*1 Before the Court is Defendant Luxy Limited's (“Defendant”) First Motion to Compel (the “Motion”) filed in Joint Stipulation format pursuant to Local Rule 37-2 on August 25, 2021. (Dkt. No. 85.) Defendant also submitted a Declaration of Kollin J. Zimmermann (“Zimmermann Decl.”) with related exhibits in support of the Motion. (Dkt. No. 85-2.) Plaintiffs submitted a Declaration of Isaac Eddington in Support of Plaintiffs' Portion of Joint Stipulation Regarding the Motion (“Eddington Decl.”) with related exhibits. (Dkt. No. 85-31.)

On September 8, 2021, pursuant to Local Rule 37-2.3, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum (“Deft.'s Supp. Mem.”) in support of the Motion (Dkt. No. 92) and Plaintiffs Reflex Media, Inc. and Clover8 Investments Pte. Ltd. (together “Plaintiffs”) filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion (“Pltfs.' Supp. Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 93.) On September 17, 2021, the Court on its own motion vacated the hearing on the Motion and took the matter under submission. (Dkt. No. 104.)

Having reviewed the arguments and authorities presented in the Joint Stipulation, for the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS the Motion in part and DENIES the Motion in part.

Plaintiffs filed this trademark and copyright infringement action on January 15, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1.) The operative pleading is the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed on April 28, 2021. (Dkt. No. 58.) Defendant filed an Answer and Second Amended Counterclaim on July 27, 2021. (Dkt. No. 71.)

The Court assumes that the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background of this action, and therefore, does not find it necessary to repeat Plaintiffs' allegations and Defendant's counterclaims here. (See, e.g., prior discovery orders at Dkt. Nos. 74, 81, 109, 151, 157.)

The Motion seeks an order to compel Plaintiffs to provide further written responses and produce documents in response to Defendant's discovery requests concerning ten (10) categories of non-privileged information relating to Plaintiffs' trademarks and copyrighted work(s). (Joint Stip. at i-ii.)

Because of the voluminous nature of the Motion (the Joint Stipulation is fifty-three pages) and the related discovery requests and responses, which the parties submitted in two declarations with a total of thirty-five attached exhibits, totaling more than 700 pages, the Court will not recite the text of each disputed discovery request and response in this Order, but identifies the relevant requests in its discussion of the disputed issues related to the specific requests.[1]

Additionally, the disputed issues and related discovery requests are identified below as described in the Joint Stipulation.

*2 A party may obtain discovery concerning any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(B)(1). Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id.

District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). In resolving discovery disputes, the court may exercise its discretion in “determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing those facts in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” Unilin Beheer B.V. v. NSL Trading Corp., No. CV 14-2210-BRO (SSx), 2015 WL 12698382, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (citing Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport, 235 F.R.D. 553, 558 (D. Conn. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Issue No. 1: Documents concerning the creation and assignment of the copyrights at issue and whether Plaintiffs can assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to documents relating to the creation and assignment of the copyrighted works at issue when Plaintiffs' law firm is identified as “authors” of the copyrighted works in the copyright registrations.

(Joint Stip. at 6-7.)

In response to RFPs Nos. 78 and 79, Plaintiffs object that the RFPs seek documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product privileges. (Joint Stip. at 6.) Further, with respect to RFP No. 78, Plaintiffs state that they have “produced all documents filed with or received from the U.S. Copyright Office (apart from publicly available copyright certificates” and are “unaware of any additional nonprivileged responsive documents,” and that RFP No. 79 is “unreasonably broad.” (Zimmermann Decl., Exs. 10 (Reflex First Supp. Responses to Luxy's First Set of RFPs); 14 (Clover8 Responses to Luxy's First Set of RFPs).)

The attorney-client privilege protects communications between an attorney and his or her client in the rendering of legal advice from compelled disclosure. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389. However, underlying facts are discoverable and do not become privileged simply because they are in the possession of a party's attorney. Id. at 396 (attorney-client privilege extends only to communications and not to facts).

As the Court emphasized in a prior discovery ruling, because the SF Firm identified itself as a co-author of the copyrighted Terms of Use and the Privacy Policy, Plaintiffs' law firm is both litigation counsel and a percipient witness in the case. (See Dkt. No. 151.) Therefore, because Plaintiffs have put the creation, validity, and assignment of the copyrighted material squarely at issue, documents relating to the copyright authorship, registration, and assignments are subject to disclosure, even if prepared by a law firm and Plaintiffs cannot prevent inquiry into these issues by claiming privilege. See e.g., Space Coast Bus., LLC v. Coastal Media Assocs., LLC, 2011 WL 13299574, at *2-3 (M.D. Fl. July 7, 2011) (allowing deposition testimony of attorney who submitted trademark and copyright applications; noting factual information lawyer provided in the copyright or trademark applications “is not confidential and therefore is not privileged”). Furthermore, as Defendant underscores, a copyright assignment is “an arm's length commercial transaction” and the attorney-client privilege does not apply. (Joint Stip. at 9 (citing Est. of Brown v. Arc Music Grp, 830 F.Supp.2d 501, 508 (N.D. Ill. 2011)).)

*3 But other communications by and amongst the lawyers at the SF Firm and their clients, Reflex and Clover8, in the firm's capacity as counsel to these parties, however, remain privileged and Defendant has presented no evidence or authority to suggest otherwise. Defendant, urging the Court to find that there has been a wholesale waiver of Plaintiffs' attorney-client privilege argues all of the documents identified on Plaintiffs' privilege log that indicate they are about either the creation or the assignment of the copyrighted works must be disclosed because they cannot be subject to attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product protections. (Joint Stip. at 11.) Defendant's waiver argument is overreaching and unpersuasive.

Defendant primarily seeks to compel production based on the assertion of privilege waiver, but Plaintiffs also objected to these requests as facially overbroad. (Joint Stip. at 6-7.) To the extent RFPs Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, and 87 seek “all” or “every” DOCUMENT and “every COMMUNICATION” the Court agrees. Further, the Court specifically directed the parties to meet and confer in an effort to narrow the scope of these disputed requests and it does not appear that Defendant has made any effort to do so, but instead simply insists that Plaintiffs respond to the requests as initially presented.

Accordingly, the Court sustains Plaintiffs' objections based on overbreadth and the Motion is DENIED as to requiring any further production in response to RFPs Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, and 87.

Issue No. 3: Whether Plaintiffs must search for and produce documents and information regarding Plaintiffs use of other companies' trademarks as internet search keywords and the ads triggered thereby.

(Joint Stip. at 14.)

(Id. at 15.)

*4 (Id.)

(Id. at 15-16.)

Defendant has broadly framed its arguments about this group of discovery requests in terms of the relevance of evidence that Plaintiffs' trademarks are not generic and whether Plaintiffs have infringed other companies' trademarks as follows:

(Joint Stip. at 16 (internal citations omitted).) Defendant further argues that the information sought in these requests “is relevant to the equitable considerations inherent in trademark infringement cases.” (Id.) Defendant refutes Plaintiffs' objections that the requests are unduly burdensome by asserting that “Plaintiffs' boilerplate objection as to burden are unsupported by any explanation of how or why properly responding to the request would cause undue burden.” (Id. at 17.) The problem here, however, is that while Defendant argues the relevance of the requests from general principles of copyright law, with the exception of RFP No. 55 which it narrowed, Defendant does not address the specific objections to the individual discovery requests, particularly as to overbreadth.

This is particularly the case with respect to the terms KEYWORDS, and the requests for documents “RELATING TO any marketing or advertising” (RFP No. 54); the requests for “advertising and marketing spend on KEYWORDS, on a monthly, quarterly, and annual basis, broken down by each particular KEYWORD (RFP No. 56); and documents RELATING TO YOU use of any KEYWORDS in connection with YOUR Seeking Arrangement page/listing on the Google Play store” (RFP No. 59). While the Court has no quarrel with the general principles outlined in the cases Defendant cites regarding equitable remedies in copyright infringement or finding necessary to establish an “exceptional case”, these authorities do not cure or excuse the facial defects in the specific requests at issue.

The Court cannot grant a discovery motion based on generalized categories. Rather, the Court is tasked with assessing the specificity of particularized discovery requests and the specific objections raised to those requests. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (“[a] second consideration in evaluating a discovery request is how burdensome it will be to respond to that request.” (emphasis added)).

Here, the Court finds ROG No. 13, RFPs Nos. 54, 55 as narrowed, 56, and 59, each to be sufficiently overbroad to sustain Plaintiffs' objections to each of the requests. Moreover, as Plaintiffs emphasize, to the extent these requests purport to seek information concerning Plaintiffs' purported infringement of others' trademark rights, the discovery seeks information that is neither relevant to the claims and defenses in the case nor proportionate to the needs of the case. (Joint Stip. at 19.)

*5 Consequently, the Motion is DENIED as to ROG No. 13 and RFPs Nos. 54, 55 as narrowed, 56, and 59.

Issue No. 4: Whether Plaintiffs must search for and produce information and documents regarding its business expansion plans.

Defendant argues that under the Sleekcraft factors, either parties' plans for expansion to compete with the other party is relevant to assessing likelihood of confusion. (Joint Stip. at 22, (citing AMF Inc v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979)).) On that basis, Defendant urges that Plaintiffs' objections based on relevance and lack of proportionality should be overruled. (Id.) In addition, Defendant points out that the trade secret objection is also without merit because the Court has issued a Protective Order. (Id.)

Plaintiffs respond that Defendant's requests are “vague” and “more broad than is reasonable or proportional to the needs of the case and irrelevant as well.” (Id. at 23.) Plaintiffs assert that, even as narrowed, RFP No. 62's request for documents “sufficient to show [Plaintiffs'] future business plans” is “not particularly clear.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the information sought is not relevant because “the rival litigants' status has already been conclusively established by judicial order and Luxy's admission.” (Id. at 23-24.)

Defendant effectively refutes Plaintiffs' objection that the information sought is not relevant because the settled authorities Defendant cites establish that it is either parties' plans for expansion that are relevant in the Sleekcraft likelihood of confusion analysis. (See Joint Stip. at 23.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs' acknowledge, as they must, that the litigants are direct competitors. (Id. at 24.) Nevertheless, Defendant does not adequately address the facial overbreadth of its requests. There is likely a subset of information regarding Plaintiffs' strategic expansion plans for its platforms that is both relevant and proportional to the needs of this case, but Defendant has made no effort to narrow its requests either topically or temporally. To the extent these requests seek disclosure of information about “all” future business plans, Plaintiffs' objections to ROG No. 9 and RFP No. 62 as narrowed are sustained.

*6 Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to ROG No. 9 and RFP No. 62.

Issue No. 5: Whether Plaintiffs must search for and produce documents and information explaining the relationship between Reflex and Clover8 and various other affiliates and subsidiaries that operate aspects of Plaintiffs' dating services and/or have rights to the trademarks or copyrights at issue.

(Joint Stip. at 25.)

Defendant argues that it is entitled to discovery regarding Plaintiffs' corporate affiliates, particularly as that information may relate to the creation, ownership, and assignment of the copyrighted works. (Joint Stip. at 26.) Plaintiffs contend that the “relationships between members of Plaintiffs' corporate family are not relevant to Luxy's infringement.” (Id. at 27.)

As an initial matter, the Court does not disagree with Defendant about the potential relevance of the information regarding the creation, ownership, and assignment of the intellectual property in dispute. But the interrogatory itself is structurally defective. The Court sustains Clover8's objection that the Clover8 ROG No. 1 is compound insofar as it includes multiple subparts regarding each company's corporate structure and each company's ownership and/or control of particular domain names and websites, and each company's involvement, if any, in the creation of the TRADEMARKS AT ISSUE. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(A)(1). Further, Plaintiffs point out that they have produced the relevant trademark and copyright assignments and do not “dispute that either or both of the Plaintiffs are (at least) co-owners of the relevant intellectual property[.]” (Joint Stip. at 28.)

On the record presented here, taking into account the defects in the interrogatory, the Court finds that Clover8 has adequately responded to the interrogatory.

*7 The Motion is DENIED as to Clover8 ROG No. 1.

Issue No. 6: Whether Plaintiffs must identify specific expressive elements that they claim are protectable under the copyright registrations at issue, given that the registrations state that they contain preexisting text, which would not be subject to protection under the registration.

(Joint Stip. at 29.)

In support of its effort to compel a further response to Clover8 ROG No. 3, Defendant restates the basic principle that “only those expressions in the Copyrighted Works that are sufficiently ‘original’ are protectable.” (Id.) Defendant argues that this information is particularly relevant here because the registrations themselves “state that the Copyrighted Works contain preexisting text” and Clover8's response is “evasive.” (Id.) Thus, Defendant argues it is insufficient for Clover8 to simply point to the copyrighted Terms of Use and Privacy Policy without identifying the specially “original” and/or “expressive” portions of those works. (Id. at 29-30.)

Plaintiffs respond that “Luxy is asking here for a discovery request that is in the nature of a legal brief” because “the Court will decide, which portions of the Plaintiffs' copyrighted policies are ‘original’ or ‘expressive’ within the meaning of copyright law.” (Id. at 30.) Plaintiffs maintain that they have “designated the numerous portions of their copyrighted policies that are headlines as ‘Otherwise Stated’ as original and expressive language, and have stated that that designations without limitation.” (Id.) This, Plaintiffs contend, is sufficient to satisfy its discovery obligation as to Clover8 ROG No. 3. The Court disagrees.

Here, unlike in many previous discovery requests discussed above, the information sought is specific, narrowly framed, and directly relevant to the infringement claims at issue. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to discover what particular elements Plaintiffs contend are “original” or “expressive” in its intellectual property at issue in this case. Plaintiffs' response is indeed evasive and more is required to meet its discovery obligation.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Clover8 ROG No. 3. On or before the expiration of the discovery cut-off, Plaintiffs must provide a supplemental response to Clover8 ROG No. 3 that identifies the specific elements of the protected works that Plaintiffs contend are “original” and/or “expressive” text.

Issue No. 7: Whether Plaintiffs must produce and identify all assignments, licenses and agreements regarding the trademarks and copyrights at issue, including any assignments or licenses between Plaintiffs' various affiliates, parents and subsidiaries.

(Joint Stip. at 32-33.)

Defendant argues that, as with Issue No. 5, Plaintiffs “are intentionally concealing the nature of the Clover8/Reflect corporate family.” (Id. at 33.) Defendant maintains that it is essential to obtain “all agreements involving the assignment of the copyrights in the Works” as this is “relevant to establish chain of title, and whether Clover8 has standing to bring its copyright claims.” (Id.) Plaintiffs, however, respond that they have produced “the copyright assignments sufficient to establish a chain of ownership” and Defendant's request for “every assignment, every permission, and every consent ever granted to anyone” is unreasonably broad and Defendant has not explained how such consents would be in any way relevant to this dispute. (Id. at 34.) The Court agrees with Defendant that the requests are overbroad and, as such, seek information neither relevant to the claims and defenses at issue nor proportionate to the needs of the case.

*9 Plaintiffs' objections to Clover8 ROG No. 10 and RFPs Nos. 10 and 74 are sustained. The Motion is DENIED as to Clover8 ROG No. 10 and RFPs Nos. 10 and 74.

Issue No. 9: Whether Plaintiffs must produce all demand letters, cease-and-desist letters, settlement agreements, and correspondence with third parties concerning Plaintiffs' attempts to enforce their trademark rights, or third parties' attempts to enforce their trademark rights against Plaintiffs.

Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs' efforts to enforce their marks against third parties (RFP 17) are relevant to the strength of their marks under the Sleekcraft analysis. (Joint Stip. at 36.) Defendant notes that it narrowed the original requests in RFPs Nos. 17 and 18 to exclude any litigation files from other cases. (Id. at 37.) Plaintiffs respond that RFPs Nos. 17 and 18 remain overbroad insofar as the “narrowed” requests still seek “all of the demand and cease-and-desist letters, and settlement agreements,” from other litigation. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiffs assert that they did not “shirk” its meet and confer responsibilities. (Id. at 39.) The Court found the original requests to be facially overbroad and directed the parties to meet and confer in an effort to narrow the discovery sought. (Id.) Despite several meet and confer communications, Plaintiffs contend the requests remain overly broad and beyond the bounds of relevance and proportionality.

Indeed, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendant's arguments that the documents concerning other settlement agreement, demand letters, and/or cease-and-desist letters is relevant in this case or proportional to the needs of this case.

Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to RFPs Nos. 17 and 18.

Issue No. 10: Whether Plaintiffs must produce all instances where they used their trademarks generically such as the use of phrases “seeking an arrangement”, “seeking arrangements”, and “what's your price”.

*10 (Joint Stip. at 40.)

Defendant argues that communications where Plaintiffs have used their own trademarks in a descriptive or general fashion are relevant, and cites to Professor McCarthy as an authority who has explained that where a trademark proponent itself uses the term in a generic fashion, that is “strong evidence of genericness.” (Id. (citing 2 McCarthy § 12:13).) Defendant states that consistent with the Court's direction to further meet and confer in an effort to narrow the requests, Defendant asked Plaintiffs “to provide an estimate of the number of documents that would be responsive to these requests so that the parties could have a productive conversation about the burden,” but Plaintiffs refused to provide any such information. (Id. at 41.) Therefore, Defendant says it “has no basis on which to evaluate any potential burden” and Plaintiffs should be compelled to produce all responsive documents. (Id.)

Plaintiffs respond that to the extent the request seeks “communications of any type” it would include paper, email, text, Internet advertisement, and any other type of communication. (Id.) Plaintiffs argue this would require a search of “an expansive universe of communications” and such a search is not warranted here, “especially within internal-communications that were never shared with the public.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the phrases Defendant wants Reflex to search “would not constitute generic use as a matter of law, making the search for such phrases doubly irrelevant.” (Id.) Plaintiffs emphasize that the test for genericness concerns the significance of the term in consumer minds not the producer. (Id. (citing Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017)).)

While the merits decision on “genericness” is beyond the scope of this discovery order, the authorities that Plaintiffs cite are persuasive to undermine Defendant's arguments about the potential relevance and proportionality of the information sought in RFPs Nos. 33, 34, and 35 as drafted. The Court thus concludes that RFPs Nos. 33, 34, and 35 remain overbroad such as to sweep into the requests a wide swath of information that is neither relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case nor proportionate to the needs of the case.

The Court sustains Plaintiffs' objections to these RFPs, and the Motion is DENIED as to RFPs Nos. 33, 34, and 35.

Issue No. 11: Whether Plaintiffs must produce a representative sample of every usage in commerce of the trademarks at issue, including usage in promotional and marketing materials.

*11 (Joint Stip. at 43.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs “bear the burden of proving how the MARKS AT ISSUE have appeared in the marketplace” which is the information sought in RFP No. 38. (Id.) Defendant further argues that in meet and confer efforts, Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendant's request that Plaintiffs be “prepared to state whether Plaintiffs have produced documents sufficient to show a representative example of every usage of the MARKS AT ISSUE in commerce from 2014 to present, including any such usages that may differ from the current branding guidelines already produced.” (Id. (citing Zimmermann Decl. ¶¶ 27, 30, Ex. 20).) According to Defendant, Plaintiffs refused to do so. (Joint Stip. at 44.)

For their part, Plaintiffs argue that the “Request could not be answered without a review of every one of Plaintiffs' advertisements, whether email, app, Internet or print.” (Id.) Plaintiffs insist that the request seeks information that is neither relevant or proportionate to the needs of the case because “Plaintiffs are only suing over Luxy's use of ... [the Plaintiffs'] trademarks in word mark form,” therefore, “searches through logos, images and so forth are irrelevant.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also note that they have produced responsive information in the form of “two large brand books and voluminous website pages, USPTO filings, and other material depicting how the relevant marks have been [used].” (Id.)

Having reviewed the parties' evidence and argument, the Court concludes that RFP No. 39 is overbroad and seeks information neither relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case nor proportionate to the needs of the case. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 39.

Issue No. 14: Whether Plaintiffs must produce all financial records relating to revenue and costs in connection with the goods and services offered under the trademark at issue, including but not limited to profit and loss statements, balance sheets, income statements, cash flow statements, and statements of shareholders' equity—as opposed to merely “documents sufficient to show the annual revenue.”

(Joint Stip. at 46.)

Defendant argues that the financial discovery sought in RFP No. 66 is appropriate under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) which requires that a party make available “the documents or other evidentiary material ... on which each computation [of damages] is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered.” (Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii)).) Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiffs' production of only “documents sufficient to show annual revenue” is wholly inadequate because in the Second Amended Complaint, “Plaintiffs seek not only a disgorgement of Luxy's profits, but “actual damages and [Plaintiffs'] lost profits in connection with Luxy's alleged infringement.” (Id.) Defendant argues that the “summary spreadsheet” produced by Plaintiffs does not satisfy their discovery obligations under relevant case law or Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). (Id.) Defendant insists that the revenue data on monthly, quarterly, and annual basis is relevant because “Luxy's purported infringement occurred during limited time periods.” (Id. at 47.)

*12 In opposing RFP No. 66, Plaintiffs first clarify that they “are not seeking any measure of damages dependent on a calculation of their own profits.” (Id. at 48.) Plaintiffs state that they will seek damages “that will be calculated by a disgorgement of Luxy's profits[.] [Plaintiffs] will not claim their own lost profits as actual damages.” (Id.) On that basis, Plaintiffs insist that Plaintiffs profits “are not relevant at all.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant has failed to justify the relevance and/or proportionality of its request for Plaintiffs' financial information on a quarterly and monthly basis as well as annually. (Id.) The Court agrees.

In Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum, Defendant maintains that “an assessment of monetary harm suffered by Plaintiffs ... remains relevant to the amount of statutory and/or punitive damages that may be awarded.” (Deft.'s Supp. Mem. at 5.) But that assertion still does not support proportionality of the expansive nature of the financial information sought in RFP No. 66, including for example, data concerning cash flow statements, and shareholder equity.

The Court finds that RFP No. 66 is overbroad and that Defendant has not adequately demonstrated the relevance or proportionality of the breadth of information this particular RFP seeks. Thus, RFP No. 66 remains as defectively overbroad now as it was when the Court first considered it at the pre-motion discovery conference.

Plaintiffs' objections to RFP No. 66 are sustained. The Motion is DENIED as to RFP No. 66.

For the reasons outlined above, the Motion is GRANTED as to Clover8 ROG No. 3. On or before the expiration of the discovery cut-off, Plaintiffs must provide a supplemental response to Clover8 ROG No. 3 that identifies the specific elements of the protected works that Plaintiffs contend are “original” and/or “expressive” text.

The Motion is DENIED in all other respects. All parties to bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Issue Numbers outlined in this Order track the Issue Numbers as presented in the Joint Stipulation and in the pre-motion summary email the parties provided to the Court on July 30, 2021, which is attached as Appendix A to the Court's August 4, 2021 Order re: Discovery Disputes. (See Dkt. No. 74.)