*1 On June 27, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant Sunrise Senior Living, LLC (“Sunrise”) in Alameda County Superior Court. After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (“Northern District”), on October 31, 2018, the Northern District granted: (1) an unopposed motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Heredia's claims, staying proceedings as to those claims; and (2) a motion to transfer the action to this District, ordering the transfer of the remaining claims. Dkt. 42. On June 21, 2019. Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Sunrise and Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. (”Defendants”), which Defendants answered on July 15, 2019. Dkt. 77, 83. In the SAC, Plaintiffs, purporting to represent a class of residents similarly situated, asserting California state law claims for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Unlawful, Unfair, and Fraudulent Business Practices, and Elder Financial Abuse, alleged that Defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud residents of assisted living facilities in California by, among other things, falsely representing that residents would receive care services each resident needed, as determined by a resident assessment. SAC, ¶ 2. On May 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed, provisionally under seal, a Motion for Class Certification (“Certification Motion”) and supporting documents. See Dkt. 138-145. Defendants' opposition to the Certification Motion is due by August 3, 2020. Dkt. 137.

On July 2, 2020, Sunrise filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Provide Further Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21 (Dkt. 166, “Motion”), along with a Local Rule 37 Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 166-1, “Joint Stipulation” or “Jt. Stip.”), and supporting and opposing declarations and exhibits (Dkt. 166-2, 166-3). On July 9, 2020, Plaintiffs and Sunrise filed separate Supplemental Memoranda in connection with the Motion. Dkt. 168, 170. The Court finds the Motion appropriate for decision without oral argument and vacates the hearing set for July 23, 2020.

Having considered the evidence and arguments in support of and in opposition to the Motion, for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Motion (Dkt. 166).

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)); Net-Com Servs., Inc. v. Eupen Cable USA, Inc., 2012 WL 12888106, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Discovery should ordinarily be allowed under the concept of relevancy unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of this action.” (citation omitted)). But discovery requests that seek irrelevant information are inherently unduly burdensome. Wheel Grp. Holdings, LLC v. Cub Elecparts, Inc., 2018 WL 6264980, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018).

*2 Pursuant to Rule 33, “[a]n interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Rule 33(a)(2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule 33(b)(3). “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Rule 33(b)(4). If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by examining a party's business records, and “if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party,” the responding party may answer by specifying (and making available) the records in sufficient detail to allow the interrogating party to locate and them as readily as the propounding party. Rule 33(d).

A propounding party may move for an order compelling an answer or production to a request for production or an answer in response to an interrogatory if the responding party fails to produce documents or fails to respond as requested under Rule 34 or fails to respond under Rule 33. Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii),(iv). An evasive or incomplete answer or response is treated as a failure to answer or respond. Rule 37(a)(4). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”); Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

The Interrogatories and responses at issue in the Motion are set forth below.

Jt. Stip. at 7-9. In the Joint Stipulation, Sunrise argues: (1) the interrogatories seek relevant information; (2) Plaintiffs' objections are not well-taken; and (3) Plaintiffs have not fully answered the interrogatories. See Jt. Stip. at 9-13. Plaintiffs counter: (1) the interrogatories improperly seek expert opinions and mischaracterize their contentions; (2) the supplemental responses sufficiently answer the interrogatories; and (3) further supplementation is precluded by Sunrise's “discovery stonewalling.” Id. at 14-21.

In its Supplemental Memorandum, Sunrise argues: (1) Plaintiffs' position is “shocking” because, in connection with another motion, one of Plaintiffs' counsel stated that Plaintiffs “would be able to provide this very information” (Dkt. 170 at 1, emphasis omitted); (2) the interrogatories do not call for expert opinions because the putative class members, that is, residents of Defendants' assisted living communities, have “firsthand knowledge regarding how much time they believe should have been provided” (id. at 2, emphasis omitted) removing the calculation from the ambit of expert opinion; (3) “even if the interrogatories did call for” expert opinions (id. at 3, emphasis omitted), “they are nonetheless appropriate unless only an expert could respond” (id., emphasis omitted); (4) Plaintiffs' incorporation of records in their responses is improper (id. at 4); and (5) Plaintiffs' complaints about Sunrise's compliance with discovery are not supported as, among other things, Sunrise explained why “it is simply not possible” to provide some discovery in the format Plaintiffs request (id. at 4, emphasis omitted).

In their Supplemental Memorandum, Plaintiffs advised that they had prepared draft further responses for Sunrise's consideration to resolve the dispute, if Sunrise agreed to withdraw the Motion. Dkt. 168 at 2; Exh. A& B to Dkt.168-1. Sunrise declined Plaintiffs' offer. Dkt. 168 at 2.

The interrogatories ask for information relating to Plaintiffs' alleged contentions. “An interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may order that the interrogatory need not be answered until designated discovery is complete, or until a pretrial conference or some other time.” Rule 33(a)(2). “Courts using their Rule 33(a)(2) discretion generally disfavor contention interrogatories asked before discovery is undertaken.” In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 5212170, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2008). However, courts have recognized that contention interrogatories “may in certain cases be the most reliable and cost-effective discovery device, which would be less burdensome than depositions at which contention questions are propounded.” Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 652 (C.D. Cal. 1997); SPH Am., LLC v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 2016 WL 6305414, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016). Where contention interrogatories are served close to trial, rather than at the inception of an action, “they can also be a useful tool to narrow the issues in dispute.” Protective Optics, Inc. v. Panoptx, Inc., 2007 WL 963972, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).

*5 As a general rule, a party moving to compel responses to contention interrogatories at an early stage in litigation must show the responses would “contribute meaningfully” to one of the following: (1) clarifying the issues in the case; (2) narrowing the scope of the dispute; (3) setting up early settlement discussion; or (4) exposing a substantial basis for a motion under Rule 11 or Rule 56. See In re Convergent Techs. Secs. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 337 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). “These guidelines are not to be applied rigidly, and so any decision must be made on a case by case basis.” HTC Corp. v. Tech. Props. Ltd., 2011 WL 97787, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011)); see also In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 5212170, at *1 and n.3 (acknowledging “non-rigid rule”).

To meet this burden, a party seeking early answers must present “specific, plausible grounds for believing that securing early answers to its contention questions will materially advance the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” In re Convergent, 108 F.R.D. at 338-39. In assessing whether a defendant has met that burden, “if a complaint presents a relatively detailed specification of the real world events giving rise to it, and proceeds on relatively well established legal theories, an attempt to justify early use of contention interrogatories on the ground that answers would clarify the issues would not be especially persuasive. Id. at 337. Similarly, courts also consider the parties' respective access to information: “at least in cases where defendants presumably have access to most of the evidence about their own behavior, it is not at all clear that forcing plaintiffs to answer [contention interrogatories], early in the pretrial period, is sufficiently likely to be productive to justify the burden that responding can entail.” Id. at 337-38.

Courts also recognize that “answers to contention interrogatories evolve over time as theories of liability and defense begin to take shape; answers to those interrogatories may not come into focus until the end of discovery.” Woods v. DeAngelo Marine Exhaust, Inc., 692 F.3d 1272, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Rule 26(e) requires that as theories mature and as the relevance of various items of evidence changes, responses to interrogatories, and particularly contention interrogatories, be corrected or supplemented to reflect those changes.” Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S, 377 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Woods, 692 F.3d at 1280).

Further, as with any other discovery device, contention interrogatories can, depending upon how they are used, become unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1). See Former S'holders of Cardiospectra, Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 2013 WL 5513275, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) (requiring a “listing every single fact in support of [the parties'] contentions would be unduly burdensome”); Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 4113341, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012) (contention interrogatories “are often overly broad and unduly burdensome” when they require a party to state “every fact” or “all facts” supporting responses). Courts permit broad responses to broad contention interrogatories. See Hanford Exec. Mgmt. Emp. Ass'n v. City of Hanford, 2013 WL 5671460, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2013) (finding “broad and generalized” response to “broad and generalized” contention interrogatory “is sufficient”).

In addition, contention interrogatories calling for expert opinions are improper. See Finjan, Inc. v. ESET, LLC, 2018 WL 4772124 *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018); see also Montgomery v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2015 WL 11233384, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). However, interrogatories are not improper “to the extent they seek only facts, not how an expert would construe those facts.” Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2017 WL 1352052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr.13, 2017). Thus, in Amgen, applying both the rule that expert opinions are not properly requested by contention interrogatories and the rule that broad rather than detailed responses are appropriate to such interrogatories, the Court limited responses to contention interrogatories to only “material facts” and precluded “any expert opinions” from the response. 2017 WL 1352052, at *3.

*6 The interrogatories at issue seek information about Plaintiffs' contentions. As set forth above, contention interrogatories are, in the appropriate circumstance, a proper discovery vehicle. However, when they are served “at an early stage in litigation,” the propounding party must show that the responses would “contribute meaningfully” to: (1) clarifying the issues in the case; (2) narrowing the scope of the dispute; (3) setting up early settlement discussion; or (4) exposing a substantial basis for a motion under Rule 11 or Rule 56. See In re Convergent, 108 F.R.D. at 337.

Here, the fact discovery cutoff is not until March 26, 2021, the expert discovery cutoff is not until June 4, 2021, and the Final Pretrial Conference is not until July 30, 2021. See Dkt. 69. Although served well after the filing of the action in state court, in light of the removal and transfer of the case, in the context of a trial date more than a year away, an expert discovery cutoff nearly eleven months away, and a fact discovery cutoff more than eight months away, these interrogatories were served “at an early stage in the litigation.” See Folz v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2014 WL 357929, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (denying motion to compel further responses to contention interrogatories, finding “substantial discovery” remained to be taken with more than eight months remaining until the discovery cutoff).

Although not identified in In re Convergent as one of the litigation events to which contention interrogatories may “contribute meaningfully” so as to justify their early use, the Court assumes that Certification Motion is an appropriate event upon which such a showing may be made. Thus, if Sunrise demonstrates that the interrogatories meaningfully contribute to the clarification or resolution of the pending Certification Motion, such interrogatories may be warranted at this stage.

Here, it is not readily apparent that Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21 meaningfully contribute to the clarification or resolution of the Rule 23 issues raised by the Certification Motion. The interrogatories seek information about: (1) what formula Plaintiffs contend Sunrise should have used to determine the time needed to provide adequate services to residents (Interrogatory No. 20); and (2) for each service that Plaintiffs contend in ¶ 52 of the SAC were not properly provided due to insufficient staffing, what amount of time should have been allocated (Interrogatory No. 21).

As initial matter, the Court notes (1) Plaintiffs have set forth detailed allegations in the SAC and (2) the information from which staffing formulae and task-time analyses can be calculated are held primarily by Sunrise—two factors that counsel against permitting early-stage contention interrogatories. See In re Convergent, 108 F.R.D. at 337-38.

In addition, although Sunrise asserts variously, in conclusory fashion, that the information sought is “central to this case,” “basic,” “crucial,” “critical,” and “go[es] to the heart of [Plaintiffs'] theories and Sunrise's ability to defend itself” (Jt. Stip. at 2, 9), as Plaintiffs note, the SAC does not allege that what “formula” or what time per task Sunrise was required to apply to residents' care (id. at 18). Rather, Plaintiffs allege, and will be required to prove at trial, that Sunrise's staffing was inadequate to provide proper and promised care to residents. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 2-9, 35-50, 55, 84-88, 93-95, 113. Plaintiffs have not alleged, and are not required to prove, that any particular staffing level or formula should have been applied; instead, they have alleged and will be required to prove that the staffing level/formula actually used by Sunrise resulted in care that fell below that which was promised or otherwise required by law. Plaintiffs might seek to offer expert testimony of best practices or opinions on appropriate levels of care. But Rule 26, and Judge Staton's Scheduling Order, sets for the timing and procedures for disclosure and testing of such opinions. Contention interrogatories are not the vehicle to present or test such expert opinions. As the information sought by the interrogatories relate to “contentions” that Plaintiffs have not pled and need not prove, the significance of the information sought by the interrogatories in general, and with respect to the Rule 23 issues raised by the Certification Motion in particular, is tangential at best. It does not appear it will “meaningfully contribute” to the resolution of the Certification Motion.

*7 The foregoing is particularly apparent with respect to Interrogatory No. 20, which is not based on any allegation in the SAC, but is instead based on statements by Plaintiffs' counsel in support of a motion to compel filed on January 2, 2020. See Jt. Stip. at 3 (citing Dkt. 107-3). Nothing in the records cited by Sunrise supports a finding that Plaintiffs are required to, or even intend to, prove at trial what specific formula Sunrise was required to apply relating to staffing for resident care. It certainly does not support a finding that Plaintiffs are required to prove such a formula for the Certification Motion. Similarly, although Interrogatory No. 21 is tied to ¶ 52 of the SAC, the information sought by the interrogatory is a statement of the amount of time that Plaintiffs contend “should be allocated to each” service provided to meet residents' needs. However, in ¶ 52 of the SAC, Plaintiffs allege only that: Sunrise promised to provide the care required by resident assessments; such promise was material to their decision to be admitted to Sunrise facilities; they reasonably expected that care would be delivered at the promised level; and the reasonably expected staffing would be sufficient to deliver that care. See SAC ¶ 52. Plaintiffs did not allege what “amount of time [they] believe should be allocated to each service” (Interrogatory No. 21). It is not apparent why interrogatories that seek information about issues that Plaintiffs have not alleged in the SAC, and are not required to prove at trial, are “crucial” or “central to the issues in the case” or bear in any meaningful way upon the Certification Motion.

However, even assuming Sunrise had shown that the contention interrogatories here contribute meaningfully to the determination of the Certification Motion, Plaintiffs' objections that the interrogatories call for expert opinions are well-taken. The interrogatories ask for “the particular formula [Plaintiffs] contend SUNRISE should have used to determine the amount of time to provide adequate services to residents” and “the amount of time [Plaintiffs] believe should be allocated to each” of the care services that Plaintiffs contend were not properly provided. Stated another way, the interrogatories ask Plaintiffs to calculate, for every service at issue, how much time an assisted living facility should spend caring for residents and provide a formula for how staffing should be set to provide that care. Such questions seek more than just facts, lay opinions, or the simple application of law to facts. Those questions require expert analysis.

It is surprising that Sunrise takes the position that the interrogatories do not require expertise, considering the repeated arguments made by Sunrise in this action that its task-time studies and staffing formulae are so highly sensitive that some portions thereof should not be produced in discovery at all, even pursuant to an attorneys-eyes only protective order, and that any protective order must exclude as potential experts for Plaintiffs anyone who works or consults for any of 1,493 named competitors of Sunrise within the State of California. See Dkt. 105. Sunrise further sought to seal from the public record an on-the-record, in-court colloquy about how a hypothetical time-task study used to inform staffing methodologies might be performed at an assisted living facility, arguing that the hypothetical exercise “divulged information regarding Sunrise's proprietary methods of developing and implementing its staffing methodology.” See Dkt. 130 at 2; Dkt. 136. Despite that history, Sunrise now asserts that the named Plaintiffs and purported class members, who by definition are residents of assisted living facilities, have the capacity to “DESCRIBE the particular formula [they] contend SUNRISE should have used to determine the appropriate amount of time to provide adequate services to residents” based solely on their “firsthand knowledge” without the assistance of expert analysis. Sunrise's contention is not supported.

Sunrise is correct in one respect. If only some of the information called for by the interrogatories requires expert testimony, then Plaintiffs should answer, at least in general terms, any portion not requiring expert testimony. Amgen Inc., 2017 WL 1352052, at *2-3. But, based on the limited significance at this stage of the requested information, a response would exclude expert opinions and need only provide a broad discussion of the material facts in support of the contentions at issue. See id. at *3; Hanford, 2013 WL 5671460, at *9.

Here, it is not apparent that any portion of the interrogatories can be answered without expert testimony. Nor is it apparent that Plaintiffs have contentions about the proper staffing formula or task-times. Nonetheless, again, assuming that the early-stage contention interrogatories contribute meaningfully to the Certification Motion, Plaintiffs would be required to provide general responses limited to responsive contentions and material underlying facts, if any, excluding any expert opinions.

*8 Turning to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21, with the interrogatories limited as set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiffs have fully and fairly responded to the interrogatories.

Interrogatory No. 20 asks Plaintiffs to describe “the particular formula [Plaintiffs] contend SUNRISE should have used to determine the appropriate amount of time to provide adequate services to residents.” In their Supplemental Response, Plaintiffs state, among other things, that “Sunrise must staff its facilities in a manner that reasonably ensures that the amount of caregiver hours is sufficient to meet the assessed needs of all residents, taking into account the time required to provide those services .... Plaintiffs contend that the formula or methodology used by Sunrise to determine the number of hours of staff on duty each day and shift must: 1) accurately capture and account for the care workload and the amount of time required to provide all services each resident needs, and 2) allot sufficient hours of staff time each day and shift to ensure that all documents and promised resident services are delivered.” Plaintiffs also refer to two expert declarations as examples of “staffing approach[es].” In light of the limitations excluding expert testimony and limiting any response to “material” facts, and in light of the fact that Plaintiffs do not have the burden to prove, either at trial or in the Certification Motion, that they have a “particular formula” to determine task time, as opposed to proving that Sunrise did not deliver on their promises or obligations, this response fairly answers the interrogatory.

Interrogatory No. 21 asks Plaintiffs to state “the amount of time [Plaintiffs] believe should be allocated to each” care service that Plaintiffs contend in ¶ 52 of the SAC that Sunrise did not sufficiently allocate due to insufficient staff. In their Supplemental Response, Plaintiffs state, among other things: “To date, Sunrise has refused to produce the data and information required to provide a complete response to this interrogatory .... As such, Plaintiffs' staffing experts are presently unable to fully respond to this interrogatory.... Plaintiffs are unable to determine the precise care required by residents, the aggregate workload per day based on each resident population, and the amount of time required per day to deliver all needed care for all residents.” Plaintiffs also cite portions of an expert declaration and an attachment thereto. Based on the response, and their position in the Joint Stipulation (see Jt. Stip. at 14-16), Plaintiffs contend that this response cannot be answered without expert testimony, and such expert testimony is not currently available due to a lack of data from Sunrise. The parties dispute whether the lack of availability of such testimony is due to Sunrise's failure to produce data in useable format. Compare Jt. Stip. at 19-20 with Dkt. 170 at 5. The Court does not reach that issue, because the Court has found that expert testimony is not required to be provided by Plaintiffs in response to the interrogatories. Thus, the reason why it was not given is immaterial; it is not necessary or required at this stage. Plaintiffs' response, and its position in the Joint Stipulation, confirms that it has no further responsive facts, and any further response would call for expert testimony, which it is not required to provide at this stage. The Court has no reason to doubt Plaintiffs' representations. In fact, the nature of the dispute calls to mind the language from In re Convergent, cited above: “at least in cases where defendants presumably have access to most of the evidence about their own behavior, it is not at all clear that forcing plaintiffs to answer [contention interrogatories], early in the pretrial period, is sufficiently likely to be productive to justify the burden that responding can entail.” 108 F.R.D. at 338-39. That is particularly true here.

*9 Sunrise takes issue with Plaintiffs' references to expert reports in their supplemental responses. Of course, as noted above, a party may, under Rule 33(d), answer an interrogatory by specifying and making available records from which the answer to the interrogatory may be determined if the burden of deriving the answer from the records is substantially the same for either party. Sunrise contends that the references to the expert reports are inappropriate and insufficient. However, as the Court has found Plaintiffs are not at this time required to provide expert testimony in response to the interrogatories, the expert reports were beyond what Plaintiffs were required to provide. Any asserted deficiency in those reports is immaterial because the reports themselves were not required to be provided.

Subject to the limitations set forth above regarding the proper scope of Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21, the Court finds Plaintiffs' Supplemental Responses thereto fairly answered the interrogatories. As a result, Sunrise's Motion (Dk. 166) is DENIED.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs included with their Supplemental Memorandum “proposed” Second Supplemental Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21, which Plaintiffs offered to serve if Sunrise withdrew the Motion. As noted, Sunrise declined the offer. It appears the proposed Second Supplemental Responses were in draft form, as they were undated and have errors in the numbering of the interrogatories and the responses (see Dkt. 168-1 at 9-10, 14-15, 17 (CM/ECF pagination). As the Court has denied the Motion, it takes no action with respect to the proposed but apparently never finalized Second Supplemental Responses. The Court does note that under Rule 26(e)(1)(A), a party who has responded to an interrogatory must supplement that response in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect, the response is incomplete and the additional corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion (Dkt. 166) is DENIED.

Initials of Clerk: mba