*1 THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery Response (DE 47), Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 59), and Third Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 114), and the Court has carefully reviewed said Motions, the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

The above-styled cause is a negligence action slip and fall case arising out of Plaintiff's accident in the vestibule of Defendant's store on June 10, 2015.

By her Motion To Compel Discovery Response (DE 47), Plaintiff requests that the Court compel responses to items in her Request For Admission, First Request For Production, and Second Request For Production. As to Plaintiff's Request For Admission and First Request For Production, the Court notes that Plaintiff's Motion (DE 47) is untimely per Local Rule 26.1(g)(1). Local Rule 26.1(g)(1) provides that objections to deficiencies in production must be submitted to the court within 30 days from the original due date of the response or objection at issue or within 30 days of the time that a party first learned of or should have learned of the deficiency. S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(g)(1). Where a party has failed to bring a discovery dispute before the court within the applicable 30 day period without good cause, the delay “may constitute a waiver of the relief sought at the Court's discretion.” Id. The instant Motion (DE 47) was filed over four months past the 30 day deadline established by the Local Rule. Plaintiff argues that there is good cause for the delay because the requested material has become more important to her case with the discovery of new evidence relating to flooring safety and new allegations contained in her Second Amended Complaint (DE 36) regarding the safety of flooring material. Upon review, the Court does not find these intervening events to be so substantial as to justify the late filing of the instant Motion and the Court will not exercise its discretion to overlook the time limit.

The instant Motion (DE 47) is timely filed as to Plaintiff's Second Request For Production. By her Second Request For Production Plaintiff seeks “contacts/records between Defendant and any cleaning company that would clean the removable rugs/mats used in the vestibule of the store at issue” as well as “records of such cleanings and payments” one month before and one month after the date of Plaintiff's fall. Defendant objects that the requested information is irrelevant, arguing that the cleaning of the mats, which were not present at the time of the accident, is irrelevant to the question of how slippery the floor was on that day. See DE 55. The Court finds that Plaintiff's discovery request is not relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

By the instant Motion (DE 59), Plaintiff requests that Defendant be compelled to provide responses and produce documents relating to the October 27, 2017 deposition of Defendant's representative Sharon Brown and the notice thereof. On October 18, 2017, Plaintiff served Defendant with a Notice Of Taking Videotaped Deposition Duces Tecum Of Organization Representative (DE 59-1), which included requests for the production of documents at the deposition to be held on October 27, 2017. On October 24, 2017 Defendant served objections to the requests. Plaintiff's requests included two parts, Schedule A and Schedule B. Schedule A listed topics about which Defendant's corporate representative should have knowledge. Schedule B listed documents to be produced at the deposition. (Hereinafter items in Schedule A will be referenced as “A#” and in Schedule B as “B#”).

*2 Schedule A in Plaintiff's notice requests that Defendant produce a corporate representative with knowledge of (1) the video surveillance/recording system in operation at the store and the video feeds to the store and any other locations; (2) Policies and procedures concerning the viewing, handling, and preservation of video footage; (3) Policies and procedures concerning the viewing, handling, and preservation of video footage in preparation for litigation; and (4) the viewing, handling, and preservation of video footage relating to Plaintiff's slip and fall. Defendant objected that these items were overbroad, not properly limited to the store at issue, and could be construed as being or were in fact requests for attorney-client or work-product privileged information. See DE 59-2. Defendant did not however move for a protective order and the deposition was taken. As to the items on Schedule A the Court considers Plaintiff's Motion (DE 59) to compel in light of the information actually provided or not provided at the deposition. In her Motion (DE 59), Plaintiff provides an excerpt from the deposition of Sharon Brown in which questions about store procedures relating to spills and surveillance video were met with objections on the grounds of work-product and attorney-client privilege. In its Response (DE 96), Defendant provides an excerpt from the Brown deposition featuring questions that were substantially similar to the questions in Plaintiff's excerpt but were not met with privilege objections and which were answered by Brown. The Court's review of Plaintiff's citations to the transcript reveal that Plaintiff was not impeded in receiving the information requested in Schedule A.

By request B1, Plaintiff requests “[a]ll policies and procedures set forth in Schedule A1-3.” Defendant objects to B1 on the grounds that it is “vague and ambiguous, and overbroad,” and incorporates the objections made to A1-3. Defendant claims that B1/A1 is vague, ambiguous, and not properly limited in scope because it is not clear to what extent information is requested about the surveillance system. Though Defendant's objection is lacking in detail, the Court accepts it because B1 is patently ambiguous as applied to A1. B1 requests “[a]ll policies and procedures set forth in Schedule A1-3” but A1 does not set forth any policies or procedures. If the Court were to grant Plaintiff's Motion (DE 59) as to B1/A1 it would find it impossible to describe the production to be compelled.

The same problem does not afflict B1 as applied to A2-3, by which Plaintiff requests policies and procedures regarding the “viewing, reviewing, downloading, retaining, and preserving” of video surveillance footage both generally and at times when the store is notified of an incident. Defendant's Response (DE 96) shows that Defendant understands these requests to encompass “hundreds of stores across the United States and Puerto Rico.” The Court does not read Plaintiff's request in this way. A2-3 relate their respective requests to “said video surveillance system,” that is, the system in place at the store where Plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff does not request all policies and procedures in operation at all of Defendant's stores, but rather those policies and procedures in place at the one relevant store. Defendant's objection as to the scope of B1 as applied to A2-3 is unavailing. Defendant's objections that the requests are vague, ambiguous, and overbroad are boilerplate and lack sufficient specificity. See Rule 34(b)(2)(B); S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(e)(2)(A). This leaves only Defendant's privilege objection. If Defendant has non-privileged information containing its policies and procedures regarding video surveillance at the subject store, it must produce it pursuant to B1 as applied to A2-3.

By request B2, Plaintiff asks for the production of “[a]ll documents concerning the viewing, reviewing, downloading, retaining, preserving, and producing for litigation” of footage from the video surveillance system “at the subject premises and any other location regarding the subject incident.” Defendant again alleges that Plaintiff's request is overbroad, but includes more detail. Defendant argues that it cannot evaluate which documents are responsive because the request could encompass any conceivable document relating in some way to the surveillance system. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is attempting to embark on “a fishing expedition” unrelated to “an alleged slip and fall claim on a transitory substance.” Rule 34 provides that requests for production “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). In addition, the rules provide that the scope of discovery is limited to information that is “relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Defendant has made objections of sufficient specificity grounded in these principles. The Court determines that Plaintiff's request B2 is insufficiently particular, and considering the relevance and proportional value of the material requested declines to compel production.

*3 By request B3, Plaintiff seeks production of “[o]riginal unedited footage from all cameras at the subject premises for the date of June 10, 2015 from opening until 5:45 p.m.” Defendant objects that this is an overbroad request for irrelevant information. By the instant Motion (De 59) Plaintiff concedes that footage from the hour leading up to the incident would be sufficient. The Court finds the more limited request to be relevant and proportionate to the needs of the case and not unduly burdensome to produce. Defendant shall produce all footage from the subject store showing the hour prior to the incident.

By request B4, Plaintiff seeks production of “[a]ll camera schematics of the subject premises for the date of June 10, 2015.” By its Response (DE 96) Defendant claims that it produced the camera schematics at the deposition and that the request for production of the schematics is moot. Plaintiff contends that the schematics produced are insufficient because they are in fact only a proposal as to where cameras should be located and do not show the actual location of cameras in the store. The court orders Defendant to make a more responsive production if possible.

By request B5, Plaintiff seeks the production of “[a]ll purchase/acquisition records for all cameras at the subject premises on June 10, 2015.” Defendant objects that these records have no relation to Plaintiff's slip and fall. Considering the patent disconnect between these records and Plaintiff's accident the Court finds that the information sought by B5 is outside the proper scope of discovery and will not compel its production. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

By request B6, Plaintiff seeks the production of “[a]ll purchase/acquisition records for all cameras at the subject premises on June 10, 2015.” Defendant objects that this information is irrelevant to Defendant's liability regarding Plaintiff's slip and fall. The Court finds that the information sought by B6 is outside the proper scope of discovery and will not compel its production. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C), if a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the Court is not required to apportion reasonable expenses for the motion. The Court does not order attorneys fees relating to Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 59).

By her Third Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 114), Plaintiff seeks to obtain “any and all camera installation records in the vestibule area at the subject premises on June 10, 2015.” By its timely objection, Defendant claims that the camera installation records have no bearing on Plaintiff's slip and fall. Plaintiff argues that installation records may impeach Sharon Brown's testimony that the camera had not worked for at least three years. In addition, Plaintiff argues that installation records concerning the vestibule cameras will assist the Plaintiff in discovering why the malfunctioning camera is of a “horizontal bar-like” shape and the other cameras are “bubble-like.” Plaintiff has not explained how the requested installation record would impeach Brown's testimony or provided any substantive reason to believe that Defendant has made misrepresentations regarding the malfunctioning camera. Plaintiff's argument in regards to the installation records of the other cameras is even more dubious. There is no conceivable connection between the shapes of Defendant's cameras and Plaintiff's slip and fall. The Court finds that the information sought by Plaintiff's Third Motion to Compel Discovery (DE 114) is outside the proper scope of discovery and denies the instant Motion (DE 114). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

*4 ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery Response (DE 47) be and the same is hereby DENIED;

2. Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 59) be and the same is hereby GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part, as provided herein such that Defendant must serve upon Plaintiff's counsel production consistent with the terms of this Order by noon on Friday, January 26, 2018;

3. Plaintiff's Third Motion To Compel Discovery (DE 114) be and the same is hereby DENIED;

4. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and Local Rule 7.3 of the Southern District of Florida, by noon on Friday, January 26, 2018, Plaintiff shall file with the Clerk of this Court a Memorandum showing good cause for the filing of her instant Motions (DE Nos. 47 & 114); and

5. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and Local Rule 7.3 of the Southern District of Florida, by noon on Friday, January 26, 2018, Defendant shall file with the Clerk of this Court a Memorandum together with supporting Affidavits and Exhibits consistent with Local Rule 7.3 of the Southern District of Florida establishing the fees and costs incurred in opposing the instant Motions (DE Nos. 47 & 114).

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 2018.