*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Robert Phifer, Jr.'s (“Phifer”) Motion to Compel Defendant Hyundai Power Transformers, USA (“HPT”) to Fully Respond to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories and Requests for Production (Doc. 77). For the following reasons, Phifer's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Phifer brings this action based on alleged illegal employment practices by his former employer HPT. Amended Compl. (Doc. 43) p. 1. Phifer asserts claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation against HPT in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at pp. 18-31. Phifer also asserts claims of interference and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Id. at 31-35.

Phifer, who is an African American male, began his employment with HPT in July 2011 in the Winding Department. Id. at 5. He claims that the environment at HPT was hostile and discriminatory against Black employees. For example, Phifer alleges that Black workers were called “boy” by White employees and supervisors; that White workers were allowed to freely take Saturdays off while Black workers were disciplined for asking; that Black workers were denied promotions and favorable shift assignments; and that White employees received more favorable treatment during investigations of safety violations, attendance points, and FMLA leave. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 27-30, 32-46, 76-83, 92-93, 98-104, 127-130, 132-134, 142-144, 149-155. According to Phifer, Black workers were barred from using a particular break room while White and Korean workers were allowed to nap there during their shifts. Id. at ¶ 46. Phifer also alleges that Ted Arkuszeski, a Plant Manager who supervised him, often spoke in a hostile and discriminatory manner to Phifer and other African American workers. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. He alleges that Luther Scull, a Team Leader who also supervised him, threated to cut an African American's automobile brake lines so that he would wreck and go into a ditch. Id. at ¶ 32.

Phifer alleges that he complained about this discrimination in March 2018 to HPT's chief operating officer and later to HPT's president. Id. at ¶ 47. Two months later he was suspended for accessing a breaker panel. Id. at ¶ 60. Phifer claims that his co-workers routinely accessed the break panel and were not disciplined. Id. After five days of suspension, Phifer was terminated. Id. at ¶ 70.

In addition to his claims of race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, Phifer claims that HPT interfered with his FMLA rights. Id. at ¶¶ 18-26. Phifer alleges that, in January 2018, he had a son who was born with serious medical needs. Id. at ¶ 18. Phifer applied for and was ultimately approved leave under the FMLA to care for his son. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20. Nonetheless, Phifer claims that Scull, who was acting under the direction of HPT's senior supervisor Clayton Payne, attempted to discipline him for taking FMLA leave. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23. Although the amended complaint is not clear whether Phifer alleges he was disciplined by HPT for taking FMLA leave, that inference can be drawn. Id. at ¶¶ 22-25, 182 & 194. The allegations also suggest that Phifer was eventually suspended and terminated for exercising his FMLA rights. Id. at ¶¶ 185, 198 & 201.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

*2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 defines the general scope of discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Under Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery includes “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Id. In defining the scope of discovery, a court may consider “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id.

In the discovery context, relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). A party seeking to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant. Clark v. Hercules, Inc., 2017 WL 3316311, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2017). A district court has broad discretion in determining whether discovery material is relevant. Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

Even if discovery is relevant, a court may limit the frequency or extent of the discovery under certain circumstances. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). One such circumstance is when “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit ....” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). A party resisting production on this basis bears the responsibility of establishing that producing the discovery would be an undue burden. Coker v. Duke & Co., Inc., 177 F.R.D. 682, 686 (M.D. Ala. 1998). The resisting party must “make a particular and specific demonstration of fact and cannot rely on simply conclusory assertions about the difficulty of complying with a discovery request.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Phifer seeks an order compelling HPT to more fully respond to Interrogatories 7, 12, and 13 and to produce documents responsive to his Requests for Production (“RFP”) 14, 17, 20, and 24. Phifer's Mot. (Doc. 77) pp. 1, 3-4. The undersigned will address the interrogatories and RFPs in turn.

A. Interrogatories Nos. 7, 12, and 13

Interrogatory No. 7

Interrogatory No. 7 asks HPT to “[d]escribe any investigation Defendant has conducted or requested regarding race discrimination, harassment, FMLA interference and retaliation, workplace policy and safety violations[.]” Phifer's Interrog. (Doc. 77-1) pp. 6-7. Phifer seeks “the date(s) of the investigations, names of the individuals who took part in the investigations and the substance of the complaints, findings and administration taken in the investigations.” Id. Phifer agrees to narrow the temporal scope of his request from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018, and HPT agrees to provide responsive, non-privileged information relating to complaints of race discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or FMLA violations against Tony Wojciechowshi, Juseok Kim, and Sang Wook Park—the decision makers in Phifer's suspension and/or termination—within that timeframe. (Doc. 77-9) pp. 3-5.

Unsatisfied with this compromise, Phifer asks the Court to compel HPT to describe “[c]omplaints of workplace policy violations against Ted Arkuszeski, Luther Scull, Clayton Payne and any other direct or indirect supervisor of employees in the Winding Department.” Id. at 6-7. HPT argues that, to the extent Phifer's request is not limited to complaints of race discrimination, race harassment, retaliation, or FMLA violations, it is not relevant to his claims. HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) pp. 8-9. HPT also argues that it cannot respond to Phifer's request for “workplace policy violations” because the term is not defined. Id. at 9.

*3 The undersigned finds that the information Phifer seeks is relevant but that the request is overly broad. Therefore, the undersigned will tailor Phifer's request and will grant his motion to compel to the following extent. HPT shall describe any investigation conducted or requested regarding race discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and FMLA violations against Phifer's direct and indirect supervisors within the Winding Department. HPT shall also describe any investigation conducted or requested regarding complaints about the way in which these supervisors administered discipline for safety violations, attendance points, promotions, and scheduling. HPT need not describe investigations that were conducted or requested prior to January 1, 2015, or after December 31, 2018. HPT shall provide the dates of the investigations, names of the individuals who took part in the investigations and the substance of the complaints, findings, and administration taken in the investigations.

Interrogatory No. 12

Interrogatory No. 12 asks HPT to “[l]ist each African American employee who was terminated and/or resigned from employment with HPT from January 1, 2020 to present, including their address, age, date of hire, position, date of termination and/or resignation, the reason for the termination and name of person who authorized or approved the dismissal.” Phifer's Interrog. (Doc. 77-1) p. 9. Phifer claims that the information is relevant because HPT has “created a hostile work environment for African-American employees due to ongoing harassment” and that the “list of African American employees employed during Plaintiff's tenure and subjected to termination, as Plaintiff was, is relevant to Plaintiff's claims and to identify potential comparators and similarly situated employees.” Phifer's Mot. (Doc. 77) p. 6.

After discussions with HPT, Phifer agreed to temporally limit the request from January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2018. Id. HPT asserts that, even with the temporal limitation, the request “still seeks the name of every single African American who was terminated or resigned for more than a six year period, regardless of the employee's position, department, supervisor, disciplinary history, misconduct, or reason for leaving.” HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) p. 10. Further, HPT argues that Phifer's “request is not limited to comparators or similarly situated employees” and that information about employees who resigned have nothing to do with any claim, defense, or fact at issue in this case. Id. at 10-11. Additionally, HPT asserts that, even if the request were limited to African American employees who worked in the same department as Phifer, there is no basis for how the identity of terminated African American employees is relevant or proportional to the needs of the case. Id. at 11.

The undersigned finds that the information Phifer seeks is relevant to his claims. Identifying African Americans who ended their employment with HPT—either voluntarily or involuntarily—may lead to discoverable information supporting Phifer's claim that his workplace was subjectively and objectively hostile to African American employees. See Melton v. Nat'l Dairy, LLC, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1341 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (“Remarks and conduct targeted at others ‘may contribute to the overall hostility of the working environment.’ ”). However, the undersigned also finds that Phifer's request is overly broad because it is not limited to the employees within the Winding Department. Therefore, the undersigned will grant Phifer's motion to compel to the following extent. HPT shall provide Phifer with a list of each African American employee in the Winding Department who was terminated and/or resigned from employment with HPT from January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2018. HPT shall include the employees' address, age, date of hire, position, date of termination and/or resignation, the reason for the termination and name of person who authorized or approved the dismissal.

Interrogatory No. 13

*4 Interrogatory No. 13 asks HPT to “[l]ist each employee that applied for FMLA leave and was denied leave, the reason for the denial of leave, the supervisors denying the leave and whether the employee was disciplined, suspended or terminat[ed] within 90 days of requesting FMLA leave.” Phifer's Interrog. (Doc. 77-1) p. 10. Phifer asserts that “[i]dentifying employees who were denied FMLA leave and those who were subsequently disciplined, suspended or terminated within the 90 day time period is relevant and material to Plaintiff's FMLA interference claims to show a pattern and practice of interfering with approved FMLA and to identify other employees treated similar to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 77) p. 7. Phifer agrees to narrow the temporal scope of his request from January 1, 2015, to present. (Docs. 77-6, 77-9). HPT argues that Phifer's request for information is both irrelevant and unduly burdensome. HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) pp. 14-15.

HPT argues that Phifer's request is irrelevant because “[t]he fact that another employee was denied FMLA leave and was subsequently disciplined or suspended proves nothing.” HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) p. 12. The undersigned disagrees. An FMLA interference claim may lie when an employer discourages an employee from using FMLA leave. Identifying employees who were denied FMLA leave and who later suffered an adverse employment action could show that HPT discouraged employees from seeking FMLA leave under the threat of disciplinary action. Further, this information could provide circumstantial evidence showing that HPT has a pattern or practice of interfering with the rights of their employees to request and take FMLA leave. Principe v. Seacoast Banking Corp. of Fla., 2010 WL 2976766, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2010) (“To the extent that Principe seeks to prove her FMLA retaliation claim by circumstantial evidence, FMLA leave taken by other employees and the conditions of employment upon their return is relevant to establishing Seacoast's pattern or practice of dealing with employees who exercise, or attempt to exercise, their FMLA rights.”). Therefore, the undersigned finds that the information Phifer seeks—to the extent it applies to employees in the Winding Department—is relevant to his FMLA claims.

HPT also argues that providing the requested information would be unduly burdensome. HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) p. 13. HPT states that it “does not maintain a list of all employees who have requested FMLA leave, and because many requests for FMLA leave are oral or handwritten, it is impossible to do an accurate electronic search for the names of all individuals who have applied for FMLA leave.” Id. HPT contends that, to fulfill the request, it “would have to manually review the personnel record for every single employee” to determine if that employee requested FMLA leave and, if so, “whether the employee was disciplined or suspended within 90 days of the request.” Id.

The undersigned finds that the burden on HPT to provide this information for the entire company outweighs its likely benefit to Phifer. Therefore, the undersigned will grant Phifer's motion to compel to the following extent. HPT shall identify Winding Department employees who were denied FMLA leave and were subsequently disciplined or terminated within 90 days between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2018.[1] HPT shall also include the reason for the denial of leave, the name(s) of the supervisor(s) denying the leave, and the type of discipline (if any) the employee received within 90 days of requesting FMLA leave.

B. RFP Nos. 14, 17, 20, and 24

RFP No. 14

*5 RFP No. 14 asks HPT to “[p]roduce copies of all safety training materials, videos and surveillance video used by HPT from January 1, 2010 to present.” Phifer's RFP (Doc. 77-2) p. 15. After discussions with HPT, Phifer agreed to narrow the temporal scope of the request from 2011-2019. (Docs. 77-6, 77-9). Phifer asserts that the policies and procedures regarding safety violations are necessary evidence to evaluate and rebut HPT's reason for his termination.[2] Phifer's Mot. (Doc. 77) p. 8.

HPT states that it has produced approximately 735 pages of documents reflecting its safety policies and training related to lock out/tag out and control of hazardous energy. HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) p. 14. It argues that it should not be compelled to produce further materials because safety policies or procedures unrelated to lock-out, tag-out, and hazardous energy are not relevant or proportional to the needs of this case, as it is undisputed that HPT's stated reason for terminating Phifer was a violation of these specific policies and procedures. Id. at 15.

The undersigned finds that, because HPT has stated that it terminated Phifer for violating safety policies regarding lock out/tag out procedures and control of hazardous energy, those safety policies are necessary for Phifer to rebut HPT's reason for termination. However, Phifer has not shown that safety policies unrelated to lock out/tag out procedures and control of hazardous energy are relevant to his claims. Therefore, Phifer's motion to compel production of general safety training materials unrelated to lock out/tag out or hazardous energy is denied.[3]

RFP No. 17

RFP No. 17 asks HPT to “[p]roduce the complete personnel file with all contact information (unredacted) of each and every employee who requested FMLA leave, and was subsequently disciplined or terminated from the company from January 1, 2020 to present.” Phifer's RFP (Doc. 77-2) p. 17.

The undersigned previously granted Phifer's request for HPT to identify these individuals as set forth in Interrogatory 13. However, Phifer has not shown that the personnel files of the aforementioned employees are relevant to his claims. Therefore, Phifer's motion to compel production of this information is denied.

RFP No. 20

RFP No. 20 asks HPT to “[p]roduce a roster and/or computer generated list of all HPT employees for the period of January 1, 2010 to present which lists the employee's name, gender, date of hire, race, position, job title, supervisor, and termination date, if applicable.” Phifer's RFP (Doc. 77-2) p. 18. Phifer asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that this information is necessary to identify comparator information and to rebut HPT's defenses that Phifer was terminated for a safety violation. Phifer's Mot. (Doc. 77) p. 9. HPT argues that this request is nothing more than a fishing expedition. HPT's Resp. (Doc. 79) p. 17.

The undersigned finds that Phifer has not articulated a need for this broad request or shown how any of this information is relevant to his claims. Accordingly, Phifer's request to compel this information is denied.

RFP No. 24

*6 RFP No. 24 asks HPT to “[p]roduce all data and lists maintained for attendance and disciplinary points.” Phifer's RFP (Doc. 77-2) p. 19. Phifer argues that this information is relevant to show that African American employees were held to different standards related to accruing attendance points and were therefore subjected to unfair discipline and termination. Phifer's Mot. (Doc. 77) p. 10. Phifer agrees to narrow this request to employees and supervisors in the Winding Department from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018. Id.

Notably, HPT does not oppose the production of this material within its response to Phifer's motion to compel. However, in its written objections to Phifer's RFP, HPT asserts that the request is overbroad and unduly burdensome. (Doc. 77-10) p. 7. Having considered these objections, the undersigned finds that the information requested, as narrowed by Phifer, is relevant to his claims. As for whether producing this information is unduly burdensome, the undersigned finds that HPT has not made a sufficient showing to sustain that objection. Therefore, Phifer's motion to compel is granted to the following extent. HPT shall produce all data and lists maintained for attendance and disciplinary points as it pertains to employees and supervisors in the Winding Department from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for these reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

DONE this 7th day of May, 2021.

During the parties' negotiations related to this interrogatory, HPT agreed to identify any employees supervised by Payne who were denied FMLA leave and were subsequently disciplined or terminated within 90 days between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2018. (Doc. 77-10) p. 4. This compromise, however, does not encompass the employees within the Winding Department who may have experienced an adverse employment action after requesting or being denied FMLA leave. That is the information relevant to whether HPT discouraged employees from using FMLA leave.

Phifer's Motion does not seek to compel videos or surveillance video.

It appears from Phifer's Motion that, during the parties' meet-and-confer regarding these discovery issues, HPT agreed to search for and produce other versions of the safety training materials it previously produced. Phifer's Mot. (Doc. 77) pp.7-8. If HPT has located any such material, it shall produce the material to Phifer.