stated that discovery had just begun and as more information became available to him, he might amend his response in accordance with the Federal Rules. (Docket No. 52 at 9).

*9 Plaintiff's supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 is extremely lengthy. “Without waiving any previously asserted objections,” it states:

For the reasons explained below, the First Interrogatory Motion is granted except as to sanctions.

First, the Court rejects Plaintiff's contention that the Interrogatory Motion is an “abuse of discovery” or “unnecessary” in light of Plaintiff's asserted representation that it would provide a further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 and its failure to do so as of May 18, 2021. The discovery cut-off – the deadline by which any discovery motions must be heard and any discovery ordered in connection therewith must be supplied – is July 6, 2021. As far as the Court can tell from the record, Plaintiff has provided neither the promised supplemental response nor a date by which it would provide such response. Given the history and the discovery deadline in this case, it is perfectly reasonable for Defendant to pursue the further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 by motion at this juncture.

*15 Second, Plaintiff's general objections which have been incorporated into his response to Interrogatory No. 1 are overruled because such general and boilerplate objections are improper and unsupported. See A. Farber & Partners, Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 188. Such objections do not explain or analyze on an individualized basis why Interrogatory No. 1 is objectionable and are therefore inadequate.

Third, Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's definition of “adverse employment action” is overruled. Plaintiff provides no authority to the Court to support the legal position asserted in such objection. Accordingly, while Plaintiff may qualify any further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 by initially indicating that he does not agree that Defendant's definition of “adverse employment action” is correct, he nonetheless must provide a response to Interrogatory No. 1 consistent with Defendant's definition of such term (e.g., “While Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant's definition of what legally constitutes an ‘adverse employment action,’ Plaintiff identifies the following actions/omissions which are encompassed within such term as defined by Defendant and which he claims he was subject to in this lawsuit ...”).

Fourth, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's supplemental response is evasive, non-responsive, and lacking in specificity – aside from essentially being a run-on regurgitation of the operative complaint. Plaintiff offers no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, within fourteen (14) days Plaintiff shall provide Defendant with a verified straightforward, non-evasive, specific further supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1.

Finally, the Court denies Defendant's request for sanctions which appears in the body of the First Interrogatory Motion because such request for relief is not included in the Notice of Motion as required. See, e.g., Local Rule 7-4 (“The notice of motion shall contain a concise statement of the relief or Court action the movant seeks.”).

B. Second Interrogatory Motion, First Document Motion and Second Document Motion

In the Second Interrogatory Motion, First Document Motion, and Second Document Motion, Defendant essentially seeks to compel Plaintiff to provide (1) verified responses without objection to Interrogatory Nos. 9-13; (2) responses to RFP Nos. 75 and 88-111 without objection; and (3) all documents in Plaintiff's possession, custody or control responsive to RFP Nos. 75 and 88-111. As discussed above in connection with the First Interrogatory Motion, Plaintiff argues that such motions constitute “an abuse of the discovery process” and are “unnecessary” because “Plaintiff has already agreed to supplement.” (Docket No. 60 at 2). Defendant's remaining motions are likewise granted (except as to sanctions) for the reasons explained below.

First, any objections Plaintiff may have had to Interrogatory Nos. 9-13, RFP Nos. 75 and RFP Nos. 88-111 have been waived by Plaintiff's failure timely to raise them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992). After conducting the holistic reasoning analysis required by Burlington to the extent the current record before it permits, the Court finds that such waiver encompasses a waiver of any privilege objections.

To the extent Plaintiff suggests that good cause exists to excuse such waivers, the Court – after considering the factors set forth in note 19, supra – disagrees. Plaintiff's assertion that he missed the response deadline because certain discovery communications were not sent to one of Plaintiff's multiple attorneys and due to an ongoing staffing shortage at Plaintiff's counsels' law firm caused by the pandemic do not persuade the Court otherwise. As to the former, the record detailed above reflects that the discovery communications in issue which inadvertently were not sent to Attorney Urban – who started working on this matter in February 2021 and to this day is not identified on the docket as Plaintiff's counsel of record – were sent to at least two other attorneys who represent Plaintiff, at least one of whom communicated with Defendant's counsel office relating to the same. Urban was a recipient of Defendant's counsel's March 24, 2021 meet and confer letter relating to the Second Interrogatory Motion, First Document Motion, and Second Document Motion, as well as the email extending Plaintiff's response deadline to April 7, 2021. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiff did not timely respond to the foregoing discovery requests in issue and, at least as of May 18, 2021, had still not responded. As to the latter excuse – a staff shortage due to the pandemic – suffice to say the Court is not persuaded that such a staff shortage a year into the pandemic constitutes good cause for the utter failure to respond to the discovery requests in issue in a case in which the discovery cut-off – a date by which all discovery motions must have been heard and discovery ordered in connection therewith produced – is July 6, 2021.

*16 Second, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff's suggestion that it was incumbent upon Defendant's counsel to withdraw Defendant's Motions based on Plaintiff's counsel's representation that Plaintiff would produce responses to the outstanding discovery on some unspecified date in the future, particularly given the upcoming discovery deadline. As the record does not reflect that Plaintiff has yet responded to Interrogatory Nos. 9-13, RFP No. 75 and RFP Nos. 88-111, Plaintiff, within fourteen (14) days shall, to the extent he has not already done so (1) produce to Defendant verified substantive responses without objection to Interrogatory Nos. 9-13; (2) produce to Defendant responses to RFP Nos. 75 and 88-111 without objection; and (3) produce to Defendant all documents in Plaintiff's possession, custody or control responsive to RFP Nos. 75 and 88-111.

Third, the Court denies Defendant's requests for sanctions which appear in the body of the Second Interrogatory Motion, the First Document Motion and the Second Document Motion because the requests for such relief are not included in the Notices of Motion as required. See, e.g., Local Rule 7-4 (“The notice of motion shall contain a concise statement of the relief or Court action the movant seeks.”).

V. Orders

IT IS THEREFORE FOUND AND ORDERED:

Plaintiff and his counsel are cautioned that the failure to comply with this Order will subject Plaintiff and his counsel to sanctions as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), which may include (a) monetary sanctions; (b) an order prohibiting Plaintiff from supporting his claims or from introducing evidence; (c) an order striking Plaintiff's pleadings in whole or in part; and (d) an order to dismiss this action in whole or in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

In connection with the First Interrogatory Motion, Defendant filed a Notice of Motion, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, a Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond with supporting exhibits, and a Reply with another Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond. (Docket Nos. 52, 63). Plaintiff filed a single consolidated Opposition to all four of Defendant's Motions with Declarations of Andrew Magaline and Aleksander Urban and exhibits. (Docket No. 60).

In connection with the Second Interrogatory Motion, Defendant filed a Notice of Motion, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, a Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond with supporting exhibits, and a Reply with another Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond. (Docket Nos. 53, 64). As previously noted, Plaintiff filed a single consolidated Opposition to all four of Defendant's Motions with Declarations of Andrew Magaline and Aleksander Urban and exhibits. (Docket No. 60).

In connection with the First Document Motion, Defendant filed a Notice of Motion, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, a Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond with supporting exhibits, and a Reply with another Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond. (Docket Nos. 54, 65). As previously noted, Plaintiff filed a single consolidated Opposition to all four of Defendant's Motions with Declarations of Andrew Magaline and Aleksander Urban and exhibits. (Docket No. 60).

In connection with the Second Document Motion, Defendant filed a Notice of Motion, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, a Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond with supporting exhibits, and a Reply with another Declaration of Chelsea M. Desmond. (Docket Nos. 55, 66). As previously noted, Plaintiff filed a single consolidated Opposition to all four of Defendant's Motions with Declarations of Andrew Magaline and Aleksander Urban and exhibits. (Docket No. 60).

California Government Code section 3506 prohibits public agencies and employee organizations from interfering with, intimidating, restraining, coercing or discriminating against public employees because of their exercise of their rights under section 3502, which essentially affords public employees the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations, the right to refuse to join or participate in the activities of employee organizations, and the right to represent themselves individually in their employment relations with the public agency. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3506, 3502.

California Government Code section 3502.1 provides: “No public employee shall be subject to punitive action or denied promotion, or threatened with any such treatment, for the exercise of lawful action as an elected, appointed, or recognized representative of any employee bargaining unit.”

Interrogatory No. 1 essentially called for Plaintiff to identify each and every adverse employment action Plaintiff claims he was subjected to in this lawsuit and, for purposes of such interrogatory, defined “adverse employment action” as “any termination, suspension, demotion, reprimand, loss of pay, failure or refusal to promote, or other action or failure to act that [Plaintiff] claims adversely effects [Plaintiff's] employment-related rights or interests.” (Docket No. 52 at 7).

Such Document Requests essentially call for the production of all documents/communications Plaintiff published or exchanged with Andrew McEntyre/Scott O'Connor/Scott Martinez/James Tulette/Shawn Bonfield about any complaints/grievances/concerns about any aspect of such individuals' employment with the City for specified periods of time (RFP Nos. 75, 88-91), all documents/ communications Plaintiff published or exchanged with the ESOA relating to the foregoing individuals' employment with the City for specified periods of time (RFP Nos. 92-96), and all documents/ communications Plaintiff published or exchanged with any person regarding any lawsuit filed against the City/any City employees for a specified period of time (RFP No. 97). (Docket No. 54 at 6-8).

Attorney Aleksandra Urban's name first appeared on a pleading filed in this action on April 1, 2021. (Docket No. 45). Defendant's counsel Chelsea M. Desmond – who herself was added to the docket as one of Defendant's attorneys of record on February 5, 2021 – attests that as of February 17, 2021, she either was not aware, or did not recall that Plaintiff's counsel desired Aleksandra Urban to be included on all discovery related emails for this case. (Docket No. 64-1 at 2, ¶ 2; Docket No. 66-1 at 2, ¶ 2). As noted above, Plaintiff's counsel notified two of Defendant's attorneys (not including Attorney Desmond) on February 3, 2021 that Urban handled e-discovery for Defendant but, as best as the Court can determine, the earliest email in the record which reflects that Aleksandra Urban is actually an attorney – an email which is copied to Attorney Desmond – is dated February 24, 2021. (Docket No. 52-1 at 15 [email signed “Aleksandra Urban, Esq.”]).

These interrogatories essentially call for Plaintiff to describe his alleged total loss of earnings (No. 9), his total economic earnings since his employment with the City ended (No. 10) and from his two public safety union consulting businesses (Nos. 11, 12), and any efforts he made to mitigate his alleged loss of earnings (No. 13). (Docket No. 53 at 6; Docket No. 64-1 at 3, ¶ 8).

Such Document Requests essentially call for the production of all documents/communications regarding Plaintiff's loss of earnings (RFP No. 98), mitigation efforts (RFP No. 99), earnings since leaving his employment with the City (RFP No. 100), medical/billing records related to treatment Plaintiff sought/received (RFP No. 101), billing records/charges/invoices from January 1, 2017 to the present for services he performed for his two public safety union consulting businesses/their clients (RFP Nos. 102, 107), payroll records for his two public safety union consulting businesses showing any wages/payments made to Plaintiff from January 1, 2017 to the present (RFP Nos. 103, 108), Plaintiff's paystubs/timesheets/time-records for his two public safety union consulting businesses from January 1, 2017 to the present (RFP Nos. 104, 109), Plaintiff's stock/ownership of his two public safety union consulting businesses from January 1, 2017 to the present (RFP Nos. 105, 110) and communications between Plaintiff and his two public safety union consulting businesses from January 1, 2017 to the present (RFP Nos. 106, 111). (Docket No. 55 at 6-8; Docket No. 66-1 at 4, ¶ 9).

Defendant's counsel's assistant emailed such discovery requests to attorneys Kevin A. Lipeles, Thomas Schelly and Andrew T. Magaline – Plaintiff's three attorneys of record in this action – but not to Aleksandra Urban (who, as noted above, is not listed on the docket as an attorney of record). (Docket No. 60-1 at 4; Docket No. 60-2 at 2, ¶ 2). See supra note 9.

Defendant's counsel emailed such meet and confer letter to attorneys Kevin A. Lipeles, Aleksandra Urban and Andrew T. Magaline. (Docket No. 53-1 at 6; Docket No. 54-1 at 6; Docket No. 55-1 at 6; Docket No. 63-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 63-1 at 9; Docket No. 64-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 64-1 at 6-10; Docket No. 65-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 65-1 at 5-9; Docket No. 66-1 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 66-1 at 6-10). Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that Aleksandra Urban was not copied on the March 24, 2021 meet and confer letter. (Docket No. 60 at 2).

Defendant's counsel's email granting such extension was directed to attorneys Kevin Lipeles, Aleksandra Urban and Andrew T. Magaline. (Docket No. 52-1 at 31; Docket No. 53-1 at 11; Docket No. 54-1 at 11; Docket No. 55-1 at 11).

Defendant's counsel's assistant emailed such documents to attorneys Kevin A. Lipeles, Thomas Schelly and Andrew T. Magaline – the three attorneys of record in this action – but inadvertently did not send it to Aleksandra Urban (who, as noted above, is not listed on the docket as an attorney of record). (Docket No. 53-1 at 14; Docket No. 54-1 at 14; Docket No. 55-1 at 14; Docket No. 60-2 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 63-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 64-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 65-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 66-1 at 2, ¶ 4). On April 21, 2021, Attorney Magaline exchanged further email communications with Plaintiff's counsel's assistant relating to the Joint Stipulations, effectively acknowledging receipt thereof. (Docket No. 63-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 63-1 at 11-13; Docket No. 64-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 64-1 at 12-14; Docket No. 65-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 65-1 at 11-13; Docket No. 66-1 at 2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 66-1 at 12-14).

Defendant's counsel telephonically conferred with Plaintiff's counsel Aleksandra Urban. Defendant's counsel's confirmation email was directed to Aleksandra Urban, Kevin Lipeles, Andrew Magaline and Thomas Schelly. (Docket No. 65-1 at 15; Docket No. 66-1 at 16).

Pursuant to Local Rule 37-1, the moving party's letter must identify each issue and/or discovery request in dispute, state briefly as to each such issue/request the moving party's position (and provide any legal authority the moving party believes is dispositive of the dispute as to that issue/request), and specify the terms of the discovery order to be sought.

Pursuant to Local Rule 37-2.4, the Court will not consider any discovery motion in the absence of a joint stipulation or a declaration from counsel for the moving party establishing that opposing counsel (a) failed to confer in a timely manner in accordance with Local Rule 37-1; (b) failed to provide the opposing party's portion of the joint stipulation in a timely manner in accordance with Local Rule 37-2.2; or (c) refused to sign and return the joint stipulation after the opposing party's portion was added. If such a declaration accompanies the motion, then Local Rules 6-1 (calling for not less than a 28-day notice), 7-9 (calling for the filing of an opposition not later than 21 days before the hearing date), and 7-10 (calling for the filing of a reply not later than 14 days before the hearing date).

Courts have broad discretion to determine whether a party's failure to raise timely objections to discovery should be excused for “good cause.” See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 240 (D.D.C.1999). In exercising such discretion, courts consider several relevant factors, including: (1) the length of the delay in responding; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) dilatory conduct or bad faith by the responding party; (4) prejudice to the party seeking the disclosure; (5) the nature of the request (i.e., whether the discovery requested was overly burdensome or otherwise improper); and (6) the harshness of imposing the waiver. Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468, 474 (D. Md. 2005).

Paladin Associates, Inc. v. Montana Power Co, 328 F.3d 1145, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff given “opportunity to be heard” within meaning of rule allowing for imposition of discovery sanctions as plaintiff received notice of possibility of sanctions when defendant filed motion for costs, plaintiff allowed to submit responsive brief, and issues were such that evidentiary hearing would not have aided court's decisionmaking process); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 898 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1990) (party need not be given opportunity to respond to sanctions request orally if given full opportunity to respond in writing).

Plaintiff's general objections essentially (1) objected to the extent the requests sought information that is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, or any other applicable privileged or protected information; (2) objected to the extent the requests sought information or documents from third parties or which is protected from compelled disclosure under the California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, and the United States Constitution; and (3) objected to the extent the requests sought information that is irrelevant and/or not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and (4) objected to the extent the requests sought documents that are not in Plaintiff's possession, custody or control. (Docket No. 52 at 7-8).