*1 On June 18, 2021, Defendant Julian Omidi filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence seized by the Government pursuant to four warrants. [Doc. ## 1086, 1104.] The Government filed its opposition on July 6, 2021. [Doc. ## 1109, 1105, 1114.] The parties stipulated to, and on July 13, 2021, the Court approved, additional briefing to correct an error in Defendant Omidi's initial brief regarding an address and applicable search warrant. [Doc. # 1115.] On July 14, 2021, the Government filed a supplemental opposition addressing the correct address and applicable warrant. [Doc. ## 1120, 1123.] On July 16, 2021, Defendant Omidi filed his reply. [Doc. ## 1125, 1132, 1133.] That same day, Defendant Surgery Center Management, LLC (“SCM”) filed a notice of partial joinder in Defendant Omidi's motion, with a supporting declaration [Doc. # 1127], and filed a supplemental declaration on July 17, 2021 [Doc. # 1128]. On July 19, 2021, the Government filed a motion to strike the supplemental declaration of Defendant Omidi (filed with his reply) and the two SCM declarations or, in the alternative, an application to file a sur-reply addressing the aforementioned three declarations. [Doc. # 1129.] The Court granted the Government leave to file a sur-reply [Doc. # 1134], which was filed on July 22, 2021. [Doc. # 1136.] The Court heard oral argument on the motion on July 28, 2021 and August 2, 2021. Having carefully considered the arguments set forth in the parties' briefs and at the hearings on this matter, the Court DENIES Defendant Omidi's motion.

The parties are well aware of the lengthy history in the instant case and the Court will not repeat it in detail here. Suffice it to say that during the Government's investigation of the “GET THIN”[1] network of entities—i.e., Defendant Omidi, his brother, Michael Omidi, M.D., his mother Cindy Omidi (collectively, the “Omidis”), and affiliated entities and associates—relating to allegations of health care fraud, tax fraud, money laundering, and other potential crimes, the Government applied for, and obtained, four warrants to search and seize items from the following locations for the period January 1, 2008 to the date the warrants were issued in 2014:

Each of the aforementioned four warrants (collectively, the “Warrants”) authorized the seizure of items listed therein as potential evidence of a scheme by the GET THIN entities, the Omidis, and others to: recruit patients for Lap-Band surgery by false and misleading advertising in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331 (misbranding a medical device); make false statements to health insurance plans in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1035; defraud health insurance plans and patients seeking Lap-Band surgery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1347 (health care fraud), and 1349 (fraud conspiracy); launder proceeds of such fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering); evade the payment of income taxes, knowingly fail to file income tax returns, and file false income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, and 7206(1), and evidence and instrumentalities of a conspiracy to commit the foregoing offenses and to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (collectively, the “Subject Offenses”). [Business Office Warrants, Attachment B-1, ¶ I.1; Home Warrant, Attachment B-2, ¶ I.1; Google Warrant, Attachment B-1, ¶ III.11.a; AOL Warrant, Attachment B-3, ¶ III.11.a.]

Each Warrant was issued by Hon. Victor B. Kenton, former United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to his finding that the supporting affidavits established probable cause to search and seize the items described therein. The Business Office Warrants and Home Warrant were supported by an affidavit from Food and Drug Administration, Office of Criminal Investigations Special Agent Zeva Pettigrew (“SA Pettigrew”) (“Master Aff.”) [Doc. ## 1114, 1114-1, 1114-2, 1114-3 (Exh. A)[3]], which was also attached to, and incorporated into, the smaller affidavit specific to the Google and AOL warrants [Doc. # 1114-4 (Exh. C) (“Email Aff.”) ¶ 5]. Each Warrant included an “Exhibit 1” attachment listing 174 entities which met one or more of six criteria connecting them to the GET THIN network (“Exhibit 1 Entity”). Master Aff. ¶ 263. Each Warrant incorporated the supporting affidavits, which were provided to the agents executing the Warrants. [See Warrants (each indicating that “[s]uch affidavit(s) or testimony are incorporated herein by reference and will be provided to the agent(s) executing this warrant.”)] In executing the Warrants (and the other warrants issued at or around the same time, see note 1, supra), the Government seized approximately 1,700 boxes of physical documents and 203 digital devices. [Doc. # 1104-6 (Exh. 6) at 18; see also # 1114-4 to 1114-8 (Exh. D) (Inventory).]

A. Fourth Amendment Generally

*3 The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The description must be specific enough to enable the person conducting the search reasonably to identify the things authorized to be seized. This requirement prevents general, exploratory searches and indiscriminate rummaging through a person's belongings.” United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The specificity required in a warrant varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved. Warrants which describe generic categories of items are not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the items subject to seizure is not possible.” Id. (citations omitted).

“In determining whether a description is sufficiently precise,” the Ninth Circuit has “concentrated on one or more of the following: (1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; and (3) whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued[.]” Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A warrant “need only be ‘reasonably specific, rather than elaborately detailed[.]’ ” United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982)). Moreover, even if a warrant is overbroad, it may be cured if a supporting affidavit with sufficiently precise information is expressly incorporated by reference and attached to the warrant, or provided to the agents executing the search. United States v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 1993).

“Probable cause exists if it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit.” United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, .... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citation omitted). “To find probable cause, a magistrate or judge is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” United States v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[a] magistrate's determination of probable cause to issue a warrant is treated with great deference and is not reviewed de novo.” United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). A magistrate's finding of probable cause will not be reversed “unless it is clearly erroneous” and the Court need “only find that under the totality of the circumstances the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. In doubtful cases, preference should be given to the validity of the warrant.” Id.

B. Standing

A defendant bears the burden of establishing standing to challenge a warrant. See United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010). To have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, “an individual must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” and “must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and their expectation must be one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable.” United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d at 1026 (same).

*4 “The Fourth Amendment shields not only actual owners, but also anyone with sufficient possessory rights over the property searched.... To be shielded by the Fourth Amendment, a person needs some joint control and supervision of the place searched, not merely permission to be there. For example, where a defendant not only has the right to possess a location, but also the right to exclude others, he likely has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge searches there.” Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[p]roperty used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential property.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 695 (citation omitted); see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (“An expectation of privacy in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home.”). “Of course, individuals may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police into their offices ... [b]ut unlike the nearly absolute protection of a residence, the great variety of work environments requires analysis of reasonable expectations on a case-by-case basis.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 695 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “For starters, it is crucial to Fourth Amendment standing that the place searched be “given over to [the defendant's] exclusive use.”[4] Id. at 695-96 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “By the same token, we have rejected managerial authority alone as sufficient for Fourth Amendment standing.” Id. at 696.

In United States v. Cella, the Ninth Circuit held that a hospital's corporate officer, described as the “de facto controlling force in its management,” lacked standing to challenge the seizure of records from the hospital print shop because, notwithstanding his access and control of the print shop operations, “his rights did not include any expectation of privacy over documents which were kept at the print shop premises ... over which [he] did not show an independent possessory or proprietary interest.” 568 F.2d 1266, 1270, 1283 (9th Cir. 1977); see also SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 698 (“an individual challenging a search of workplace areas beyond his own internal office must generally show some personal connection to the places searched and the materials seized.”).

C. Permeated with Fraud Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[a] generalized seizure of business documents may be justified if the government establishes probable cause to believe that the entire business is merely a scheme to defraud or that all of the business's records are likely to evidence criminal activity.” United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Rude, 88 F.3d at 1551 (noting that district court finding that business was “permeated with fraud” was supported by affidavit “as it is clear therefrom that [the business's] central purpose was to serve as a front for defrauding prime bank note investors.”); United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) (“even an extraordinarily broad warrant authorizing the seizure of essentially all business records may be justified when there is probable cause to believe that fraud permeated the entire business operation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Offs. Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit explained, in upholding a warrant, that “[w]hile the seizure was extraordinarily broad, and in that sense ‘general’, under the particular facts of this case the scope of the warrant was justified. It was not possible through more particular description to segregate those business records that would be evidence of fraud from those that would not, for the reason that there was probable cause to believe that fraud permeated the entire business operation of 50 State.” In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has noted that warrant applications that do not allege that a business's operations were permeated with fraud or affidavits that do not make that contention sufficiently clear, are insufficient to invoke the doctrine. See United States v. Bridges, 344 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Kow, 58 F.3d at 428 (permeated with fraud doctrine did not apply where government's own affidavit conceded that the business was “legitimate” and failed to allege or explain why government could not reasonably segregate business documents on the basis of whether they were likely to evidence criminal activity).

A. Standing

*5 As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendant Omidi has established standing to challenge the Home Warrant and Google Warrant (as to his email account only), but has failed to meet his burden of establishing standing to challenge the Business Office Warrants and AOL Warrant.

1. Business Office Warrants

Defendant Omidi submitted a supplemental declaration attesting that “Suite 800E was [his] private office which [he] did not share with anyone else.” [Doc. # 1125-1 (Omidi Supp. Decl.) ¶ 3.] He also attests that he “had and made use of access to all of the common areas” of the surrounding office space, and that, at the time, he acted as a manager for SCM and had “day-to-day control and oversight over records stored in paper and digital format in common areas of Suite 800.”[5] Id. He attests that he had the right to exclude others from the offices, to limit access of SCM employees, consultants, and visitors to confidential information stored there, and took precautions to secure the common areas from interference without his authorization. Id. SCM similarly filed a declaration from Monica Porter, a former HR director for Forward Business Solutions, LLC (an Exhibit 1 Entity), which she attests was managed by SCM. [Doc. # 1128 (Porter Decl.) ¶ 1.] Porter states that Suite 800E was “under the exclusive possession and control of” Defendant Omidi, who acted as a “contract consultant” for SCM, which was owned by Defendant Omidi's uncle, Shawn Pezeshk. Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). Porter states that Defendant Omidi “was the only person who acted for [SCM] in controlling possession of the premises [at Suite 800E]” and that he “had the keys to the premises, and no person could access the premises without his permission and consent.” Id. ¶ 7. Porter's declaration goes as far as to state that “[o]nly Mr. Omidi had the exclusive right to access to the offices [at Suite 800E].” Id. ¶ 4.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendant Omidi submitted his supplemental declaration only with his Reply brief, although the statements contained therein were clearly known to him and should have been filed with his initial brief. See L. Crim. R. 12-1.1 (“A motion to suppress shall be supported by a declaration on behalf of the defendant, setting forth all facts then known upon which it is contended the motion should be granted.”). Because granting the Government leave to file a sur-reply cures the potential prejudice to the Government arising from the late-filed declarations, and because of the interest in addressing claims on the merits whenever possible, see Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010), the Government's motion to strike the aforementioned declarations of Omidi, Devereux, and Porter [Doc. # 1129] is DENIED. Nonetheless, the statements contained in these supplemental declarations, when considered, are insufficient to establish Defendant Omidi's standing to challenge the Business Office Warrants.

*6 Defendant Omidi's argument is an interesting one: he and his associates disclaim his having any direct leadership role with respect to the GET THIN network, referring to him as simply an SCM manager or contract consultant, who somehow still had “exclusive” possession and control of the entirety of Suite 800E and its common areas. These bald assertions of possession and control are not supported by the objective evidence presented. See United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendant's “bald assertion that he was an overnight guest (and [codefendant]'s statement to that effect) is not sufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house” with standing to challenge the warrant); see also United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant's affidavit insufficient to establish standing to challenge validity of warrantless search of airplane hangar and vehicle given its “vague and conclusory” nature, as the affidavit, among other things, did not name lessee or owner of premises, from one of whom the defendant necessarily acquired whatever proprietary or possessory interest he asserted).

The record reflects that Suite 800E was a sprawling office space spanning approximately 9,000 square feet with at least 10 interior offices and 20 rows of cubicles with more than 50 individual workstations. [Doc. # 1136-2 (SA Pandis Decl.) ¶¶ 3-4. Photos taken by agents executing the Business Office Warrants appear to show other individuals' family photographs and personal effects in these workstations, suggesting that these areas belonged to various other individual employees. See id. Exh. B (Photographs). According to SA Pandis, who assisted with the search of the Business Office Warrants, Defendant Omidi did not appear to be present during the search and no specific workstation or interior office was identified as belonging to him. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Nor has Defendant Omidi himself ever specifically identified which office space, as opposed to the entire suite, allegedly belonged to him. See generally Omidi Decl.; Omidi Supp. Decl. At the July 28, 2021 hearing when again specifically asked by the Court to identify Defendant Omidi's alleged specific private office space, counsel was unable to do so.

Suite 800E was leased by Cosmopolitan Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery (an Exhibit 1 Entity), neither Defendant Omidi nor SCM appear to be identified in the lease documents, and Defendant Omidi has not explained what connection he claims to have had with that entity. [See Doc. # 1136-1, Exhs. L, M.] [redacted] [See Doc. # 1140, Exh. N at 69.] [redacted] Id. at 66.

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi has not met his burden of establishing standing. He has failed to identify which office space was his personal space, and to the extent he appears to be claiming that the entirety of Suite 800E's 9,000 square feet exclusively belonged to him, he fails to sufficiently establish a personal connection to that space and any such assertion is unsupported by the evidence highlighted above. Moreover, Defendant Omidi's asserted authority (as a manager or contract consultant for SCM) makes his standing argument even more attenuated than in SDI Future Health, Inc., where the Ninth Circuit noted that “managerial authority alone” was insufficient to confer Fourth Amendment standing on a company's own president and part-owner. Nor has Defendant Omidi engaged with the factors that the Ninth Circuit has indicated could inform a determination of whether the requisite personal connection exists. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 698; see also footnote 3, supra. In sum, Defendant Omidi fails to show an independent possessory or proprietary interest in Suite 800E or that he had any personal connection to Suite 800E and to the materials seized therefrom. See id.; Cella, 568 F.2d at 1270, 1283. Defendant Omidi's contention that he has established standing because he was an alleged “victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed,” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 (1969), is unpersuasive, as the cited Alderman language does not negate the standing requirements set forth above.

2. Home Warrant

*7 With respect to the Home Warrant, Defendant Omidi attests that he had lived at the Home as his primary and permanent residence at the time of the search and for approximately the preceding four years. Omidi Supp. Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant Omidi lived in the Home with his mother, id., and the Master Affidavit indicates that the initial buyer of the Home was Top Surgeons (an Exhibit 1 Entity), and later changed to FJKJ, LLC (another Exhibit 1 Entity). Defendant Omidi's name, however, appears in several locations of the escrow file. Master Aff. ¶¶ 237b. It should be noted that Defendant Omidi has, again, failed to specify which room (or rooms) were specifically his. Defendant Omidi has attested, however, that he “held a key to the house, used all the common areas of the house and garage, and enjoyed the right to admit or exclude others from the entire house.” Omidi Supp. Decl. ¶ 2. He “supervised work and workers at the house to include extensive repairs for leaks, clogged pipes, concrete repair, [and] roof repair.” Id. Moreover, the Master Affidavit itself acknowledges that individuals engaged in health care fraud and financial crimes [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 266 (emphasis added). Under these facts, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi has established that he maintained some possessory rights, joint control and supervision, and a reasonable expectation of privacy over the Home, and has accordingly met his burden to establish that he has standing to challenge the Home Warrant. See Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1186-87; see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 700 (1987).

3. Google Warrant

Defendant Omidi also has standing to challenge the Google Warrant with respect to the one email account identified as his own: weightlosscenters@gmail.com. Defendant Omidi has sufficiently attested that he had a possessory interest, and a reasonable expectation of privacy, in the account. [See Doc. # 1086 ¶ 7 (Omidi Decl.)] The Government does not strongly contend otherwise. [See Doc. # 1101 at 21.] With respect to the three other email accounts identified in the Google Warrant (omidimd@gmail.com; 4approvals@gmail.com; and md.checks@gmail.com), Defendant Omidi has failed to meet his burden of establishing standing. It is undisputed that these three accounts did not belong to Defendant Omidi, and he has failed to establish (or really even attempted to establish) any possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in them. [See generally Doc. # 1086; 1125 at 15-16.] For the same reasons that the Court finds that Defendant Omidi lacks standing to challenge the AOL Warrant, below, the Court finds that he also lacks standing to challenge the warrant as to the three Gmail accounts that do not belong to him.

4. AOL Warrant

The AOL Warrant relates to one email account belonging to Farrell Newton, a CPA who performed work for the Omidis and the GET THIN entities. It is well settled that “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[a] person's reasonable expectation of privacy may be diminished in ‘transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have already arrived at the recipient.’ ” United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A person has no expectation of privacy in another person's email account.”); United States v. Nazemzadeh, No. 11-CR-5726–L, 2013 WL 544054, at *2 n. 2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (“Defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email accounts of others.”); United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir.1994) (“[W]hen one party relinquishes control of a letter by sending it to a third party, the reasonableness of the privacy expectation is undermined.”).

Defendant Omidi attests that Mr. Newton served as his personal accountant and an accountant for one or more unnamed entities with whom Defendant Omidi had attorney-client, joint defense, joint client, and attorney work product communications. Omidi Decl. ¶ 8. It is undisputed that the AOL account did not belong to Defendant Omidi. He claims, however, that he had an expectation of privacy in information that was sent to Mr. Newton's AOL account. Any expectation of privacy, however, is diminished once sent to the recipient. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1146. The Court concludes that Defendant Omidi has not established that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy once his emails were sent to Mr. Newton's AOL account. For example, Defendant Omidi has not provided any evidence that he had any access to the AOL account or that he took any affirmative steps to prevent others from accessing it or information that Defendant Omidi sent to it. Defendant Omidi's citation to Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs. Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2012), for the proposition that there is a legitimate privacy interest in financial and employment information stored in the AOL account, is misplaced. There, the email account at issue was plaintiff's own personal email account, not that belonging to a third party. See id. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi lacks standing to challenge the AOL Warrant.

B. The Permeated with Fraud Doctrine Applies

*8 Having concluded that Defendant Omidi has standing to challenge the Home Warrant and Google Warrant (as to his own account only), the Court next turns to whether there was probable cause to issue the Warrants.[6] The Court finds that the Master Affidavit established probable cause to believe that [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 260. SA Pettigrew's conclusion was reached based upon the following evidence set forth in the Master Affidavit, among others:

7 The Master Affidavit indicates that Triwest is an organization that administered the Tricare program in California. Master Aff. ¶ 67. Tricare is the health care program for uniformed service members, retirees, and their families.

As outlined above, the Master Affidavit presented facts giving rise to probable cause to believe that each step of GET THIN's business practice evinced fraudulent activity – starting with misleading advertising, to sales pitch call centers that attempted to set up as many consultations as possible to have large prospective patient volume, to templated patient information and/or manipulation of patient data to potentially qualify for Lap-Band or other procedures, to overbilling of those procedures or billing under incorrect diagnostic codes, to the creation of the Exhibit 1 Entities to evade scrutiny of GET THIN's excess billing practices, to laundering proceeds of those fraudulent billing practices, and finally to evading or filing false income taxes.

Unlike Kow or Bridges, where the Ninth Circuit held that the permeated with fraud doctrine did not apply because, among other things, the supporting affidavit failed to assert that the business was permeated with fraud or that the government could not reasonably segregate the business's documents on the basis of whether they were likely to evidence criminal activity, Kow, 58 F.3d at 428; Bridges, 344 F.3d at 1018, the Master Affidavit does just that. The Master Affidavit specifically asserted the aforementioned detailed evidence, among others, and established probable cause to believe that the GET THIN operations were permeated with fraud. Master Aff. ¶ 260. The Master Affidavit also averred that [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 262.

In light of (1) the types of allegations involved (among other things, health care fraud, tax fraud, money laundering); (2) the approximately 200 Exhibit 1 Entities for which there was probable cause to believe were part of GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and were created to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis; and (3) the generally document-intensive evidence related to the kinds of fraud alleged here, which would likely require reviewing seized evidence to uncover fraudulent activity (i.e., health care fraud (reviewing alleged improper coding, overbilling, alteration of patient data) and tax fraud and money laundering (reviewing financial statements, banking information, transactions, the creation or use of entities to potentially disguise or hide assets)), the Court finds that the Master Affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that the GET THIN entities were permeated with fraud.

*9 To be sure, and as the Master Affidavit itself acknowledges, some of GET THIN's insurance claims were “clean” and some of its practices improved over time. Master Aff. ¶ 261; see also Doc. # 1132, Exh. 10 (Salazar 4/2/2019 Decl.); 1133, Exh. 11 (Sampling of billing records). That does not negate the fact, however, that the Master Affidavit presents probable cause to find that GET THIN entities' central purpose was to operate as an insurance billing mill and that fraud permeated the entire business operation. See Rude, 88 F.3d at 1551; see also Smith, 424 F.3d at 1006. Defendant Omidi cites no case, nor is the Court aware of one, where the existence of some legitimate business transactions, no matter the scope, negates the applicability of the doctrine. Rather, as highlighted above, the Master Affidavit established probable cause to believe that GET THIN's operations were permeated with fraud through every step of its business model. See Kow, 58 F.3d at 428; Bridges, 344 F.3d at 1018. At the July 28, 2021 hearing, Defendant Omidi cited to United States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d 65 (5th Cir. 1997), in support of his contention that the permeated with fraud doctrine did not apply, in particular with respect to the Home Warrant. Humphrey explained that the permeated with fraud doctrine (or all records doctrine) “must be applied with caution when an allegedly fraudulent business was operated out of a residence.” Notwithstanding this general principle, the Fifth Circuit held that “the search warrant was valid in the light of the pervasive nature of the fraud, the considerable overlap of the [defendants'] business and personal lives, and the limitation of the warrant to records pertaining to financial transactions.” Id. The same can be said here given the pervasive nature of the GET THIN fraud scheme, as discussed above, the considerable overlap between Defendant Omidi's business and personal lives (such as the buyer of the Omidi Home being two Exhibit 1 Entities, and evidence that GET THIN documents were discarded from the Home), and the time and subject limits to the Warrants, where feasible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Humphrey does not assist Defendant Omidi in evading the permeated with fraud doctrine.

C. The Warrants Were Sufficiently Specific Given the Nature of the Subject Offenses

Moreover, even if the “permeated with fraud” doctrine did not apply, the Court finds in the alternative that each of the Warrants are sufficiently specific to withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge. As noted above, “[t]he specificity required in a warrant varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved. Warrants which describe generic categories of items are not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the items subject to seizure is not possible.” Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963. The Court concludes that although some of the language in the Warrants is expansive, that is a necessity borne out of the widespread and sprawling nature of the alleged GET THIN fraud scheme, which the Master Affidavit presents probable cause to support. Contrary to Defendant Omidi's assertions, it is not inconsistent to find that the permeated with fraud doctrine applies and that, even if it did not, the Warrants are sufficiently specific, under the circumstances and facts presented, to be valid.

1. Particularity

“Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702. “[T]he warrant must make clear to the executing officer exactly what it is that he or she is authorized to search for and seize. The description must be specific enough to enable the person conducting the search reasonably to identify the things authorized to be seized.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Each of the Warrants contain the requisite particularity. Contrary to the assertions made by Omidi's counsel at the July 28 and August 2 hearings, the Master Affidavit sets forth more than simply allegations of fraudulent billing on Lap-Band claims. Rather, the Master Affidavit sets forth probable cause to believe that GET THIN was involved in an elaborate scheme involving not only fraudulent insurance billing, but also money laundering and tax evasion, often through the use of Exhibit 1 Entities. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 212-16; 227-35. Each Warrant describes the items sought and is “not vague as to what it directed law enforcement officers to search for and to seize.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702. For example, the Business Office Warrants specifically described 34 categories of documents and related digital devices to be seized, including, among other things, items relating to prospective or actual Lap-Band patients, billing, policies or protocols, other medical procedures (such as EGDs, sleep studies, nutritional consultations, psychological consultations), financial statements, banking records, and other specified items for the Exhibit 1 Entities, the Omidis, and some of their specified associates. [Doc. # 1123, Exhs. J, K.] The Home Warrant specifically described 19 categories of documents and related digital devices to be seized, including, among other things, financial statements, documents relating to Property Care Insurance, any Nevis or overseas trust, documents evidencing Defendant Omidi's involvement in Lap-Band matters or any other matters relating to the Exhibit 1 Entities, and communications involving Defendant Omidi relating to Lap-Band matters, or any other matters relating to the Exhibit 1 Entities. [Doc. # 1114-3, Exh. B.] The Google Warrant specifically described 21 categories of documents to be seized, including, among other things, documents relating to Lap-Band patients or any other aspect of the business of any Exhibit 1 Entity, contracts and other documents referencing relationships between an Exhibit 1 Entity, Defendant Omidi, and other Omidi affiliates, financial statements and other accounting records for Exhibit 1 Entities and Defendant Omidi. [Doc. # 1104-3, Exh. 3.] The AOL Warrant specifically described four categories of documents to be seized, including, among other things, documents relating to any Exhibit 1 Entity or Defendant Omidi. [Doc. # 1104-3, Exh. 4.] The Exhibit 1 Entity list attached to each Warrant also identifies each entity in alphabetical order, rendering it easier for agents executing the Warrant to quickly determine whether a particular business was identified as an Exhibit 1 Entity. Thus, the Court finds that each of the Warrants was sufficiently particular so that agents executing the search would understand what to search for and to seize. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702.

2. Breadth

*10 Nor were the Warrants overbroad under the facts and circumstances presented. “Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 702. Here, each of the Warrants admittedly contemplates the seizure of an expansive list of items. That in itself, however, does not render them deficient. The circumstances of this case and the widespread scope of the Subject Offenses, for which there was probable cause to support, render the scope of the Warrants permissible. As noted above, given: (1) the types of allegations involved; (2) the numerous Exhibit 1 Entities for which there was probable cause to believe were part of GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and/or were used to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis; and (3) the generally document-intensive evidence related to the kinds of fraud alleged here, the Court concludes that the Warrants were not overbroad. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963. As the Master Affidavit explained, [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 262.

In contrast to defects noted in other warrants found to be overbroad, see Kow, 58 F.3d at 427-28, 429 n.3, each of the Warrants here specified time limits and subject matter limits. For example, each Warrant limited itself to a specific time period (January 1, 2008 to the date of the warrant), subject matter (Lap-Band patients and affiliated procedures, where possible) and specifically identified the names of 174 Exhibit 1 Entities. While Defendant Omidi contends that the Warrants were overbroad given the large number of GET THIN entities listed in Exhibit 1 to each Warrant, the Court finds that this extensive, specific list actually supports the Government's position. The Master Affidavit set forth probable cause to believe that the Exhibit 1 Entities were used to facilitate GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis and their associates. Multiple statements attributed to Defendant Omidi and/or GET THIN associates suggest that many of the entities were created to evade scrutiny from insurance companies and others regarding the number of GET THIN insurance claims. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 131, 170-187-195. While Defendant Omidi also contends that the records sought in the Warrants should have been limited to only Lap-Band surgeries, the Warrants did limit their seizures to Lap-Band patients where possible. See, e.g., Initial Business Office Warrant ¶ I.1.a.1-6; 8-11. As noted in the Master Affidavit, however, there was probable cause to believe that GET THIN entities routinely used non-Lap Band related billing codes to create the illusion that procedures were unrelated to Lap-Band surgery to avoid scrutiny from insurance companies at the sheer volume of Lap-Band related claims, or where patients seeking Lap-Band surgery had insurance that did not cover Lap-Band surgery. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 145-46. There was also probable cause to believe that GET THIN entities were performing other non-Lap Band related procedures that were not medically necessary or properly billed. See Master Aff. ¶ 157. Accordingly, some categories in the Warrants were necessarily broader than being limited to Lap-Band claims alone. See, e.g., Initial Business Office Warrant ¶ I.1.a.5; 7; 12.

Defendant Omidi also takes issue with the alleged overbreadth of the seizure of documents or communications related to [redacted] See, e.g., Initial Business Office Warrant, ¶ I.20, 21. This provision is permissible under the circumstances because, as noted above, the Master Affidavit established probable cause to believe that the Exhibit 1 Entities acted to facilitate GET THIN's fraudulent insurance billing, money laundering, and/or tax evasion scheme and to obscure any relationship to the GET THIN network and/or the Omidis. To the extent that any of the Warrants were overbroad, however, any overbreadth would have been cured by the Master Affidavit (and if applicable, the Email Affidavit) being expressly incorporated by reference and attached to the Warrants or provided to the agents executing the search. See Towne, 997 F.2d at 544.

*11 Furthermore, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses at each of the prescribed locations. As noted above, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi has failed to establish his standing to challenge the Business Office Warrants. Even assuming arguendo that he did demonstrate standing, it cannot be disputed that the Business Office was the administrative office space housing GET THIN's operations, including SCM, which held itself out as authorized to act on behalf of the Exhibit 1 Entities. Master Affidavit ¶¶ 4, 271. The Business Office housed GET THIN's accounting department, call center, insurance verification, human resources, billing/collection, audit, reception, kitchen, IT services, software, and other work areas, and included company servers. Id. ¶¶ 273-74; see also Doc. # 1140, Exh. N at 67-68. Given that the Business Office was the undisputed hub of GET THIN's operations, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses at the Business Office. See Wong, 334 F.3d at 836.

The Home was Defendant Omidi's primary and permanent residence. One witness recounted observing Defendant Omidi taking files back and forth between the Business Office and Home. Master Aff. ¶ 289. Surveillance of Defendant Omidi on August 28, 2013 indicated that he left the Home and entered the Business Office carrying a bag with an attached strap, which was reasonable to conclude included documents or data relating to the GET THIN entities. See id. ¶ 290. A “trash run” of the Home conducted by IRS agents on December 12, 2013 uncovered discarded bank records for Top Surgeons (an Exhibit 1 Entity), and another trash run from January 9, 2014 uncovered discarded bags of shredded business documents and 66 self-inking stamps from various GET THIN entities. Id. ¶¶ 294-95. SA Pettigrew attested that based on her review of emails, Defendant Omidi has been using mobile devices to conduct GET THIN business. Master Aff. ¶ 297. SA Pettigrew also attested that based on her experience, individuals engaged in health care fraud and financial crimes [redacted] Id. ¶ 266. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses at the Home. See Wong, 334 F.3d at 836.

It was also reasonable to seek evidence from Defendant Omidi's Gmail account because, as he acknowledges, it was an account from which he conducted GET THIN business. See Omidi Decl. ¶ 7. The Email Affidavit also specified that based on emails already received, it was apparent that Defendant Omidi used his Gmail account to [redacted] as this account was [redacted] Email Aff. ¶ 11a.-cc. The Master Affidavit also detailed a May 31, 2011 email from a GET THIN employee to Defendant Omidi at this account explaining that she had instructed another employee [redacted] Master Aff. ¶ 131.

As noted above, the Court concludes that Defendant Omidi lacks standing to challenge the AOL Warrant. Even assuming arguendo that he did have standing, the Court finds that it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses from the AOL account. Mr. Newton exchanged emails with Defendant Omidi from this account regarding the tax benefits of creating privately held insurance companies. SA Pettigrew asserted that there was probable cause to believe that some of these exchanges related to the establishment of entities overseas to conceal income, disguise ownership of assets, and evade payment of taxes. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 227-235. Consolidated tax returns prepared by Mr. Newton suggest that the tax returns that were filed (on behalf of the limited number of GET THIN entities that did file tax returns) were false. See id. ¶ 212. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to seek evidence of the Subject Offenses from the AOL account. See Wong, 334 F.3d at 836.

The portion of each of the Warrants authorizing the seizure of digital devices was also permissible. As outlined in the Master Affidavit, there was probable cause to believe that GET THIN entities, the Omidis, and their associates, were conducting the Subject Offenses through the use of digital devices, including but not limited to computers and mobile phones. Each Warrant also outlined detailed procedures governing the search and seizure of these devices and explained why it was not feasible to search these devices onsite. See Master Aff. ¶ 310 (among other things, [redacted] see also Doc. # 1140, Exh. N at 69 (Salazar testifying that Defendant Omidi always carried his laptop with him, suggesting that it would be reasonable to find evidence of Subject Offenses in his email and digital devices).[8]

D. Defendant Omidi's Other Arguments Lack Merit

1. Purported Reliance on Stale Information

*12 Defendant Omidi also contends that the Warrants were unreasonable because the supporting affidavits relied on stale information such that they failed to demonstrate probable cause. “Information offered to support a search warrant becomes stale when enough time has elapsed such that there is no longer sufficient basis to believe ... that the items to be seized are still on the premises.” United States v. Grant, 682 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The mere passage of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a question of staleness. That is particularly true with electronic evidence. Thanks to the long memory of computers, any evidence of a crime was almost certainly still on the defendant's computer, even if he had tried to delete” them. United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[p]robable cause determinations are ‘commonsense, practical’ questions, and a ‘fair probability’ is less even than a preponderance of the evidence. In this day and age, even persons with minimal technological savvy are aware that data is frequently preserved and recovered after deletion from an electronic device.” Id. at 1044 (quoting United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Here, it is true that much of the evidence presented in the Master Affidavit relates to approximately 2012 or even earlier. See generally Master Aff. Some evidence shows, however, that alleged fraudulent insurance claims were submitted by GET THIN entities through November 2013, monies were still on deposit in GET THIN affiliated accounts in March 2014, and trash runs showed GET THIN records discarded in January 2014. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 25; 201. Given the “long memory of computers” and the fact that the Government had sent preservation requests for the Gmail and AOL accounts in November 2012 and August 2013, respectively [Email Aff. ¶¶ 12, 29], there was certainly a “fair probability” that evidence of the Subject Offenses would be uncovered at the specified locations. See Flores, 802 F.3d at 1044; see also Master Aff. ¶ 310(d) [redacted] Moreover, given that the Subject Offenses included allegations of health care fraud and given requirements regarding the retention of patient medical files and related data, there was certainly a “fair probability” to conclude that evidence of the Subject Offenses would be found at the specified locations.

2. Purported Failure to Show Necessity

Defendant Omidi also contends that the Government failed to establish that the evidence sought was necessary, in light of the various subpoenas already served on GET THIN entities in years prior to the issuance of the Warrants. This argument too lacks merit as, among other things, the Master Affidavit explains that GET THIN's prior subpoena responses included delayed, incomplete, altered, and manipulated data and may have provoked the destruction of records. See Master Aff. ¶¶ 254-59; 311 (inter alia, witness reported that immediately before GET THIN's production of May 2010 patient files, they saw Defendant Omidi in a room with patient files on a table and a black garbage bag of already shredded papers). Accordingly, the Government has sufficiently shown why the evidence sought in the Warrants was necessary notwithstanding its earlier subpoena requests.

3. Retention of Digital Devices

Defendant Omidi also argues that the Government failed to complete searches of digital devices within the time period prescribed in the Warrants (60 days) and failed to return seized items pursuant to terms set forth in the Warrants. Within 60 days of the execution of the Warrants, there was an acknowledged dispute over the procedure by which the Government could search the digital devices seized pursuant to the Warrants. By July 22, 2014, the Government and attorneys representing GET THIN entities met with Stroz Freidberg, a consulting and technical services firm specializing in computer forensics and other matters, to assess the potential scope of Stroz Freidberg's work to cull and review the seized digital devices for, among other things, potential privileges. [Doc. # 1104-6, Exh. 7 (Aquilina Decl.) ¶ 12.] During this period, the Government applied for extensions to review the seized items for some of the Warrants, which were granted by the reviewing magistrate judges. See, e.g., 14-1033M (relating to Home Warrant) [Doc. ## 6, 8, 10, 15, 27, 29, 38, 45, 61, 66] (reflecting orders granting government's requests for extensions of time to retain and search seized digital devices); 14-1034M (Initial Business Office Warrant) [Doc. ## 6, 8, 10, 12, 14] (same)].

*13 The Government does not appear to have expressly sought extensions for the Google Warrant or AOL Warrant. See generally 14-1029M, 14-1026M. The parties eventually stipulated to workflow agreements with Stroz Freidberg to process data from seized digital devices and assist in the scope and privilege review. [Doc. # 1104-6, Exhs. 6, 7.] The parties also agreed to have Hon. Dickran Tevrizian, retired United States District Judge, serve as a discovery referee to resolve disputes regarding whether any electronic data was privileged. Id. By all accounts, these arrangements fell apart [Doc. # 1114-9, Exh. I], and the Government eventually employed a Filter/Taint Team to facilitate its review after Hon. Paul Abrams, United States Magistrate Judge, declined to enter an order setting forth a privilege review protocol. Judge Abrams declined to become involved in [redacted] [Doc. # 1114-9, Exh. I (Oct. 15, 2015 Order).] Currently, it appears that some, but not all, of the seized digital devices have been returned to their owners. [See Doc. # 1101 (Williams Decl.) ¶ 11.] Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the wholesale suppression of seized items is not an appropriate or proportional remedy. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”).

In contrast to United States v. Salceda, CR 10-274, 2012 WL 763583, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012), this is not a situation where the terminology in the warrant was found to be ambiguous and construed against the Government, or where the Government continued to search for items after having sought, and been denied, a new warrant. Rather, the record reflects that within the time period contemplated for review of the seized digital devices, the parties were engaged in discussions to try to agree on a stipulated procedure to process seized digital devices, eventually stipulated to a procedure for a third party to facilitate that review, with a retired district court judge to assist in resolving any disputes, before that arrangement fell apart. The Court also notes that Defendant Omidi has not articulated to the Court's satisfaction (and in light of the findings issued herein), which specific seized digital devices belong to him and remain seized.[9] To the extent that Defendant Omidi maintains that the Government has continued to improperly withhold any specific seized items belonging to him, the parties should meet and confer on the status of those specific items and file a status report for the Court regarding the issue. If any data or information derived from the seized digital devices in the Government's possession are likely to be used at trial and have not been disclosed to Defendants at this late date, then the Court would consider what remedies may be appropriate under those circumstances.

4. Good Faith Reliance

Finally, the Court concludes that even if the Warrants were in any way deficient (which the Court finds they are not), there “was enough information so that objectively reasonable officers were entitled to rely on the magistrate judge's determination” of probable cause. United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1994). None of the grounds that would disqualify the officers from that entitlement are present. There is no indication that agents misled the magistrate judge or displayed a disregard for the truth in the supporting affidavit or that the magistrate judge abandoned his judicial role. Nor is there any indication, as highlighted above, that the Warrants were facially deficient such that the officers could not reasonably presume them to be valid, or the Master Affidavit and Email Affidavit were so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon them in good faith. Id. at 836; see also United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007).

5. SCM's Late Partial Joinder

With respect to SCM's two-page late partial joinder, the motion to suppress is DENIED for the same reasons stated above. SCM seeks suppression of only the AOL Warrant and Business Office Warrants, on the grounds that Mr. Newton performed accounting work for SCM, and because SCM used Suite 800E office space. [See Doc. ## 1127, 1128.] As an initial matter, SCM has not met its burden of establishing standing to challenge the AOL Warrant and Business Office Warrants beyond its bald assertions. See Armenta, 69 F.3d at 308. Even if it had, the Master Affidavit and Email Affidavit established probable cause to believe that SCM was involved in the Subject Offenses and that it was reasonable to seek evidence at the subject locations, for the same reasons discussed at length above.

6. No Evidentiary Hearing is Necessary

*14 “An evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress need be held only when the moving papers allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested issues of fact exist.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “A hearing will not be held on a defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress merely because a defendant wants one. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that a significant disputed factual issue exists such that a hearing is required.” Id. (emphasis added and citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f the affidavits show as a matter of law that [the movant] was or was not entitled to relief, no hearing [is] required.” United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980).

Here, Defendant Omidi's motion rests primarily on legal arguments regarding whether the Warrants satisfied the particularity and breadth requirements, and do not raise a “significant disputed factual issue” warranting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant Omidi contends that his assertions regarding standing are a fact-based inquiry that require one. The Court disagrees, particularly in light of the fact that Defendant Omidi has already been provided the opportunity to submit two declarations (with one filed after the Government expressly pointed out the deficiencies in his standing arguments) and has still failed to establish the requisite standing for the Business Office Warrants and AOL Warrant. While Omidi's counsel argued at the August 2 hearing that an evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve any factual dispute about Omidi's standing to contest the Business Office Warrants, the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary given that even if Defendant Omidi could establish standing (which he has not), it would make no difference given that the Court finds, for the reasons set forth above, that the Warrants were sufficiently specific under the totality of the circumstances presented to withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge.

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Julian Omidi's motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. To the extent SCM filed a partial joinder in Defendant Omidi's motion, SCM's motion is also DENIED.

By August 13, 2021, the parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report as to any seized digital devices belonging to Defendant Omidi still in the Government's possession, why the devices have not been returned to Defendant Omidi, and what prejudice, if any, has resulted from the delay in return of the devices.

This Order shall be filed under seal given its citations to several under seal documents. By August 13, 2021, the parties shall also meet and confer and, if necessary, submit a joint proposed redacted copy of this Order for filing on the public CM/ECF docket. The proposed redactions shall be highlighted in yellow for the Court's review.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

GET THIN does not refer to a single entity, but is a shorthand used in the Master Affidavit to refer to a sprawling network of entities affiliated with the Omidis and their associates initially arising out of the ubiquitous advertising campaign promoting Lap-Band surgeries in the Southern California area. Calling the 1-800-GET-THIN phone number would direct callers to the GET THIN call center and administrative office. See Master Aff. ¶ 10.

The Government applied for, and obtained, several other warrants at or around the same period, which are not at issue in the present motion.

Given its size, the Master Affidavit was docketed on the CM/ECF system as four separate entries.

Factors which the Court may consider when a defendant has not established that the area searched is “given over to [his] exclusive use,” include “(1) whether the item seized is personal property or otherwise kept in a private place separate from other work-related material; (2) whether the defendant had custody or immediate control of the item when officers seized it; and (3) whether the defendant took precautions on his own behalf to secure the place searched or things seized from any interference without his authorization.” SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 698.

Defendant Omidi and Ms. Porter refer to Suite 800E, Suite 800, and the 8th floor of 9001 Wilshire Boulevard somewhat interchangeably, and it appears that all of these descriptions refer to the same physical office space. At the August 2, 2021 hearing, Omidi's counsel suggested that 800E referred to Defendant Omidi's private office space within Suite 800, but there is no evidence in the record supporting this, and the Business Office Warrants specifically identify the property to be searched to be “Suite 800E.” Instead, it appears that the “E” in 800E refers to the fact that the suite was located in the East Tower. [See Business Office Warrants, Att. A-1 [redacted]

The Court notes that even assuming arguendo that Defendant Omidi had standing to challenge the Business Office Warrants and AOL Warrant, each of the Warrants is supported by probable cause and is sufficiently specific, as discussed in the sections below.

With respect to the Home Warrant and Business Office Warrants, Defendant Omidi also contends that the Government failed to establish probable cause that each particular digital device contained evidence of the Subject Offenses. [See Doc. # 1086 at 20.] The Government was not required to make this specific showing. See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2006) (“we have never held that agents may establish probable cause to search only those items owned or possessed by the criminal suspect ... By setting forth the details of the [ ] scheme and the instrumentalities of the crime, augmented by descriptions of [co-defendant] Reinhold's involvement with Adjani, the government satisfied its burden. The magistrate judge therefore properly approved the warrant, which in turn encompassed all the computers found at Adjani's residence [not just those belonging to Adjani].”) (emphasis added).

The only digital devices seized pursuant to the Home Warrant that Omidi specifically attests were his personal possessions were an unspecified smart phone and unspecified laptop computer. Omidi Decl. ¶ 3.