*1 Before the court is defendant Alpha Biomedical and Diagnostic Corp's (“Alpha's”) motion to quash several non-party subpoenas issued by plaintiffs Philips Medical Systems Puerto Rico, Inc., Philips Medical Systems Nederland B.V., and Philips India Limited (collectively “Philips”). Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 53. Philips served the subpoenas on several of Alpha's clients, requesting the production of various records related to Alpha's repair of Philips-branded medical equipment. See Dkt. 55-1. Philips opposed the motion to quash, Dkt. 55, Alpha replied, Dkt. 57, and Philips submitted a surreply, 59. This matter is before me by consent of the parties. Dkt. 34. For the reasons set forth below, Alpha's motion is GRANTED.

Both Alpha and Philips are engaged in business related to medical imaging systems used in hospitals and medical centers, and they are embroiled in a dispute related to alleged trade secrets. On May 22, 2020, Philips sent Alpha a proposed confidentiality order to facilitate discovery as it would relate to confidential materials. Dkt. 55 at 3. On June 23, parties held a conference call in which they discussed Alpha's concerns related to another Philips case and its desire to protect what it believes are trade secrets. Dkt. 53 at 2; Dkt. 55 at 4. Philips invited Alpha to review the proposed confidentiality order to assuage its concerns. Dkt. 53 at 2-3; Dkt. 55 at 4. Alpha accuses Philips of not seriously engaging in this negotiation, and Philips accuses Alpha of the same. Dkt. 53 at 3; Dkt. 55 at 4.

On June 26, Philips prepared several third-party subpoenas on Alpha's clients. See Dkt. 55-1. These seek copies of Alpha's contracts with their clients; invoices, receipts, and other documentation related to maintenance of Philips-branded medical equipment; copies of proof of payment to Alpha for maintenance of Philips medical equipment; communications between the client and Alpha concerning maintenance of Philips medical equipment; documents concerning a client's indebtedness to Alpha; video surveillance related to repair and maintenance of Philips medical equipment from January 2012 to the present; and the names of individuals/entities that currently or since January 2012 have serviced Philips-branded medical equipment for the client. Id. The subpoenas were served on June 29, June 30, and July 1. Id. They require a response from non-parties between July 27 and July 31. Id.

Philips did not provide Alpha with prior notice of the subpoenas, but Alpha obtained a copy issued to one of its clients and, on July 6, filed a motion to quash. Dkt. 53 at 3. Philips stated that the failure to provide Alpha with prior notice was an oversight, Dkt. 55 at 14, and it provided Alpha with copies of the subpoenas on July 7 after learning of that oversight. See Dkt. 55-2.

Alpha argues the subpoenas must be quashed because Philips improperly attempted to circumvent party discovery procedures; violated the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45; and seeks Alpha's trade secrets. Philips contends that Alpha lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas; that the subpoenas seek relevant information not subject to any privilege; and that any Rule 45 violation was harmless.

*2 Although parties clash over Alpha's standing to challenge the third-party subpoenas, I see no need to address this dispute. Alpha need not have standing to challenge a third-party subpoena where “the court could effect the relief [it] seek[s] sua sponte.” Green v. Cosby, No. 3:14-CV-30211-MGM, 2017 WL 1377593, at *2–3 (D. Mass. Apr. 11, 2017); accord Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Navellier & Assocs., Inc., No. CV 17-11633-DJC, 2019 WL 688164, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2019); Accusoft Corp. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-40007-FDS, 2012 WL 1358662, at *11 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2012). District courts possess “inherent powers that are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’ ” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). Indeed, the court possesses inherent “equitable powers ... over [its] own process, to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice.” Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145–46 (1888). I rely on these powers to resolve the present motion.

Rule 45 allows attorneys to issue third-party subpoenas in connection with civil litigation, with the following limitation:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). The documents Philips seeks via third-party subpoenas appear to be largely those which it could obtain directly from Alpha (contracts with Alpha, documentation related to repairs by Alpha, proof of payment to Alpha, communications with Alpha, documents related to indebtedness to Alpha). See, e.g., Dkt 55-1 at 4–5 (items 1–5). “Courts have recognized that if material sought by subpoena is readily available to a party in the action, as it likely is here, then obtaining it through subpoena on a nonparty often will create an undue burden.” Ponder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV 19-MC-91215-ADB, 2019 WL 2249675, at *1–3 (D. Mass. May 24, 2019) (citing cases) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, item numbers 7 and 8 are overbroad, as they seek the names of all individuals/entities who have serviced Philips equipment since January 2012 and do not limit their request to Alpha representatives. See, e.g., Dkt 55-1 at 5. Philips has not explained why the names of non-Alpha representatives who serviced Philips equipment have any relevance in a dispute with Alpha. Because the third-party subpoenas are overbroad and seek information that Philips could request from Alpha, I find that they impose an undue burden on third parties.

Further, the subpoenas were served without obedience to Rule 45's notice requirement, which provides as follows:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4). Philips admits that it did not provide Alpha with notice and a copy of its subpoenas prior to serving them on various third parties. It nonetheless argues that the subpoenas need not be quashed because Alpha was able to raise its objections in its motion to quash. This argument takes too narrow a view of the subpoena power.

*3 When an attorney issues a third-party subpoena, she acts as an officer of the court, taking on not only the court's power but also its “attendant responsibility and liabilities.” Kremsky v. Kremsky, No. CV 16-4474, 2017 WL 30003, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2017); see also U.S. S.E.C. v. Hyatt, 621 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the notion “that a subpoena issued under Rule 45(a)(3) by an attorney as an officer of the court is not itself a court order subject to contempt sanctions if disobeyed”). “The risks attached to the misuse of the subpoena power are great. Under this delegation of public power, an attorney is licensed to access, through a non-party with no interest to object, the most personal and sensitive information about a party.” Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1998), order vacated in part on reconsideration, No. 96-1792, 1999 WL 33957391 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1999) (internal citations omitted). And “the injury resulting from attorney misuse of the subpoena power is not limited to the harm it inflicts upon the parties. Rather, misuse of the subpoena power also compromises the integrity of the court's processes.” Id. at 489.

Here, Philips and Alpha were in the midst of negotiations over their approach to confidential information during discovery. Only days after Philips suggested Alpha review a proposed confidentiality order to solve their discovery dispute, Philips issued numerous third-party subpoenas seeking information that Alpha claims is protected and most of which Philips could have sought from Alpha. Philips does not explain why it moved with such haste. Nor do I see why Philips could not wait a few more days to permit Alpha to offer a proposed solution when Philips would shortly be moving to extend discovery deadlines. See Dkt. 54 at 3.

Moreover, although Philips states that the lack of notice provided Alpha was mere oversight, it provides no details to explain why this mistake occurred. It also suggests that perhaps it was under no obligation to provide prior notice in any event, contending that Rule 45 “does not provide a specific time frame for serving the notice.” Dkt. 59-1 at 2. This view runs contrary to the plain language of the rule, which requires that notice be served on each party “before it is served on the person to whom it is directed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) (emphasis added). Given that the attorneys here were exercising the powers of the court, I would expect a more careful reading of the rule and at least some explanation for the alleged oversight.

Although it is true that some courts have declined to issue sanctions for violations of Rule 45's notice requirement where there was no prejudice to the objecting party, see, e.g., Pagan-Colon v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 264 F.R.D. 25, 28–29 (D.P.R. 2010), prejudice is not the only factor relevant to the inquiry. This is true because “public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process is eroded” when the subpoena power is misused. Spencer, 179 F.R.D. at 489. Here, where Philips offers no explanation for its failure to abide by Rule 45's notice requirements and where it seeks information that imposes an undue burden on third parties, I find it appropriate to quash the subpoenas.

Finally, I note that Philips suggests Alpha has engaged in sanctionable conduct by contacting third parties who received subpoenas. See Dkt. 59-1 at 4. Philips may raise this issue in a separate motion should it desire to do so.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to quash at Docket No. 53 is GRANTED. Insofar as Philips seeks documents that are in Alpha's possession, I order Philips to obtain those documents from Alpha rather than from third parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 12th day of August, 2020.