*1 Before the Court for resolution is Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and to Compel Production of Documents Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”), filed on February 23, 2022, along with Declarations of Joseph A. Garofolo (“Garofolo Decl.”); Joseph A. Creitz (“Creitz Decl.”); Shagha Balali (“Balali Decl.”); and Craig P. Ramsdell (“Ramsdell Decl.”). (Dkt. Nos. 72-76.) Defendants filed an Opposition on March 3, 2022 (“Opposition” or “Oppo.”) supported by a Declaration of Clarissa A. Kang (“Kang Decl.”). (Dkt. No. 81.) On March 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Reply with a further Declaration of Craig P. Ramsdell (“Ramsdell Reply Decl.”). (Dkt Nos. 84-85.) On March 23, 2022, the Court held oral argument on the Motion and took the matter under submission. (Dkt. No. 94.)

After reviewing the parties' briefing and considering the parties arguments at the hearing, for the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for sanctions and awards Plaintiff $17,205.00 for costs incurred in taking the non-appearances at properly noticed Rule 30(b)(6) depositions for which Defendants failed to appear and reasonable attorneys' fees associated with bringing the Motion. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff's request for an order compelling production of certain unredacted documents.

In a discovery order dated March 28, 2022, the Court previously summarized the allegations of the operative Second Amended Complaint in this ERISA action, and therefore, will not repeat those allegations here. (See Dkt. No. 97.) Rather, the Court outlines below the facts pertinent to the instant Motion.

On September 21, 2021, presiding District Judge Virginia A. Phillips issued a Civil Trial Scheduling Order that set December 31, 2021 as the discovery cut-off and scheduled a bench trial for April 12, 2022. (Dkt. No. 52.) Judge Phillips's scheduling order expressly provides that “[t]he discovery cut-off is the last date to complete discovery, including expert discovery. It is also the last day for hearing any discovery motion.” (Id.)

On January 3, 2022, Judge Phillips approved the parties' stipulation to continue the trial date and related dates and deadlines, establishing March 31, 2022 as the current discovery cut-off. (Dkt. No. 66.)

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may obtain discovery concerning any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(1) identifies six factors to be considered when determining if the proportionality requirement has been met, namely, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Id. Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. When, as here, federal jurisdiction is based on a federal question, federal privilege law governs. See FED. R. EVID. 501; Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 242 F. Supp. 2d 740, 750 (S.D. Cal. 2003).

A. Plaintiff's Arguments

1. Defendants' Non-Appearance at Depositions

*2 Plaintiff requests sanctions against Defendants for Defendants' failure to appear at four noticed depositions without serving objections or seeking protective orders from the Court. (Motion at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff emphasizes that the Administrative Committee failed to appear for two depositions without a granted protective order. (Id. at 4.) Defendants Twentieth Century Fox, Inc. (“Fox”) and The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) also failed to appear for depositions without a granted protective order. (Id. at 5.)

On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff served a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice on the Administrative Committee for a deposition scheduled on December 8, 2021. (Id. at 3.) On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff served Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices on Fox and Disney for depositions scheduled on December 14 and 15, 2021 respectively. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, on November 23, 2021, counsel for the parties met and conferred by telephone about the examination topics in the three deposition notices, but counsel did not discuss the scheduled deposition dates on that call. (Id.) Plaintiff's counsel states that on December 6, 2021, just two days before the Administrative Committee's scheduled deposition, defense counsel, Clarissa Kang, informed him for the first time that Defendants could not commit to appear for their depositions on the noticed dates. (Id.) Ms. Kang did not provide any alternative dates for the depositions at that time. (Id.)

On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff took the non-appearance of the Administrative Committee. (Id. at 4.) On December 10, 2021, Ms. Kang informed Plaintiff's counsel that the Administrative Committee was available for deposition on December 28 and 29, 2021, but Plaintiff's counsel “informed Ms. Kang that he was not available on those dates due to the anticipated birth of his child.” (Id.) Plaintiff, on December 12, 2021, then served a second Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition on the Administrative Committee scheduling the deposition for December 20, 2021, only to be informed by Ms. Kang, two days later, that the Administrative Committee was not available on December 20, 2021 either. (Id.) Ms. Kang proposed December 17, December 28, and December 29 as alternative dates, but Plaintiff's counsel again informed Ms. Kang that he could not be available on December 28 or 29 because of the expected birth of his child. (Id.)[1]

Mr. Ramsdell's child was born unexpectedly on December 20, 2021, and Plaintiff was able to take the Administrative Committee's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on December 29, 2021. (Id.) When counsel asked the Fox/Disney witness why he had been unavailable on December 8 or 20, 2021, “the witness was unaware of any depositions scheduled for those dates and testified that he was never asked whether he was available for deposition on those date.” (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff emphasizes that Defendants Fox and Disney did not provide any alternative dates for their depositions, despite the fact that the deposition cut-off was only two weeks away. (Id.) With no alternative dates proposed, Plaintiff proceeded with the depositions of Fox and Disney on December 14 and 15, 2021, respectively, noting these defendants' non-appearance. (Id.) On December 16, 2021, Ms. Kang informed Plaintiff's counsel for the first time that “the designee for Fox and Disney (whose depositions Plaintiff agreed to take simultaneously) was available from December 28 through December 30, 2021” and Mr. Ramsdell again explained to Ms. Kang that he was not available on those dates as he awaited the birth of his child. (Id.)

*3 Plaintiff argues that despite being notified that Defendants would not appear for depositions on the noticed dates, Plaintiff needed to proceed with the non-appearances because the parties could not agree to stipulate to an extension of the discovery cut-off. It was not until December 23, 2021, that the parties agreed for the first time to stipulate to continue the discovery deadline. (Id.) Plaintiff ultimately took the consolidated Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Fox and Disney on February 4, 2022. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that before the Court granted the parties' stipulation on January 3, 2022 to continue various dates, including the discovery cut-off, Plaintiff was reluctant to agree to stipulate to continue the discovery cut-off because to have done so would have rendered Defendants' otherwise untimely written discovery requests timely. (Id. at 5-6.) Only after Defendants agreed on December 23, 2021 “that Plaintiff would not be required to substantively respond to their written discovery requests, if Plaintiff stipulated to a continuance” did Plaintiff agree to a three-month continuance of the discovery cut-off and other court deadlines. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants cannot avoid sanctions for the non-appearances based on giving notice of their intention not to appear. Such verbal notice without a request for a protective order, according to Plaintiff, is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of taking the non-appearances because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are clear that a witness cannot simply ignore properly noticed depositions and avoid the costs of non-appearances. (Id. at 1.)

Thus, Plaintiff asks the Court to impose sanctions, pursuant to Rule 37(d)(1)(A) against Defendants for failing to appear at their deposition where the non-appearances were not substantially justified. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff relies on the language of Rule 37(d)(2) and Ninth Circuit decisions in Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964) and Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 1993) to urge that Defendants' notification of its intention not to appear for the noticed depositions even if the deposing party refused to reschedule, is not sufficient to avoid sanctions here. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff points out that Defendants neither served formal objections to the deposition notices nor sought a protective order. (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff argues that if the Court allows Defendants to avoid sanctions here, “notices of deposition would be ineffective in compelling a party's deposition on a specific date and time and rendered toothless.” (Id.) Plaintiff emphasizes that if the Court were to balance the equities, which is not necessary under Rule 37, “this is not an instance in which Pliantiff was uncooperative,” because Defendants did not inform Plaintiff of their intention not to appear until December 6, 2021, which was several weeks after the notices of depositions were served on November 15 and 16, 2021.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,841.00 as reimbursement for the cost of the deposition non-appearances. (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks $15,405.00 in attorneys' fees for costs associated with extensive meet-and-confer efforts with Defendants' counsel, attending a telephonic conference, and drafting this Motion. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff seeks a total sanctions award of $26,526.00 in attorneys' fees to be awarded jointly and severally against Defendants and their counsel. (Reply at 11.)

2. Request for Order Compelling Production of Unredacted Documents

*4 In the Motion, Plaintiff also seeks an order compelling Defendants to produce unredacted copies of documents produced in discovery and identified as TWDC00000160-195, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, and 288-300. (Motion at 12.) Plaintiff mantains that the redacted documents pertain “to the status of claims and appeals of other participants under the Plan.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the redacted information is relevant and proportionate to the needs of the case within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(1). (Id.)

B. Defendants' Opposition

Defendants argue that any scheduling difficulties caused by the looming December 31, 2021 discovery-cut off were of Plaintiff's own making because Plaintiff did not begin propounding discovery until less than two months before the December 31, 2021 discovery cut-off. (Oppo. at 3-4.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff unilaterally set the four depositions during the year-end holiday season on dates when the witnesses were not available and “rebuffed” Defendants' efforts to both reschedule the depositions and to continue the case dates and deadlines. (Oppo. at 5.)

Defendants argue that sanctions should not be awarded here because Defendants made reasonable requests to reschedule the Administrative Committee's deposition and to stipulate to extending the case deadlines but “Mr. Ramsdell refused to agree to any of Defendants' requests.” (Id. at 5-6.) Defendants emphasize that before Plaintiff convened the deposition of the Administrative Committee, “it was clear from Ms. Kang's prior communications that the Administrative Committee was unable to produce a witness and would not be appearing.” (Id. at 6.)

Defendants also urge that the cases Plaintiff cites in support of the request for sanctions are inapposite and do not control here because those cases involved “extreme scenarios of willful misconduct not at all factually analogous to the present situation.” (Id. at 14-15.)

Finally, Defendants maintain that the documents that Plaintiff seeks to have unredacted are properly redacted on the basis of confidentiality of non-parties. (Id. at 16.)

A. Sanctions are Warranted for Defendants' Non-Appearances

From the Court's perspective, the record here suggests that what occurred with the scheduling of the Defendants' Rule 30(b)(6) depositions was the result of tactical efforts by both sides to trap their opponent in the strictures of the original December 31, 2021 discovery cut-off. Both sides “weaponized” the December 31, 2021 deadline to try to press a strategic advantage.[2] Nevertheless, Plaintiff, as the deposing party, was entitled to schedule the depositions within the time allowed by the remaining discovery period. Plaintiff served the deposition notices in mid-November. (Motion at 3; Ramsdell Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exs. B, C.) Defense counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff's counsel shortly after the deposition notices were served, on November 23, 2021, but never discussed unavailability of her witnesses, did not propose alternative dates for the depositions, and did not seek or obtain a protective order. Defendants did not notify Plaintiff that the Administrative Committee would not be available for its deposition as noticed until December 6, 2021, just two days before the deposition was noticed to go forward. (Motion at 3; Ramsdell Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. E.)

*5 Rule 37(d)(1) provides that the Court may, on motion, order sanctions against a party, where that party fails to attend its own deposition; the

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3).

Here, the Court finds that Defendants' failure to even propose alternative dates until just two days before the Administrative Committee's deposition was substantially unjustified. Further, defense counsel's repeated efforts to offer December 28 and 29, 2021 as deposition dates, when she knew that Plaintiff's counsel would be unavailable due to the expected birth of his child, was also substantially unjustified and, arguably, unprofessional. Defendants argue that sanctions should not be awarded in this case because the failure to appear was not due to “bad faith.” (Oppo. at 10.) But, as Plaintiff emphasized during oral argument, Rule 37(d) does not require a finding of bad faith, only that the non-appearance be substantially unjustified.

Defendants' reliance on Twin Rivers Eng'g, Inc. v. Fieldpiece Instruments, Inc., 2017 WL 10543657 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017) is also unavailing. (Id. at 11.) In that case, the court declined to award sanctions where it found that the deponent's non-appearance was attributable to an apparent miscommunication between the parties. (Id.) Here, there was no “miscommunication” between the parties, but rather a wholesale failure by Defendants to provide alternative dates for the properly noticed depositions or to seek a protective order. Defendants' position that it can unilaterally refuse to appear for properly noticed depositions and need not seek a protective order, if adopted, would make a mockery of the Federal Rules. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that unless a Rule 30(b) deponent “has obtained a court order that postpones or dispenses with his duty to appear, that duty remains[.] Under the Rules, it is for the court, not the deponent or his counsel, to relieve him of the duty to appear.” Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., 333 F.2d at 269. Thus, here, Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of the costs Plaintiff incurred to take the non-appearances of Defendants' properly noticed Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.

To substantiate those costs, Plaintiff presents the Declaration of Craig P. Ramsdell, which attaches four invoices from the court reporting service that total $3,841.35 for the depositions at which Defendants failed to appear and pursuant to Rule 37(d)(3). In the Motion, Plaintiff requests an award of $3,841.00 (Motion at 10), and the Court will require Defendants and/or their counsel to pay Plaintiff $3,841.00 as reasonable expenses for Defendants' failure to appear. (Ramsdell Decl., ¶ 24, Ex. P.)

In connection with the opening brief, Plaintiff seeks $15,405.00 for attorneys' fees—applying Mr. Ramsdell's rate of $650 per hour—for attorney time devoted to “drafting this motion, engaging in extensive meet-and-confer efforts with Defendants' counsel and preparing for and participating on the telephonic conference on January 28, 2022.” (Motion at 11.) Plaintiff seeks an additional $6,630 for 10.2 hours spent drafting the reply brief. (Ramsdell Reply Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) In total, Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees of $26,526.00. (Reply at 11.)

*6 After reviewing Plaintiff's submissions and conducting the requisite lodestar analysis, the Court finds the total attorneys' fees that Plaintiff seeks to be excessive and, therefore, reduces the total compensable fees as discussed below.

In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted the lodestar method for calculating attorneys' fee awards. A court determines the lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a particular motion by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 433. “Although the district court's calculation of an award need not be done with precision, some indication of how it arrived at its figures and the amount of the award is necessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986).

In the Reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants do not challenge the reasonableness of Mr. Ramsdell's hourly rate or any specific time entries, and therefore the argument is waived. (Reply at 10-11.) That said, even where an opposing party does not challenge the reasonableness of billing rates and/or billed hours, the Court has an independent duty to assess the reasonableness of both the hourly bill rates and hours sought in a fee motion. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting district court's “duty to independently review the applicant's fee request”).

In determining the reasonable hourly rate of the prevailing attorney, the Court must look to the “rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jordan v. Multnomah Cty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The prevailing market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate.”).

A party seeking attorneys' fees must provide “satisfactory evidence ... that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community[.]” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n.11 (1984). A declaration regarding the prevailing rate in the relevant community is sufficient to establish a reasonable hourly rate. Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). “When a fee applicant fails to meet its burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested rates, however, the court may exercise its discretion to determine reasonable hourly rates based on its experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in the community.” Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., No. CV 8-519-MMM (RZx), 2009 WL 605789, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009); and see Moreno v. Empire City Subway Co., No. CV 5-7768-LMM (HBP), 2008 WL 793605, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (stating that if fee applicant “has submitted no evidence of the prevailing market rate for attorneys of like skill ... it is within [the court's] discretion to determine the reasonable hourly rate ... based on [the court's] familiarity with ... prevailing rates in the [relevant community]”).

In addition to establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a prevailing party in a discovery dispute seeking attorneys' fees “bears the burden of proving that the fees and costs taxed are ... reasonably necessary to achieve the result obtained.” Rucker v. Air Ventures, Hawaii, LLC, No. CV 16-492-HG (KSC), 2017 WL 4158201, at *3 (D. Haw. Sept. 19, 2017) (citing Tirona v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Haw. 1993)). The court reviews time records submitted by the applicant to determine whether the hours were reasonably incurred or if “any of the hours were unnecessary, duplicative or excessive,” or inadequately documented. True Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. CV 13-2219-HSG (DMR), 2015 WL 3453459, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2015) (internal citation omitted).

*7 In support of the request for an award of attorneys' fees associated with the deposition scheduling dispute, Plaintiff represents that Mr. Ramsdell bills at a rate of $650 per hour and offers evidence in the form of the Declarations of Joseph A. Garofolo, Shagha Balali, and Joseph A. Creitz confirming that Mr. Ramsdell's billing rate is consistent with rates for partner-level ERISA counsel of similar experience and expertise in the relevant Los Angeles community. (Garofolo Decl., ¶ 12; Balali Decl., ¶ 4; Creitz Decl., ¶ 14.) Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Ramsdell's hourly rate to be reasonable under the lodestar standard. Notably, as Plaintiff points out, Defendants do not challenge Mr. Ramsdell's billing rates. (Reply at 11.)

The Court finds the total hours sought, however, to be excessive. Plaintiff argues that she should be awarded not only fees associated with bringing the instant Motion, but also fees associated with the meet and confer process as well as preparing for and participating in the Court's required pre-motion conference procedure. The billing records documenting Mr. Ramsdell's time devoted to the discovery dispute indicate that of the 24.70 hours billed between January 7, 2022 and February 23, 2022, 15.50 hours were devoted to drafting and preparing the Motion. (See Ramsdell Decl., Ex. Q.) The remaining 9.2 hours were for work associated with meet and confer correspondence with defense counsel and/or preparing for and participating in the Court's required pre-motion telephonic conference. (Id.)

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) refers to “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Plaintiff points to Dickinson v. Fronzen Foods, Inc. v. FPS Food Process Sols. Corp., 2021 WL 2444157 (D. Idaho June 15, 2021) as supporting the ability to recover attorneys' fees relating to meet-and-confer efforts under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) in addition to fees incurred in drafting the discovery motion. (Motion at 11.) But courts in this district have held under Rule 37(a)(5) that “only the time expended ... in actually preparing the moving papers here is compensable.” Berryhill v. Johnson, No. SACV 11-1468-AG (RNBx), 2012 WL 13020328, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2012) (“Berryhill”) (declining to compensate plaintiff for time expended in connection with meet and confer efforts). The Court also finds persuasive the reasoning in Sandoval v. Yeter, another decision from this district, where the court declined to award fees for billing entries reflecting “tasks [attorney] would have done anyway to attempt to resolve the dispute.” Sandoval v. Yeter, No. CV 18-867-CBM (JPRx), 2019 WL 7905731, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (citing Berryhill).

This Court's discovery procedures require all parties to participate in a pre-motion telephonic discovery conference with the Court before filing any motion to compel. See http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-karen-l-stevenson. The purpose of this requirement is to avoid unnecessary and expensive motion practice whenever possible. Because this conference and the meet and confer required prior to the conference in order for the parties to submit a brief joint email outlining their dispute for the Court are required of both parties, whether or not any motion is ever filed, the attorney time spent preparing for and participating in the Court's pre-motion procedure is not time attributable to “bringing the motion,” as no motion may even ensue from the conference. Furthermore, the obligation to meet and confer before filing any motion is established by Local Rule 7-3.

Thus, the Court declines to award Plaintiff attorneys' fees incurred for 9.2 hours of Mr. Ramsdell's time for billing entries that reflect time devoted to meet and confer efforts or the required pre-motion conference. As a result, the Court reduces the total allowable attorneys' fees by $5,980 (9.2 hrs. x $650/hr = 5,980.00) and results in a lodestar amount of $16,705.00 pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A). However, the Court still finds this figure high considering Plaintiff's own uncooperative conduct in this discovery dispute and the nature of the work needed to bring this straightforward fee motion. Accordingly, the Court reduces the lodestar figure by 20% for a total award of $13,364.00. This amount, when added to the allowed costs of $3,841.00, results in a total award to Plaintiff of $17,205.00.

B. The Unredacted Plan Documents Regarding Other Claims are Discoverable

*8 The Court is persuaded, in light of the claims and defenses at issue in this ERISA action regarding the administration and interpretation of the Plan, that the documents identified as TWDC00000160-195, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, and 288-300 are relevant and proportionate to the needs of the case insofar as Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants failed “to apply the provisions of the Plan consistently to employees who have been terminated by Disney subsequent to the mergence.” (Motion at 12.) Further, the information appears to be responsive to Request No. 18 of Plaintiff's RFPs to the Administrative Committee.

Defendants redacted certain information from the documents that relate to the administration and interpretation of the Plan for other beneficiaries. Further, Defendants argue that they have a fiduciary obligation to protect the privacy interests of third-parties who are not part of this lawsuit. (Oppo. at 2-3.) However, on March 24, 2022, the Court entered a robust Stipulated Protective Order that can adequately protect sensitive information of non-parties that may be reflected in these documents. (See Dkt. No. 96.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's request that Defendants be compelled to produce unredacted versions of documents identified as TWDC00000160-195, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, and 288-300, is GRANTED in part, with the qualification, as the Court emphasized at the hearing, that personally identifying information concerning individual non-party Plan beneficiaries, including names and addresses, may remain redacted.

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders that:

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Plaintiff did not give a reason why he was unavailable on December 17, 2022.

It appears that Plaintiff sought to force Defendants' depositions in the final days of the discovery period but did not want to give Defendants a reason to deem their late-served written discovery requests timely. While Defendants sought to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions unless it could extract an extension of the discovery cut-off. As the Court noted at the hearing, a pox on both these houses! Indeed, the record suggests that both parties' conduct in the closing days of the initial discovery period was less than cooperative and inconsistent with Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that the rules be “construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).