I. INTRODUCTION

*1 On June 27, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action Complaint against Defendant Sunrise Senior Living, LLC (“Defendant”) in Alameda County Superior Court alleging that Defendant has “engaged in a scheme to defraud seniors, persons with disabilities, and their family members at its assisted living facilities in California by falsely representing to all residents in its admission contracts that each resident will be provided the care services ... the resident needs ....” Dkt. 1-1. On January 29, 2018, Defendant removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (“Northern District”) based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Dkt. 1. On October 31, 2018, the Northern District granted: (1) an unopposed motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Heredia's claims, staying proceedings as to those claims; and (2) a motion to transfer the action to this District, ordering the transfer of the remaining claims. Dkt. 42. On March 4, 2019, in this District, the Honorable Josephine L. Staton, United States District Judge, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs' “claims have been adequately pled.” Dkt. 65 at 8. Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on June 21, 2019, which Defendant answered on July 15, 2019. Dkt. 77, 83.

On January 2, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Dkt. 107, “Motion”), along with a Local Rule 37 Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 107-1, “Joint Stipulation” or “Jt. Stip.”), and supporting and opposition declarations and exhibits (Dkt. 107-2 to 107-4). On January 9, 2020, Plaintiffs and Defendant filed separate Supplemental Memoranda in connection with the Motion. Dkt. 108-110. The Court granted Plaintiffs' Application to file a portion of their Supplemental Memorandum under seal. Dkt. 112.

The Motion was heard on January 23, 2020. During the hour-long hearing, counsel for the parties were provided a further opportunity to present their respective positions. Following discussions, the parties were ordered to further meet and confer regarding certain issues and Plaintiffs were directed to submit a status report regarding the outcome of the conference(s). Per the Court's order, on January 30, 2020, the parties submitted their Joint Status Report. Dkt. 115.

Having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel offered in support of and in opposition to the Motion, as well as the Joint Status Report, for the reasons set forth below and at the hearing, the Court now rules as follows.

II. RELEVANT LAW

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)); Net-Com Servs., Inc. v. Eupen Cable USA, Inc., 2012 WL 12888106, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Discovery should ordinarily be allowed under the concept of relevancy unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of this action.” (citation omitted)). But discovery requests that seek irrelevant information are inherently unduly burdensome. Wheel Grp. Holdings, LLC v. Cub Elecparts, Inc., 2018 WL 6264980, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018).

*2 “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”); Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION

The Joint Stipulation specifies that the disputed requests fall into two categories: (1) Target Staffing Formula, Task Times (Request for Production [“RFP”] Nos. 9, 12, and 14) and Resident Assessment, Census, and Payroll Data (RFP Nos. 20-23, 25, 26, and 29). The Court addresses each category in turn.

A. Target Staffing Formula, Task Times (RFP Nos. 9, 12, and 14)

Plaintiffs seek documents regarding the formula or procedure Defendant uses for calculating facility staffing levels (RFP No. 9), any “task time” studies or analyses of the time required to provide promised services (RFP No. 12), and any calculation of the aggregate minutes of staff time required to provide promised services (RFP No. 14). Plaintiffs maintain that these documents are relevant to their claim that Defendant fails to set facility staffing at levels sufficient to meet resident needs. Plaintiffs further maintain that the requested documents are relevant to Defendant's defense that it “sets staffing levels based on the aggregate needs” of residents as determined by assessments conducted for each resident. Jt. Stip. at 6-8. Defendant asserts that it has agreed to produce all documents relating to staffing procedures it followed during the class period, with the exception of its “task time studies,” which it maintains are not subject to discovery because they are irrelevant, do not bear on the issue of class certification, and constitute trade secrets. Id. at 5.

1. Target Staffing Formula

Plaintiffs contend that although Defendant agreed to produce all documents relating to staffing procedures it followed during the class period, to date, it has not produced documents that completely explain how the target staffing levels are derived. Pl. Supp. Mem. at 1. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that the previously produced documents do not explain how Defendant has calculated “standard hours,” which are used to drive the target staffing formula. Id. In its Supplemental Memorandum, Defendant claims that “Plaintiffs have all target and actual staffing data. In short, there are no such documents, and there is no such information, that Plaintiffs seek but do not already have.” Def. Supp. Mem. at 3 (emphasis omitted).

With respect to responsive documents relating to the Target Staffing Formula (excluding Time Task Studies, discussed below), Defendant, through counsel, has represented that it has produced all responsive documents, including all past and current staffing formulas and methods. The Court will take Defendant at its word and nothing further is required under Rule 34. As with all discovery responses, Defendant is reminded that any party who fails to produce responsive information it has agreed to provide in responses or supplemental responses runs the risk at trial of exclusion of any responsive information not disclosed or other potential penalties. See Rule 37(c)(1).

2. Task Time Studies

*3 This dispute relates to collected task time studies based on observations of community personnel, which was used in formulating an “enhanced” staffing method implemented in September 2019. Jt. Stip. at 21. As noted, Defendant contends that production of its task time studies is inappropriate because: (1) they are not relevant to Plaintiffs' allegations, (2) they do not bear on the issue of class certification, and (3) they are trade secrets. Id. at 5.

First, Defendant maintains that its task time studies did not inform the staffing methodology challenged by Plaintiffs as the revised staffing procedures were only implemented in September 2019 and are thus, not relevant to 99 percent of staffing during the class period. Jt. Stip. at 21-22. Defendant asserts that the SAC does not contain any allegations regarding purported misrepresentations regarding Defendant's staffing formula or any underlying data used to create it, nor could Plaintiffs since the studies at issue did not inform the staffing methodology in place for the vast majority of the class period. Id. at 25.

However, Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that Defendant has falsely represented that care would be provided in accordance with each resident's assessment, and that Defendant fails to provide sufficient numbers of properly trained staff to meet the aggregate needs of the residents. SAC ¶ 2. The class period is defined as the period from June 27, 2013 through the present (id. ¶ 79), and Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. Id. at 35-36. In particular, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring Defendant to cease and desist “ongoing violations” and disclose that it “does not ensure that sufficient numbers of trained staff are available to meet the assessed needs of its current residents.” Id. ¶ 9 & p. 35. Defendant denies Plaintiffs' allegations, and affirmatively claims that it “sets staffing levels based on the aggregate needs of the residents.” Answer at 1-2. As such, documents regarding any methods for calculating care and staffing from June 2013 through the present are relevant to Plaintiffs' claims and responding to Defendant's defense in this action, as are any documents relating to the decision to initiate task time studies and change the staffing formulas.

Next, Defendant contends that the task time studies are not relevant to class certification, and Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing to justify “pure merits-based discovery.” Defendant argues that “because the time task studies did not exist for the vast majority of the class period and did not have any bearing on [Defendant's] staffing in California until well after either Plaintiff lived at a [Defendant] community, [Plaintiffs] cannot reasonably argue that the studies would be relevant to issue of whether certification of their class claims is appropriate.” Jt. Stip. at 26.

Whether to allow pre-class certification discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009); Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975). “[O]ften the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and that some discovery will be warranted.” Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942. “Although in some cases a district court should allow discovery to aid the determination of whether a class action is maintainable, the plaintiff bears the burden of advancing a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 are satisfied or that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. Absent such a showing, a trial court's refusal to allow class discovery is not an abuse of discretion.” Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (as amended); Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (“the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery measures are likely to produce persuasive information substantiating the class allegations”). Here, as Defendant concedes, the District Judge in this action did not bifurcate class and merits discovery. See Beets v. Molina Healthcare, Inc., 2019 WL 2895630, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2019) (concluding that because the district court expressly declined to bifurcate discovery, “some leeway should be afforded with respect to merits related issues as part of the precertification discovery determination”); In re Toys R Us-Delaware, Inc. v. Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., 2010 WL 4942645, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (where district judge did not bifurcate discovery, defendant was required to “respond fully and completely to all discovery requests”). Indeed, Judge Staton's standing procedures provide: “Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court does not bifurcate class discovery from merits discovery.” https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-josephine-l-staton, ¶ 9.

*4 In any event, the Court finds that the task time studies are relevant to class certification. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered the recent decision in In re: Williams-Sonoma, Inc., -- F.3d --, 2020 WL 131360 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2020), in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in ordering defendant to disclose a list of its California customers in a proposed class action. In Williams-Sonoma, the plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant based on alleged misrepresentations as to the thread count in its bedding product. After the district court determined that Kentucky law, not California law, governed the plaintiff's claims and therefore, he could not pursue a class action pursuant to Kentucky consumer law, the plaintiff sought to obtain discovery to aid his counsel in finding a California purchaser, who might be willing to sue. Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit concluded that discovery “to find a client to be named plaintiff before a class action is certified is not within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).” Id. at *3. Therefore, the district court erred when it ordered the discovery from defendant “for the sole purpose of aiding his counsel's attempt to find a California purchaser of bedding from [defendant] who might be willing to sue.” Id. at *2-3.

Here, unlike the discovery at issue in Williams-Sonoma, the discovery at issue goes to the heart of the existing claims. This is not a case where Plaintiffs are seeking information to find a new plaintiff, but rather, to discover information relevant to proffered class members. Whether the staffing levels were sufficient is the central issue in this action, and Plaintiffs cannot evaluate and formulate its motion for class certification, with issues relating to commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, without the ability to assess the basis for Defendant's staffing determinations as applied to the purported class across the purported class period. Although Defendant claims that the new staffing procedures were not implemented until September 2019, as Defendant stated at the hearing, the task time studies themselves were conducted two to three years ago. Plaintiffs' class allegations are sufficiently plausible to entitle Plaintiffs to discovery on Defendant's staffing procedures and formulas, and the basis for both. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball, Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 943 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that evidence of “uniform corporate policies” carry “great weight for certification purposes” (citation omitted)).[1]

Defendant further objects to the production of its task time studies because they are protected trade secrets. However, “there is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information.” Upjohn Co. v. Hygieia Biological Labs., 151 F.R.D. 355, 358 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 685 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Davis v. Leal, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1999) (“the trade secrets privilege is not absolute, but requires a balancing of the need for protecting the secret with the needs of the case”). “In order to resist discovery of a trade secret, a party must first demonstrate by competent evidence that the information sought through discovery is a trade secret and that disclosure of the secret might be harmful. If this showing is made, ‘the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery to establish that the disclosure of trade secrets is relevant and necessary to the action.’ ” Upjohn Co., 151 F.R.D. at 358 (citation omitted); Davis, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. California law applies in this case, see Upjohn Co., 151 F.R.D. at 358, which defines a “trade secret” as:

*5 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d).

Defendant contends that its task time studies qualify as trade secrets because: (1) the studies were created internally by Defendant based on observations completed with Defendant communities by staff and stored internally; (2) they cannot be easily duplicated or acquired by other companies, nor is their substance known outside of Defendant; and (3) the studies are independently economically valuable to Defendant given that the studies relate only to work performed at its communities and correlate exclusively to its ongoing pilot project related to staffing procedures. Jt. Stip. at 23-24. Beyond these general assertions, however, Defendant provided no evidence, such as an affidavit from a competent corporate officer, attesting to these claims or demonstrating what measures, if any, Defendant has taken to keep this information from being made available to its competitors or other third parties. Although Defendant represented that such a declaration could be provided (Jt. Stip. at 24 n.8), no such declaration had been submitted as of the hearing on January 23, 2020 nor did Defendant file a motion for a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G) to prevent disclosure. As noted, once a party seeking discovery shows relevance, “the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also DIRECTV, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”). Prior to the filing of the instant Motion, the parties were advised of the same authorities mandating, where appropriate, evidentiary support for objections to discovery requests in opposing a motion to compel. See Dkt. 98 at 3 (citing McGraw-Hill Cos. and DIRECTV, Inc.).

Additionally, there is a protective order in this case intended to protect the handling of confidential information. Dkt. 105. As the Court noted at the hearing, the comprehensive protective order already in place provides a high level of protection, including a provision that prevents Plaintiffs from disclosing confidential information to any experts who are consultants of a director competitor of Defendant's, identified as 1493 different entities. The parties also have agreed to a “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY” designation to address and protect “extremely sensitive” confidential information, including trade secrets. Defendant has not explained why the protective order in place is inadequate to protect the information at issue, beyond its speculative concern for inadvertent disclosure.

While the Court is mindful of the sensitive nature of trade secrets and the concern that such information not be disclosed to a competitor, in this instance, the disclosure is not being made to a direct competitor. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 293 (D. Del. 1985) (“it is presumed that disclosure to a party who is not in competition with the holder of the trade secret will be less harmful than disclosure to a competitor”). Further, the purported trade secret at issue, if any, does not involve the type of highly confidential information central to Defendant's business, such as the “secret formula” for Coca-Cola's most famous product. Rather, the task time studies are compilations of observations of how staff members spent their time at different facilities starting some two to three years ago—information that was visible to residents at the facilities and in some instances residents' family members.

*6 Because Defendant has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the task time studies constitute trade secrets and has not established why the existing protective order is insufficient, Defendant's objection on this basis is overruled.

In the Joint Status Report, the parties request a telephonic conference with the Court during the week of February 3, 2020 to discuss issues regarding protocols to limit the risk of “inadvertent disclosures.” Dkt. 115 at 2. The Court treats the request as a request to discuss a potential modification of the Protective Order, which the parties have a right to seek. See Dkt. 105, ¶ 14.1. The Court sets a telephonic conference for Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 11:00 a.m. Counsel shall contact the Court's Courtroom Deputy for call-in information. If counsel are not available at that time, they shall confer with each other and forward proposed alternative mutually convenient dates and times to the Court's Courtroom Deputy.

B. Resident Assessment, Census, and Payroll Data (RFP Nos. 20-23, 25, 26, and 29)

Plaintiffs maintain that these requests seek information required to conduct expert analysis as to whether staffing levels at Defendant's facilities are sufficient to provide promised services. Jt. Stip. at 2. Plaintiffs indicate that the resident assessments and care plans (RFP Nos. 20-23) will be analyzed to identify the various services/tasks promised to residents. Then, using that information, the resident census data (RFP No. 29), and task times, Plaintiffs' experts will calculate the number of hours required to provide the promised services. Finally, the required hours are compared to the actual staffing hours at Defendant's facilities, which are obtained from the payroll records (RFP Nos. 25-26). Id. at 33.

Defendant contends that it has already produced or agreed to produce substantial information and documents sufficient to allow Plaintiffs to understand how its staffing has worked over the past six years, and requesting documents concerning all resident assessments for all 13,000 current and former residents, as well as payroll and attendance data for nearly 11,000 current and former employees is unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case. Jt. Stip. at 5, 35, 37-40; Def. Supp. Mem. at 4-5.

1. Resident Assessments and Census Records

Plaintiffs seek all resident assessments regarding any resident conducted during or relating to the class period (RFP No. 20), documents concerning any resident assessments (RFP No. 21), documents concerning any calculation, study, analysis, summary, or measure of acuity information for any resident (RFP No. 22), all resident service plans for each resident (RFP No. 23), and daily resident census records for each facility for each day of the class period (RFP No. 29). Defendant objected to these requests for production, asserting these requests are overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague and ambiguous, premature, not proportional to the needs of the case, seek information not relevant or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and/or seek private, privileged, trade secret, proprietary, and/or confidential information. Jt. Stip. at 28-32.

Nevertheless, Defendant does not appear to object to responding to these requests in their entirety; rather, Defendant contends it has already produced each version of the residency agreement, the resident assessment tool that will enable Plaintiffs to calculate the number of hours of promised services per assessment, the target staffing data relating to every community for every month during the class period and has offered to produce monthly occupancy reports. Defendant also is willing to produce a sampling of resident assessments and care plans. In particular, Defendant offered to produce documents for a subset of individuals at the named Plaintiffs' communities (those that did not sign an arbitration agreement) with an understanding that Plaintiffs could request an additional subset after Plaintiffs reviewed and assessed the necessity of an additional production. Jt. Stip. at 36, 38; Allyn Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A. Plaintiffs are amenable to a sampling methodology, but proposed to limit the initial production to a sample of ten facilities, conditioned upon: (a) Defendant not opposing class certification on the basis that the sample is not representative; and (b) Plaintiffs' reservation to pursue additional production in the future (with Defendant retaining the right to oppose any further request). Jt. Stip. at 33.

*7 As noted above, under Rule 26(b)(1), the Court looks to the following in assessing proportionality: “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Defendant contends that requests for resident assessments and census data is disproportionate to the needs of the case. Defendant explains that “the requested files for more than 10,000 California residents exist only in hard copy, some of which are located at [Defendant's] communities and some of which are located in offsite storage facilities.” Jt. Stip. at 35, 37. Counsel for Defendant attests that, based on the prior costs of scanning select hard copy residency agreements, wellness files, and business files for the San Rafael community, the cost of scanning and redacting copies of resident files would cost approximately $40,000 per community, resulting in an overall cost of approximately $1.6 million dollars for the approximately forty communities at issue. Id. at 37; Allyn Decl. ¶ 6.

Plaintiffs attempt to refute Defendant's assertions regarding the cost of producing resident assessment information, maintaining that contrary to Defendant's representations, the information at issue is available electronically. Plaintiffs' counsel claims that “[b]ased on experience in similar cases, [he] believe[s] the vast majority (if not all) of the requested information exists in electronic form” in Defendant's records. Marks Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs represent that the documents produced to date show that resident assessments are uploaded into Defendant's automated system. Jt. Stip. at 14. While the Court agrees with Defendant that what happens at other communities does not ether disprove Defendant's representations about how it stores its records, to the extent that the resident assessments have been saved in electronic format, Defendant's purported burden of scanning hard copies would be substantially reduced. Based on the information provided, it appears that roughly 3,000 resident files may exist electronically. See Jt. Stip. at 35 (indicating that the requested files for more than 10,000 residents exist only in hard copy).

Balancing relevance, privacy, burden, and proportionality concerns, the Court finds that a sampling method is warranted and appropriate. However, in briefing the Motion, neither party provided evidence regarding what would constitute a statistically significant and reasonable sample size in their briefing. The Court previously rejected Defendant's contention that discovery should be limited to only putative class members who did not have arbitration clauses in their agreements. At the same time, requiring Defendant to produce resident assessments for all former and current residents and daily resident census records for 10 different communities is disproportionate to the needs of the case at this time. The Court previously concluded that a sample size of roughly 15 percent was appropriate for purposes of identifying the names and contact information of potential class members. The Court finds a similar approach appropriate with respect to the resident assessments and census records. In the Court's tentative ruling regarding this Motion and as stated at the hearing, the parties were directed to meet and confer in a good faith effort to identify mutually acceptable sample groups. Per the Joint Status Report, the parties reached an agreement regarding the selection and number of a sample group of communities for the production of resident assessment and census information, and regarding the production of staffing data for the same sample group of communities. Joint Status Report at 2. As the parties have not articulated the substance of this agreement, the Court orders Defendant to produce the documents in accordance with the parties' mutual agreement.

2. Payroll Data

Plaintiffs seek all payroll and/or attendance data for all facility staff (RFP No. 25) and contract labor (RFP No. 26) for every day during the class period. Defendant objected to production of these documents on the grounds that the requests are vague and ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, premature, seek irrelevant information or information not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, seek private, trade secret, proprietary, and/or confidential information, and/or production would impose a burden disproportionate to the needs of the case. Jt. Stip. at 31-32.

*8 In the Joint Stipulation, Defendant contends that it has produced staffing data that shows both the monthly target and actual staffing levels for team members working in positions that provide care to residents at each California community. Jt. Stip. at 37. It maintains that the payroll and attendance data “adds nothing,” and requesting payroll records for nearly 11,000 current and former employees is disproportionate to the needs of the case, requiring an “enormous and time-consuming undertaking for members of [Defendant's] payroll and IT teams.” Id. at 39-40; Def. Supp. Mem. at 5.

The Court finds RFP Nos. 25 and 26 are overly broad and disproportionate to the needs of the case. These requests seek information regarding all employees without regard to whether these staff members were involved in resident care. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently explained why the documents that have been previously produced are insufficient to establish the actual staffing hours at the facilities. The payroll records contain substantial private information regarding third parties, and imposes burdens that are not proportional to the needs of the case. As such, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel further responses to RFP Nos. 25 and 26 is DENIED without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion (Dkt. 107) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

In addition, at the request of the parties, counsel for the parties shall call-in and appear telephonically for a conference with the Court on Tuesday, February 4, 2020 at 11:00 a.m. to discuss potential proposed modifications to the Protective Order (Dkt. 105). Counsel shall contact the Court's Courtroom Deputy for call-in information. If counsel are not available at that time, they shall confer with each other and forward alternative mutually agreeable dates and times for such during the week of February 3, 2020 to the Court's Courtroom Deputy.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Initials of Clerk: mba