*1 This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. [Docket No. 177].

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. [Docket No. 177].

I. RELEVANT FACTS

For a more complete account of the facts that give rise to the present case and its procedural history, see this Court's prior Orders. [Docket Nos. 161, 173].

On December 10, 2019, while this case was before the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Defendant Arctic Cat Sales Inc. served its First Set of Request for Production of Documents on each Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs served their Responses on January 9, 2020. (Haws Decl. [Docket No. 181] ¶ 2; see also, Exs. 1–3 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1–158). On February 11, 2020, Defendant Arctic Cat Sales Inc. served its First Set of Interrogatories on each Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs served their Responses on March 12, 2020. (Haws Decl. [Docket No. 181] ¶ 3; see also, Exs. 4–6 [Docket No. 181-1], at 159–417).

On February 25, 2020, following a motion to dismiss that was granted in part and denied in part, the present case was transferred from the Central District of California to this Court. (Order Transferring Action [Docket No. 85]).

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order in this case, and on August 17, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order in this Case. [Docket Nos. 105, 159]. Both the original Pretrial Scheduling Order and the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order allow for supplemental discovery by stating:

(Id. at 3).

On May 15, 2020, Defendants sent Plaintiffs a deficiency letter outlining several purported deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ discovery responses. (Ex. 10 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1003–13). The Parties’ conferred regarding the purported deficiencies. (See, Exs. 11, 12 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1014–27; Nichols Decl. [Docket No. 187] ¶¶ 2–4). On June 29, 2020, Plaintiffs provided Defendants with a “source document index” which provided basic information regarding documents that were produced without metadata. (Nichols Decl. [Docket No. 187] ¶ 7; see also, Ex. 12 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1025–27).

On July 28, 2020, Plaintiffs served their Supplemental Responses to Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s First Set of Interrogatories. (Nichols Decl. [Docket No. 187] ¶ 4; see also, Exs. 7–9 [Docket No. 181-1], at 418–1002).

On August 17, 2020, Arctic Cat Sales Inc. served its Second Set of Interrogatories and Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents on each Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs served their responses on September 16, 2020. (Haws Decl. [Docket No 181] ¶ 6; Exs. 16–21 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1057–86).

*2 Beginning on September 16, 2020, the Parties conferred several times regarding purported deficiencies with Plaintiffs’ responses to both Set One and Set Two of Arctic Car Sales Inc.’s discovery requests, as well as, purported deficiencies with the discovery requests themselves. (See, Exs. 13–14 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1028–49; Nichols Decl. [Docket No. 187] ¶¶ 8–9). On September 28, 2020, Defendants agreed to withdraw several specific interrogatory requests that had been served in Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s Second Set of Interrogatories. (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 19; Ex. 13 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1028).

II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES [Docket No. 177]

On November 2, 2020, Defendants Arctic Cat Sales Inc., Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. filed their present motion to compel.[1] (Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Disc. Responses [Docket No. 177]). Defendants seek an Order of this Court compelling: Plaintiff Robby Gordon (“Gordon”) to amend his Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13,14, 15, 16, and 17, and Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 1(a), 1(c), 1(d), 1(e), 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 17; Plaintiff Todd Romano (“Romano”) to amend his Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, and Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, and 4; Plaintiff Speed RMG Partners, LLC (“Speed RMG”) to amend its Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11; and all Plaintiffs to amend and supplement their Responses to every First Set and Second Set Request for Production of Documents. (Id.). In addition, Defendants seek an Order of this Court striking all boilerplate objections from every one of Plaintiffs’ discovery responses. (Id.).

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Courts construe Rule 26(b)(1) broadly. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); see also, Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (Rule 26 “is liberal in scope and interpretation, extending to those matters which are relevant”). However, the scope of discovery is intended to focus on the actual claims or defenses that are at issue in the litigation. See e.g., Sierrapine v. Refiner Prods. Mfg., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 604, 609 (E.D. Cal. 2011). As such, the party seeking discovery is required to make a threshold showing of relevance before production of information is required. Hofer, 981 F.2d at 380.

In addition, “even if relevant, discovery is not permitted where no need is shown, or compliance would be unduly burdensome, or where harm to the person from whom discovery is sought outweighs the need of the person seeking discovery of the information.” Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter #2, 197 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). “The party resisting production bears the burden of establishing lack of relevancy or undue burden.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Com. Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).

*3 “On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3) provides for various motions to compel disclosure or compel discovery depending on the failure of the other party. Specifically, the Court may compel a discovery response if “a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33” or “fails to produce documents ... as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)–(iv).

B. Analysis

Defendants seek an Order of this Court striking all boilerplate objections from every one of Plaintiffs’ discovery responses. (Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Disc. Responses [Docket No. 177]). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ boilerplate objections are improper because they are not stated with specificity. (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 5], at 5–7). Defendants further contend that “it is impossible for [Defendants] to know whether Plaintiffs’ have provided full and complete responses to its discovery requests.” (Id. at 7).

It is well-established that boilerplate objections, without more specific explanations for any refusal to provide information, are not consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd., 198 F.R.D. at 511–12; see also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B)–(C). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ boilerplate objections are ineffective, and reliance on those boilerplate objections would not be appropriate.

However, Plaintiffs do not rely on their boilerplate objections, but they continue and either respond to a particular request or provide a specific objection to that request. Plaintiffs represent that they have not withheld any non-privileged discovery based on their boilerplate objections, and they have provided a privilege log to account for any privilege objections. (Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 3–4). As Plaintiffs have not relied on their boilerplate objections, there is no reason for this Court to order them stricken. See, Dilena v. Ballistic Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 09-157 (JMR/RLE), 2010 WL 11537423, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2010) (“We are not troubled by a party's decision to include general objections so long as they are employed to preserve an objection to specific discovery requests, and are not deployed to stonewall the opposing party's legitimate discovery requests.”); Wohlers v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ind. Co., No. 07-3891 (PJS/RLE), 2008 WL 11349814, at *2 (D. Minn. June 30, 2008) (“[T]he Defendant's decision to include general objections is appropriate, given that they are employed to preserve an objection to specific discovery requests, and are not deployed to stonewall the Plaintiff's legitimate discovery requests.”).

Accordingly, this Court will consider Defendants’ challenges to specific discovery requests based on the substantive responses, or lack thereof, that Plaintiffs have provided without regard to any boilerplate objections. See, Dilena, 2010 WL 11537423, at *2 (denying motion to compel insofar as it broadly argued that discovery responses contained boilerplate objections, but reviewing the at-issue discovery requests and responses individually); Wohlers, 2008 WL 11349814, at *2 (denying request to compel the defendant to withdraw boilerplate objections and fully answer discovery requests).

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, [Docket No. 177], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court striking all boilerplate objections from every one of each Plaintiffs’ discovery responses.

*4 Defendants seek an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiffs Gordon and Romano to amend their Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, and Plaintiff Speed RMG to amend its Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. (Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Disc. Responses [Docket No. 177]).

In response to each at-issue interrogatory, Plaintiffs provide a lengthy narrative Answer and also purport to invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). (See, Exs. 7–9 [Docket No. 181-1], at 418–1002). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ narrative Answers are non-responsive, and Plaintiffs’ purported invocation of Rule 33(d) is improper. (See, Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 7–13). Although Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ responses to each at-issue interrogatory are all deficient for the same reasons, Defendants provide Gordon's Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 as representative examples. (See, Id.).

Plaintiffs contend that their narrative answers “contained detailed written responses that provide exactly the information sought,” and their “reference to documents under Rule 33(d) is proper.” (See, Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 6–13). Although Plaintiffs contend that their responses to each at-issue interrogatory are all sufficient, Plaintiffs provide Gordon's Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 as representative examples. (See, Id.).

Set One Interrogatory No. 2 to Gordon requested that he identify the amount of royalty payments he believes that he is currently owed and how he calculated that amount. (Ex. 7 [Docket No. 181-1], at 421). Interrogatory No. 2 simply sought a number representing the total amount of royalty payments that Gordon believes he is owed, and an explanation of how he calculated that amount.

Gordon's original Answer to Interrogatory No. 2 provides a lengthy narrative response, and his Supplemental Answer incorporates the original narrative response, provides additional narrative, and purports to invoke Rule 33(d). (Id. at 421–26). Gordon's narrative response is evasive and unintelligible. Gordon does not simply state the royalties he believes he is owed as the interrogatory requests. Rather, he provides a winding labyrinth of tangential information that is utterly incomprehensible. No reasonable person could read Gordon's unintelligible narrative response to Interrogatory No. 2 and derive from it the amount of royalties that Gordon believes he is owed and how he calculated that figure. (See, Id.). As such, Gordon's narrative response to Interrogatory No. 2 is non-responsive and therefore deficient.[2]

*5 Set One Interrogatory No. 4 to Gordon requested that he identify each vehicle and product design that he provided to Defendants, including each novel feature that he specified, the language used to specify the novel feature, and communications related to that vehicle or design. (Id. at 426–27). Like his responses to Interrogatory No. 2, Gordon's original Answer to Interrogatory No. 4 provides a lengthy narrative response, and his Supplemental Answer incorporates the original narrative response, provides additional narrative, and purports to invoke Rule 33(d). (Id. at 427–36). Again, Gordon's narrative response is evasive and unintelligible. Gordon does not simply list the vehicle designs and product designs that he provided to Defendants, nor does he simply state the additional requested information. Rather, he provides a voluminous amount of tangential information that renders his response unintelligible. No reasonable person could read Gordon's unintelligible narrative response to Interrogatory No. 4 and derive from it the requested information. (See, Id.). Thus, Gordon's narrative response to Interrogatory No. 4 is non-responsive and therefore deficient.

The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiffs’ responses to each of the at-issue Set One Interrogatories. The Court finds that Gordon's narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 6, and Romano and Speed RMG's narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6, are each nonresponsive and therefore deficient for the same reasons as Gordon's narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4.

The Court further finds that Gordon and Romano's narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, and Speed RMG's narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, are deficient. Each of those interrogatories requested that the recipient Plaintiff identify “each and every fact in support of” a particular claim or affirmative defense. (Exs. 7–9 [Docket No. 181-1], at 418–1002). The Court notes that those interrogatory requests are very broad and invite very broad responses. The Court also notes that poorly drafted interrogatories beget poorly drafted responses. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs responses to those interrogatories are deficient.

In their narrative responses to each of those interrogatories, Plaintiffs provided some narrative followed by a list of facts. However, each list of facts is non-inclusive and prefaced with the phrase “including, without limitation.” (See, Id.). Because those interrogatories seek “each and every fact” in support of a particular claim or affirmative defense and Plaintiffs have provided a non-inclusive list of those facts, Plaintiffs’ responses are incomplete and therefore deficient. In addition, Plaintiffs appear to have provided an identical list of facts in response to each of those interrogatories. (See, Id.). It seems unlikely that each of the particular claims and affirmative defenses identified in those interrogatories would be supported by an identical set of facts. Plaintiffs must specifically respond to each interrogatory request. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully ....”). To the extent that Plaintiffs’ responses to any given at-issue interrogatory include facts that do not support the particular claim or affirmative defense specified by that specific interrogatory, Plaintiffs’ answers are non-responsive and thus deficient.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ responses to each of the at-issue interrogatories are deficient. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ need to respond to those interrogatories is not abrogated by their purported invocation of Rule 33(d) because, as explained below, none of their responses meet the requirements of Rule 33(d).

Rule 33(d) gives a party the option to produce business records in lieu of a detailed Interrogatory Answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). Rule 33(d) provides:

(Id.).

“Invocation of Rule 33(d) ‘requires first that the information actually be obtainable from the documents.’ ” Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., No. 11-820 (ADM/JSM), 2015 WL 12781248, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2015) (quoting In re Sulphuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 320, 325 (N.D. Ill. 2005)). In addition, simply referring the interrogating party generally to large numbers of documents does not satisfy a party's obligations under Rule 33(d). See, Schwendimann, 2015 WL 12781248, at *5. Rather, “ ‘[r]eferring to business records en masse, without specifying particular documents is an “abuse of the option [provided by Rule 33(d)].’ ”” Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (citations omitted). “ ‘To answer an interrogatory, a responding party has the duty to specify, by category and location, the records from which answers to interrogatories can be derived.’ ” Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., No. 9–cv–1091 (JNE/JSM), 2012 WL 12894846, *10 (D. Minn. May 11, 2012) (citation omitted); see also, Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., 168 F.R.D. 295, 305 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[Parties] may not simply refer generically to past or future production of documents. They must identify in their answers to the interrogatories specifically which documents contain the answer. Otherwise they must completely answer the interrogatories without referring to the documents.”).

Here, Plaintiffs purport to invoke Rule 33(d) in response to each of the at-issue interrogatories by providing listings of bates numbered documents at various points in their Supplemental Answers. (See, Exs. 7–9 [Docket No. 181-1], at 418–1002). These documents are not organized as used in the normal course of business, nor are they identified or organized in any other meaningful way which would enable Defendants to determine which particular documents contain Plaintiffs’ responses. Plaintiffs contend that they have meaningfully organized the document lists “by providing specific bates numbers immediately following the particular piece of information [in the narrative response] to which the documents correspond.” (Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 8). However, as already noted, Plaintiffs narrative answers are all deficient and many are unintelligible. Hence, it is still unclear how, or even if, the documents referenced in connection with any given interrogatory actually respond to the specific inquiry presented by that interrogatory.

Moreover, Plaintiffs preface each listing of bates numbered documents with the phrase, “including without limitation,” and Plaintiffs further state in each interrogatory response that their “identification of documents ... is intended to be illustrative only, and is not comprehensive.” (See, Id.). In its prior Order, this Court has already addressed this same issue.[3] (Order [Docket No. 173], at 19–23). By providing incomplete listings of bates numbered documents that purportedly contain, supplement, or support their Answers, Plaintiffs have not fully responded to the Interrogatories. (See, Id. at 23).

*7 In sum, Plaintiffs have merely provided deficient narrative responses coupled with an incomplete document dump with an improper reference to Rule 33(d) in each of their Answers and Supplemental Answers to the at-issue Set One Interrogatories.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs must amend each of their narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 to plainly and directly answer the specific inquiry presented by each of those particular interrogatories without the inclusion of non-responsive information. Furthermore, Gordon and Romano must amend their narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 and Speed RMG must amend its narrative responses to Set One Interrogatory Nos. 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 to plainly and directly identify all the facts that primarily[4] support the specific claim or affirmative defense that is referenced by each of those particular interrogatories without the inclusion of additional, non-responsive facts that do not primarily support the specific claim or affirmative defense referenced. To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on documents under Rule 33(d) to support, supplement, or illustrate their narrative responses, Plaintiffs must specifically identify every document that they rely on for their response and indicate in a meaningful way what responsive information is contained in those documents.

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, [Docket No. 177], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff Gordon to amend his Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, Plaintiff Romano to amend his Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, and Plaintiff Speed RMG to amend its Answers to First Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18.

Defendants seek an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiffs to identify the documents that are responsive to each Set One Request for Production of Documents. (Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Disc. Responses [Docket No. 177]).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides two alternatives for a party in producing documents responsive to requests propounded under Rule 34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i). It provides that a party must either (1) “produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business,” or (2) “organize and label them to correspond to categories in the request.” Id. “Producing large amounts of documents in no apparent order does not comply with a party's obligation under Rule 34.” See, Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 610 (D. Neb. 2001). “[T]he producing party does have a burden to select and produce the items requested rather than simply dumping large quantities of unrequested materials onto the discovering party along with the items actually sought under Rule 34.” 8B James A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2213 (3d ed. 2010). The purpose and spirit of the Rule permitting a party to select between the two alternatives provided is to prevent a party from making documents responsive to requests difficult to find. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, advisory committee note (1980) (noting that the two-alternative approach was taken in response to the frequent practice of parties deliberately mixing critical documents with others for the purpose obscuring their significance).

*8 Here, Plaintiffs have generically indicated in response to nearly every Set One Request for Production of Documents that they “will produce responsive, non-privileged, non-work product, discoverable documents if any exist in [their] possession, custody, and control.” (See, Exs. 1–3 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1–158). Defendants contend that because Plaintiffs have produced documents responsive to Defendants’ Requests for Production of Documents in bulk, they cannot determine in reference to any particular request whether Plaintiffs have produced documents responsive to that request, represent that they do not possess documents responsive to that request, or have produced some and withheld other documents responsive to that request. (See, Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 13–15).

Plaintiffs contend that they have complied with the requirements of Rule 34 by producing responsive documents as kept in the ordinary course of business because the documents produced include metadata. (Mem. in Opp'n [Docket no. 186], at 13–17). However, “[i]f a party claims that the documents were kept in the ordinary course of business, ... it bears the burden of demonstrating that fact.” Hodges v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 14-cv-4855 (ADM/TNL), 2015 WL 13804602, at *13 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Mizner Grand Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 270 F.R.D. 698, 700 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). “[A] mere assertion that [the documents] were so produced is not sufficient to carry that burden.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535, 540–41 (D. Kan. 2006)). In the present case, by merely asserting that the produced documents include metadata, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that the documents were produced as kept in the ordinary course of business. See, Id.

“Moreover, even when a party produces documents as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, if the business record-keeping system used by the producing party is so deficient as to undermine the usefulness of production, that party may not have met its obligations under Rule 34.” Id. (quoting Mizner Grand Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 270 F.R.D. at 700); see also, Graske v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108–09 (D. Neb. 2009) (concluding that the defendant's production of nearly 7,000 pages of documents without any indices or other tools to guide the plaintiffs to responsive documents was deficient for responses to certain document requests). In the present case, Plaintiffs’ method of producing responsive documents in bulk is merely a improper document dump that does not provide Defendants with any specification as to, or meaningful way of determining, which of the produced documents are responsive to which particular request or requests. See, Graske, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (“[T]he fact that the documents can be electronically searched by key term is not sufficient to discharge defendant's duty to sufficiently identify the location of the relevant documents.”). Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 34(b). See, Hodges, at *13; Graske, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–09; Wagner, 208 F.R.D. at 610; see also, GP Indus., LLC v. Beckman, No. 8:06CV51, 2007 WL 4245786, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 29, 2009) (“Under Rule 34(b), the responses must allow the requesting party to readily determine which documents are responsive to which request.”).[5]

*9 Accordingly, Plaintiffs must specifically respond to each Request for Production of Documents, and Plaintiffs must reference by bates number which documents respond to which specific Requests for Production of Documents. See, e.g., Hodges, 2015 WL 13804602, at *14 (ordering the producing party to identify responsive documents by bates number); Remote Techs., Inc. v. Data Int'l Co., Ltd., No. 10-1678 (MJD/JSM), 2012 WL 13028154, at *12 (D. Minn. July 31, 2012) (same).

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, [Docket No. 177], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiffs to identify the documents that are responsive to each Set One Request for Production of Documents.

Defendants seek an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff Gordon to amend his Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 1(a), 1(c), 1(d), 1(e), 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 17; Plaintiff Romano to amend his Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, and 4; and Plaintiff Speed RMG to amend its Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11. (Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Disc. Responses [Docket No. 177]). Defendants also seek an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiffs to amend and supplement their Responses to every Second Set Request for Production of Documents. (Id.).

The Parties dispute the number of discovery request they are each permitted pursuant to the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, [Docket No. 159], in this case. (See, Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 19–22; Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 17–23).

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order in this case, and on August 17, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order in this Case. [Docket Nos. 105, 159]. Both the original Pretrial Scheduling Order and the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order allow for supplemental discovery by stating:

(Id. at 3). Recognizing that the Parties had engaged in some discovery while this case was before the United States District Court for the Central District of California, this Court allowed for “supplemental” discovery in its Pretrial Scheduling Order. The term “supplemental” is not typically included in a scheduling order, and its inclusion was purposeful.

“Supplemental” is not an ambiguous term, it is an adjective that means “[s]upplying something additional.” Supplemental, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Therefore, the inclusion of the term “supplemental” before the term discovery in the operative Pretrial Scheduling Orders clearly and unambiguously indicates that the permitted discovery is in addition to that which was previously conducted while this case was before the California court. The Pretrial Scheduling Order also clearly and unambiguously indicates that each side is permitted no more than twenty-five supplemental interrogatories and no more than sixty supplemental requests for production.

Defendant Arctic Cat Sales Inc. served Plaintiffs with its First Set of Request for Production of Documents and First Set of Interrogatories on December 10, 2019, and February 11, 2020, while this case was then still before the California Court. Thus, pursuant to this Court's Pretrial Scheduling Order, Defendants are permitted to serve Plaintiffs with supplemental written discovery of up to twenty-five interrogatories and sixty requests for production of documents in addition to their Set One discovery requests.

*10 Although Arctic Cat Sales Inc. originally served more than twenty-five Set Two Interrogatories on Plaintiffs, Defendants agreed to withdraw several of the interrogatory requests during the meet and confer process. (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 19; Ex. 13 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1028). The Set Two Interrogatories that have not been withdrawn are Set Two Interrogatory Nos. 1(a), 1(c), 1(d), 1(e), 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 17 to Plaintiff Gordon, Set Two Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to Plaintiff Romano, and Set Two Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11 to Plaintiff Speed RMG. (See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 22).

As limited, Arctic Cat Sales Inc. has served twenty-three Set Two Interrogatories on Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s Set Two Interrogatories do not comply with this Court's operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order because they contain more than twenty-five discrete subparts. (See, Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 18–22). Plaintiffs provide Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 to Plaintiff Gordon as representative examples. (Id.).

The operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order in this case specifies that interrogatories will be counted in accordance with Rule 33(a). Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). The Rule itself does not define what counts as a “discrete subpart,” but the manner used to count interrogatories is addressed in the advisory committee notes:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, advisory committee note (1993). “[I]nterrogatory subparts are to be counted as part of but one interrogatory ... if they are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary question.” Henchen & Assocs., LLC v. Am. Portfolios Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 10-3590 (SRN/JSM), 2012 WL 13027961, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Wildearth Guardians v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., No. 09-01862, 2010 WL 546313, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 2010)); accord, Alexander v. 1328 Uptown, Inc., 18-cv-1544 (ECT/ECW), 2019 WL 4929931, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2019). However, “once a subpart of an interrogatory introduces a line of inquiry that is separate and distinct from the inquiry made by the portion of the interrogatory that precedes it, the subpart must be considered a separate interrogatory no matter how it is designated.” Henchen, 2013 WL 13027961, at *6 (quoting Wildearth Guardians, 2010 WL 5464313, at *2).

Here, the Court will consider each of the Set Two Interrogatory requests in the order that they were presented in the present motion to compel because Defendants have not indicated any preferred hierarchy of the interrogatories for consideration, and the Court will therefore presume that they have been presented in the order of priority. Set Two Interrogatory No. 1 to Gordon seeks information related to novel designs incorporated into Defendants’ vehicles, and as drafted, it contained five subsections. (Ex. 16 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1060–61). Plaintiffs contend that Second Set Interrogatory No. 1 consists of six discrete subparts, one for the initial body of the interrogatory and one for each of the five subsections. (Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 20–21). However, the Court finds that, standing alone, the initial body of Set Two Interrogatory No. 1 to Gordon is so broad, vague, and ambiguous that there is no way to determine what information it seeks, and it clearly incorporates more information than is at issue in the present case. As such, the Court finds that the initial body of Set Two Interrogatory No. 1 to Gordon can only be construed to modify the subsections of that interrogatory. (See, Ex. 16 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1060). Therefore, the initial body of Set Two Interrogatory No. 1 to Gordon is not a discrete subpart of the interrogatory, and Gordon is not required to respond to it standing alone.

*11 Defendants have expressly withdrawn Subsection (b) of Set Two Interrogatory No. 1 to Gordon. (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 19, 22; Ex. 13 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1028). Hence, it does not count towards Defendants’ twenty-five permitted supplemental interrogatories, and Gordon is not required to respond to it. The Court finds that Subsections (a), (c), (d), and (e) are each discreate subparts. Accordingly, the Court counts Set Two Interrogatory No. 1 to Gordon, as limited, as four supplemental interrogatories. See, e.g., Henchen, 2013 WL 13027961, at *6.

Set Two Interrogatory No. 2 to Gordon seeks the identity of every document that he relied upon to answer each of Defendants’ other interrogatories. (Ex. 16 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1062). Plaintiffs contend that Set Two Interrogatory No. 2 to Gordon consists of seventy-six discrete subparts, one for each of the nineteen Set One Interrogatories and one for each of the discrete subparts of the other Set Two Interrogatories. (Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186], at 21–22). However, it is not necessary to address Plaintiffs’ numerosity arguments. In Second Set Interrogatory No. 2 to Gordon, Defendants seek discovery on discovery; Defendants seek information about Plaintiffs’ responses to Defendants’ prior and contemporaneous discovery requests. (See, Ex. 16 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1062).

“Where, as here, a party seeks discovery on discovery, that party must provide an adequate factual basis to justify the discovery, and the Court must closely scrutinize the request in light of the danger of extending the already costly and time-consuming discovery process ad infinitum.” Parimal v. Manitex Int'l, No. 3:19CV01910 (MPS), 2020 WL 6689395, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2020) (quoting Kay v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 18CV12137 (JPO) (JLC), 2020 WL 283702, at *1 (D.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2020)); see also, Gross v. Chapman, No. 19 C 2743, 2020 WL 4336062, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2020) (“While most courts acknowledge that ‘discovery about discovery’ can be appropriate under certain circumstances, those circumstances are limited to times when one party's discovery compliance has reasonably been drawn into question, [or] that there is ‘an adequate factual basis’ for an inquiry.”); Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 328 F.R.D. 557, 566 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Ashcraft v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 16-cv-02978-JAD-NJK, 2018 WL 6171772, at *2 n.2 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2018)) (“Discovery into another party's discovery process is disfavored.”).

Here, Defendants have not provided any explanation for why an inquiry into the process utilized by Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants’ other written discovery requests is relevant or justified. To the extent that Defendants have challenged Plaintiffs’ responses to specific discovery requests, this Court has addressed those challenges. Moreover, to the extent that Interrogatory No. 2 to Gordon would uncover any relevant information, the Court finds that the relevancy would be greatly outweighed by the burden on Plaintiffs to provide the requested information. Therefore, Gordon is not required to respond to Set Two Interrogatory No. 2, and that interrogatory does not count towards Defendants’ twenty-five permitted supplemental interrogatories.

Second Set Interrogatory No. 3 to Gordon consists of three discrete subparts because it seeks the identity of certain manufacturers, communications and agreements with those manufacturers, and the specific amount of money Gordon claims he has lost due to the claimed ‘lost opportunity’ and the method of calculating that amount. (See, Ex. 16 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1063). Thus, the Court counts Set Two Interrogatory No. 3 to Gordon as three supplemental interrogatories.

*12 Second Set Interrogatory No. 6 to Gordon consists of two discrete subparts because it first seeks the identity a certain manufacturer, and separately the identity of certain contracts and documents. (See, Id. at 1066–67). Notably, that interrogatory also improperly requests the production of documents. (Id.). Although Gordon must Answer the questions presented, Gordon is not required to produce documents in response to an interrogatory request.[6]

Second Set Interrogatory No. 10 to Gordon consists of two discrete subparts, and Second Set Interrogatories Nos. 11 and 12 each consist of one part. (See, Id. at 1071–74). Second Set Interrogatory No. 13 to Gordon consists of three discrete subparts. Similar to Second Set Interrogatory No. 1, the initial body of Set Two Interrogatory No. 13 to Gordon is so broad, vague, and ambiguous that there is no way to determine what information it seeks, and it can only be construed to modify the three subparts of that interrogatory. (See, Id. at 1075). Those three discrete subparts separately seek the identity of patents for which Gordon had been willing to execute assignments, the identity of specific terms in the July 2015 Agreement which supported Gordon's willingness to execute patent assignments, and an explanation of the facts and documents that caused Gordon to refuse to execute those assignments. (See, Id.).

Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 15 to Gordon consists of two discrete subparts, and Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 16 and 17 each consist of 3 discrete subparts. (See, Id. at 1077–80); see also, Superior Indus., LLC v. Masaba, Inc., No. 10-CV-764(DWG/LIB), at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2010) (“[E]ach interrogatory that seeks identification of documents, identification of persons with knowledge about the event, and information regarding a topic will be considered three separate interrogatories.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Second Set of Interrogatories to Gordon, as limited and including all discrete subparts, consists of twenty-four interrogatory requests.

The Court further finds that Second Set Interrogatory No. 2 to Romano consists of one part, which brings the total number of supplemental interrogatories served by Defendants on Plaintiffs to twenty-five. (See, Ex. 17 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1091). Therefore, Plaintiff Gordon must amend his Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 1(a), 1(c), 1(d), 1(e), 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 17, including all discussed discrete subparts, and Plaintiff Romano must amend his Answer to Second Set Interrogatory No. 2.[7] Any additional Second Set Interrogatories served by Defendants do not comply with the supplemental discovery limits set forth in the operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order and need not be responded to by Plaintiffs.[8]

*13 Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, [Docket No. 177], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiff Gordon to amend his Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 1(a), 1(c), 1(d), 1(e), 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 17; Plaintiff Romano to amend his Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, and 4; and Plaintiff Speed RMG to amend its Answers to Second Set Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11, as set forth above.

Defendants also seek an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiffs to amend and supplement their Responses to every Second Set Request for Production of Documents. (Defs.’ Mot. to Compel Disc. Responses [Docket No. 177]; Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 179], at 22). Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents consisted of six requests to Plaintiff Gordon, three requests to Plaintiff Romano, and nine requests to Plaintiff Speed RMG. (Exs. 19–21 [Docket No. 181-1], at 1117–55). In total, Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents consists of 18 requests, which is clearly within the sixty supplemental document requests permitted by the Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs have not responded to this discovery, and the Plaintiffs have not provided any specific argument as to why those requests are improper beyond their erroneous interpretation of the supplemental discovery limitations set forth in the operative Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order. (See, Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 186]).

Accordingly, as explained above in reference to Set One, Plaintiffs must specifically respond to each Set Two Request for Production of Documents, and Plaintiffs must reference by bates number which documents respond to which specific Set Two Requests for Production of Documents.

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, [Docket No. 177], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Plaintiffs to amend and supplement their Responses to every Second Set Request for Production of Documents.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and based on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, [Docket No. 177], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth above. Plaintiffs shall amend their Interrogatory Responses and supplement their Document production, as set forth above, within twenty-one (21) days of this Order.