I. INTRODUCTION

*1 Before the Court are two requests by Plaintiffs for sanctions against Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Section 1927”), the Court's inherent powers, and Central District of California Local Civil Rule (“Local Rule”) 83-7.

The first sanctions request is brought in connection with Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File Four Discovery Motions, and Motion to Modify the Scheduling Orders (“First Leave Motion”). (First Leave Mot., ECF No. 256.) In support of the First Leave Motion, Plaintiffs filed the Declaration of Michael A. Slater in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File Four Discovery Motions, and Motion to Modify the Scheduling Orders (“Slater First Leave Declaration”) (Slater First Leave Decl., ECF No. 256-1, at 1–10[1]) and its accompanying Exhibits A through BB (“Plaintiffs' First Leave Exhibits”) (Pls.' First Leave Exs. A–BB, ECF No. 256-1, at 11–237). In response to the First Leave Motion, Defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Leave to File Four Discovery Motions, and Modify the Scheduling Orders (“First Leave Opposition”). (First Leave Opp'n, ECF No. 258.) Together with their First Leave Opposition, Defendants filed the Declaration of Timothy Donahue in Opposition to Motion for Cell Phone Inspection (“Donahue Cell Phone Declaration”).[2] (Donahue Cell Phone Decl., ECF No. 258-1.) Plaintiffs then filed Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File Four Discovery Motions, and Motion to Modify Scheduling Orders (“First Leave Reply”). (First Leave Reply, ECF No. 260.) In support of the First Leave Reply, Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Declaration of Michael A. Slater in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File Four Discovery Motions, and Motion to Modify the Scheduling Orders (“Slater Supplemental First Leave Declaration”). (Slater Suppl. First Leave Decl., ECF No. 259.)

The second sanctions request is brought in connection with Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Entity Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“Second Leave Motion”). (Second Leave Mot., ECF No. 280.) In support of the Second Leave Motion, Plaintiffs filed the Declaration of Michael A. Slater in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Entity Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“Slater Second Leave Declaration”) (Slater Second Leave Decl., ECF No. 280-1, at 1–7) and its accompanying Exhibits A through K (“Plaintiffs' Second Leave Exhibits”) (Pls.' Second Leave Exs. A–K, ECF No. 280-1, at 8–77). In response to the Second Leave Motion, Defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel Responses from Entity Defendants, Set One (“Second Leave Opposition”). (Second Leave Opp'n, ECF No. 286.) In support of their Second Leave Opposition, Defendants filed the Declaration of Timothy Donahue in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File (“Donahue Second Leave Declaration”) (Donahue Second Leave Decl., ECF No. 286-1, at 1–6) and its accompanying Exhibit A (“Defendants' Second Leave Exhibit A”) (Defs.' Second Leave Ex. A, ECF No. 286-1, at 8–10). Plaintiffs then filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Entity Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“Second Leave Reply”). (Second Leave Reply, ECF No. 290.) In support of the Second Leave Reply, Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Declaration of Michael A. Slater in Support of Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Compel Entity Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“Slater Supplemental Second Leave Declaration”). (Slater Suppl. Second Leave Decl., ECF No. 290-1.)

*2 The Court previously ruled on the substantive portions of the First and Second Leave Motions, but deferred its ruling on the sanctions requested therein. (ECF Nos. 274, 315.) This Order resolves the two pending sanctions requests.

Upon review of the papers filed by the parties, the Court concludes that a hearing is not necessary and that the sanctions requests in each of the First Leave Motion and Second Leave Motion are suitable for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the two sanctions requests.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. Plaintiffs' Allegations

This case is proceeding on the basis of the Complaint, filed by Plaintiffs RG Abrams Insurance and Robin Goltsman (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on February 20, 2020 (Compl., ECF No. 1), and four counter-claims as follows: Abrams's counter-claim against Robin Goltsman and RG Abrams Insurance (collectively, “Counter-Defendants”), filed April 22, 2020 (ECF No. 19); Rinelli's and Mills's counter-claim against Counter-Defendants, filed June 12, 2020 (ECF No. 23); Wooten's and Armstrong's Counter-Claim against Counter-Defendants, filed June 12, 2020 (ECF No. 24); and Law Office of C.R. Abrams's and Rinelli Law Group's counter-claim against Counter-Defendants and Core Seminars, filed December 13, 2021 (ECF No. 282). The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on January 12, 2021. (ECF Nos. 71–73.)

The allegations of the Complaint are presented in great detail in the December 28, 2020 Order of Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman (ECF No. 70) and, because of their length, need not be repeated here. For purposes of the First and Second Leave Motions, the Court summarizes the relevant allegations as follows:[3] Plaintiff Robin Goltsman and Defendant Christopher R. Abrams entered into a business relationship in the year 2000. (Compl. 6–7.) Ten years later, they restructured the business into two separate business entities that, by 2019, proved to be a less than harmonious arrangement. (Id. at 7.) The businesses were again restructured and Goltsman hired some of the employees from the original business and Abrams hired the others. (Id. at 8–10.) While Goltsman was out of town in December 2019, Abrams, together with his and Goltsman's employees—Sarah Rinelli, Jack R. Mills, Robin Armstrong, and Cynthia Wooten—(together “Individual Defendants”) took Goltsman's client database, her marketing software, and her computer in order to start their own business. (Id. at 10.) This business eventually was divided into two businesses, The Law Offices of CR Abrams and Rinelli Law Group (“Entity Defendants”).[4] On this basis, Plaintiffs bring claims of violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)), and a number of related state law claims against the Individual Defendants and the Entity Defendants. (Compl. 1, 11–20.)

*3 The Court does not summarize the allegations contained in the four Counter-Claims as they bear no relevance to the sanctions requests in the First and Second Leave Motions.

B. The Two Sanctions Requests

A brief review of the docket in this case reveals an extraordinary—if not alarming—history of discovery disputes dating back to November 2020. (See ECF No. 55.) Despite three generous extensions of the discovery cut-off date totaling seventeen months (see ECF Nos. 107, 159, 170), eight informal discovery conferences and related hearings (see ECF Nos. 95, 101, 104–06, 111, 113–15, 139, 157, 162, 173, 187), a revision of the pre-filing meet-and-confer process providing step-by-step instructions, necessitated by the parties' strained and unproductive relationship (see ECF Nos. 115, 139), two discovery status conferences to monitor discovery progress (see ECF Nos. 73, 187), eight motions to compel for which a total of 1,573 pages were filed (ECF Nos. 55, 61, 123, 126, 127, 140, 145, 148, 176, 200) and for which the Court has issued eight orders totaling 239 written pages (ECF Nos. 70, 134, 146, 156, 161, 182, 189, 248), the parties still were unable to complete discovery within the October 1, 2021 discovery cut-off date (twenty months after the filing of the Complaint). This generated a series of eleventh-hour filings that included ex parte applications for leave to file post-cut-off discovery motions (ECF Nos. 169, 218, 219, 223) and a request for reconsideration of their denials (ECF Nos. 227, 230), culminating in the filing of the instant First and Second Leave Motions.

Through the First Leave Motion, Plaintiffs sought leave to file the following four proposed discovery motions: (1) a motion to compel an inspection of the computer devices of Rinelli and Mills (First Leave Motion 34–165); (2) a motion to compel the Individual Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents, Set Three (id. at 167–221); (3) a motion to compel the inspection of the Individual Defendants' cell phone devices (id. at 223–315); and (4) a motion to compel additional depositions of the Individual Defendants (id. at 317–413). (Id. at 7–17.) The First Leave Motion also sought an extension of the discovery cut-off date.[5] (Id. at 18–19.) Through the Second Leave Motion, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a fifth proposed discovery motion: a motion to compel supplemental responses of the Entity Defendants to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. (See generally Second Leave Mot.)

*4 As to both the First and Second Leave Motions, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to an award of sanctions pursuant to Section 1927, the Court's inherent power, and Local Rule 83-7, all because Defendants and their counsel acted in bad faith and willfully abused the judicial process. (First Leave Mot. 26–32; First Leave Reply 21–23; Second Leave Mot. 19–25; Second Leave Reply 14.) As sanctions, they seek the attorneys' fees Plaintiffs incurred in the bringing of the First Leave Motion ($8,015.00) and supporting it with the First Leave Reply ($4,025.00), as well as the attorneys' fees incurred in bringing the Second Leave Motion ($2,835.00) and supporting it with the Second Leave Reply ($1,260.00), for a total sanctions request of $16,135.00. (First Leave Mot. 30; First Leave Reply 22; Second Leave Mot. 23; Second Leave Reply 14.)

The undersigned granted the First and Second Leave Motions, permitting the filing of the five proposed discovery motions. (ECF Nos. 274, 315.) However, in the interest of moving the discovery forward in an efficient manner, the undersigned deferred the ruling on the sanctions requests in each of the two motions to a later date. (ECF Nos. 274 at 2; 315 at 4.) That date is now.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts are empowered to levy sanctions by many sources. In the Central District of California, those sources include: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 11, which addresses signed writings filed with the court (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); (2) Section 1927, which addresses attorney conduct that “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplies the proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 1927); (3) Local Rule 37-4, which addresses the failure of counsel to comply with the District's local rules pertaining to discovery (C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-4); (4) Local Rule 83-7, which addresses the failure of a party or its counsel to comply with any of the District's local rules (C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-7); and (5) the court's inherent power, which addresses the willful or bad faith conduct of litigation (see Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2001)). As Plaintiffs seek sanctions pursuant to Section 1927 and the Court's inherent power in the First and Second Leave Motions, and also pursuant to Local Rule 83-7[6] in the Second Leave Motion, the Court reviews each request in turn.

Section 1927 provides that any attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Thus, Section 1927 sanctions are limited to the conduct of an attorney, not a party. See, e.g., Kanbar v. Kaufman, No. C 07-2123 VRW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148215, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009) (finding that declaration regarding the subjective bad faith of a party rather than of the party's attorney not relevant to Section 1927 sanctions). Because Section 1927 punishes the multiplication of proceedings, the initial pleadings are beyond its reach. Willis v. City of Oakland, 231 F.R.D. 597, 598 (C.D. Cal. 2005). However, Section 1927 applies broadly to unnecessary filings and tactics once a lawsuit has begun. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996). Proceedings subject to Section 1927 sanctions include not only the bringing of motions, but also the “failure[ ] to withdraw moot motions.” Mostowfi v. 12 Telecom Int'l, Inc., No. C-03-5784 VRW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62075, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2005).

*5 For Section 1927 sanctions to apply, the court must make a finding of recklessness, Fink, 239 F.3d at 993, and “subjective bad faith,” In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has explained:

Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Recklessness has been found where an attorney's misleading statements to the court prompted a mistrial and thereby multiplied the proceedings unnecessarily. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, recklessness has been found where an attorney raised frivolous legal arguments. Vedatech, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Nos. C 04-1249 VRW, 04-1818 VRW, 04-1403 VRW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45095, at *46–47 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2005). However, recklessness has not been found where there is no evidence that the attorney had reason to know of errors in their filings and acted reasonably thereafter to correct the error. See, e.g., Pines v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. SA CV 89 - 631 AHS (RWRx), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6972, at *18–19 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1992) (finding sanctions were not warranted where attorneys withdrew declarations with errors from consideration once counsel became aware of their defects).

A court also may impose sanctions under its inherent authority. It long has been established that a court's inherent powers “derive from the absolute need of a trial judge to maintain order and preserve the dignity of the court.” Zambrano v. Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)). However, “because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citations omitted).

A court's inherent power “is not limited by overlapping statutes or rules.” Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 813 F.3d 1233, 1243 (9th Cir. 2016). Indeed, “ ‘the inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49). Thus, “[w]hile Rule 37 also provides a method to sanction a party for failing to comply with discovery rules, it is not the exclusive means for addressing the adequacy of a discovery response.” Id. (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49). Where, in its informed discretion, the court determines that “neither the statute nor the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” Id. at 1244 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50).

Because “inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). Thus, courts may not exercise these powers without a “specific finding of bad faith.” United States v. Stoneberger, 805 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986). Toward this goal, the Ninth Circuit has drawn the contours of the conduct that merits sanctions under the court's inherent powers. In In re Keegan, the Ninth Circuit held that, before awarding inherent powers sanctions, the court must make an explicit finding that counsel's conduct “constitute[ed] or [was] tantamount to bad faith[.]”. In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In re Keegan stated that while recklessness may be sufficient for Section 1927 sanctions, bad faith is required for sanctions under the court's inherent power. Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “a finding of bad faith does not require that the legal and factual basis for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorney's fees.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

*6 Applying these tenets, bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith has been found in a variety of litigation abuses. Bad faith has been found in conduct that delays or disrupts the litigation, such as a party's failure to produce documents despite their Rule 26 and 34 obligations, and making misrepresentations in the context of the discovery disputes. Haeger, 813 F.3d at 1244–45. In addition, bad faith has been found where “a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices” of falsifying evidence and continuously deceiving its counsel, opposing party, and the court. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 856, 869–72 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995)). Similarly, bad faith has been found where a claim in a complaint is filed without factual support and the attorneys refuse to dismiss the claim. Mai Sys. Corp. v. Walbert Enters., Nos. 95-55706, 96-55148, 96-55550, 95-56275, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13897, at *8–9 (9th Cir. June 9, 1997).

Conduct tantamount to bad faith has been found where counsel made reckless and knowing misrepresentations to the court and introduced evidence in violation of evidentiary rules and prior orders. B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1107–08. Similarly, conduct tantamount to bad faith has been found where a party acts only recklessly, but for an improper purpose, such as influencing proceedings in one case to gain tactical advantage in another, even where the act involves making a truthful statement or interposing a non-frivolous objection. In re Itel Sec. Litig.l, 791 F.2d 672, 674–75 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom Bader v. Itel Corp., 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). Likewise, conduct tantamount to bad faith has been found where an attorney recklessly misrepresents facts and law with the purpose of influencing proceedings. Fink, 239 F.3d at 994. Conduct tantamount to bad faith also has been found where an attorney “ ‘knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent[.]’ ”. Primus Auto., 115 F.3d at 648 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

However, the requirement of bad faith sets a high bar that does not countenance an award of sanctions for lesser conduct. For example, mere recklessness, without more—such as filing a complaint without conducting a reasonable inquiry—does not rise to the level of bad faith. In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436–37. Nor does inadvertence, such as an oversight in complying with enrollment requirements to practice before a district court. Zambrano, 885 F.2d at 1484–85. Nor does carelessness, such as an unintentional inaccurate description of a particular filing. Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628–29 (9th Cir. 1993). Nor does ignorance or negligence, such as filing a complaint without adequate legal basis. Barber, 146 F.3d at 711.

Local Rule 83-7 provides:

C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-7. Thus, Local Rule 83-7 expressly contemplates that different levels of willfulness will result in different types of sanctions, monetary or otherwise.

The imposition of sanctions rests in the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g., Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding Section 1927 sanctions); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Section 1927 sanctions). However, sanctions under Section 1927 or the court's inherent power must be tailored to the particular conduct at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Glodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610– 11 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Section 1927 only authorizes the taxing of excess costs arising from an attorney's unreasonable and vexatious conduct; it does not authorize imposition of sanctions in excess of costs reasonably incurred because of such conduct. Similarly, cases that have considered the district court's inherent power to sanction attorneys for litigating in bad faith have related such sanctions to the amount of fees incurred by the opposing party[.]” (citations omitted)). In Chambers, the Supreme Court found proper the assessment of attorneys' fees as a sanction. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55. Other courts have considered sanctions including assessment of attorney's fees and costs, disqualification of counsel, or monetary penalties. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 1985).

*7 Monetary sanctions may not be imposed without notice, an opportunity to respond, and a hearing. See Miranda v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Nor may attorney disbarment or other attorney disciplinary action be imposed as a sanction without these procedural protections. Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained that these procedural requirements are necessary to ensure that:

Id. at 522–23 (citation omitted). However, an oral or evidentiary hearing is not required. Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). An opportunity to fully brief the issue satisfies any due process requirement in this context. Id. (citing Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 268 (10th Cir. 1995)).

Finally, “[t]he imposition of sanctions requires a statement of reasons for the district court's actions, including the need for the particular sanctions imposed.” Couveau v. Am. Airlines, 218 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1078) (per curiam) (citing G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.3d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1990) (“If the district court ultimately imposes sanctions, detailed findings are necessary to identify the objectionable conduct and provide for meaningful appellate review.”)).

B. Sanctions Analysis

In both the First and Second Leave Motions, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants and their counsel should be sanctioned under Section 1927 and the Court's inherent power—and in the Second Leave Motion, pursuant to Rule 83-7—because they acted with subjective bad faith, willfully abused the judicial process, and “created roadblocks at every turn.” (First Leave Mot. 26–30; Second Leave Mot. 19–23.) Plaintiffs point to eight acts of purported litigation improprieties as evidence that sanctions are warranted against Defendants and their counsel: (1) providing deficient discovery responses to all of Plaintiffs' interrogatories and document requests, which in turn required motions to compel in order to resolve the resulting discovery disputes; (2) appearing for deposition only upon a court order and, even then, complying with their counsel's instructions not to answer; (3) refusing to participate in discovery from September 2020 to the present; (4) failing to comply with discovery orders issued by the Court; (5) failing to meet and confer in good faith with respect to two of the five discovery motions by claiming that their untimely objections to the Rule 34 cell phone inspections were timely and making frivolous arguments in response to Plaintiffs' request for additional deposition time; (6) delaying Plaintiffs' ability to conduct discovery as to the Entity Defendants by misrepresenting their legal status and amenability to suit for more than a year; (7) failing to meet and confer in good faith with respect to the First Leave Motion by providing no meaningful responses to Plaintiffs' legal arguments and “hurling irrelevant arguments and ad hominem attacks at Plaintiffs' counsel”; and (8) failing to meet and confer in good faith with respect to the Second Leave Motion by refusing to stipulate to the filing of the fifth discovery motion despite the fact that the discovery sought from the Entity Defendants was delayed by the above misrepresentation. (First Leave Mot. 26–30; Second Leave Mot. 19– 23.)

*8 Defendants do not respond to Plaintiffs' request for sanctions under Section 1927, the court's inherent power, or Local Rule 83-7. (See generally First Leave Opp'n; Second Leave Opp'n.) Rather, they argue only that sanctions against them are not warranted under Rule 37(a)(5) because Plaintiffs' meet-and-confer efforts were “done entirely in bad faith.” (First Leave Opp'n 8; Second Leave Opp'n 11.)[7] But this argument is of no avail here for two reasons. First, Rule 37(a)(5) permits the award of sanctions in connection with only motions to compel discovery, not with motions for leave to file discovery motions such as the First and Second Leave Motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Second, the Court separately has ruled on Plaintiffs' requests for Rule 37(a)(5) sanctions in connection with the five discovery motions. (See ECF Nos. 283, 287, 306, 309, 315.)

Exercising its sanction authority with the required restraint, the Court will let pass Defendants' lack of opposition to the sanctions requested here and, instead, will review the sanctions request on its merits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the evidence offered by Plaintiffs does not support their request for sanctions under any of Plaintiffs' three theories.

As a starting point, Plaintiffs do not distinguish between the acts of Defendants and those of Defendants' counsel as the predicate for Section 1927 sanctions. (First Leave Mot. 26–30; Second Leave Mot. 19–23.) In that only an attorney's conduct is sanctionable under Section 1927, the Court first must determine which of the seven complained of acts is attributable to Defendants' counsel. Based only upon Plaintiffs' description, and without the benefit of any evidence from either side on this issue, the Court concludes that the first through sixth acts—all involving Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' discovery and the meet-and-confer obligations related thereto—are attributable to Defendants, and only the seventh and eighth acts—failure to meet and confer in good faith in connection with the First and Second Leave Motions—could be attributed to Defendants' counsel.[8]

*9 But even these acts do not amount to conduct that unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings here, as required by Section 1927. As to the First Leave Motion, Plaintiffs note that the parties met and conferred pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 on “October 15 (email), October 18 (email), October 19 (email), October 20, 2021 (email and telephonic).” (First Leave Mot. 2; see also Slater First Leave Decl. ¶¶ 3–5; Pls.' First Leave Ex. A). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' own evidence supports a finding that Defendants' counsel actively met and conferred as to the First Leave Motion. But it does not support a finding that any conduct by Defendants' counsel caused Plaintiffs' counsel to engage in more conferences than necessary to, as required by Local Rule 7-3, either resolve the issue or determine that an impasse has been reached. To the contrary, the evidence shows that it was Plaintiffs' counsel who pursued discovery conferences beyond the single session required by Local Rule 7-3 (C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-3 (“The conference shall take place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion.”) (emphasis added).) (See Slater First Leave Decl. ¶ 4; Pls.' First Leave Ex. A) (Plaintiffs' first email on October 15; Plaintiffs' follow-up email of October 18; Defendants' response of October 18; Plaintiffs' response of October 18; Defendants' response of October 19; Plaintiffs' phone call of October 20).) While Plaintiffs' counsel's extraordinary efforts to resolve the dispute without motion practice are laudable, Plaintiffs cannot now blame Defendants' counsel for multiplying the proceedings.

Arguing that Defendants' counsel's meet-and-confer efforts pertaining to the First Leave Motion were “frivolous” and provide “the best evidence of orchestrated delay,” Plaintiffs describe the exchange as follows:

(First Leave Mot. 28.) This passage, however, finds no support in the evidence. The Court's review of the meet-and-confer letters pertaining to the First Leave Motion reveals that, while the two counsel indisputably have dissimilar communication and advocacy styles, there were no ad hominem attacks by Defendants' counsel in this exchange. (See Pls.' First Leave Ex. A.) There were, to be sure, disagreements regarding the law, and certainly some of the exchange fell below the standard of civility expected in this District. (See id.) See Central District of California Civility and Professionalism Guidelines (last amended January 10, 2022) (“District Civility Guidelines”) at Preamble (last amended Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/ attorneys/admissions/civility-and-professionalism-guidelines (noting that members of the bar are encouraged “to act toward each other with the dignity and civility that our profession demands.”). However, the Court is not persuaded that the evidence here supports a finding that the meet-and-confer exchange pertaining to the First Leave Motion is properly characterized as reckless or based upon subjective bad faith.

As to the Second Leave Motion, Plaintiffs note that the parties met and conferred pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 on “November 10 (email), November 12 (emails), November 14 (email), November 15 (email) and November 16 (telephonic).” (Second Leave Mot. 2; see also Slater Second Leave Decl. ¶¶ 9–13; Pls.' Second Leave Exs. J, K.) Again, Plaintiffs' own evidence supports a finding that Defendants' counsel actively met and conferred as to the Second Leave Motion. But, again, it does not support a finding that any conduct by Defendants' counsel caused Plaintiffs' counsel to engage in more conferences than necessary to either resolve the issue or determine an impasse had been reached. And yet again, the evidence also demonstrates that it was Plaintiffs' counsel's efforts to resolve the issues that resulted in more than the single required Rule 7-3 meet-and-confer session. (See Slater Second Leave Decl., ¶¶ 9–13; Pls.' Second Leave Exs. J, K).) (Plaintiffs' first email of November 10; Defendants' response of November 12; Plaintiffs' response of November 12; Plaintiffs' follow-up email of November 14; Plaintiffs' phone call of November 15; Plaintiffs' follow-up email of November 19).) As with the First Leave Motion, Plaintiffs cannot blame their own counsel's self-imposed—albeit extraordinary—efforts on Defendants' counsel.

*10 Contending that Defendants' counsel's meet-and-confer efforts pertaining to the Second Leave Motion are “the clearest examples of defense counsel/ Defendants' subjective bad-faith and abuse of the judicial process and discovery procedures,” Plaintiffs describe the meet-and-confer exchange as follows:

(Second Leave Mot. 21.) This passage, while consistent with the parties' written meet-and-confer exchange (Slater Second Leave Decl. ¶¶ 9–13; Pls.' Second Leave Exs. J, K), also does not support the finding of recklessness and subjective bad faith that is required for Section 1927 sanctions. At most, it shows that Mr. Basinger did not provide a response to Plaintiffs' argument. While, indeed, this conduct disappointingly falls below the civility standards of this District, see District Civility Guidelines § 8 (“Before filing a motion with the court, [attorneys] will engage in more than a mere pro forma discussion of its purpose in an effort to resolve the issue with opposing counsel.”), and without doubt created the need for the filing of the Second Leave Motion, it does not rise to the level of conduct punishable under Section 1927. Although Plaintiffs characterize the exchange as a showing of Defendants' bad faith, the exchange just as easily can be characterized as a disagreement regarding whether Plaintiffs' “fact”—that the Entity Defendants were not parties to this lawsuit until after the October 1 discovery motion filing deadline—would support the granting of the Second Leave Motion. Without more, the Court is unwilling to conclude that Defendants' counsel acted recklessly or based upon subjective bad faith in this meet-and-confer exchange.

*11 To the extent Plaintiffs rely on Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2015), for the proposition that the misrepresentation about the legal status of the Entity Defendants itself is sanctionable under Section 1927 because it constitutes the knowing and reckless raising of a frivolous argument (Second Leave Mot. 19–20), such reliance is misplaced. In Blixseth, the conduct that was found to be frivolous, and sanctioned as such, was accusations made by counsel that they could not back up “with even a shred of credible evidence,” involving “demonstrably inaccurate statements,” which the court found to be “at best, a distortion of the record” and “an unreasonable and irresponsible breach of [the attorney's] duty of good faith and candor in dealing with the judiciary.” Blixseth, 796 F.3d at 1007–08 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the alleged misrepresentation that is the basis of Plaintiffs' accusation—that the entities named The Law Office of C.R. Abrams, LLC and Rinelli Law Group do not exist—technically was not a misrepresentation as these entities actually are named The Law Office of C.R. Abrams, P.C. (see ECF No. 151-1 at 37–38) and Rinelli Law Group, P.C., see Business Search – Results, California Secretary of State, https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/CBS/SearchResults?filing=&SearchType=CORP &SearchCriteria=Rinelli+Law+Group&SearchSubType=Keyword, (last visited Feb. 8, 2022) (results of search for “Rinelli Law Group”).[10] While the Court does not endorse this type of gamesmanship, it is unable to make the leap to a Section 1927 finding of reckless frivolousness, as Plaintiffs appear to seek. Indeed, Judge Aenlle-Rocha already declined to award sanctions under Section 1927 and the Court's inherent power for this very conduct—a request made by Plaintiffs in connection with their opposition to Defendants' motion to quash service of summons on the Entity Defendants. (ECF Nos. 201 at 16–18; 245.)

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request for Section 1927 sanctions against Defendants' counsel.

Plaintiffs seek sanctions under the Court's inherent power against Defendants and their counsel on the basis of the eight acts detailed above. (First Leave Mot. 26–32; Second Leave Mot. 19–25.) However, as also noted above, the first through sixth acts complained of relate to the discovery deficiencies that led to the filing of the five discovery motions, for which sanctions already have been considered and/or awarded. (See ECF Nos. 283, 287, 306, 309, 315.) This leaves only the seventh and eighth acts—the failure to meet and confer in good faith in connection with the First and Second Discovery Motions—as the basis for sanctions under the Court's inherent power.

As the Court has concluded above that Defendants' alleged failure to meet-and-confer in good faith was neither reckless nor based upon subjective bad faith, it is axiomatic that such conduct does not rise to the level of bad faith or improper purpose required for sanctions under the Court's inherent powers.

The Court recognizes that “sanctions are not to be lightly granted” and that the Court must be vigilant against the risk of chilling creative advocacy. Philips N. Am. LLC v. Kpi Healthcare, Inc., No. SACV 19-1765 JVS (JDEx), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163110, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). That this Court ultimately granted the First and Second Leave Motions does not render foregone the conclusion that Defendants acted in bad faith or for an improper purpose in opposing them. See id. at *10–11 (declining to find bad faith merely because the discovery motion ultimately was granted).

To the extent Plaintiffs rely on Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that the alleged misrepresentation about the legal status of the Entity Defendants itself is sanctionable under the Court's inherent power because it constitutes a willful abuse of the judicial process (Second Leave Mot. 19–20), such reliance is misplaced. In Gomez, the conduct that was found to constitute bad faith was the attorneys' receipt, continued knowing collection, and knowing use of attorney-client privileged communications, despite instructions from the state bar to send the documents to the court. Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1134. Finding that conduct to be a violation of the attorneys' “individual ethical and professional duty” that “[did] not pass the most lenient ethical ‘smell test,’ ” the court awarded sanctions under its inherent power. Id. Here, as noted above, the challenged representations technically do not appear to be misrepresentations at all and, in any event, did not involve the severe breaches of ethical and professional duties as found in Gomez. Again, while the Court does not countenance such conduct, it cannot find here that it rises to the high level of bad faith required for sanctions under its inherent power. Further, as noted above, Judge Aenlle-Rocha already has declined to award sanctions under his inherent power for this conduct.

*12 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request for sanctions under the Court's inherent power against Defendants or their counsel.

Through the Second Leave Motion, Plaintiffs seek sanctions under Local Rule 83-7, which, as stated above, allows for the imposition of sanctions against a party that violates any of the District's local rules. C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-7. (Second Leave Mot. 19–25.) However, Plaintiffs fail to specify what local rule Defendants have violated. To the extent Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' purported failure to meet and confer in good faith constitutes a violation of Local Rule 7-3, such argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, as stated above, the Court has found no evidence supporting the contention that Defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith in connection with the Second Leave Motion. Second, the failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3 does not, without more, justify sanctions. Rather, “the remedy in such a situation is for the motion to be ordered off calendar.” Philips, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163110, at *10.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request for sanctions under Local Rule 83-7 against Defendants or their counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' request for sanctions under the First and Second Leave Motions is DENIED.

Pinpoint citations in this Order refer to the page numbers appearing in the ECF-generated headers of the cited documents.

A comparison between the Donahue Cell Phone Declaration and the Donahue declaration filed by Defendants in support of their opposition to Plaintiff's motion to compel an inspection of Defendants' cell phone devices (ECF No. 278-2) reveals that they are not the same. Accordingly, the Court construes the Donahue Cell Phone Declaration as a mis-titled declaration in support of Defendants' First Leave Opposition and considers it here as such.

The Court summarizes the allegations and claims in the Complaint. In doing so, the Court neither opines on the veracity or merit of the allegations and claims, nor makes any findings of fact.

Much ink has been spilled and many resources have been dissipated on the correct names of the Entity Defendants; specifically, whether they are limited liability companies (“LLC”), professional corporations (“P.C.”), or something else. As described below, this dispute has bled into the Second Leave Motion as Plaintiffs contend that the motion was necessitated by, among other things, Defendants' counsel's alleged misrepresentation for more than one year about the legal form of the Entity Defendants as named in the Complaint and their respective amenability to suit, thus delaying the discovery that is the subject of the Second Leave Motion.

Because a request to modify the Scheduling Order is not within the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge (see 28 U.S.C. § 636), the Honorable Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha (the District Judge assigned to this case) bifurcated the First Leave Motion into (1) a request to modify the Scheduling Order, to be ruled upon by himself, and (2) a request for leave to file the four proposed discovery motions, to be ruled upon by the undersigned. (ECF No. 271.) Upon a finding of good cause, Judge Aenlle-Rocha modified the Scheduling Order and yet again graciously extended the discovery cut-off date (the date to hear discovery motions) for another eight months, to May 15, 2022. (Id. at 2.) Judge Aenlle-Rocha neither apportioned the sanctions request in the First Leave Motion between the request to modify the scheduling order and the request for leave to file the four discovery motions, nor ruled on it. (See generally id.)

In the Second Leave Motion, Plaintiffs also seek sanctions pursuant to Local Rule 37-4 for Defendants' “failure to comply or cooperate with [Local Rule] 37.” (Second Leave Mot. 19.) However, because Local Rule 37 describes the obligations of parties in connection with discovery motions, the Court does not consider that basis for sanctions here given that neither the First nor the Second Leave Motions are discovery motions.

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to sanctions against Plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1987 (First Leave Opp'n 9; Second Leave Opp'n 11–12), which the Court understands to be a typographical error; thus, the Court construes the request as one pursuant to Section 1927. However, the Court DENIES this request for two reasons. First, Defendants may not seek affirmative relief through their oppositions. Courts in this and other districts have concluded that a request for affirmative relief is not proper when raised for the first time in an opposition. See, e.g., Interworks Unlimited, Inc. v. Digital Gadgets, LLC, No. CV 17-04983 TJX (KSx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167149, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2019) (party responding to motion “cannot seek affirmative relief by way of an opposition brief”); Karma Auto. LLC v. Powersource LLC, No. CV 16-00530 TJH (MRWx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235557, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) (denying request for Section 1927 sanctions made in an opposition brief and citing Local Rule 6-1 for the proposition that courts may decline to rule on a request that is not brought as a properly noticed motion); Thomasson v. GC Servs. L.P., No. 05cv0940-LAB (CAB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54693, at *21 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2007) (“[T]he court rejects any discovery-related or other requests for affirmative relief Plaintiffs attempt to piggy-back on their Opposition as inappropriate, untimely, and obfuscating.”). Second, even if the request were properly before the Court, Defendants fail to provide any evidence regarding how Plaintiffs multiplied this or any proceedings, let alone did so recklessly, as required by Section 1927. (See generally First Leave Opp'n; Second Leave Opp'n.)

To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the act of misrepresenting the Entity Defendants' legal status and amenability to suit is attributable to Defendants' counsel, they fail to provide any evidence that Defendants' counsel acted without the consent or direction of Defendants. (See generally First Leave Mot.; Second Leave Mot.) While it appears that Defendant Abrams ultimately provided the correct information about the Entity Defendants at his deposition (see ECF No. 245 at 9–10), it is a bridge too far—at least in the absence of competent supporting evidence—to conclude that Defendants and their counsel were at odds with each other on this factual issue or legal strategy and/or that Defendants' counsel acted unilaterally. Indeed, in addressing this very issue, Judge Aenlle-Rocha attributed the misrepresentations to Defendants, not their counsel. (ECF No. 245 at 10 (“Accordingly, the record shows that Plaintiffs' failure to serve [the Entity Defendants] ... was caused in part by Defendants' conduct and representations.”).)

Despite Plaintiffs' repeated insistence (here and in other filings) that the October 1, 2021 cut-off date was the last day to file discovery motions rather than to hear them, this is incorrect. The October 1, 2021 cut-off date always has been the last day to hear discovery motions, except as to the extension through December 30, 2021 to hear the limited set of discovery motions pending as of that date. ECF Nos. 170 at 4; 209; 271 at 4 n.2 (“For the avoidance of doubt, the court clarifies that the September 9, 2021 order extended the deadline to hear or resolve all discovery motions that were pending as of September 9, 2021.... The order did not permit the filing of additional discovery motions after September 9, 2021, absent Magistrate Judge Audero's consent.”)

The Court takes judicial notice of Rinelli Law Group, P.C.'s records with the California Secretary of State. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); L'Garde, Inc. v. Raytheon Space & Airborne Sys., 805 F. Supp. 2d 932, 937–38 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (taking judicial notice of results of records searches on California Secretary of State website).