I. INTRODUCTION

*1 Before the Court is Counter-Defendant Robin Goltsman's Motion to Compel Counter-Claimants' Supplemental Reponses to Counter-Defendant's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“Motion”). (Mot., ECF No. 200.) The Motion was filed jointly by Counter-Defendant Robin Goltsman (“Goltsman”) and Counter-Claimants Christopher R. Abrams, Sarah Rinelli, Jack R. Mills, Cynthia Wooten, and Robin Armstrong (collectively “Counter-Claimants”), in the form of a Joint Stipulation as required by Central District of California Local Civil Rule (“Local Rule”) 37-2. C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-2. Through the Motion, Goltsman seeks an order compelling Counter-Claimants to supplement their responses to Goltsman's Requests for Production of Documents Set One (“RFP-1”), each as detailed below. (Mot. 3.)[1] Goltsman also seeks $2,784.00 as her reasonable expenses for bringing the Motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 37(a)(5)(A). (Id.)

In support of the Motion, Goltsman filed the Declaration of Drew M. Tate (“Tate Declaration”) (Tate Decl., ECF No. 200-1.) Missing from the Tate Declaration were the requests as propounded by Goltsman and the responses as served by Counter-Claimants. (See generally Tate Decl.) On October 15, 2021, the Court ordered Goltsman to amend the Tate Declaration to include the discovery requests and responses at issue in the Motion. (ECF No. 236.) On October 19, 2021, Goltsman filed the operative Amended Declaration of Drew M. Tate (“Amended Tate Declaration”) (Am. Tate Decl., ECF No. 238, at 1–6), and its accompanying Exhibits A through N (Goltsman's Ex. A (id. at 7–21); Ex. B (id. at 22–33); Ex. C (id. at 34–48); Ex. D (id. at 49–63); Ex. E (id. at 64–77); Ex. F (id. at 78–112); Ex. G (id. at 113–33); Ex. H (id. at 134–66); Ex. I (id. at 167–91); Ex. J (id. at 192–224); Ex. K (id. at 225–31); Ex. L (id. at 232–34); Ex. M (id. at 235–38); Ex. N (id. at 239–42)); Ex. O (id. at 243–45); Ex. P (id. at 246–48); Ex. Q (id. at 249–55); Ex. R (id. at 256–58); Ex. S (id. at 259–61); Ex. T (id. at 262–66); Ex. U (id. at 267–69); Ex. V (id. at 270–74); Ex. W (id. at 275–77); Ex. X (id. at 278–81).[2]

In support of their opposition to the Motion, Counter-Claimants filed the Declaration of Timothy Donahue (“Donahue Declaration”) (Donahue Decl., ECF No. 200-3, at 1–5), and its accompanying Exhibits 1 and 2 (X-Cls.' Ex. 1 (id. at 6–14); Ex. 2 (id. at 15–22)). In addition, Counter-Claimants filed an Objection to Declaration of Drew M. Tate (“Objection to Tate Declaration”). (Obj. to Tate Decl., ECF No. 200-4.) Counter-Claimants did not file objections to the operative Amended Tate Declaration.

*2 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds the Motion suitable for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons set forth below, Goltsman's Motion is GRANTED in its entirety.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Allegations

This case is proceeding on the basis of Plaintiff's Complaint, filed February 20, 2020 (“Complaint”) (Compl., ECF No. 1), and three counter-claims as follows: Abrams's counter-claim against Goltsman and Plaintiff RG Abrams Insurance (collectively, “Counter-Defendants”), filed April 22, 2020 (“Abrams Counter-Claim”) (Abrams X-Cl., ECF No. 19); Rinelli's and Mills's counter-claim against Counter-Defendants, filed June 12, 2020 (“Rinelli/Mills Counter-Claim”) (Rinelli/Mills X-Cl., ECF No. 23); and Wooten's and Armstrong's Counter-Claim against Counter-Defendants, filed June 12, 2020 (“Wooten/Armstrong Counter-Claim”) (Wooten/Armstrong X-Cl., ECF No. 24)—all filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on January 12, 2021. (ECF Nos. 71–73.)

The allegations of the Complaint are presented in great detail in the December 28, 2020 Order of Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman (ECF No. 70) and, because of their length, need not be repeated here. For purposes of this Motion, the Court summarizes the relevant allegations as follows:[3] Goltsman employed Abrams in her trust and estates business around the year 2000. (Complaint 6–7.) In or around 2010, Goltsman and Abrams restructured the business into two separate companies—RG Abrams Insurance and the CR Abrams Law Firm. (Id. at 7.) In 2016, Goltsman and Abrams hired Rinelli and Mills and again restructured the business which, by 2019, proved to be a less than harmonious arrangement. (Id. at 8–9.) Goltsman, along with Rinelli and Mills, started a separate business of pre-paid legal services without Abrams. (Id. at 9–10.) In December 2019, Golstman decided to downsize her business and laid off both Rinelli and Armstrong, who had worked for Goltsman as a legal secretary. (Id. at 10.) However, Goltsman paid Armstrong $5,000.00 to pick up and deliver her business mail while she was away from the office. (Id.) Goltsman told Mills and Wooten that she would continue to employ them. (Id.) While Goltsman was out of town in December 2019, Abrams, together with Rinelli, Mills, Armstrong, and Wooten (whom Goltsman believed were working for her), took Goltsman's client database, her marketing software, and her computer in order to start their own business. (Id. at 10.) On this basis, Goltsman brings claims of violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)), and a number of related state law claims. (Id. at 1, 11–20.)

In the Abrams Counter-Claim, Abrams generally alleges that Counter-Defendants disrupted his law office practice and stole information from him; that, in failing to repay him $115,950.00 owed to him by March 2017, Counter-Defendants breached an unspecified legal agreement with him; and that, on March 29, 2019, Goltsman punched, pushed, threatened, and struck him. (See generally Abrams X-Cl.) On this basis, Abrams brings state law claims of breach of contract, battery, and nuisance. (Id.)

*3 In the Rinelli/Mills Counter-Claim, Rinelli and Mills allege that they performed work for Counter-Defendants for three years through November 2019 (Rinelli as an employee, Mills not as an employee) and that they were not paid for their work and were not reimbursed a variety of expenses. (See generally Rinelli/Mills X-Cl.) On this basis, they bring a number of wage-and-hour claims and a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, all under California law. (Id.)

In the Armstrong/Wooten Counter-Claim, Armstrong and Wooten allege that they were employees of Counter-Defendants for a period of five years through November 2019 and that they were misclassified as exempt employees, were not paid all wages due them, and were not reimbursed a variety of expenses. (See generally Armstrong/Wooten X-Cl.) On this basis, they bring a number of wage-and-hour claims and a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, all under California law. (Id.)

B. The Discovery Dispute

On March 17, 2021, Goltsman served her RFP-1 on each of Rinelli, Mills, Wooten, and Armstrong. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 3; Goltsman's Exs. A–D,.) Their responses were due by April 16, 2021. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 5.) On March 22, 2021, Goltsman served her RFP-1 on Abrams. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 4; Goltsman's Ex. E.) His responses were due by April 21, 2021. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 5.)

Generally speaking, Goltsman's document requests to each Counter-Claimant seek documents that support the allegations in their respective counter-claims, documents related to the employment of Rinelli, Wooten, Mills, and Armstrong with Counter-Defendants Goltsman and RG Abrams Insurance, and documents relating to Counter-Claimants' damages.[4] (Mot. 5; Goltsman's Exs. A–E.)

Rinelli, Mills, Wooten, and Abrams served their responses to Goltsman's requests on April 16, 2021. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 6; Goltsman's Exs. F–I.) Armstrong served her responses to Goltsman's requests on June 8, 2021. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 7; Goltsman's Ex. J.)

Upon review of Counter-Claimants' responses, Goltsman identified the following deficiencies in Counter-Claimants' respective responses: (1) all contain the same paragraph of boilerplate objections; (2) the substantive responses are not compliant with the discovery rules in that they do not state whether the responding parties will produce documents in their possession, custody, and/or control; and (3) although responsive documents are identified, the documents have not been produced. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶¶ 6–12; see generally Goltsman's Exs. F–J, K, N.) Goltsman requested that Counter-Claimants provide supplemental responses through which they would: (1) remove and/or support their boilerplate objections; (2) state whether they would produce responsive documents in their possession, custody, and/or control; and (3) produce the responsive documents at the time of their supplemental responses. (see Goltsman's Exs. K, N.) Despite the exchange of seven meet-and-confer letters and a number of emails to resolve all of the issues (see Goltsman's Exs. K–U), and one informal discovery conference to resolve the limited issue of Counter-Claimants' failure to produce any of the documents they identified as responsive in their respective responses (see ECF No. 173), Counter-Claimants have not supplemented their responses or produced any documents. (See Mot. 6.)

*4 Goltsman now seeks to compel a supplemental response and production of documents from each of the Counter-Claimants, as follows:

From Abrams: to RFP-1 Nos. 2–11, 16, 19, 20–25, 28, and 30–35;

From Rinelli: to RFP-1 Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10–13, 16–20, 23, 33, 35–43, 46, and 51;

From Mills: to RFP-1 Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, and 20–27;

From Wooten: to RFP-1 Nos. 2–10, 12, 15–25, 27–29, 31–33, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, and 46; and

From Armstrong: to RFP-1 Nos. 2–10, 12, 15–25, 27–29, 31–33, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, and 46.

(“Requests at Issue”). (Id. at 6–7.) In addition, Goltsman seeks an award of the $2,784.00 in reasonable expenses—specifically attorneys' fees—she incurred in bringing the Motion. (Id. at 7.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Rule 26(b)(1) governs the scope of discovery in federal cases and provides that parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. But relevance alone does not justify discovery. As a general matter, Rule 26(b) is to be “liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of information,” even if that information is not ultimately admitted at trial. Comcast of L.A., Inc. v. Top End Int'l, Inc., No. CV 03-2213-JFW(RCx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2003).

In addition to relevance, Rule 26(b)(1) requires that the discovery be proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(1). Proportionality is determined by a consideration of the following factors: “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id.

Further, the court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery” pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2) if:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

Rule 34 governs requests for production of documents. It allows a party to serve on any other party “a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample ... items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control[,]” including, inter alia, documents and electronically stored information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). The responding party must serve its answers and any objections to requests for production of documents within thirty days after being served with the requests, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2). The answer must state whether the responding party will permit the inspection of the matter requested or will produce copies of the documents or the electronically stored information in lieu of the inspection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). In the latter instance, “[t]he production must ... be completed no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” Id. The grounds for an objection must be stated with specificity (id.) and the responding party must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection (Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C)). In addition, pursuant to Cen Local Rule 34-2, the response “shall quote each request for production in full immediately preceding the statement of any response or objection thereto.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 34-2.

*5 A requesting party that is dissatisfied with discovery responses made under the federal rules may move to compel further responses pursuant to Rule 37(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” Nguyen v. Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122787, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed,” as well as “the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Comcast, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *6 (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)).

B. The Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Objections to the Tate Declaration.

As noted above, Counter-Claimants objected to the Tate Declaration in its entirety on the grounds that it purportedly lacks foundation, is made upon no facts establishing competency or personal knowledge, is premised upon improper opinions and conclusions, paragraph 18 makes no sense, and the moving party is not a proper legal entity. (Obj. to Tate Decl. 1–2.) In addition, Counter-Claimants object to paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, and 18 of the Tate Declaration, reiterating the above objections in whole or in part as to each, and adding the following objections: “not a fact,” “Declaration is nonfactual,” and argumentative. (Id.) On this basis, Counter-Claimants request that the Court disregard the declaration. (Id. at 2.)

Given that the Tate Declaration was superseded by the filing of the Amended Tate Declaration, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' objections to the Tate Declaration as moot.

C. The Court OVERRULES the General Objections Counter-Claimants Assert in the Motion.

Beyond the objections asserted in Counter-Claimants' respective responses to the RFP-1 requests propounded on each of them, which the Court addresses below, Counter-Claimants raise two additional objections in the Motion. (Mot. 7–9.) First, they object on the ground that Goltsman and her counsel have engaged in fraud upon the court because they are pursuing discovery on behalf of a non-existent entity as to which a motion to dismiss was pending at the time the Motion was filed. (Id. at 7.) Second, they object on the ground that the requested documents were generated by Goltsman to begin with and, as she testified in her deposition, she has easy access to them through her two iPads. (Id.) However, those objections are not asserted as to any specific request, and instead appear to be general objections applicable to all requests. (See id.) The Court rules on Counter-Claimants' general objections first and then turns to their specific objections asserted in their respective responses.

As a threshold matter, general objections are prohibited. See Bretana v. Int'l Collection Corp., No. C07-05934 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79334, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2008) (“Answers to discovery (and any grounds for objection) must be stated with specificity as to each request.... Defendants' blanket objections are inadequate.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2))). On this basis alone, Defendants' general objections, asserted in the Motion only, are OVERRULED. In addition, Defendants' general objections are OVERRULED for the independent reasons stated below.

Counter-Claimants generally object that Goltsman's discovery constitutes a “fraud upon the court” because the party that propounded the discovery, purportedly also the movant here, is “a nonexistent legal entity with no standing,” against which a motion to dismiss was pending at the time the Motion was filed, and, as such, the discovery sought is not proportional to the needs of the case (“Fraud Upon the Court Objection”). (Mot. 7.) However, the Fraud Upon the Court Objection is improper for multiple reasons. First, the party that propounded the discovery at issue, who also is the movant in the Motion, is Goltsman, not RG Abrams Insurance—the entity Counter-Claimants contend does not exist. Second, the operative motion to dismiss to which Counter-Claimants refer—entitled the Renewed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 119)—had nothing to do with the viability of RG Abrams Insurance as a legal entity; rather, it addressed the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (See generally ECF Nos. 119, 228.) Third, the Fraud Upon the Court Objection could only apply, if at all, to Armstrong because Abrams, Rinelli, Wotten, and Mills already had served their responses to their respective RFP-1 before they even filed the Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, the Renewed Motion to Dismiss was filed on May 25, 2021 (ECF No. 119), more than one month after Abrams, Rinelli, Wooten, and Mills served their April 16, 2021 responses (Mot. 3). Fourth, even if the Renewed Motion to Dismiss was pending at the time Armstrong served his responses on June 8, 2021 (id.), until such motion were granted, Counter-Claimants were required to comply with their discovery obligations, as District Judge Aenlle-Rocha clarified in his August 23, 2021 order. (ECF No. 193 (“the court hereby CLARIFIES that discovery in this action is not stayed in any respect.”).) Fifth, the Renewed Motion to Dismiss was denied on October 7, 2021, invalidating the Fraud Upon the Court Objection—to the extent it ever was valid. (ECF No. 228.)

*6 On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Fraud Upon the Court Objection.

Counter-Claimants generally object that Goltsman generated the documents sought by the RFP-1 requests to each Counter-Claimant, and that, as she testified in her deposition, “she has easy access to them in her 2 iPads” (“Goltsman's Own Documents Objection”). (Mot. 7.) However, the Goltsman's Own Documents Objection is unavailing for multiple reasons. First, other than Counter-Claimants' counsel's bald assertion that Goltsman testified she has easy access to the documents sought by the RFP-1 requests, there is no competent evidence to support this contention. (See generally Mot.; Donahue Decl.) To the extent Counter-Claimants rely on Goltsman's deposition testimony to support this contention, that reliance is misplaced. The RFP-1 requests generally seek documents that support Counter-Claimants' contentions in their respective counter-claims, as described more fully above, including damages. But the excerpts from the Goltsman deposition provided by Counter-Claimants speak only to the fact that she maintained her games, books, media, correspondence, and banking matters on her two Apple iPads. (See X-Cls' Ex. 1 at 9.) Indeed, even these categories of documents do not begin to cover the documents identified as responsive by Counter-Claimants, but which they appear to have withheld pursuant to the Goltsman's Own Documents Objection: deposition of Goltsman; Goltsman's responses to discovery; the missing computer that Goltsman gave to her grandson; Goltsman's bank records, checks, canceled checks; Goltsman's payroll, credit card, and personal and personnel records, employment files, and text messages and emails about Counter-Claimants; letters from Goltsman's attorneys; Goltsman's insurance records; paystubs, W-2s, and 1099s issued by Goltsman to Counter-Claimants; worktime and attendance records; job duties and descriptions; and Counter-Claimants' discovery responses. (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.) Second, even if Goltsman had all of the documents that Counter-Claimants identified but withheld, such an objection is unavailing and insufficient to resist a discovery request. “[C]ourts have unambiguously stated that [an equally available] objection is insufficient to resist a discovery request.” Nat'l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis., Inc. v. On Point Events, LP, 256 F.R.D. 678, 682 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Goltsman's Own Documents Objection.

D. The Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Specific Objections.

In addition to the general objections Counter-Claimants assert in the Motion, they assert specific objections in response to the RFP-1 requests. The Court addresses each below and, for the reasons stated, OVERRULES them in turn.

Counter-Claimants assert the following objection to the Requests at Issue:

*7 (“Overbreadth Objection”). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J (typographical errors in original).)

Goltsman disagrees with Counter-Claimants that the Requests at Issue are overbroad. She contends instead that these requests “simply seek all documents that support the particular allegations in Counter-Claimants' respective Counter-Claims”; “specific documents pertaining to Rinelli, Wooten, and Armstrong's employment, such as personnel records, time records, payroll records, wage statements, payment of meal and rest break premiums, employee handbooks, W-2s and 1099s, and job duties and responsibilities”; and documents “regarding Counter-Claimants' claims for damages, including medical records, Counter-Claimants' social media records, documents supporting Counter-Claimants' mitigation efforts, and alleged communications with other individuals (except for their attorneys) regarding the claims and allegations in the Counter-Claims.” (Mot. 110.) Goltsman explains that, as such, the Requests at Issue “seek specific documents with specific substantive parameters.” (Id. at 110–111.) She notes that, in any event, “Counter-Claimants have failed to articulate a legitimate basis for their contentions that Goltsman's Requests are overbroad.” (Id. at 111.)

In response, Counter-Claimants argue that counsel for Goltsman “insists on abusively and unreasonably requesting a broad swath of documents.” (Id.) They note that as attorneys and legal secretaries, they have an absolute, mandated duty to protect their clients and that this obligation includes protecting not only the matters of their clients but also their identities. (Id.) They add that Goltsman “ignores their [sic] burden of proof”; that she “ignores the facts of this case”; and that she “ignores the reality of counter-claimant's [sic] position in society and in the eyes of the law.” (Id.)

The Court agrees with Goltsman. As a starting point, Counter-Claimants must do more than state that the Requests at Issue are overbroad—they must explain the nature and extent of the purported overbreadth. Franklin v. Smalls, No. 09cv1067 MMA(RBB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150312, at *70 (S.D. Ca. Oct. 18, 2012) (“[m]erely stating that [a discovery request] is overbroad does not suffice to state a proper objection.... Instead, the objecting party must specify which part of the request is overbroad, and why.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Here, Counter-Claimants have failed to provide the required information to support their Overbreadth Objection.

Moreover, the Requests at Issue are not overbroad. They seek documents that support specific factual allegations made by the Counter-Claimants in their respective Counter-Claims. The Court acknowledges that document requests that seek “any and all documents” in support of factual contentions can be found to run afoul of Rule 26(g). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g); see also Gopher Media, LLC v. Spain, No. 3:19-cv-02280-CAB-KSC, No. 1:17-cv-2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215002, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2020) (“As a rule, requests for ‘any and all’ documents or communications ... are facially overbroad.” (citation omitted)); Salas v. Facultatieve Techs. the Ams., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00335-LJO-BAM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72426, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) (“Courts tend to find document requests seeking all documents related to a claim or defense as lacking particularity.” (citation omitted)). Still, document requests that seek a specific type of information related to a specific event, such as the specific allegations in Counter-Claimants' respective Counter-Claims, are permissible. Shuckett v. DialAmerica Mktg., No. 17cv2073-LAB(KSC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154027, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2018) (“[A] discovery request will not be objectionable as overly broad if it uses an omnibus term to modify a sufficiently specific type of information or group of documents.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Christenson, No. 2:10-cv-00422-LRH-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16977, at *31–32 (D. Nev. Feb. 7, 2011) (finding that when a “document request seeking documents ‘pertaining to’ or ‘concerning’ a broad range of items” is modified to seek “a sufficiently specific type of information, document, or event, rather than large or general categories of information or documents, the request will not be deemed overly broad on its face.'” (citation omitted).) In any event, any overbreadth concerns Counter-Claimants may have had were resolved when Goltsman, through a June 2, 2021 meet-and-confer letter, clarified that she sought documents related to Counter-Claimants' specific factual allegations, as well as “employment-related documents such as personnel records, payroll records, and wage statements, and documents related to Counter-Claimants' claims for damages.” (Goltsman's Ex. K at 228.)

*8 Counter-Claimants' appeal to the privileged nature of their communications with their clients and their obligation to protect them does not support their Overbreadth Objection. Counter-Claimants offer no facts to support their contention that the Requests at Issue will yield privileged client communications. (See generally Mot.) To the contrary, as noted above, the Requests at Issue seek documents related to the contentions Counter-Claimants make in their Counter-Claims and their damages. As detailed above, Abrams's contentions are that Counter-Defendants disrupted his law office and stole information from him, breached a contract with him, and battered him. As also detailed above, the contentions of Rinelli, Mills, Wooten, and Armstrong are that they worked for Counter-Defendants and that Counter-Defendants owe them unpaid wages and reimbursement of expenses. It is not self-evident how the Requests at Issue could yield privileged documents. Moreover, to the extent that documents responsive to these requests do contain privileged matter, the proper response is to assert a privilege objection and identify the matter in a privilege log, not to decline to produce any nonprivileged responsive documents that may exist.

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Overbreadth Objection.

Counter-Claimants assert the following objections to the Requests at Issue:

(“Undue Burden/Harassing Objection”). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.)

Goltsman disagrees with Counter-Claimants' contention that the Requests at Issue are unduly burdensome or harassing in the first instance. (Mot. 112.) In addition, she notes that, despite meet-and-confer opportunities, Counter-Claimants have, to date, failed to support the objection “with the requisite detail, either by way of declaration and/or in supplemental responses under oath.” (Id.)

Counter-Claimants respond that Goltsman has “failed to explain any basis for their [sic] position” or to provide “at least some fact” to justify discovery; that Goltsman and her counsel have “engaged in a fraud upon this court”; that Goltsman ignores her own admissions in her testimony; that Goltsman is “[t]rying to punish or get even,” presumably with Counter-Claimants, because she “feels rejected and abandoned by Counter-claimants”; that Goltsman has “engaged in lawyer shopping [and] forum shopping”; and that all of this must “be taken into account, under the rules of proportionality set forth in Rule 26(b)(1).” (Id. at 112–13.)

To succeed on an undue burden objection, the party resisting discovery has the burden of establishing that the request is unduly burdensome. Pham v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00148-KJD-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130038, at *8 (D. Nev. Nov. 9, 2011); see also Fosselman v. Caropreso, No. C 09-0055 PJH (PR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28816, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2011) (“The party resisting discovery has the burden of establishing lack of relevance or undue burden.” (citation omitted)). To satisfy this burden, Counter-Claimants, as the resisting parties, must provide “sufficient detail regarding the time, money, and procedures required to produce the requested documents.” Id. Indeed, this detail must come in the form of evidentiary declarations supporting such objections. See A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” (citing Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996))). The fact that a production of documents will be time-consuming and expensive or would hamper a party's business operations ordinarily is not a sufficient reason to avoid the production. In re Toys “R” Us-Delaware, Inc. Litigation, No. ML 08-1980 MMM (FMOx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130884, at *21–22 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010). Moreover, that a party may believe that the other party's lawsuit and discovery constitute harassment is not a proper basis upon which to refuse to respond to discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).

*9 Counter-Claimants' arguments are unavailing. First, they miss the mark altogether. As the parties resisting discovery, it is Counter-Claimants' burden to clarify, explain, and support their Undue Burden/Harassing Objection, and demonstrate why discovery should not be allowed on that basis. See Bible v. Rio Props., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 614, 618 (C.D. Cal. 2007). This, they have not done. Moreover, although Counter-Defendants insist that Goltsman's testimony evidences the vindictive nature of this lawsuit (Mot. 112–113), there is no evidence before the Court to support this allegation. The excerpts of Goltsman's deposition that Counter-Claimants offer in support of this contention have nothing to do with her intent in bringing the lawsuit. (See X-Cls.' Exs. 1, 2.) Rather, they involve where Goltsman keeps her games, books, media, correspondence, and banking records (X-Cls.' Ex. 1 at 8–9); where Goltsman would find information about a former lawyer and whether she told Rinelli or Mills or sent them anything in writing about her communications with her lawyer (id. at 10–11); whether Goltsman kept records of calls from her loyal customers (id. at 12); what Goltsman expected to find and what she found when she went to the Lambert office in December 2019 (id. at 12–13); what Goltsman did with the computer in the Lambert office (id. at 13–14); the names used for Goltsman's business (X-Cls.' Ex. 2 at 17); Goltsman's employment in the past ten years (id. at 18); the type of legal entity that Goltsman used for her business (id. at 19, 22); whether RG Abrams Insurance purchased a particular business (id. at 20). When asked whether she talked to Rinelli about wanting to sue Abrams, Goltsman responded, “No, I didn't want to sue [Abrams]. I wanted my database. That's all.” (Id. at 22.)

Second, Counter-Claimants offer no evidence regarding the burden that answering this discovery purportedly would impose on them. (See generally Mot; Goltsman's Exs. F–J.) In the absence of any declarations under penalty of perjury offering evidence that establishes the nature and extent of the burden, the Court has no basis upon which to find any burden here, let alone the requisite level of “undue” burden. See In re Toys “R” US-Delaware, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130884, at *20–21.

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Undue Burden/Harassing Objection.

Counter-Claimants assert the following objection to the Requests at Issue: “Objection ... vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.” (“Vagueness Objection”). (Goltsman's Exs. F–J.)

Goltsman argues that the Requests at Issue are “straightforward in that they seek documents that support Counter-Claimants' specific claims, their particular allegations, and purported damages.” (Mot. 113.) Moreover, Goltsman notes that Counter-Claimants have failed to identify, either in the Motion or during their meet-and-confer efforts, any particular term or phrase that is vague, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Id.)

Characterizing the Requests at Issue as “nebulous, wordy, [and of a] confusing structure,” Counter-Claimants note that they were “not able to in good faith respond, with an intelligent reply,” thus warranting the objection. (Id. at 114.) They note that the legal authorities Goltsman offers in support of her Motion “are of no value ... [b]ecause they do not apply to this case ... [and instead] are general legal concepts and boilerplate authorities.” (Id.)

“The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity. The responding party should exercise common sense and attribute ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests.” Advanced Visual Image Design, LLC v. Exist, Inc., No. EDCV 14-2525-JGB (KKx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109140, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2015) (quoting Bryant v. Armstrong, 285 F.R.D. 596, 606 (S.D. Cal. 2012)). “It is not ground for objection that the request is ‘ambiguous’ unless so ambiguous that the responding party cannot, in good faith, frame an intelligent reply.” United States ex rel. Englund v. County of Los Angeles, 235 F.R.D. 675, 685 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

The Court fails to understand what is vague, ambiguous, or unintelligible about the Requests at Issue. They seek documents related to Counter-Claimants' own allegations, quoting Counter-Claimants' own words. (Goltsman's Exs. F–J.) Indeed, as Goltsman aptly agues, despite referring to these requests as nebulous, wordy, and confusing (Mot. 114), Counter-Claimants fail to state specifically what is confusing about the requests (see generally Mot.).

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Vagueness Objection.

*10 Counter-Claimants assert the following objections to the Requests at Issue: “Objection not relevant, not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... exceeds permissible scope of discovery.” (“Relevance/Proportionality Objection”). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.)

Goltsman notes that the Requests at Issue seek documents that relate to “Counter-Claimants' specific claims, allegations, and damages.” (Mot. 114.)

In response, Counter-Claimants assert:

(Mot. 115.)

It is well-established in the Ninth Circuit that “[a] complaint guides the parties' discovery, putting the defendant on notice of the evidence it needs to adduce in order to defend against the plaintiff's allegations.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Trabulsi v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 8:17-cv-02088-JLS-SK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227807, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2018) (“[T]he allegations in a complaint generally dictate what evidence is discoverable.” (citing Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1292)).

The Requests at Issue are relevant here and proportional to the needs of the case. Indeed, they quote the language of the Counter-Claims in identifying the contentions for which documents are sought. (See Goltsman's Exs. A–E.) On this basis, it cannot be disputed that the Requests at Issue seek documents that are relevant to the claims and defenses of this case as required by Rule 26(b)(1). Counter-Claimants address neither here. (See generally Mot.)

Moreover, where the discovery sought “appears relevant on its face,” the burden shifts to the objecting party to “establish[ ] lack of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery either does not come within the broad scope of relevance or is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” Krause v. Nev. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00342, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14872, at *10 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Dolfo v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 11-cv-2828-DMS (BGS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46256, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2013) (“Once the moving party establishes that the information requested is within the scope of permissible discovery, the burden shifts to the opposing party to specify how the discovery request is irrelevant, overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive.” (citations omitted)). Counter-Claimants address neither. (See generally Mot.)

With respect to Counter-Claimants' proportionality concerns, the Court notes that, other than uttering the word “proportional” and pointing to Rule 26(b) (Mot. 115), Counter-Claimants fail to meet their burden of specifying how the discovery sought through the Requests at Issue is disproportional to the needs of the case. See Comcast, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *6 ((citing Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429). Indeed, they fail to address any of the seven proportionality factors found in Rule 26(b)(1).

*11 On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Relevance/ Proportionality Objection.

Counter-Claimants assert the following objection to the Requests at Issue: “Objection ... invades financial privacy of responding party and of third persons.... Responding party objects in violation of Civil Code 985.” (“Privacy Objection”). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.)

Goltsman contends that the Privacy Objection is improper because Counter-Claimants fail to establish that there exists a reasonable right of privacy to the information sought by the Requests at Issue in the first instance, and that, in any event, they have provided no legal authority in support of their assertion that the documents are protected by the right of privacy. (Mot. 116.) Moreover, Goltsman contends that the documents she seeks relate to Counter-Claimants' contentions and damages, and Counter-Claimants have failed to show how such documents would invade their privacy and the privacy of third parties, and how they would be harmed as a result of such an invasion. (Id.) Finally, Goltsman notes that, although any privacy concerns Counter-Claimants may claim can be addressed adequately by a protective order under Rule 26(c), they nevertheless refuse to enter into the very protective order that could shield any private documents from the public. (Id. at 116–117.)

In response, Counter-Claimants characterize the Requests at Issue as “unnecessary annoyance, oppression and undue burden,” and argue that, because the information sought is privileged, they are not required to produce such documents, even under a protective order. (Id. at 117.) In addition, they note that the then-pending motion to dismiss has created jurisdictional problems throughout the litigation. (Id.) Finally, they assert that Goltsman's deposition testimony contradicts the allegations in the Complaint. (Id.)

The Court is not persuaded by Counter-Claimants' arguments. As a threshold matter, the Court disregards Counter-Claimants' arguments that the Complaint is contradicted by the existing testimony. Given that the merits of the claims or defenses in this case are not before this Court, such an assertion lacks any relevance to the Motion. Moreover, as stated earlier, whatever vitality there might have been to the argument that the motion to dismiss would resolve the discovery disputes raised here is extinguished by the fact that the motion has been denied.

In addition, Counter-Claimants' privacy challenge fails substantively. The Ninth Circuit has recognized a constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. See Normal-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998); Breed v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Northern Dist. of Cal., 542 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1976). However, the right of privacy is not an absolute bar to discovery and courts must balance the need for the information against the claimed privacy right. Allen v. Woodford, No. CV-F-05-1104 OWW LJO, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11002, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) (“Unlike a privilege, the right of privacy is not an absolute bar to discovery.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Resolution of a privacy objection or request for a protective order requires a balancing of the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted.”); see also E.E.O.C. v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 395 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he right to privacy is not a recognized privilege or absolute bar to discovery, but instead is subject to the balancing of needs.”). A party asserting a privacy objection must establish first that there exists a reasonable right of privacy to the information sought to be disclosed. Christian v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:18-cv-05792-CJC (JDEx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157307, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2020) (finding privacy claim unavailing without a showing of a reasonable right to privacy).

*12 Here, Counter-Claimants fail to establish in the first instance that there exists a reasonable right of privacy to the information sought by any of the Requests at Issue. (See Mot. 117.) Instead, as detailed above, they make assertions that do not come close to resembling a privacy argument. (Id.) Moreover, even if Counter-Claimants had shown a right of privacy exists for the information sought here, they fail to explain how their purported privacy interests, or those of third persons, will be harmed by the disclosure of this information. (See Mot. 117.)

Moreover, it is not lost on the Court that this purported privacy concern is one of Counter-Claimants' own making in that they decline to enter into a stipulated protective order that would shield their private information from the public. (See id.) See Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 352–53 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (ordering disclosure of names, addresses, and telephone numbers subject to a protective order limiting the use of the information to the parties in the litigation and protecting it from public disclosure). While a decision to not enter into a stipulated protective order is within Counter-Claimants' prerogative, they make this decision at their own peril in that, in so doing, they undermine their own argument that the information at issue is confidential. See, e.g., Brooks v. Motsenbocker Advanced Devs., Inc., No. 07cv773 BTM (NLS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1350, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008) (overruling privacy objection where responding parties seeking to protect documents from disclosure failed to take any steps to protect the information, such as entering into a stipulated protective order or moving for their own protective order before their deadline to respond).

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Privacy Objection.

Counter-Claimants assert the following objection to the Requests at Issue: “Objection trade secret ....” (“Trade Secrets Objection”). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.)

Goltsman contends that the Trade Secrets Objection is improper because federal courts do not recognize such an absolute privilege. (Mot. 117.) She argues that Counter-Claimants have failed to meet their burden of providing the information that demonstrates that the documents sought by the Requests at Issue would require the disclosure of trade secrets and/or whether the disclosure of such information would be harmful. (Id. at 118.) Moreover, she notes that, as with Counter-Claimants' privacy objections, Counter-Claimants undermine their contention that the information sought contains trade secret by refusing to stipulate to a protective order that would shield any such information from the public. (Id.)

In response, Counter-Claimants reiterate the arguments they raised as to the Privacy Objection. They characterize the Requests at Issue as “unnecessary annoyance, oppression and undue burden,” and argue that, because the information sought is “privileged,” they are not required to produce such documents, even under a protective order. (Id.) In addition, they note that the then-pending motion to dismiss has created jurisdictional problems throughout the litigation. (Id.) Finally, they note that Goltsman's deposition testimony contradicts the allegations in the Complaint. (Id.)

The Court is not persuaded by Counter-Claimants' arguments. As a threshold matter, for the reasons stated earlier, the Court disregards Counter-Claimants' arguments that the Complaint is contradicted by the existing testimony. In addition, as also stated earlier, whatever vitality there might have been to the argument that the motion to dismiss would resolve the discovery disputes raised here is extinguished by the fact that the motion was denied.

*13 Moreover, Counter-Claimants' trade secret challenge fails substantively. “[T]here is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information.” Upjohn Co. v. Hygieia Biological Labs., 151 F.R.D. 355, 358 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 685 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Davis v. Leal, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (“[T]he trade secrets privilege is not absolute, but requires a balancing of the need for protecting the secret with the needs of the case”). To resist discovery of a trade secret, “a party must first demonstrate by competent evidence that the information sought through discovery is a trade secret and that disclosure of the secret might be harmful.” Upjohn Co., 151 F.R.D. at 358 (citations omitted.) Where this showing is made, “the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery to establish that the disclosure of trade secrets is relevant and necessary to the action.” Id.; see also Davis, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. Once relevancy and necessity have been established, the Court must “weigh the risk of disclosure of the trade secret to unauthorized parties with the risk that a protective order will impede prosecution or defense of the claims.” Trevino v. ACB Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 612, 617 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Nonetheless, “[o]nce the moving party has established relevance and necessity, the discovery is virtually always ordered.” Bare Escentuals Beauty, Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 07CV90, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90893, at *6–7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In addition, Rule 26(c)(1)(G) states that a party may obtain a protective order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G).

Here, Counter-Claimants fail to provide any information to aid the Court in its determination that the documents sought contain trade secrets in the first instance. (See Mot. 118.) Moreover, even if they had demonstrated that the information sought was a trade secret, they have failed to establish that disclosure of the secret might be harmful. (Id.) Finally, as with their Privacy Objection, Counter-Claimants' refusal to stipulate to a protective order that would shield their trade secret information from the public significantly undermines their contention that the information sought contains trade secrets.

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Trade Secrets Objection.

Counter-Claimants assert the following objection to the Requests at Issue: “Objection ... seeks materials and information protected by attorney-client privilege, attorney work product ....” (“Privilege Objection”). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.)

Golstman argues that Counter-Claimants' Privilege Objection is incomplete because Counter-Claimants have failed to comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) by providing a description of the matters withheld pursuant to privilege in a manner that, without disclosing privileged information, would allow Goltsman to assess the privilege claim. (Mot. 119.) She notes that it cannot be argued that the Requests at Issue, which seek to discover documents that support Counter-Claimants' claims, specific allegations, and damages, “would require the disclosure of attorney-client communications and/or attorney-work [sic] product.” (Id. at 120.) Goltsman also notes that Counter-Claimants' failure to identify the withheld documents and produce a privilege log, as required by Rules 26 and 34, renders her unable to determine the propriety of Counter-Claimants' withholding of documents. (Id.) On this basis, Goltsman requests that Counter-Claimants be compelled to produce a privilege log. (Id.)

Counter-Claimants respond by characterizing the Requests at Issue as unethical and “vague, sloppy, overbroad, drafting of discovery, makes it impossible to ‘mind read.’ ” (Id. (typographical errors in original).) They argue, without authority, that it is Goltsman's burden to not seek privileged discovery and “to show that the discovery does not and is not intended to invade and violate attorney-client privilege and work product and privacy rights of other individuals.” (Id.) Counter-Claimants also argue that Plaintiff has made no motion to compel, or met and conferred regarding the alleged inadequacy of, Counter-Claimants' privilege logs. (Id.)

*14 All of Counter-Claimants' arguments fail. As a threshold matter, the Court easily disposes of the argument that Goltsman has not met and conferred regarding this issue as patently incorrect. Indeed, Goltsman's June 2, 2021 letter to Counter-Claimants devotes the equivalent of an entire page to their Privilege Objections. (Goltsman's Ex. K at 230–231.) Indeed, Counter-Claimants' own responsive letter of June 8, 2021 devotes an entire paragraph to this issue. (Goltsman's Ex. M at 237.) And Goltsman's further letter of June 11, 2021 responds with yet another paragraph on this issue. (Goltsman's Ex. N at 241.)

Next, Counter-Claimants' argument that it is Goltsman's burden to not seek privileged discovery misses the mark. Goltsman is not seeking privileged discovery here. She seeks only that Counter-Claimants serve their privilege logs, identifying any documents withheld pursuant to privilege, so that she can determine whether such documents are properly withheld. The party raising the privilege shoulders the burden of demonstrating that the information and documents are protected, and must provide sufficient information so that the requesting party may make an informed determination regarding the validity of the objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii)); see also United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977).

On this basis, the Court OVERRULES Counter-Claimants' Privilege Objection. To be clear, the Court overrules only Counter-Claimants' objection to serving a privilege log in the first instance; it does not rule as to the propriety of any privilege they may assert.

Given that, as detailed above, the Court OVERRULES all of Counter-Claimants' objections, the Court GRANTS Goltsman's request that Counter-Claimants be compelled to supplement their RFP-1 responses without those objections.

E. Armstrong's Objections Have Been Waived.

Goltsman contends that Armstrong has waived her objections to Goltsman's RFP-1 because she served untimely objections. (Mot. 121.) She notes that, having been served with RFP-1 on March 17, 2021, Armstrong's responses were due by April 16, 2021, but that Armstrong served her responses on June 8, 2021. (Id.)

Counter-Claimants respond that the untimely service of Armstrong's responses was caused by “[a]n inadvertent and unknown clerical issue” through which Goltsman was served with an extra copy of Wooten's responses instead of Armstrong's responses. (Id.) They note that “once this error was brought to counter-claimant's attention Ms. Armstrong's responses were served via email on June 8, 2021.” (Id.) Characterizing this as “a clear instance of excusable neglect,” Counter-Claimants argue, without authority, that a finding of waiver is not appropriate where the untimeliness of the response was a result of such neglect. (Id. at 121–22.)

Based upon the evidence presented to the Court, the Court concludes that Armstrong has waived her objections. As a threshold matter, it is well-established that failure to respond to a Rule 34 discovery request within the time permitted—thirty days after being served—waives all objections thereto. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992); Full Tilt Boogie v. Fortune, No. 2:19-cv-09090-ODW-KESx, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147017, at *30 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2021). Counter-Claimants fail to supply any legal authority to the contrary or for the proposition that Armstrong's waiver should be excused because it was caused by excusable neglect. (See Mot. 121.) See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Arguments made in passing and not supported by citations to the record or to case authority are generally deemed waived.”); Sager v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. SA CV 12-1015 FMO (MLGx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45690, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (“It is axiomatic that every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

*15 Moreover, Counter-Claimants fail to provide any competent evidence that the untimely service of Armstrong's responses was caused by “an inadvertent and unknown clerical issue,” as they contend. (Mot. 121–22.) The only under-oath testimony offered by Counter-Claimants is the Donahue Declaration, which concerns mostly matters unrelated to the Motion. Indeed, Mr. Donahue testifies only regarding his legal experience (Donahue Decl. ¶ 1); the filing of the complaint and the motion to dismiss (id. at ¶¶ 2–3); the deposition of RG Abrams Insurance (id. at ¶¶ 3–5, 7); Abrams's deposition (id. at ¶¶ 6, 8–13); an unrelated informal discovery conference (id. at ¶ 14); objections to the Tate Declaration (id. at ¶ 15); and facts to support Counter-Claimants' request for attorneys' fees in connection with this Motion (id. at ¶ 16). Nowhere does the Donahue Declaration touch upon, let alone provide evidence regarding, the reasons for the untimely service of Armstrong's responses. (See generally Donahue Decl.) Nor do Counter-Claimants offer competent evidence to explain the further delay in serving Armstrong's responses. Indeed, Counter-Claimants were notified of this deficiency on June 2, 2021 (Goltsman's Ex. K), but waited six days—until June 8, 2021—to serve the responses (Goltsman's Ex. M). This delay in responding to the June 2, 2021 correspondence undermines Counter-Claimants' assertion that Armstrong's responses already were prepared as of April 16, 2021 but only inadvertently not sent on that day. (See Mot. 121 (“On April 16, 2021, two copies of Ms. Wooten's responses ... were inadvertently served via email, instead of Ms. Armstrong's responses.”) Courts do not consider arguments based on factual assertions that are not supported by the record. Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Calif., 305 F.R.D. 115, 122–23 (N.D. Cal 2014) (“The court does not consider any arguments based on factual assertions that are unsupported by evidence.”); see also C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-6 (“Factual contentions involved in any motion and opposition to motions shall be presented, heard, and determined upon declarations and other written evidence (including documents, photographs, deposition excerpts, etc.) alone, except that the Court may, in its discretion, require or allow oral examination of any declarant or any other witness.”) Given that Counter-Claimants had a full opportunity to provide factual support for their position, but failed to do so, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to allow oral examination on this issue.

On this basis, the Court FINDS that Armstrong's untimely service of her discovery responses effects a waiver of her objections and GRANTS Goltsman's request that Armstrong be compelled to serve supplemental responses without any objection.

F. Counter-Claimants' Responses Are Procedurally Deficient Under Rule 34(b)(2) and Local Rule 34-2.

Goltsman requests that Counter-Claimants be compelled to supplement their responses to cure the procedural deficiencies under Rule 34(b)(2) and Local Rule 34-2. (Mot. 106–07.) Specifically, she notes that Counter-Claimants have failed to state whether any inspection will be permitted or, if they are unable to comply, failed to so state and to provide a reason for the non-compliance, as required by Rule 34(b)(2). (Id.) Goltsman notes that, instead, Counter-Claimants identify documents but do not produce them or state they will produce them or allow their inspection. (Id.) In addition, Goltsman contends that Counter-Claimants' responses fail to satisfy the Local Rule 34-2 requirement that they quote each request for production in full before providing the response. (Id. at 109.)

Counter-Claimants fail to address Goltsman's concerns. Instead, they assert the Fraud Upon the Court Objection, the Goltsman's Own Documents Objection, and the privilege, privacy, good faith, vagueness, overbreadth objections, all of which are overruled above.

Rule 34(b)(2)(C) is clear: if a party withholds responsive matter on the basis of an objection, it must so state. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). Here, none of Defendants' responses indicate whether they are withholding responsive material pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(C). (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J.) Because Rule 34(b)(2)(C) does not impose an affirmative obligation that a party state it is not withholding documents, the absence of a Rule 34(b)(2)(C) statement implies that Counter-Claimants are not withholding responsive material. However, given their repeated assertion that they “reserve[ ] the right to amend and supplement this response based on ongoing discovery” (See Goltsman's Exs. F–J), it is unclear to the Court—and apparently to Goltsman as well—whether Counter-Claimants are withholding documents.

Moreover, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires that a document production “be completed no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). Here, the RFP-1 served on each of the Counter-Claimants specifies that production must be completed “within thirty (30) days of service hereof ....” (Goltsman's Exs. A at 9; B at 24; C at 36; D at 51; E at 66.) Given service dates of March 17, 2021 as to Rinelli, Mills, Wooten, and Armstrong, and of March 22, 2021as to Abrams (see Mot. 5), their respective complete productions—without reservation of right to supplement—were due April 16, 2021 as to Rinelli, Mills, Wooten, and Armstrong, and April 21, 2021 as to Abrams. In turn, Counter-Claimants do not specify a different, “reasonable time” in which their respective document productions will be completed in their responses. (See generally Goltsman's Exs. F–J.) In light of Counter-Claimants' failure to state whether inspection will be permitted or copies will be produced, and their repeated reservation of rights to supplement their responses, the Court finds Counter-Claimants' respective responses to RFP-1 to be procedurally deficient.

*16 On this basis, the Court GRANTS Goltsman's request that Counter-Claimants be compelled to supplement their responses to RFP-1 to bring them into compliance with the Rules and the Court's rulings above.

G. The Court GRANTS Goltsman's Request for the Attorneys' Fees She Expended in Bringing the Motion in the Amount of $2,784.00.

Plaintiff asks the Court to award her the attorneys' fees expended in the bringing of the Motion in the amount of $2,784.00. (Mot. 3, 122–24.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Goltsman's request and awards Goltsman the sum of $2,784.00.

Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A), if a discovery motion is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, before granting an award of reasonable expenses, Rule 37(a)(5)(A) requires that the court determine whether any of the three exceptions to the rule apply. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Pursuant to these exceptions, the Court may not order this payment if: “(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)–(iii). The party contesting the discovery sanction on a properly brought motion under Rule 37(a)(5) bears the burden of establishing substantial justification or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. See Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “the opportunity to submit briefs” satisfies the “opportunity to be heard” requirement. Paladin Assocs. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, because the Rule 37 sanctions issues to be resolved were such that an evidentiary hearing would not have aided the decisionmaking process, district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the briefing); see also Pac. Harbor Cap., Inc. v. Carnival Airlines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (“an opportunity to be heard does not require an oral or evidentiary hearing on the issue.” (citations omitted)); Lynch v. Cassavetes, No. 13-4317 DSF (JC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195015, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2014) (finding that an opportunity to be heard is satisfied by an opportunity to respond in writing).

Applying the above framework, the Court concludes that neither oral argument nor an evidentiary hearing would be of assistance in determining whether to award sanctions or the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded under Rule 37(a)(5)(A). Counter-Claimants received notice of Goltsman's request for attorneys' fees when Goltsman provided them with her portion of the joint stipulation so that they could include their responsive arguments. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-2.2. And, indeed, Counter-Claimants responded to Goltsman's argument, albeit by noting only that “[i]t is counter-claimant, not counter-defendant, who is entitled to an award of attorney's fees.” (Mot. 124.) But the only circumstance under which Counter-Claimants could obtain an award of attorneys' fees in connection with Goltsman's Motion is if Goltsman's Motion were denied in full, a circumstance not present here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). In any event, holding a hearing to have the parties' counsel restate what already is in the Motion and in their under-oath declarations would be a waste of time and resources. The Court finds that it has sufficient evidence of the facts it needs to make a determination regarding the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded here. Moreover, in an effort to streamline the discovery dispute resolution process, the parties have waived their right to an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are awarded. (ECF No. 115 at 3 (“The parties waive their rights under Rule 37(a)(5) to an opportunity to be hard where a discovery motion seeks reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, and, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, will submit to the Court's ruling on the papers as filed.”).) On this basis, the Court makes its ruling without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

*17 Having preliminarily determined that Goltsman is entitled to her reasonable expenses pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A), the Court next turns to the question whether any of the Rule 37(a)(5)(A) exceptions apply to bar such an award. They do not.

Counter-Claimants make no argument that the first exception—that the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i))—applies here. (See generally Mot.) Goltsman satisfied her pre-filing obligations by complying with the Court's revised pre-filing procedures of two rounds of written meet-and-confer efforts. (Goltsman's Exs. K, N.)

Counter-Claimants also do not argue that the second exception—that the opposing party's response or objection was substantially justified (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii))—applies. (See generally Mot.) Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have offered guidance regarding the standard for establishing “substantial justification” sufficient to avoid a discovery sanction. In Hyde, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a good faith dispute concerning a discovery question might, in the proper case, constitute ‘substantial justification ....’ ” Hyde, 24 F.3d at 1171 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that the standard is “satisfied if there is a ‘genuine dispute’... or ‘if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.’ ” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1998) (citations and alterations omitted).

As a threshold matter, Counter-Claimants do not argue that their discovery positions were substantially justified. (Mot. 124.) Rather, they contend only that it is they who are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees because “the moving parties are deceptive, incomplete, fraudulent and inadequate,” and Goltsman's Motion “is unnecessary, fraught with misrepresentations, unsupported by any fact and only designed to harass and burden the ‘enemy.’ ” (Id.) They contend that “[p]art of this tactic is to file and pursue discovery and the case on behalf of an entity that does not even exist,” a fact Counter-Claimants note “the attorneys have known ... from the beginning, but have quietly withheld ... from the court.” (Id.)

As detailed above, not one of Counter-Claimants' objections challenged by Goltsman is well-taken. Rather than offer explanations and/or clarify their objections in order to justify their failure to produce responsive documents, Counter-Claimants argue that Goltsman's lawsuit is improper, accuse Goltsman of fraud upon the court and ill-motives, confuse legal issues and standards, and generally fail to address head-on the legal arguments raised by Goltsman. For these reasons, the Court is unable to conclude that Counter-Claimants' responses and/or objections were ones on which reasonable people could differ or that were justified in any way, let alone “substantially” justified, as required to satisfy the exception here.

Counter-Claimants also do not argue that the third exception—that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii)—applies here. (See generally Mot.) And the Court can find no evidence of such a circumstance.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Goltsman is entitled to the reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, she expended in the bringing of the Motion, as discussed below.

*18 When an award of attorneys' fees is authorized, the court must calculate the proper amount of the award to ensure that it is reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983). In the Ninth Circuit, the court must perform a two-step process to determine the reasonableness of any fee award. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). First, the Court determines the “lodestar figure.” See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Second, where appropriate, the Court may adjust the lodestar amount based on several factors adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), known as the Kerr factors:

Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70.

A strong presumption exists “that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[o]nly in rare instances should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the basis of other considerations.” Id. (citations omitted). “Under the lodestar approach, many of the Kerr factors have been subsumed as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted). The Kerr factors that are subsumed within the initial lodestar calculation are “(1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality of representation,” “(4) the results obtained,” and “(5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement.” Id. at 364 n.9 (citations omitted). “Adjusting the lodestar on the basis of subsumed reasonableness factors after the lodestar has been calculated, instead of adjusting the reasonable hours or reasonable hourly rate at the first step ... is a disfavored procedure.” Id. (citation omitted).

The party seeking the award of fees must submit evidence to support the request. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the party must support the request with evidence regarding the “number of hours worked and the rates claimed.” Id. The party opposing the fee request bears the “burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in submitted affidavits.” Common Cause v. Jones, 235 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397).

Goltsman requests $2,784.00 in attorneys' fees based upon the following lodestar calculation: 11.6 hours spent by Plaintiff's counsel, a fifth-year associate at Fisher & Phillips LLP, at an hourly rate of $240.00. (Mot. 123–24; Am. Tate Decl. ¶¶ 20–23.) Counter-Claimants challenge neither the hours spent in bringing the Motion nor the hourly rate requested. (Mot. 124.) Nevertheless, the Court conducts an independent review of both to ensure that the lodestar requested is appropriate for this Motion. For the reasons stated below, the Court awards Plaintiff the sum of $2,784.00 in reasonable expenses expended in the bringing of the Motion.

*19 As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Goltsman's counsel's documented 11.6 hours fall well short of those awarded in this district. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 8:17-cv-00423-JVS-KESx, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226622, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) (approving 36.1 hours for the preparation of a joint stipulation); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Jadoo TV, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-9768-FMO (KSx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221869, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (approving 32 hours for the preparation of a discovery motion).

Courts reviewing hours billed for purposes of a lodestar calculation have the discretion to discount hours that are impermissibly vague and do not appear to pertain to the preparation of the discovery motion. For example, in Dubose v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-7832 CAS (AJWx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81362, at *14–18 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012), the court imposed a 20% across-the-board reduction on fees because they were, among other things, not related to the motion. Id. Similarly, in Sandoval v. Yeter, CV 18-0867-CBM (JPRx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227406, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019), the court discounted time entries on the ground that they were not for motion-related work. Id.

Here, there is no basis upon which to reduce Goltsman's counsel's billed hours. The billing entries are clear and concise and reflect work associated with the preparation of the Motion: analyzing Counter-Claimants' objections and evaluating their compliance with the legal frameworks governing objections and responses (2.1 hours); reviewing the legal framework regarding attorneys' fees sanctions (0.3 hours); preparing Goltsman's portion of the Motion (6.9 hours); preparing the Tate Declaration (1.5 hours)[5]; preparing the proposed order on the Motion (0.3 hours); and preparing evidence in support of the Motion (0.5 hours), for a total of 11.6 hours. (Am. Tate Decl. ¶¶ 22–23.)

Goltsman claims an hourly rate of $240.00 for Mr. Tate. (Mot. 123–124; Am. Tater Decl. ¶ 21.) Counter-Claimants do not dispute the reasonableness of this rate. (See generally Mot; see generally Donahue Decl.) In determining whether the hourly rate billed is reasonable for purposes of an attorneys' fees award, the Court must ensure that the requested rates “are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); accord Carson v. Billings Police Dep't, 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the party seeking fees must prove that the rate charged is in line with the “prevailing market rate of the relevant community.” (citation omitted)). The burden is on the fee applicant “to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney's own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community....” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 (citation omitted). For this purpose, “the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). “[R]ates outside the forum may be used if local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the relevant community here is the Central District of California. In addition, the court may rely on its own experience to determine a reasonable hourly rate. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). Finally, in exercising its discretion in setting a fee, the court must assess the “reasonableness of the fee in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Jordan v. Multonah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987).

*20 Here, Goltsman's counsel does not attest to his background and experience. (See generally Am. Tate Decl.) Nor does Goltsman offer a declaration of an attorneys' fees expert. (See generally Mot.) Instead, Goltsman's counsel attests only to the fact that he is “an associate attorney in [his] fifth year of law practice.” (Am. Tate Decl. ¶ 21.) In addition, Goltsman notes that, according to the Wolters Kluwer 2020 Real Rate Report (Mid-Year Update) (“Real Rate Report”)[6], her counsel's hourly rate falls below the median billing rate of $565.00 per hour for associate attorneys of similar seniority in Los Angeles in the second quarter of 2020. (Mot. 123.) With this, the Court is persuaded that an hourly rate of $240.00 for Goltsman's counsel is appropriate here. This is consistent with prior discovery rulings in this matter by the Northern District of California and this Court, both having found that the hourly rate of $350.00 by another, more junior attorney representing Goltsman was reasonable. (See ECF No. 69 at 2; ECF No. 71 at 6 n.4, 7; ECF No. 134 at 43–44; ECF No. 146 at 36–37; ECF No. 189 at 23–25.)

The Court calculates the lodestar for a total of $2,784.00 (11.6 hours multiplied by $240.00 per hour). Neither party requests an adjustment to the lodestar based on the Kerr factors. (See generally Mot.) Indeed, upon a review of the Kerr factors not already subsumed within the lodestar, the Court sees no reason to make such an adjustment. On this basis, the final attorneys' fee award pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) is $2,784.00.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Goltsman's Motion in its entirety, and ORDERS as follows: