*1 This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. [Docket No. 107].

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. [Docket No. 107].

I. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT FACTS

A. Background and Procedural History

Plaintiffs Todd Romano and Robby Gordon are the sole owners of Plaintiff Speed RMG Partners, LLC (“Speed RMG”) (together, “Plaintiffs”). (Second Am. Compl. [Docket No. 29]; Gordon Decl. [Docket No. 133] ¶ 3). Speed RMG is “a marketing, engineering, and design firm focused on powersports and the offroad sports industry.” (Gordon Decl. [Docket No. 133] ¶ 3). Defendant Arctic Cat Sales Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Arctic Cat Inc. (together, the “Arctic Cat Parties”). (Ex. 1 [Docket No. 120-1] ¶ 18). The Arctic Cat Parties are a “national manufacturer and seller of powersports vehicles such as snowmobiles, ATVs, and side-by-side vehicles, including Arctic Cat's ‘Wildcat’ product line.” (Id. ¶ 13).

On July 31, 2015, Plaintiffs entered into a Product Development and Marketing Agreement with Arctic Cat Sales Inc. (the “Agreement”). (Agreement [Docket No. 29-1]). Under the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiffs were to design and develop various side-by-side vehicles, identified in the Agreement as “Special Royalty Vehicles.” (See, Agreement [Docket No. 29-1] ¶ 2). In exchange, Arctic Cat Sales Inc. was to pay royalties to Plaintiffs on any Special Royalty Vehicles that it manufactured and sold. (See, Id. ¶ 3).

After entering the Agreement, the relationship between Plaintiffs and the Arctic Cat Parties quickly grew contentious. For an account of the Parties’ history and disputes, see this Court's prior Order at [Docket No. 161].

In January 2017, the sale of Arctic Cat Inc. to Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. was announced. (Id. ¶ 52). Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Textron Inc. (Answer [Docket No. 100] ¶¶ 10–11). “In March 2017, Arctic Cat Inc. entered into an acquisition agreement under which Arctic Cat Inc. became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc.” (Ex. 22 [Docket No. 129-12] ¶ 4). Following the acquisition, the Parties’ disputes continued.

On February 15, 2019, Plaintiffs sent Defendants a Notice of Breach and Request for Mediation alleging that Defendants had breached the Agreement in several ways. (Ex. 15 [Docket No. 134], at 73–80). Subsequently, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement which contained a mediation clause, a non-binding mediation was scheduled for March 28, 2019, in Dallas, Texas. (See, Agreement [Docket No. 29-1] ¶ 17; Nichols Decl. [Docket No. 134] ¶ 69).

On March 27, 2019, Textron Specialized Vehicles responded to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Breach by alleging that Plaintiffs had breached the Agreement in several ways. (Ex. 16 [Docket No. 134-1], at 82–86).

On March 28, 2019, the Parties attended mediation. (Nichols Decl. [Docket No. 134] ¶ 70). Mediation was not successful. (Id. ¶ 71). Also on March 28, 2019, immediately following the conclusion of mediation, the Parties raced to initiate lawsuits. (See, e.g., Id.). Defendants initiated their lawsuit against Plaintiffs in Minnesota (the “Minnesota Case”),[1] while Plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit against Defendants in California (the “California Case”). (See, e.g., Id.). Defendants won the race to file by less than two hours. (Ex. 18 [Docket No. 134-1], at 104).

*2 On May 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the Minnesota Case. (Id. ¶ 77). On May 16, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the California Case. (Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Transfer or Stay Action [Docket No. 42]).

On August 16, 2019, Judge Brasel granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, and in doing so, she ordered that the Minnesota Case be transferred to California and consolidated with the California Case. (Ex. 18 [Docket No. 134-1], at 105). On November 11, 2019, the Minnesota Case and California Case were consolidated. (Order Re: Consolidation [Docket No. 77]).

On February 25, 2020, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and the Consolidated Case was transferred to this Court. (Order Transferring Action [Docket No. 85]).

On March 10, 2020, Defendants answered Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (Answer [Docket No. 100]). Defendants did not assert any counterclaims. (See, Id.).

On September 1, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. [Docket No. 164]. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts 5 causes of action against Defendants. (Id.). The claims asserted are: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) fraud—concealment. (Id.).

B. Relevant Discovery History

In June 2019, Plaintiffs served their first written discovery requests on Defendants, and since that time, the Parties have engaged in a considerable amount of written discovery. (See, e.g., Nichols Decl. [Docket No.134] ¶¶ 82–84; Moran Aff. [Docket No. 129] ¶ 2).

On June 13, 2019, Plaintiffs served their First Set of Requests for Production on Defendants, and Defendants served their Responses on July 12, 2019. (Nichols Aff. [Docket No. 113] ¶¶ 3–10).

On October 10, 2019, Plaintiffs served their Second Set of Requests for Production on Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 17–20).

On October 22, 2019, the Parties submitted an email to the California Magistrate Judge regarding ongoing discovery disputes. (Am. Text-Only Notice [Docket No. 75]; Minutes [Docket No. 80]; see also, Ex. 11 [Docket No. 113-1], at 104–09).

On November 14, 2019, Defendants requested an extension to respond to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production, and Plaintiffs granted an extension until December 2, 2019. (Nichols Aff. [Docket No. 113] ¶ 21).

On November 18, 2019, a telephone conference was held before the California Magistrate Judge. (Minutes [Docket No. 80]). After the Parties advised the California Court that they were working to resolve the issues represented in their October 22, 2019, email, the California Court Ordered the Parties to submit a joint status report regarding the state of discovery by December 18, 2019. (Id.). Also on November 18, 2019, following the telephone conference, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted an email to the California Magistrate Judge stating that the parties had purportedly reached an agreement “which may resolve the dispute.”[2] (Ex. 10 [Docket No. 113-1], at 101). However, the November 18, 2019, email also stated that “[t]he parties preserve[d] their positions set forth in the October 22, 2019 email” and would “provide a status report by Wednesday December 11, 2019.” (Id.).

*3 On December 4, 2019, Defendants served their Amended Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production. (Exs. 11–14 [Docket No. 113-1], at 111–41).

On December 11, 2019, Plaintiffs sent an email to Defendants which asserted that Defendants had waived all objections to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production because they did not provide their Responses by December 2, 2019. (Ex. 20 [Docket No. 113-1], at 189). On December 13, 2019, the Parties met and conferred via telephone and Defendants agreed to produce their Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production by December 20, 2019. (Ex. 17 [Docket No. 129-10], at 39–40).

On December 18, 2019, the California Magistrate Judge entered a Stipulated Protective Order. [Docket No. 82]. Under the Protective Order, documents may be classified as “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only.” (Id.).

Also on December 18, 2019, the Parties filed a Joint Status Report indicating that their discovery disputes remained and that, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants had not complied with their purported agreement outlined in the November 18, 2019, email. (See, Joint Status Report [Docket No. 83]).

On December 20, 2019, Defendants served their Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production. (Nichols Aff. [Docket No. 113] ¶¶ 23–26; see also, Exs. 21–24 [Docket No. 113-1], at 199–268).

On February 10, 2020, Plaintiffs served Defendants with Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Admissions. (Id. ¶¶ 42–45).

On February 14, 2020, Plaintiffs served Defendants with Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories. (Id. ¶¶ 29–32).

On February 19, 2020, the Parties submitted another email to the California Magistrate Judge regarding ongoing discovery disputes and another telephone conference was scheduled for March 4, 2020. (Notice [Docket No. 84]). However, before the March 4, 2020, telephone conference took place, the case was transferred to this Court. (See, Order Transferring Action [Docket No. 85]).

On March 11, 2020, Defendants served their Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Admissions. (Nichols Aff. [Docket No. 113] ¶¶ 46–49).

On March 16, 2020, Defendants served their Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories. (Id. ¶¶ 33–36).

On May 20, 2020, Defendants served their Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production, Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, and Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Admission. (Nichols Aff. [Docket No. 113] ¶¶ 28, 37).

II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL. [DOCKET NO. 107].

On June 29, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Compel. [Docket No. 107]. Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court compelling: all Defendants to amend their Responses to Request for Productions Nos. 1–4; Arctic Cat Sales to amend its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1–3, 5, and 18, as well as, its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 16, 37, 41, 46, 47, and 49; Arctic Cat Inc. to amend its Response to Interrogatory No. 18; Textron Specialized Vehicles to amend its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1–3, 5, 15, and 16, as well as, its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 13, 16, 19–22, 25, 27, 29 37, 38, 41, 46, 47, and 49; and Textron Inc. to amend its Response to Interrogatory No. 10, as well as, its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 1–84. (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]). In addition, Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court: compelling Defendants to produce an unredacted version of the Alliance and Framework Agreement between Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. and Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC (the “Redacted Document”); deeming all Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Request for Production waived; compelling Defendants to certify that they have produced all responsive documents without redaction and that no responsive documents have been withheld due to waived objections; and compelling Defendants to provide a new verification in response to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories. (Id.).

*4 On July 13, 2020, a Motions Hearing was held, and the Court took this matter under advisement as of July 14, 2020. (Minute Entry [Docket No. 148]). However, on August 5, 2020, Defendants filed a letter informing this Court that they had supplemented several of their discovery responses in a purported effort to resolve some of the issues raised by the present motion. (Defs.’ Letter [Docket No. 155]). On August 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a responsive letter informing this Court that Plaintiffs did not believe that Defendants’ supplemental discovery responses resolved the issues raised by the present motion. (Plfs.’ Letter [Docket No. 156]).

On August 10, 2020, this Court issued an Order directing the Parties to conduct a supplemental meet and confer and, afterwards, to file a joint letter identifying for the Court which Interrogatories, Requests for Production, or Requests for Admission were no longer at issue or had the focus of the dispute narrowed. (Order [Docket No. 158]).

On August 20, 2019, the Parties filed a joint letter informing this Court of their positions regarding Defendants’ supplemental discovery responses, and that, in effect, none of the issues raised by the present motion had been resolved. (See, Joint Letter [Docket No. 160]). Following the receipt of the Parties’ August 20, 2019, joint letter, this Court once again took the present motion under advisement. (See, Order [Docket No. 158], at 4)

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Courts construe Rule 26(b)(1) broadly. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); see also, Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (Rule 26 “is liberal in scope and interpretation, extending to those matters which are relevant”). However, the scope of discovery is intended to focus on the actual claims or defenses that are at issue in the litigation. See e.g., Sierrapine v. Refiner Prods. Mfg., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 604, 609 (E.D. Cal. 2011). As such, the party seeking discovery is required to make a threshold showing of relevance before production of information is required. Hofer, 981 F.2d at 380.

In addition, “even if relevant, discovery is not permitted where no need is shown, or compliance would be unduly burdensome, or where harm to the person from whom discovery is sought outweighs the need of the person seeking discovery of the information.” Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter #2, 197 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted)). “The party resisting production bears the burden of establishing lack of relevancy or undue burden.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).

“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3) provides for various motions to compel disclosure or compel discovery depending on the failure of the other party. Specifically, the Court may compel a discovery response if “a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33” or “fails to produce documents ... as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)–(iv). In addition, a party requesting an admission “may move to determine the sufficiency of an answer or objection,” and [o]n finding that an answer does not comply with this rule, the court may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6).

B. Analysis

*5 Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court compelling Defendants “to produce documents responsive to request for Production Nos. 1 and 3” and compelling Defendants “to confirm that no documents responsive to Request for Production Nos. 2 and 4 exist and state that fact in supplemental responses.”[3] (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]). In addition, Plaintiffs seek and Order of this Court compelling Defendants “to produce a full unredacted version of the ‘Redacted Document’ along with all other documents that have been improperly redacted.” (Id.).

Request for Production No. 1 requests: “All AGREEMENTS between YOU and BPS Direct, LLC or any of its related entities, affiliates, owners or subsidiaries pertaining to the sale or distribution of off-road vehicles.” (Ex. 13 [Docket No. 113-1], at 129).

Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Response to Request for Production No. 1 states, in relevant part, that: “pursuant to the agreement of the parties’ counsel, it will produce relevant portions of its agreement with Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC after entry of a protective order.” (Id. at 130). Plaintiffs contend that Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Response is deficient because it unilaterally imposes a restriction to only produce the “relevant portions” of responsive documents. (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 10], at 7–8, 10–11). The Court agrees.

“Redaction is an inappropriate tool for excluding alleged irrelevant information from documents that are otherwise responsive to a discovery request.” Bartholomew v. Avalon Cap. Grp., Inc., 278 F.R.D. 441, 451 (D. Minn. 2011); see also, In re Stryker Rejuventate & Abgii Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 13-2441 (DWF/FLN), 2014 WL 2808919, at *3 (D. Minn. June 20, 2014) (“[T]here is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that permits the unilateral redaction of information, in otherwise responsive documents, that one party or the other deems not relevant.”).

Textron Specialized Vehicles’ unilateral redaction of responsive documents is improper. The only document identified to this Court as having been improperly redacted is the Redacted Document. Defendants have neither shown privilege nor undue prejudice in reference to the Redacted Document. Therefore, Textron Specialized Vehicles must produce the Redacted Document without redactions subject to the Protective Order in this case.

Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses to Request for Production No. 1 all state, in relevant part, that: “after a reasonable search, there are no documents relating to the vehicles or issues in the parties’ present dispute that are responsive to this Request.” (Exs. 11, 12, 14 [Docket No. 113-1], at 114, 122, 138). Their Amended Responses further state that they “incorporate[ ] the response of Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. to this Request.” (Id.).

*6 Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses each state, somewhat inartfully, that they do not possess any responsive documents,[4] and they are relying on Textron Specialized Vehicles’ production as the entity in possession of responsive documents. (See, Id.). The Court cannot order the production of evidence that does not exist. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. West, No. 11-2297 (PAM/JJK), 2012 WL 12894845, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2012); Struzyk v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 99-1736 (JRT/FLN), 2003 WL 21302966, at *2 (D. Minn. May 16, 2003).

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED accordingly to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Specialized Vehicles to amend its Response to Request for Production No. 1 and to produce the Redacted Document without redaction. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Inc. to amend their Responses to Request for Production No. 1 and to produce responsive documents.

Request for Production No. 2 requests: “All AGREEMENTS between YOU and BPS Direct, LLC or any of its related entities, affiliates, owners or subsidiaries pertaining to the purchase and/or sale of any ownership interest in any entity, operating division or assets.” (Ex. 11 [Docket No. 113-1], at 114).

Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Responses each state, in relevant part, that: “after a reasonable search, there are no documents responsive to this Request.” (Exs. 11–13 [Docket No. 113-1], at 114, 122, 130).

The Court notes that it is hard to see the relevance that any responsive documents to this Request might have to the claims and defenses asserted in this case. However, Defendants’ have clearly indicated that no such responsive documents exist, and the Court cannot order the production of evidence that does not exist. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 WL 12894845, at *5; Struzyk, 2003 WL 21302966, at *2.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles to amend their Responses to Request for Production No. 2.

Textron Inc.’s Amended Response states, in relevant part, that: “Textron incorporates the response of Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. to this Request.” (Ex. 14 [Docket No. 113-1], at 138). Plaintiffs contend that Textron Inc.’s reference to Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Response is improper. (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 110], at 8). The Court disagrees.

Textron Inc.’s response is poorly drafted but represents that Textron Inc. does not have any responsive documents.[5] Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Inc. to amend its Response to Request for Production No. 2.

*7 Request for Production No. 3 requests: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and BPS Direct, LLC or any of its related entities, affiliates, owners or subsidiaries pertaining to the sale or distribution of off-road vehicles.” (Ex. 11 [Docket No. 113-1], at 115).

Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Responses each state, in relevant part, that: “pursuant to the agreement between the parties’ counsel, [Defendant] states that it is in the process of locating any responsive documents and will produce such documents, if any, subject to the entry of a protective order in this case.” (Exs. 11–13 [Docket No. 113-1], at 115, 123, 131).

Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles have acknowledged the discoverability of responsive documents. (See, Id.). And they have represented to this Court that they have already produced some responsive documents. (See, e.g., Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 128], at 6). However, Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles must complete production and produce any remaining or subsequently discovered responsive documents.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED accordingly to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles to produce documents responsive to Request for Production No. 3.

Textron Inc.’s Amended Response states, in relevant part, that: “Textron incorporates the response of Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. to this Request.” (Ex. 14 [Docket No. 113-1], at 139). Textron Inc.’s response is again poorly drafted but represents that Textron Inc. does not have any responsive documents and is relying on Textron Specialized Vehicles’ production as the entity in possession of responsive documents. As already noted, the Court cannot order the production of evidence that does not exist. See, Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 WL 12894845, at *5; Struzyk, 2003 WL 21302966, at *2.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Inc. to amend its Response to Request for Production No. 3 and produce responsive documents.

Request for Production No. 4 requests: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and BPS Direct, LLC or any of its related entities, affiliates, owners or subsidiaries pertaining to the purchase and/or sale of any ownership interest in any entity, operating division, or assets.” (Ex. 11 [Docket No. 113-1], at 115).

Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Responses each state, in relevant part, that: “because there are no documents responsive to Plaintiffs’ Request No. 2, any such communications reflecting negotiations or discussions regarding this topic are not relevant to any party's claim or defense or proportional to the needs of the case. [Defendants] will not, therefore, incur the cost of searching its documents to determine whether such communications exist.” (Exs. 11–13 [Docket No. 113-1], at 116, 124, 132). Textron Inc.’s Response states, in relevant part, that: “Textron incorporates the response of Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. to this Request.” (Ex. 14 [Docket No. 113-1], at 140).

*8 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ responses are deficient because they “are not stating that it would be too burdensome to search the documents—rather, they are flatly refusing to even investigate whether any documents exist in the first place.” (Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 110], at 9). However, Plaintiffs seemingly misunderstand Defendants’ objection to this Request for Production. Defendants do not object to Request No. 4 because it would be too burdensome to search for documents per se, they object to Request No. 4 because it seeks information that is not relevant to any claims and defenses asserted in this case. (See, Exs. 11–13 [Docket No. 113-1], at 116, 124, 132). Plaintiffs’ do not provide any argument or explanation as to how the information sought by Request for Production No. 4 is at all relevant to any claims or defenses asserted in this case. (See, Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 110]).

The threshold inquiry with regard to discovery issues is whether the moving party seeks discoverable material. Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 635 (D. Minn. 2000) (citing Shelton v. Am. Motors, 805 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1986)). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), the scope of discoverable material is limited to that which is relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses. See, e.g., Mallak v. Aitkin Cty., No. 13-cv-2119 (DWF/LIB), 2016 WL 8607391, at *6 (D. Minn. June 30, 2016), aff'd, 2016 WL 8607392 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2016) (citing Sierrapine v. Refiner Prods. Mfg., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 604, 609 (E.D. Cal. 2011)). And the party seeking discovery is required to make a threshold showing of relevance before production of information is required. Hofer, 981 F.2d at 380. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not made a threshold showing that the information sought by Request for Production No. 4 is relevant to any claims or defenses in this case.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendants to amend their Responses to Request for Production No. 4 and produce responsive documents.

Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[d]eeming all objections contained in [Defendants’] responses to the Second Set of Requests for Production waived” and “[c]ompelling [Defendants] to certify that all responsive documents have been produced without redaction and with nothing withheld based on the waived objections.” (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

On November 14, 2019, Defendants requested an extension to respond to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production, and Plaintiffs granted an extension until December 2, 2019. (Nichols Aff. [Docket No. 113] ¶ 21). On December 11, 2019, Plaintiffs sent an email to Defendants which asserted that Defendants had waived all objections to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production because they did not provide their Responses by December 2, 2019. (Ex. 20 [Docket No. 113-1], at 189). On December 13, 2019, the Parties met and conferred via telephone and Defendants agreed to produce their Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production by December 20, 2019. (Ex. 17 [Docket No. 129-10], at 39–40). On December 20, 2019, Defendants provided their Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production. (Id.; see also, Exs. 21–24 [Docket No. 113-1], at 199–268). Defendants assert that they did not provide their Responses on December 2, 2019, “[d]ue to a calendaring error.” (Mem. in Opp'n [Docket No. 128], at 15; Ex. 17 [Docket No. 129-10], at 40).

“Rule 34 does not provide for automatic waiver of untimely objections, but courts routinely apply Rule 33(b)(4)’s waiver provision to all discovery mechanisms.” U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Equity Bank, No. 12-2023 (PAM/JJG), 2014 WL 12601036, at *4 (D. Minn. May 7, 2014). “Under Rule 33(b)(4), untimely objections are waived unless a court excuses the failure for good cause shown.” U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 2014 WL 12601036, at *4. Accordingly, “courts in this District have adopted a rule that such a waiver is implied into Rule 34 for late objections unless the Court excuses the failure for good cause shown.” Klein v. Affiliated Grp., Inc., 18-cv-949 DWF/ECW, 2019 WL 1307884, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2019).

*9 Here, the Court finds good cause to excuse Defendants’ failure to provide their Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production by December 2, 2019. Defendants have represented that the failure was caused by a calendaring error. Moreover, after Defendants became aware of their failure, they promptly conferred with Plaintiffs and provided their Responses. The total delay was less than 3 weeks, nothing on the record presently before the Court indicates that Defendants acted in bad faith, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any real prejudice due to the delay. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have not waived their objections to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc., 2014 WL 12601036, at *4 (excusing untimeliness where the defendant's responses were only 3 or 4 weeks late, the defendant did not act in bad faith, and the delay did not result in prejudice to the plaintiff); McKissick v. Three Deer Ass'n Ltd. P'ship, 265 F.R.D. 55, 57 (D. Conn. 2010) (excusing untimeliness where the defendants’ responses were only 1 month late, the delay was caused by an administrative error, and the defendants promptly worked to provide their responses after the administrative error was discovered).

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks to an Order of this Court deeming all Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Requests for Production waived.

Plaintiffs further seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling [Defendants] to certify that all responsive documents have been produced without redaction and with nothing withheld based on the waived objections.” (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]), However, Plaintiffs request is moot.

First, as explained above, the Court does not find that Defendants’ waived their objections. Second, when responding to requests for production, producing attorneys are required to certify their Rule 34 responses by signing the responses themselves; thereby certifying “to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry” the responses are complete and correct. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). Moreover, “[i]f a certification violates this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both.” See, Rule 26(g)(3). Thus, the certification Plaintiffs request would be redundant.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED as moot to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendants “to certify that all responsive documents have been produced without redaction and with nothing withheld based on the waived objections.”

Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling Arctic Cat Sales Inc. to provide amended responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 18 specifically identifying the documents which they assert contain information responsive to each Interrogatory, or omitting the portions of their responses that are ostensibly provided under Rule 33(d)” and “[c]ompelling Arctic Cat Inc. to provide [an] amended response[ ] to Interrogatory No. 18 specifically identifying the documents which they assert contain information responsive to the Interrogatory, or omitting the portions of their response that are ostensibly provided under Rule 33(d).”[6] (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

*10 Arctic Cat Sales’ Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 are as follows:

(Ex. 5 [Docket No. 129-5], at 2–5).

(Id. at 6).

In each of its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, Arctic Cat Sales purports to invoke Rule 33(d). (See, Id. at 2–6). Rule 33(d) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). However, simply referring the interrogating party generally to large numbers of documents does not satisfy a party's obligations under Rule 33(d). See, Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., No. 11–cv–820 (ADM/JSM), 2015 WL 12781248, *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2015). Rather, “ ‘[r]eferring to business records en masse, without specifying particular documents is an “abuse of the option [provided by Rule 33(d)].’ ”” Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (citations omitted). “To answer an interrogatory, a responding party has the duty to specify, by category and location, the records from which answers to interrogatories can be derived.” Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., No. 9–cv–1091 (JNE/JSM), 2012 WL 12894846, *10 (D. Minn. May 11, 2012) (citation omitted); see, also, Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., 168 F.R.D. 295, 305 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[Parties] may not simply refer generically to past or future production of documents. They must identify in their answers to the interrogatories specifically which documents contain the answer. Otherwise they must completely answer the interrogatories without referring to the documents.”).

Here, Arctic Cat Sales purports to invoke Rule 33(d) in its Responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 by generally referring to a vast group of documents. (See, Ex. 5 [Docket No. 129-5], at 2–6). These documents are not identified or organized as used in the normal course of business, nor are they identified or organized in any other meaningful way which would enable Plaintiffs to determine which particular documents contain Arctic Cat Sales’ Responses to the Interrogatories. Although Arctic Cat Sales lists several bates numbered documents in its Responses, Arctic Cat Sales prefaces each of those lists with the introductory signal “see, e.g.,” which indicates that “other authorities also state the proposition.” See, The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 1.2(a), at 62 (Columbia L. Rev. Ass'n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020). In other words, Arctic Cat Sales indicates that the listings of bates numbered documents are incomplete. Therefore, Arctic Cat Sales’ Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 are not fully responsive and are insufficient. Arctic Cat Sales has merely provided an incomplete document dump with an improper reference to Rule 33(d).

*13 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales to amend its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5. Arctic Cat Sales must amend its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 to specifically identify every document that contains its Response.

Arctic Cat Sales and Arctic Car Inc.’s Responses to Interrogatory No. 18 are both as follows:

(Exs. 5, 6 [Docket No. 129-5], at 15, 33).

In their Responses, the Arctic Cat Parties have indicated that no responsive communications exist because Plaintiffs did not provide the Arctic Cat Parties with any final, complete designs.[7] As already noted, the Court cannot order the production of evidence that does not exist. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch., 2012 WL 12894845, at *5; Struzyk, 2003 WL 21302966, at *2. However, the Arctic Cat Parties also respond that “certain conceptual designs provided by Plaintiffs were included in the Wildcat XX,” and the Arctic Cat Parties refer Plaintiffs to “all documents related to the Wildcat XX produced in this litigation.” (Exs. 5, 6 [Docket No. 129-5], at 15, 33). The Arctic Cat Parties’ vague reference to a mass of documents is ambiguous and improper.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED accordingly to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling the Arctic Cat Parties to amend their Responses to Interrogatory No. 18. The Arctic Cat Parties must amend their Responses to Interrogatory No. 18 to either specifically identify every communication that is responsive to this Interrogatory or clearly state that no responsive communications exist.

Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling “Textron Specialized Vehicles Inc. to provide amended responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 15, and 16 that are ‘complete in and of themselves,’ and that do not refer to the pleadings, depositions, or other documents” and “[c]ompelling Textron Inc. to provide an amended response to Interrogatory No. 10 that is ‘complete in and of themselves,’ and that does not refer to pleadings, depositions, or other documents.”[8] (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

*14 Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 3 each seek information that predates Textron Specialized Vehicles’ acquisition of Arctic Cat Inc.. (See, Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 191–94). Textron Specialized Vehicles initial Responses to each of this Interrogatories state that Textron Specialized Vehicles “was not a party to the 2015 Agreement with Plaintiffs at this time and, therefore, had no contractual obligations to which Plaintiffs refer” and referred Plaintiffs to Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s Interrogatory Responses. (Id.).

On July 27, 2020, following the Motions Hearing on this matter, Textron Specialized Vehicles supplemented its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in a purported effort to resolve some of the issues raised by the present motion. (See, Id.; see also, (Defs.’ Letter [Docket No. 155]). Each of Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Supplemental Answers to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 3 state that “[Textron Specialized Vehicles] was not a party to the 2015 Agreement during this time. Therefore, [Textron Specialized Vehicles] is unable to answer this Interrogatory as it possesses no independent knowledge from the time period,” and they each refer Plaintiffs to Arctic Cat Sales’ Responses to the Interrogatories. (Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 191–94). In addition, Textron Specialized Vehicles transcribes Arctic Cat Sales’ Response to each Interrogatory. (Id.).

Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 3 each assert a temporally limited question directed specifically at Textron Specialized Vehicles. (See, Id.). In its Responses and Supplemental Answers, Textron Specialized Vehicles indicates that it was not a party to the contract at the specified time, hence Textron Specialized Vehicles does not posses the information sought by Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 3. This is an adequate response.[9]

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Specialized Vehicles to amend its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Response and Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 5 are as follows:

(Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 195–96).

Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Response and Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 5 purport to “refer[ ] Plaintiff[s] to the documents identified in Arctic Cat Sales Inc.’s response to Interrogatory No. 5.” (Id. at 196). This Court finds nothing improper about Textron Specialized Vehicles incorporating by reference the documents identified in Arctic Cat Sales’ Response to the Interrogatory request. See, e.g., McDonald v. Lewis, No. 05-0173 (PAM/JJG), 2006 WL 8443417, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2006) (“If any part of plaintiffs’ answer has been provided in a separate interrogatory that seeks the identical information, plaintiffs are permitted to incorporate by reference the other response into their answer ....”).

Nevertheless, on the present record, Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Response and Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 5 are deficient for the same reason that Arctic Cat Sales’ Response to Interrogatory No. 5 is deficient. As explained above, Arctic Cat Sales does not specifically identify the documents that contain its Response. See, Supra, Part II.B.iii. This deficiency must be remedied. Moreover, because this Interrogatory is directed specifically at Textron Specialized Vehicles, Textron Specialized Vehicles must supplement its reference to the documents identified by Arctic Cat Sales to identify every additional responsive document, if any, that Textron Specialized Vehicles has in its possession that is not referenced by Arctic Cat Sales.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Specialized Vehicles to amend its Response to Interrogatory No. 5.

Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Supplemental Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16 are as follows:

(Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 203–04).

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16 each seek information related to designs provided by Plaintiffs to Textron Specialized Vehicles that were rejected. In its Responses and Supplemental Responses to both Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16, Textron Specialized Vehicles refers Plaintiffs to its Response to Interrogatory No. 7, as well as, Arctic Cat Sales’ Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2. (Ex. 31 [Docket No. 113-1], at 36–61; Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 203–04). However, Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, and 7 do not relate to the same topic as Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16.[10] As such, Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Supplemental Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16 are deficient. Moreover, as already explained above, to the extent that Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Responses refer Plaintiffs to documents, Textron Specialized Vehicles must specifically identify every document that contains its Response including every additional responsive document, if any, that Textron Specialized Vehicles has in its possession that is not referenced by Arctic Cat Sales.

*17 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Specialized Vehicles to amend its Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16.

Textron Inc.’s Response to Interrogatory Nos. 10 is as follows:

(Ex. 32 [Docket No. 113-1], at 371).

Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling [Defendants] to provide a new verification that contains a clear statement, signed under oath, attesting clearly to the truth of the matters that they have put forth in response to the First Set of Interrogatories to each [Defendant].” (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

The verifications to Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Inc.’s Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories and Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Second Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories each state as follows:

*18 (Exs. 5–8 [Docket No. 129-5], at 18, 35, 51, 61; Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 207; see also, Exs. 33–36 [Docket No. 113-1], at 377–84).

“Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in part, that interrogatories directed at a business entity must be answered by the entity's officer or agent, and the person who makes the answers must sign them.” Select Comfort Corp. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., No. 13-2975 (JNE/FLN), 2015 WL 12803585, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2015). In addition, “Rule 33 provides that ‘[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.’ ” Johnson v. Derhaag Motor Sports, Inc., No. 13-cv-2311 (SRN/FLN), 2014 WL 5817004, at *7 (D. Minn. Noc. 10, 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3)). “Courts in the Eighth Circuit have read these provisions in tandem, requiring parties to sign, under oath, all interrogatory responses.” Id.

“The verification requirement serves the critical purpose of ensuring that the responding party attests to the truth of the responses.” Allen v. Pulaski Cnty., No. 4:10CV1514 SWW, 2012 WL 32640, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 2012). A corporate representative is not required to have personal knowledge of all the information contained in the verified interrogatories. See, Select Comfort Corp., 2015 WL 5817004, at *7. However, the representative “must have some basis for signing the responses and for thereby stating on behalf of the corporation that the responses are accurate.” Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Here, Defendants signed verification does not attest to the truth of Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories. Moreover, the verifications expressly state that corporate representative “does not necessarily have personal knowledge of ... the content of these answers.” (Exs. 5–8 [Docket No. 129-5], at 18, 35, 51, 61; Ex. 5 [Docket No. 160-1], at 207; see also, Exs. 33–36 [Docket No. 113-1], at 377–84). Accordingly, Defendants’ verifications are deficient. Defendants must provide Plaintiffs with an affidavit or verification, signed under oath and attesting that the provided answers are true and correct to the best of that persons, knowledge, information, and belief. See, Select Comfort Corp., 2015 WL 5817004, at *7; see also, Mann v. XPO Logistics Freight, Inc., No. 16-2196-CM, 2017 WL 3054125, at *4 (D. Kan. July 19, 2017) (finding signatures without an affidavit or verification attesting to the accuracy of the answers to be insufficient and ordering the defendant to provide such an affidavit or verification).

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Defendants to provide verifications that are signed under oath and attest that Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of that persons, knowledge, information, and belief.

*19 Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling Arctic Cat Sales Inc., Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles, Inc. to provide revised responses to Request for Admission Nos. 16, 37, 41, 46, 47, and 49.”[11] (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

The Arctic Parties’ Amended responses to Request for Admission Nos. 16 and 37 are as follows:

(Exs. 3, 4 [Docket No. 160-1], at 97–98, 153).

*20 (Exs. 3, 4 [Docket No. 160-1], at 118, 167).

The Court finds that the term “launched” is not ambiguous. “Launched” means represented to dealers and/or the public that the specified products were past the prototype stage and ready to be made available in the marketplace. See, e.g., Launch, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/launch (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (defining “launch” as, among other things, “to ... introduce something new such as a product”). The Court further finds that the terms “Robby Gordon Special Edition version of the Wildcat Sport” and “the Model Year 2017 Robby Gordon Special Edition Wildcat Sport” are not ambiguous. The general objections that the Arctic Cat Parties incorporate into their Amended Responses does not alter the fact that Request for Admission Nos. 16 and 37 are not ambiguous as written. Accordingly, the Arctic Cat Parties must re-answer Request for Admission Nos. 16 and 37 and admit or deny the Requests as written.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales and Arctic Cat Inc. to revise their Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 16 and 37.

The Arctic Parties’ Amended responses to Request for Admission No. 41 are as follows:

*21 (Exs. 3, 4 [Docket No. 160-1], at 122–23, 170). Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended response to Request for Admission Nos. 41 is as follows:

(Exs. 1 [Docket No. 160-1], at 28–29).

The Court finds that the term “cancelled” is not ambiguous. “Cancelled” means deciding that the specified product would not be made available in the marketplace after having previously represented that it would be made available. See, e.g., Cancel, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/english/cancel (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) (defining “cancelled” as, among other things, “to decide that something that has been arranged will not happen”). The Court further finds that the phrase “all prior launches of all Special Royalty Vehicles” is not ambiguous. The general objections that the Arctic Cat Parties and Textron Specialized Vehicles incorporate into their Amended Responses does not alter the fact that Request for Admission No. 41 is not ambiguous as written. Accordingly, the Arctic Cat Parties and Textron Specialized Vehicles must re-answer Request for Admission No. 41 and admit or deny the Request as written.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles to revise their Responses to Request for Admission No. 41.

The Arctic Cat Parties and Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Responses Amended responses to Request for Admission Nos. 41 are as follows:

*23 (Ex. 4 [Docket No. 160-1], at 31–33, 124–27, 173–75).

The Court finds that the phrase “no longer subject to the requirements of the July 2015 AGREEMENT” is not ambiguous. Request for Admission Nos. 46, 47, and 49 are simply asking whether at the specified time Defendants announced to Speed RMG that the specified product was no longer subject to the requirements of the Agreement. These Requests are not ambiguous. If any ambiguity exists it was created by the generic objections that the Arctic Cat Parties and Textron Specialized Vehicles have chosen to incorporate into their Amended Responses. Accordingly, the Arctic Cat Parties and Textron Specialized Vehicles must re-answer Request for Admission Nos. 46, 47, and 49 and admit or deny the Requests as written.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Arctic Cat Sales, Arctic Cat Inc., and Textron Specialized Vehicles to revise their Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 46, 47, and 49.

Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling Textron Specialized Vehicles, Inc. to provide supplemental responses to Request for Admission Nos. 13, 16, 19–22, 25, 27, 29, 37, and 38 that are full and complete and do not refer to any other discovery responses.” (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

For every at-issue Request for Admission, Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Response states: “Deny. TSV had no relationship with Speed RMG Partners until after it acquired Arctic Cat Inc. in March 2017. This request is more appropriately directed to Arctic Cat Sales Inc. and Arctic Cat Inc. See their responses to Request [XX].” (See, Ex. 1 [Docket No. 160-1], at 11–26).

Every at-issue Request for Admission asks a temporally limited question directed specifically at Textron Specialized Vehicles. (See, Id.). In its Amended Responses, Textron Specialized Vehicles clearly denies each Request. Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Responses do include unnecessary verbiage by further explaining that the Request predates Textron Specialized Vehicles’ acquisition of the Arctic Cat Parties and Textron Specialized Vehicles’ relationship with Speed RMG, as well as, by referring Plaintiffs to the Arctic Cat Parties’ Responses as the Parties that had a relationship with Speed RMG at the time specified in the at-issue Requests. However, such unnecessary verbiage does not alter the fact that Textron Specialized Vehicles clearly denies each at-issue Request. As such, the Court finds that Textron Specialized Vehicles’ Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 13, 16, 19–22, 25, 27, 29, 37, and 38 are sufficient.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Specialized Vehicles to revise its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 13, 16, 19–22, 25, 27, 29, 37, and 38.

*24 Plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court “[c]ompelling Textron Inc. to provide supplemental responses to RFAs Nos. 1–84 that are full and complete and that do not refer to any other discovery responses.”[12] (Plfs.’ Mot. to Compel [Docket No. 107]).

Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 1–11, 13–17, 19–22, and 24–40 are as follows:

(Ex. 2 [Docket No. 160-1], at 48–70) Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 41–60, 64, 65, 69, 70, 74, 75, 79, and 80 are as follows:

(Id. at 70–89). Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 62, 63, 67, and 68 are as follows:

(Id. at 81, 83–84).

In its Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 1–11, 13–17, 19–22, 24–60, 64, 65, 69, 70, 74, 75, 79, and 80, Textron Inc. clearly denies each Request. In its Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 62, 63, 67, and 68, Textron Inc. clearly admits each Request. Textron Inc. does include unnecessary verbiage in its Response by denying evert having a direct relationship with Speed RMG, as well as, by referring Plaintiffs to the Responses of the Arctic Cat Parties’ and, where the request relates to a period after March 2017, the Response of Textron Specialized Vehicles. However, such unnecessary verbiage does not alter the fact that Textron Inc. clearly admits or denies each at-issue Request. As such, the Court finds that Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 13, 16, 19–22, 25, 27, 29, 37, and 38 are sufficient.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Inc. to revise its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 1–11, 13–17, 19–22, 24–60, 62–65, 67–69, 70, 74, 75, 79, and 80.

*25 Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses to Request to Admission Nos. 12, and 18 are as follows:

(Ex. 2 [Docket No. 160-1], at 54, 58) (emphasis added). Textron Inc.’s Amended Response to Request for Admission No. 23 is as follows:

(Id. at 61) (emphasis added).

In its Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 12, 18, and 23 Textron Inc. does not respond to the Request. Rather, Textron Inc. purports to state what “TSV admits.” (Id. at 54, 58, 61). Accordingly, Textron Inc.’s Amended Responses are deficient. Textron Inc. must revise its Amended Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 12, 18, and 23, and Textron must Respond to the Requests for itself in a manner permitted by Rule 36. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Inc. to revise its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 12, 18, and 23.

Textron Inc. did not amend its Responses to Request to Admission Nos. 61, 66, 71–73, 76–78, and 81–83. (See, Ex. 2 [Docket No. 160-1], at 80–90). Textron Inc.’s original Responses to Request to Admission Nos. 61, 66, 71–73, 76–78, and 81–83 admit in part and deny in part each Request. (Id.).

Pursuant to Rule 36, a responding party may admit in part and deny in part a Request, but “the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). In its Responses, Textron Inc. clearly specifies the part of each Request that it is admitting and denies the rest. (See, Ex. 2 [Docket No. 160-1], at 80–90). Textron Inc. does include unnecessary verbiage in its Responses by referring Plaintiffs to the Responses of the Arctic Cat Parties’ and Textron Specialized Vehicles, as well as, in some Responses, stating that it is not a Party to the Agreement. However, such unnecessary verbiage does not alter the fact that Textron Inc. clearly admits in part and denies in part each at-issue Request. As such, the Court finds that Textron Inc.’s Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 61, 66, 71–73, 76–78, and 81–83 are sufficient.

*26 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an Order of this Court compelling Textron Specialized Vehicles to revise its Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 61, 66, 71–73, 76–78, and 81–83.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and based on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, [Docket No. 107], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth above. Defendants shall amend their Responses and supplement their production, as set forth above, within twenty-one (21) days of this Order.