Ortega-Guzman v. Sam's East, Inc.
Ortega-Guzman v. Sam's East, Inc.
2018 WL 11343941 (S.D. Fla. 2018)
September 19, 2018

Zloch, William J.,  Senior United States District Judge

Costs and Fees
30(b)(6) corporate designee
Protective Order
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Summary
The Court found that Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery Response (DE 47) was not substantially justified, while Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Defendant To Produce An Alternative 30(b)(6) Representative (DE 58) and Plaintiff's Third Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 114) were substantially justified. The Court granted Defendant's first Motion (DE 168) in part and awarded $429 in fees. The Court denied Defendant's second Motion (DE 223).
Additional Decisions
FABIOLA ORTEGA GUZMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
SAM'S EAST, INC., d/b/a SAM'S CLUB, Defendant
CASE NO. 16-81977-CIV-ZLOCH
United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Entered on FLSD Docket September 19, 2018

Counsel

Lee Gill Cohen, Colby Phillip Connell, Kanner & Pintaluga, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, Joseph M. Abdallah, Kanner and Pintaluga PA, Delray Beach, FL, for Plaintiff.
Annalisa Gutierrez, Suzette Luisa Russomanno, William Edwards, Jerry Dean Hamilton, Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel LLP, Gilda M. Chavez, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
Zloch, William J., Senior United States District Judge

ORDER

*1 THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Sam's East, Inc.’s, Verified Memorandum For Attorney's Fees (DE 168) and Sam's East, Inc.’s, Verified Memorandum For Attorney's Fees (DE 223), which the Court construes as Motions For Attorney's Fees. The Court has carefully reviewed said Motions, the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

 

In the instant Motions (DE Nos. 168 & 223), Defendant Sam's East, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendant”), seeks attorneys fees for responses to discovery motions pursuant to the Court's prior Orders (DE Nos. 149, 153, & 197). In compliance with said Orders, Plaintiff Fabiola Ortega-Guzman (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) has filed memoranda to show good cause for filing the motions at issue. See DE Nos. 167 & 216). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides:
If the motion [to compel] is denied, the court ... must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). “[A] motion to compel is ‘substantially justified’ so long as there is ‘a genuine dispute, or if reasonable people could differ as to [the appropriateness of the contested action].’ ” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011)(alteration in original)(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). The same rule applies where a motion for a protective order is denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(B)(3).

 

In the first Motion (DE 168), Defendant seeks fees for its responses to Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery Response (DE 47), Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Defendant To Produce An Alternative 30(b)(6) Representative (DE 58), and Plaintiff's Third Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 114).

 

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery Response (DE 47) was not substantially justified, because Plaintiff's request for information about agreements between Defendant and a company that cleaned its floor mats (which were not present at the time of Plaintiff's accident) is plainly irrelevant, and the remainder of Plaintiff's discovery requests were highly untimely. The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion (DE 58) seeking an alternative representative was substantially justified because a genuine dispute existed as to Plaintiff's expressed need to depose an alternative representative following the allegedly inadequate preparation of Defendant's representative Sharon Brown. As to Plaintiff's Third Motion To Compel (DE 114), though Plaintiff's claim in said Motion that she needed the requested discovery to investigate the shapes of security cameras was entirely unreasonable, the Court finds that a genuine dispute existed as to the Motion overall, and finds it to be substantially justified.

 

*2 In the second Motion (DE 223) before the Court, Defendant requests fees for its response to Plaintiff's Motion For Protective Order To Preclude Defendant From Deposing Plaintiff's Minor Child, A.Z. (DE 184). In her Memorandum (DE 216), Plaintiff reports that Defendant's counsel indicated in a phone conversation that they intended to depose her minor child for broader and more questionable purposes than Defendant ultimately articulated in its Response (DE 190) to Plaintiff's Motion (DE 184). For this reason the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion For Protective Order (DE 184) was substantially justified.

 

In Defendant's first Motion (DE 168) and in accompanying exhibits, see DE Nos. 168-1 & 168-3, Defendant reports that Annalisa Gutierrez, Esq., worked 2.6 hours at a rate of $165 per hour on Defendant's Response (DE 55) to Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 47) for a total of $429 in fees. The Court finds this amount to be reasonable.

 

Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

 

1. Sam's East, Inc.’s, Verified Memorandum For Attorney's Fees, which the Court construes as a Motion For Attorney's Fees (DE 168), be and the same is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as provided herein;

 

2. Sam's East, Inc.’s, Verified Memorandum For Attorney's Fees, which the Court construes as a Motion For Attorney's Fees (DE 223), be and the same is hereby DENIED; and

 

3. Defendant Sam's East, Inc., does have and recover from Plaintiff Fabiola Ortega-Guzman's Counsel the sum of $429 in fees for all of which let execution issue.

 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 18th day of September, 2018.