U.S. v. Omidi
U.S. v. Omidi
2021 WL 7629927 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
September 1, 2021

Gee, Dolly M.,  United States District Judge

Search and Seizure
Scope of Warrant
Criminal
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Summary
The court found that the warrants authorizing the seizure of digital devices were permissible, as there was probable cause to believe that the GET THIN entities, the Omidis, and their associates were conducting the subject offenses through the use of digital devices. The court also found that the warrants were sufficiently particular so that agents executing the search would understand what to search for and to seize.
Additional Decisions
U.S.A.
v.
Defendant(s): Julian Omidi
Case No. CR 17-661(A)-DMG
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed September 01, 2021

Counsel

Cathy J. Ostiller, Kristen A. Williams, Alexander Wyman, Ali Moghaddas, David H. Chao, David Charles Lachman, Elisa Fernandez, James Edmund Dochterman, AUSA - Office of US Attorney Major Frauds Section, Steven R. Welk, Steptoe and Johnson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for USA.
Alex M. Weingarten, Willkie Farr and Gallagher LLP, Molly M. White, McGuireWoods LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Bruce Hamilton Searby, Searby PLLC, Washington, DC, Casey E. Donnelly, Pro Hac Vice, John L. Brennan, Pro Hac Vice, Willkie Farr and Gallagher LLP, Michael S. Schachter, Pro Hac Vice, Randall W. Jackson, Pro Hac Vice, Ravi Chanderraj, Pro Hac Vice, Willkie Farr and Gallagher LLP, New York, NY, Edmund W. Searby, Pro Hac Vice, Porter Wright Morris and Arthur LLP, Cleveland, OH, Simona A. Agnolucci, Willkie Farr and Gallagher LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Julian Omidi.
Gee, Dolly M., United States District Judge

Proceedings: [IN CHAMBERS] REDACTED ORDER RE DEFENDANT JULIAN OMIDI'S SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE [1155, 1161]

I. INTRODUCTION
*1 On August 3, 2021, Defendant Julian Omidi filed a second motion to suppress all of the evidence seized by the Government pursuant to three warrants, which was belatedly joined by Defendant Surgery Center Management, LLC (“SCM”).[1] [Doc. ## 1155, 1161 (SCM Partial Joinder), 1176 (Exhibits), 1268 (SCM Amended Joinder)[2].] The Government filed its opposition on August 17, 2021 [Doc. # 1233], and on August 24, 2021, Defendant Omidi filed his reply [Doc. # 1266]. A videoconference hearing was held on September 1, 2021. Having carefully considered the arguments set forth in the parties' briefs, the Court DENIES Defendant Omidi's motion.
 
II. BACKGROUND
In 2014, during the Government's investigation of the “GET THIN” network of entities and individuals —i.e., Defendant Omidi, his brother, Michael Omidi, M.D., his mother Cindy Omidi (collectively, the “Omidis”), and affiliated entities and associates—relating to allegations of health care fraud, tax fraud, money laundering, and other potential crimes, the Government applied for, and obtained, three warrants to search and seize items from the following locations for the period January 1, 2008 to the date the warrants were issued in 2014:
1. 9001 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 207, Beverly Hills California, pursuant to a warrant issued on May 23, 2014 (14-1035M), listing 34 categories of documents (and procedures for searching digital devices used to facilitate the Subject Offenses, defined infra) (“Suite 207 Warrant”) [Doc. # 1176 at 3-25];
2. The server and other digital devices located in Cabinet ID: A3; Shelves: 7-12, at the premises of IX2, located at 624 South Grand Avenue, Suite 1208, Los Angeles, California, pursuant to a warrant issued on May 23, 2014 (14-1030M), listing four categories of items (and procedures for searching digital devices used to facilitate the Subject Offenses, defined infra) (“Server Warrant”) [Doc. # 1176-1 at 6-23]; and
3. 5353 Desert Inn, Apt. 112, Las Vegas, Nevada (the residence and office of Farrell Newton, CPA, a financial advisor and tax preparer for the Omidis and several GET THIN entities), pursuant to a warrant issued on May 30, 2014 (D. Nev. 14-375M), listing five categories of documents (and procedures for searching computers, storage devices, and other digital equipment) (“Las Vegas Warrant”) [Doc. # 1176-1 at 220-229].
 
*2 The Suite 207 Warrant and Server Warrant (collectively, “Los Angeles Warrants”) authorized the seizure of items listed therein as potential evidence of a scheme by the GET THIN entities, the Omidis, and others to: recruit patients for Lap-Band surgery by false and misleading advertising in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331 (misbranding a medical device); make false statements to health insurance plans in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1035; defraud health insurance plans and patients seeking Lap-Band surgery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1347 (health care fraud), and 1349 (fraud conspiracy); launder proceeds of such fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering); evade the payment of income taxes, knowingly fail to file income tax returns, and file false income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, and 7206(1); and evidence and instrumentalities of a conspiracy to commit the foregoing offenses and to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”). [Suite 207 Warrant, Attachment B-1, ¶ I.1; Server Warrant, Attachment B-3.] The Los Angeles Warrants were issued by Hon. Victor B. Kenton, former United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to his finding that the supporting affidavit established probable cause to search and seize the items described therein. The Los Angeles Warrants were supported by an affidavit from Food and Drug Administration, Office of Criminal Investigations Special Agent Zeva Pettigrew (“SA Pettigrew”) (“Master Aff.”) [Doc. # 1176 at 26-221.][3] The Los Angeles Warrants included an “Exhibit 1” attachment listing 174 entities which met one or more of six criteria connecting them to the GET THIN network (“Exhibit 1 Entity”). Master Aff. ¶ 263.
 
The Las Vegas Warrant authorized the seizure of items listed therein as potential evidence or instrumentalities of violations of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206(1), and 7203 (tax evasion, subscribing to a false tax return, and willful failure to file tax returns), and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit the foregoing offenses and conspiracy to defraud the United States (Klein conspiracy)). [Doc. # 1176-1 at 224.] The Las Vegas Warrant was issued by Hon. George Foley, Jr., former United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to his finding that the supporting affidavit established probable cause to search and seize the items described therein. The Las Vegas Warrant was supported by an affidavit from Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”) Special Agent Carlos R. Tropea (“SA Tropea”) (“Las Vegas Aff.”). [Doc. # 1176-1 at 235-290.]
 
On June 18, 2021, Defendant Omidi filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to four other warrants. [Doc. # 1086.] The Court denied Defendant Omidi's motion in the August 6 Order. [Doc. ## 1172 (Sealed Order); 1228 (Redacted Order).]
 
III. DISCUSSION
As Defendant Omidi readily acknowledges, the instant motion largely repeats many of the same arguments already considered (and rejected) by this Court in its August 6 Order denying his first motion to suppress. [See, e.g., Doc. # 1155 at 8 (“This Second Motion moves to suppress evidence seized from three additional premises on much the same grounds as those set forth in the First Motion.”) (emphasis added).] In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, therefore, the Court incorporates by reference the findings already made in its August 6 Order, to the extent any of Defendant Omidi's arguments are not expressly addressed below. [See Doc. ## 1172] (Sealed Order); 1228 (Redacted Order).] Moreover, the Court will not repeat in great detail the relevant legal standards here given that they were extensively outlined in the August 6 Order. See id.
 
A. Standing
First, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi lacks standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant, Server Warrant, and Las Vegas Warrant. The Court finds that Defendant SCM lacks standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant and Las Vegas Warrant, but has standing to challenge the Server Warrant.
 
1. Suite 207 Warrant
Defendant Omidi contends that he has standing to challenge each of the three warrants “by virtue of his managerial authority over, and personal connection to, these premises and the documents seized from them.” [Doc. # 1155 at 3.] In support, he has submitted another declaration attesting that as a contract consultant for SCM, he helped manage “a succession of” unnamed medical businesses at Suite 207. Doc. # 1155-1 (Omidi Decl.) at ¶ 3. Defendant Omidi appears to have signed a June 2010 consulting agreement with SCM and also signed lease assignment documentation for Suite 207. See Doc. # 1155-1 (Consulting Agreement); Doc. # 1155-3 (Assignment of Lease) at 61, 67.[4] As already explained, Defendant Omidi may not rely on any asserted managerial authority in itself to establish standing to challenge any of the Warrants. See United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 696 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting managerial authority alone as sufficient to confer Fourth Amendment standing); see also United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendant's “bald assertion” insufficient to establish standing to challenge warrant).
 
*3 With respect to Suite 207, Defendant Omidi also contends that he kept personal records and business records there and that he “was in possession and control” of his personal records as well as “the entirety of the records and files at these premises” because he had the “exclusive obligation” to protect and maintain these files. Omidi Decl. at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). Defendant Omidi asserts that “SCM placed these records in my possession, I accepted them, and I maintained them separate and apart from all other aspects of the business under my exclusive possession and control with a personal reasonable expectation of privacy in them.” Omidi Decl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
 
Again, Omidi's argument is an interesting one: he disclaims his having any direct leadership role with respect to the GET THIN network (referring to himself as simply a contract consultant), who somehow still had “exclusive” possession and control over unspecified records kept at Suite 207. His declaration does not explain who at SCM placed these unspecified records in his possession and control, and how and where he maintained them “separate and apart from all other aspects of the business.” In his reply, Defendant Omidi relies heavily on the previously filed declaration of Monica Porter, former HR director for Forward Business Solutions, LLC (an Exhibit 1 Entity), which she attests was managed by SCM. [Doc. # 1128 (Porter Decl.) ¶ 1.] Porter states, among other things, that only Defendant Omidi had the “exclusive right” to access Suite 207 and that he “exercised full actual control” of the office, which was given to him by his uncle, Shawn Pezeshk (SCM's sole owner). Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. These blanket assertions, without more, again fail to sufficiently show that Defendant Omidi maintained personal office space within Suite 207 or that Suite 207 was given over to his exclusive use. See Armenta, 69 F.3d at 308.
 
As the Ninth Circuit explained in SDI Future Health, factors which the Court may consider when a defendant has not established that the area searched is “given over to [his] exclusive use,” include “(1) whether the item seized is personal property or otherwise kept in a private place separate from other work-related material; (2) whether the defendant had custody or immediate control of the item when officers seized it; and (3) whether the defendant took precautions on his own behalf to secure the place searched or things seized from any interference without his authorization.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 698. Defendant Omidi has not satisfied these factors. For example, many items seized from Suite 207 appear to consist of patient medical records and files. [See Doc. # 1233-1 (SA Davis Decl.) ¶¶ 5-6; Exh. A (Suite 207 Layout); Exh. B (Photographs); see also Master Aff. ¶¶ 286 ([redacted].][5]
 
Although Defendant Omidi generally asserts that he kept personal records at Suite 207 (Omidi Decl. ¶ 4), he fails to sufficiently explain where he kept such records (i.e., if he had a personal office space within the suite, which he never specifies in his declaration), whether he took precautions to store such records in a secured space separate from business records, or specify how he otherwise managed or controlled this space. See id. At the hearing, Omidi's counsel repeatedly suggested that Omidi exercised more authority than that of his title as an SCM contract consultant suggests. But again, based on the submitted declarations, which offer little helpful detail and instead, mostly sweeping generalizations of control, Omidi fails to meet his burden as set forth in SDI Future Health that he has standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant.[6]
 
*4 For many of the same reasons, the Court finds that SCM's joinder to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant also fails. For example, SCM's late, three-page joinder primarily relies on Defendant Omidi's arguments regarding standing, focusing on Omidi's role as a contract consultant for SCM. Given that Defendant Omidi lacks standing, the Court also concludes that SCM lacks standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant, given that Suite 207 was apparently leased to Beverly Hills Surgery Center, LLC, whose relationship to Omidi and/or SCM is not adequately explained.
 
2. Server Warrant
The Server Warrant relates to the server and other digital devices (collectively, “Server”) located in designated locations (Cabinet ID: A3; Shelves: 7-12) at the premises of IX2, 624 South Grand Avenue, Suite 1208, Los Angeles, California. Defendant SCM has established standing to contest the Server Warrant. As the Master Affidavit states (and as the Government acknowledges in its opposition brief, see Doc. # 1233 at 3), NexTech is the practice management software used by GET THIN to store patient information, and the NexTech servers were [redacted] Master Aff. ¶¶ 306-07.
 
Defendant Omidi again fails, however, to establish standing to challenge the Server Warrant. Defendant Omidi asserts that he had the “exclusive right” to access the Server and the premises. Omidi Decl. ¶ 6. SCM's sole owner, Shawn Pezeshk (Defendant Omidi's uncle) has submitted a declaration that he designated Defendant Omidi to oversee the security of the Server, including the “exclusive right of power and authority” to restrict access to the Server. [Doc. # 1161-1 (Pezeshk Decl. ¶ 2-4.).] Pezeshk attests that SCM “delivered the [S]erver” to Defendant Omidi, and Defendant Omidi made arrangements to lease Server space (through Ashkan Rajabi, an IT administrator for the SCM server system, who in turn leased the space from a company called IX2). Id. ¶¶ 5, 9. Rajabi was “required to follow the policies and procedures” set by Defendant Omidi regarding the Server and its contents, although these policies and procedures are not explained, nor does Defendant Omidi or Pezeshk explain how Defendant Omidi ensured compliance with these unexplained policies and procedures. See id. ¶ 6. These declarations offer generic assertions that Defendant Omidi exercised possession or control of the Server, and yet fail to provide information or any real detail regarding how he did so. See Armenta, 69 F.3d at 308.
 
Nor has Defendant Omidi sufficiently established that the items seized from the Server were his personal property, that he had custody or immediate control of the seized items when they were seized, and whether he took precautions on his own behalf to secure the place searched or things seized from any interference without his authorization. See SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 698. To the extent that Defendant Omidi conclusorily argues that he maintained exclusive use over the physical space where the Server was kept (Cabinet ID: A3; Shelves: 7-12), he also fails to set forth sufficient evidence to establish this. For example, the Master Affidavit describes how, to gain access to the Server, Rajabi would provide a facility manager with the name “Ashtech,” which the facility confirmed by looking at a chart and then opened the room for Rajabi. Id. At most, Defendant Omidi's declaration suggests a general managerial authority with respect to SCM whereby he discussed Server maintenance and security issues with Rajabi, but not that Omidi exercised the exclusive right to access the Server and premises. See Omidi Decl. ¶ 5. Again, under the framework set forth in SDI Future Health, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi has failed to establish standing to challenge the Server Warrant.
 
3. Las Vegas Warrant
*5 Defendant Omidi also lacks standing to challenge the Las Vegas Warrant, which relates to the search and seizure of documents from the home and business space of Farrell Newton, a CPA and former financial advisor and tax preparer for the Omidis and several GET THIN entities. Defendant Omidi attests that he sent his personal documents (including bank statements, credit card records, and business records) to Newton for the preparation of his tax returns. Omidi Decl. ¶ 8. Defendant Omidi contends that he has standing to contest the Las Vegas Warrant for Newton's home and business because he “expected Mr. Newton to handle these records with precautions and confidentiality because they belonged to me and I had the obligation to maintain them, secure them from view from others, and to keep them personal, confidential, and private.” Id. That Defendant Omidi intended to keep his documents private does not mean that he has standing to contest the Las Vegas Warrant for the search of Newton's home and business office, where he cannot contend that he maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy. See SDI Future Health, 568 F.3d at 695 (to have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, “an individual must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” and “must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and their expectation must be one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable.”). To find otherwise would be to hold that Defendant Omidi would have standing to challenge any warrant where his personal property and records may be found. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91, 92 (1980) (declining to use legal possession of a seized good “as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched”) (emphasis added).
 
The cases cited by Defendant Omidi are distinguishable based on those individuals' affirmative steps to maintain the privacy of their records in spaces that they controlled or took affirmative steps to control. See, e.g., United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1441, 1452 (D. Minn. 1995) (finding defendant had reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy as to partnership records in offices because, among other things, defendant was one of only four persons with key to office and took steps to keep records private); United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 107 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (defendant mayor had secured his personal calendar in “the locked archive room, and [had] instructed his Chief of Staff that ‘no one was to have access to any of [his] boxes, including the box containing the calendars, without permission.’ ”). For the same reasons, the Court finds that SCM's joinder in Defendant Omidi's motion to challenge the Las Vegas Warrant also fails, as SCM has not established the requisite standing to challenge a search of Newton's home and business office.
 
B. The Permeated with Fraud Doctrine Applies to the Los Angeles Warrants
Having concluded that Defendant Omidi lacks standing to challenge any of the three warrants at issue, and that SCM lacks standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant or Las Vegas Warrant (but SCM does have standing to challenge the Server Warrant), the Court turns next to whether there was probable cause to issue the Warrants.[7] The Court finds that the Master Affidavit established probable cause to believe that [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 260. As already discussed in the August 6 Order, the Master Affidavit presented facts giving rise to probable cause to believe that each step of GET THIN's business practice evinced fraudulent activity – starting with misleading advertising, to sales pitch call centers that attempted to set up as many consultations as possible to have large prospective patient volume, to templated patient information and/or manipulation of patient data to potentially qualify for Lap-Band or other procedures, to overbilling of those procedures or billing under incorrect diagnostic codes, to the creation of the Exhibit 1 Entities to evade scrutiny of GET THIN's excess billing practices, to laundering proceeds of those fraudulent billing practices, and finally to evading or filing false income taxes. [See Doc. # 1172 at 9-14 (discussing how Master Affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that the GET THIN entities were permeated with fraud).] Accordingly, for the same reasons already discussed at length in the August 6 Order, the Court finds that the permeated with fraud doctrine also applies to the Suite 207 and Server Warrants, which were based on the Master Affidavit.[8]
 
C. The Warrants Were Sufficiently Specific Given the Nature of the Subject Offenses
*6 Even if the “permeated with fraud” doctrine did not apply, the Court finds in the alternative that each of the Warrants are sufficiently specific under the circumstances to withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge. As noted above, “[t]he specificity required in a warrant varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved. Warrants which describe generic categories of items are not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the items subject to seizure is not possible.” United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court concludes, again, that although some of the language in the Warrants is expansive, that is a necessity borne out of the widespread and sprawling nature of the alleged GET THIN fraud scheme, which the Master Affidavit and Las Vegas Affidavit present with sufficient particularity to support a finding of probable cause.
 
1. Particularity
Each of the Warrants contains the requisite particularity. As discussed in the August 6 Order, the Master Affidavit sets forth probable cause to believe that GET THIN was involved in an elaborate scheme involving not only fraudulent insurance billing, but also money laundering and tax evasion, often through the use of Exhibit 1 Entities. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 212-16; 227-35. Each Warrant describes the items sought and is “not vague as to what it directed law enforcement officers to search for and to seize.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702. For example, the Suite 207 Warrant specifically described 34 categories of documents and related digital devices to be seized, including among other things, items relating to prospective or actual Lap-Band patients, billing, policies or protocols, other medical procedures, financial statements, banking records, and other specified items for the Exhibit 1 Entities, the Omidis, and some of their specified associates. [Doc. # 1176 at 3-25.] The Server Warrant specifically described four categories of documents and related digital devices to be seized, including, among other things, records relating to Lap-Band patients, communications with or about Lap-Band patients, documents describing policies, practices, or instructions relating to or including Lap-Band patients, and other documents describing policies, practices, or instructions relating to medical coding, billing, or charges to insurance companies, plans, or patients. [Doc. # 1176-1 at 6-16.] The Las Vegas Warrant specifically described five categories of documents and related digital devices to be seized, including, among other things, financial records relating to Defendant Omidi and any Exhibit 1 Entity. [Doc. # 1176-1 at 220-229.] Thus, the Court finds that each of the Warrants was sufficiently particular so that agents executing the search would understand what to search for and to seize. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702.
 
2. Breadth
Nor were the Warrants overbroad under the facts and circumstances presented. “Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702. Here, as with the warrants at issue in the August 6 Order, each of the Warrants admittedly contemplates the seizure of an expansive list of items. That in itself, however, does not render them deficient. The circumstances of this case and the widespread scope of the Subject Offenses, for which probable cause was established, render the scope of the Warrants permissible. Given: (1) the types of allegations involved; (2) the numerous Exhibit 1 Entities for which there was probable cause to believe were part of GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and/or were used to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis; and (3) the generally document-intensive evidence related to the kinds of fraud alleged here, the Court concludes that the Warrants were not overbroad. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963. As the Master Affidavit explained, [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 262. The Las Vegas Warrant, moreover, detailed that the items to be seized included evidence and instrumentalities of tax crimes, including tax evasion and the preparation of false tax returns. Las Vegas Aff. ¶ 12. The Las Vegas Affidavit also described how [redacted]. Id. ¶¶ 39-49; 52-53.
 
*7 In contrast to defects noted in other warrants found to be overbroad, see United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427-28 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995), each of the Warrants here specified time limits and subject matter limits. For example, each Warrant limited itself to a specific time period (January 1, 2008 to the date of the warrant), subject matter (Lap-Band patients and affiliated procedures, where possible) and specifically identified the names of 174 Exhibit 1 Entities. Again, while Defendant Omidi contends that the Warrants were overbroad given the large number of GET THIN entities listed in Exhibit 1 to each Warrant, the Court finds that this extensive, specific list supports the Government's position. The Master Affidavit set forth probable cause to believe that the Exhibit 1 Entities were used to facilitate GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis and their associates. Multiple statements attributed to Defendant Omidi and/or GET THIN associates suggest that many of the entities were created to evade scrutiny from insurance companies and others regarding the number of GET THIN insurance claims. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 131, 170-187-195.
 
While Defendant Omidi also contends that the records sought in the Warrants should have been limited to only Lap-Band surgeries, the Warrants did limit their seizures to Lap-Band patients where possible. See, e.g., Server Warrant ¶ I.1.a.1-4. As noted in the Master Affidavit, however, there was probable cause to believe that GET THIN entities routinely used non-Lap Band related billing codes to create the illusion that procedures were unrelated to Lap-Band surgery to avoid scrutiny from insurance companies at the sheer volume of Lap-Band related claims, or where patients seeking Lap-Band surgery had insurance that did not cover Lap-Band surgery. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 145-46. There was also probable cause to believe that GET THIN entities were performing other non-Lap Band related procedures that were not medically necessary or properly billed. See Master Aff. ¶ 157. Accordingly, some categories in the Warrants were necessarily broader than being limited to Lap-Band claims alone. Defendant Omidi also takes issue with the alleged overbreadth of the seizure of documents or communications related to “any other aspect of the business of any Exhibit 1 Entity.” See, e.g., Suite 207 Warrant, ¶ I.20, 21. Again, this provision is permissible under the circumstances because, as noted above, the Master Affidavit established probable cause to believe that the Exhibit 1 Entities acted to facilitate GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis.
 
Furthermore, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses at each of the prescribed locations. As noted above, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi has failed to establish his standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant, Server Warrant, or Las Vegas Warrant. Even assuming arguendo that he did demonstrate standing, it cannot be disputed that Suite 207 was a GET THIN office/document storage location. Master Aff. ¶¶ 286 ([redacted]). Given that Suite 207 was a GET THIN medical office and/or space to store medical records, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses at this location. See Wong, 334 F.3d at 836.
 
The Server consisted of the NexTech practice management software used by GET THIN to maintain GET THIN patient scheduling, billing, and electronic medical records. Master Aff. ¶ 307. Given that the Server contained GET THIN patient information, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses at this location. See Wong, 334 F.3d at 836.
 
It was also reasonable to seek evidence from Mr. Newton's Las Vegas home/business, because Newton acted as Defendant Omidi and the GET THIN entities' financial advisor and tax preparer from approximately 2008 to 2011. Las Vegas Aff. ¶ 15. [redacted] Id. ¶ 48. [redacted] Id. ¶ 49. [redacted] Id. ¶ 50. Given that Newton prepared Defendant Omidi and several GET THIN entities' tax returns and other tax-related documentation, it was reasonable to seek evidence of alleged offenses (tax evasion, subscribing to a false tax return, and willful failure to file tax returns) at this location. See Wong, 334 F.3d at 836.
 
*8 The portion of each of the Warrants authorizing the seizure of digital devices was also permissible. As outlined in the Master Affidavit, there was probable cause to believe that GET THIN entities, the Omidis, and their associates, were conducting the Subject Offenses through the use of digital devices, including but not limited to computers and mobile phones. Each Warrant also outlined detailed procedures governing the search and seizure of these devices and explained why it was not feasible to search these devices onsite. Compare Master Aff. ¶ 310 (among other things, [redacted] with United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (disapproving blanket removal of digital storage media “when there is no affidavit giving a reasonable explanation ... as to why a wholesale seizure is necessary.”). Defendant Omidi's contention that he is entitled to relief because the Government failed to comply with search protocols for electronically stored information as set forth in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (“CDT III”), 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982), moreover, is not persuasive. See United States v. Schessfo, 730 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that this “situation is unlike CDT III and Tamura in that the government properly executed the warrant, seizing only the devices covered by the warrant and for which it had shown probable cause” and explaining that the search protocol discussed in CDT III, and relied upon by Defendant, was “advisory” in nature and no longer binding circuit precedent since it had been moved to a concurring opinion in the en banc decision, rather than the majority opinion).
 
D. No Evidentiary Hearing is Necessary
Defendant Omidi's second suppression motion rests primarily on legal arguments regarding whether the Warrants satisfied the particularity and breadth requirements, and do not raise a “significant disputed factual issue” warranting an evidentiary hearing. To the extent Defendant Omidi contends that an evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve any factual dispute about Omidi's standing to contest the Warrants, the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary given that even if Defendant Omidi could establish standing (which he has not), it would make no difference given that the Court finds, for the reasons set forth above, that the Warrants were sufficiently specific under the totality of the circumstances presented to withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge.
 
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and as previously set forth in the Court's August 6 Order, Defendants Julian Omidi's and SCM's second motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
Defendant Omidi filed an earlier motion to suppress all of the evidence seized by the Government pursuant to four different warrants [Doc. ## 1086, 1104], which the Court denied on August 6, 2021 (“August 6 Order”). [Doc. # 1172.]
On August 3, 2021, Defendant SCM initially filed a partial joinder to Defendant Omidi's motion, only joining to challenge the Server Warrant (discussed below). On August 24, 2021 (after the Government had already filed its opposition and on the same date that Defendant Omidi filed his reply), SCM filed an amended joinder, clarifying that it intended to join the motion in its entirety to challenge all three warrants. [Doc. # 1268.]
This is the same Master Affidavit underlying the four warrants at issue in Defendant Omidi's first motion to suppress.
Several of the lease documents relate to another premises (9001 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 106, Beverly Hills, California, 90211). [See, e.g., Doc. # 1155-3 at 10.] It appears that Suite 207 was added as an additional location to the lease on or about September 15, 2007. See id. at 61. Defendant Omidi appears to have signed lease documentation “as to letter of credit” on or about October 21, 2009 and was sued in Los Angeles County Superior Court for unlawful detainer relating to Suite 207 following the Government's search and seizure of the premises. See id. at 66. Suite 207 appears to have been leased to Beverly Hills Surgery Center, LLC (an Exhibit 1 Entity), although Defendant Omidi does not explain his relationship with that entity.
The Court OVERRULES Defendant Omidi's objection to SA Davis's declaration. Davis attests that his role during the search of Suite 207 was to assist with the search and seizure of items listed in Attachment B of the Suite 207 Warrant, Davis Decl. ¶ 2, and he appears to have sufficient personal knowledge to authenticate the Suite 207 layout and photographs attached to his declaration. Even if Davis's declaration and exhibits were not considered, Defendant Omidi fails to establish standing to contest the Suite 207 Warrant for the reasons discussed above.
At the hearing, Omidi's counsel compared this case to United States v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005), where the Ninth Circuit “simply h[e]ld that because the [defendants] were corporate officers and directors who not only had ownership of the [premises] but also exercised full access to the building as well as managerial control over its day-to-day operations, they had a reasonable expectation of privacy over calls made on the premises.” Id. at 1117 (emphasis added). Here, as noted above, Defendant Omidi has not established, among other things, managerial control over day-to-day operations at Suite 207. While Gonzalez dealt with a small family-run business, it is distinguishable from the case at hand where the GET THIN network was allegedly run, at least in part, by the Omidi family, but could hardly be characterized as small. See SDI Future Health, 568 F.3d at 696 (describing that “in Gonzalez we focused on the close control that the owner-operators exercised over their small business, which happened to be family-run”).
The Court notes that even assuming arguendo that Defendant Omidi had standing to challenge all of the three Warrants and that SCM had standing to challenge the Suite 207 Warrant and Las Vegas Warrant, each of the Warrants is supported by probable cause and is sufficiently specific, as discussed herein.
The Las Vegas Warrant was supported by a different affidavit, which did not discuss the permeated with fraud doctrine. For the reasons discussed below, the Las Vegas Warrant also is supported by probable cause and is sufficiently specific.