*1 On September 14, 2018, the court conducted a status conference and hearing by telephone on motions for protective orders filed by the parties and certain motions collateral to them. Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (“PETA”) appeared by counsel Brian W. Lewis, Caitlin Hawks, and Asher Smith. Defendants Timothy L. Stark and Melisa D. Stark appeared pro se. The corporate defendant, Wildlife In Need and Wildlife In Deed, Inc., is not represented by counsel and therefore did not appear. The court's rulings and reasons for its rulings were made on the record and are as follows.

1. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order

The defendants, at Dkt. 143, seek an order that PETA is not entitled to discovery and all discovery should be halted as an improper fishing expedition. The motion (Dkt. 143) is DENIED. The court has already ruled that the defendants must respond to discovery, has set deadlines that have come and gone, has made rulings regarding the waiver of certain objections to discovery, and has denied an earlier motion for protective order seeking to stay all discovery.

2. PETA's Motion to Strike

PETA's motion (Dkt. 145) to strike the defendants’ motion for protective order as to any relief requested by the corporate defendant is DENIED as MOOT. Although the court agrees with PETA that the corporate defendant cannot seek relief because it does not have counsel,[1] the court resolved the motion for protective order on its merits because Mr. and Mrs. Stark were permitted to seek relief for themselves.

3. PETA's Motion for Emergency Hearing

PETA's motion (Dkt. 156) for emergency hearing on its motion for protective order and for immediate relief is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted to the extent that the court set the telephone hearing on short notice but is denied to the extent it seeks relief regarding the Facebook post, which is discussed below.

4. PETA's Motion for Protective Order

PETA's motion (Dkt. 149) asks the court to enter an order to prohibit the public disclosure of the identity of an alleged confidential informant because it is “confidential business information” or a “trade secret.” Its later-filed motion for emergency hearing states that the defendants figured out for themselves (or “guessed”) the identity of the alleged confidential informant. Defendant Timothy Stark then made a post to Facebook (on his own behalf and perhaps on behalf of the other defendants) about learning this person's identity and suspecting him of interfering in Wildlife's care and treatment of animals. The post includes an unredacted copy of the person's Indiana driver's license. Mr. Stark's post attracted many comments by Facebook users—some very nasty and threatening in tone about the identified person, some critical of the posting of the driver's license, some inquisitive and critical about Wildlife's husbandry practices, some laudatory about Wildlife's facility and animal treatment, some extremely critical of PETA, and all of it representative of the kinds of commentary (whether offensive, banal, thoughtful, run-off-at-the-mouth musings, opinions, or plain nonsense) the public puts out on Facebook about a gamut of topics.

*2 Timothy Stark's post, or at least the unredacted driver's license, has been removed from Facebook, according to the parties. Mr. Stark says it was removed without his consent, and he believes that Facebook removed it.

The motion for protective order to prohibit public disclosure of identity and request for additional relief to require removal of the post contained in the motion for emergency hearing are DENIED. There is no showing that Mr. Stark (or any defendant) learned of the identity of the person through illicit or improper means. The identity is not a trade secret; it's not even secret or confidential, because the defendants determined identity from information in the public domain or which was already known to them. No applicable privilege has been identified. The court has not been provided with any authority that would permit it to forbid the defendants from sharing information that they obtained in the public domain. There has been no showing that would allow the court to impose a prior restraint on lawful expression. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461-62 (7th Cir. 2015).

As the court explained, however, it is not condoning or approving Mr. Stark's post. Assertions he publishes could subject him to liability in other litigation. The court also will be vigilant in this litigation to protect against witness intimidation or tampering, but there has been no showing at this point that the defendants have engaged in misconduct for the purpose of influencing or preventing testimony in this case.

For the foregoing reasons and those stated on the record during the September 14, 2018 hearing, the court DENIES the motions at Dkts. 143, 145, 149, and 156, except that it granted the request at Dkt. 156 for an expedited hearing.

So ORDERED.

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record by email through the court's ECF system

Via United States mail:

3320 Jack Teeple Road

Charlestown, IN 47111

A corporate defendant must be represented by counsel and cannot seek relief or defend against any relief sought by its opponent except through a lawyer who has entered an appearance on its behalf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[C]orporations must appear by counsel or not at all.”)