Phifer v. Hyundai Power Transformers, USA, Inc.
Phifer v. Hyundai Power Transformers, USA, Inc.
2020 WL 13015922 (M.D. Ala. 2020)
December 16, 2020
Doyle, Stephen M., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
Plaintiff Robert Phifer, Jr. was denied his Motion to Compel Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes, as the court found that he had not made a sufficient showing of relevancy to support a physical inspection of the Defendant's premises. The court instead suggested that Phifer engage in written discovery and noted that he had failed to meet and confer before filing his Motion.
Additional Decisions
ROBERT PHIFER, JR., Plaintiff,
v.
HYUNDAI POWER TRANSFORMERS USA, INC., and LUTHER SCULL, Defendants
v.
HYUNDAI POWER TRANSFORMERS USA, INC., and LUTHER SCULL, Defendants
Case No: 2:19-cv-166-MHT-SMD
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
Filed December 16, 2020
Counsel
Alicia Kay Haynes, Charles Edward Guerrier, Haynes & Haynes, PC, Heather Newsom Leonard, Heather Leonard, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.Elizabeth Bosquet Shirley, John James Coleman, III, Meghan Nowicki Cox, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, Ingu Hwang, Burr & Forman LLP, Montgomery, AL, Kathryn Morris Willis, Burr & Forman LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA.
Doyle, Stephen M., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
*1 Plaintiff Robert Phifer, Jr. (“Phifer”), an African American male, brings this action against his former employer, Defendant Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc. (“HPT”), and his supervisor, Defendant Luther Scull (“Scull”) for race discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. (Doc. 43). Phifer claims that he was suspended for an alleged safety violation after he entered a breaker panel to retrieve a tool. Id. at 14-15. Phifer asserts that Caucasian and Korean workers “regularly went in and out of the breaker panel boxes” but were not disciplined like Phifer. Id. at 15. Phifer alleges that he was ultimately terminated from his position after complaining of race discrimination to HPT's President. Id. at 16.
Before the Court is Phifer's Motion to Compel Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes (Doc. 67). Phifer seeks an order authorizing him and his counsel to enter HPT's facility to inspect, photograph, and video the areas of the premises where Phifer worked, as well as where the alleged safety violation occurred. Id. at 1. For the reasons that follow, Phifer's Motion is DENIED.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 defines the general scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Under Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery includes “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Id. Rule 26(b)(1) provides several factors for a court to consider when defining the general scope of discovery. Id. Those factors include “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequences in determining the action.” In the discovery context, relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). The question of whether discovery material is relevant is ultimately a fact-specific inquiry. Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2007). A district court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of discovery material and define the general scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). See, e.g., Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996) (“District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon discovery motions, and appellate review is accordingly deferential.”); Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1415 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that “a district court has broad discretion in shaping the scope of discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)”); Dees, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1350 (explaining that a magistrate judge has great discretion in determining the relevance of proposed discovery).
*2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides that “[a] party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) ... to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2). Requests “must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection and for performing the related acts.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(B). Under Rule 26(b), a court evaluating such a request must consider the relevance of the inspection and balance the value of the information sought with the burden of the proposed intrusion. See N.Y. Ass'n for Retarded Children Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1983); Murphy v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2008 WL 3926715, at *3-4 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2008); Tesler v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 2008 WL 4371319, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2008).
II. DISCUSSION
In his Motion to Compel Entry, Phifer claims—in a conclusory fashion—that a physical inspection of HPT's premises is necessary to prove his claims of discrimination, disprove Defendants' defenses, and prepare for discovery, depositions, and trial. (Doc. 67) at 2. HPT opposes Phifer's Motion, arguing that, because this is an employment discrimination case, there is no legitimate basis for conducting a plant inspection. (Doc. 69) at 1-2. HPT also asserts that an inspection would unduly burden its business operations and threaten “the safety of its employees during a worldwide pandemic.”[1] Id.
In his Reply, Phifer attempts to explain the relevance of inspecting HPT to his employment discrimination claims. He contends that the location and accessibility of the breaker panel; the location of HPT's security cameras; and the location and accessibility of HPT's security camera viewing room are relevant because HPT “scrutiniz[ed] him using the cameras,” which allowed HPT to target “him because of his race and his complaints of discrimination.” (Doc. 70) at 3. Specifically, Phifer asserts that, “if the room used to view [him] on the security camera footage is locked or requires special permission to access the room, this may show that HPT took extra effort to target [him].” Id. Phifer continues that, “if there are no locks, warning, signage or other materials on or near the breaker panel informing employees not to enter, this will support [his] contentions that entering the breaker panel was not an issue unless [one] had previously complained of discrimination.” Id. Further, Phifer claims that “[a] lack of locks, warnings, and signage will also evidence [his] assertions that HPT's employees were not trained on how to properly lock out the panels and that HPT regularly permits employees to enter the panels without special equipment or repercussions.” Id.
*3 The undersigned finds that Phifer has not made a sufficient showing of relevancy to support a physical inspection of HPT's premises. Indeed, a locked camera room does not suggest that HPT took “extra effort” to target Phifer because of his race. A breaker panel without locks, warnings, or signs does not indicate that HPT retaliated against Phifer for complaints of discrimination or treated him differently than employees outside of his protected class. And the absence of locks, warnings, or signs around the breaker panel does not show that employees were generally allowed to enter the breaker panel without repercussion. In sum, the undersigned finds that a physical inspection of HPT's premises is not relevant to Phifer's claims. Plaintiff may engage in written discovery as to whether there were locks, warnings or signs on or near the breaker panel at the time of the alleged incident.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes. (Doc. 67) is DENIED.
DONE this 16th day of December, 2020.
Footnotes
HPT also argues that the Court should deny Phifer's Motion because Phifer failed to meet and confer before filing his Motion. (Doc. 69) at 6-7. The undersigned agrees that Phifer did not satisfy this Court's requirement to meet and confer prior to filing his motion to compel. In this Court's Guidelines to Civil Discovery Practice, “a telephone call or in person meeting addressing a discovery dispute is required before filing a motion to compel discovery.” Guidelines to Civil Discovery Practice in the Middle District of Alabama, I. Discovery in General, A. Courtesy. “The Court requires that the parties communicate either by telephone or at a face to face meeting ... where a meaningful exchange can be had.” Id. Similarly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that, in filing a motion to compel, the moving party “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Phifer's Motion is deficient in that it does not certify that he has made a good faith effort, by the means set forth in this Court's discovery guidelines, to obtain the information sought from HPT prior to filing this motion—i.e., there is no indication that Phifer has attempted to confer with HPT, through an in-person meeting, to obtain the information without court intervention. Nonetheless, as the matter is already fully briefed by the parties, the undersigned will address the Motion on its merits.