Teo v. IRS
Teo v. IRS
2020 WL 13411912 (S.D. Fla. 2020)
October 26, 2020
Middlebrooks, Donald M., United States District Judge
Summary
The Court granted the Service's Motion in part, vacating the litigation deadlines set in the Pretrial Scheduling Order, and setting a summary judgment briefing schedule. The Court also declined to grant the Service's request to stay any discovery unless and until the Court determines that discovery is necessary. Electronically stored information was not relevant to this case.
Additional Decisions
ALFRED S.K. TEO, Plaintiff,
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant
CASE NO. 20-81351-MIDDLEBROOKS/Brannon
United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Entered on FLSD Docket October 26, 2020
Middlebrooks, Donald M., United States District Judge
ORDER
*1 THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Internal Revenue Service's (the “Service”) Motion for Parties To Be Excused from Discovery and Trial-Related Requirements of Pretrial Scheduling Order (“Motion”), filed on October 2, 2020. (DE 11). Plaintiff Alfred S.K. Teo has responded in opposition, and the Service has replied. (DE 13; DE 17). For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part.
This is a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) lawsuit. In June 2020, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the Service, seeking the production of several documents related to his 2016 tax return and the Service's audit of that return. (DE 1 at 1–2). Ultimately, the Service failed to produce any responsive documentation or a written determination by the statutory deadline, including two extensions thereof, which prompted Plaintiff to file the present action. (See DE 1 at 5).
In its instant Motion, the Service requests that the Court (1) excuse the Parties from the discovery- and trial-related deadlines set forth in the Pretrial Scheduling Order and enter a summary judgment briefing schedule and (2) stay any discovery unless and until the Court determines that discovery is necessary. (DE 11 at 1). In support of its position, the Service asserts that lawsuits brought under FOIA are unique in nature in that they are ordinarily resolved by way of summary judgment, obviating the need for trial, and that “[d]iscovery is generally not available.” (DE 14 at 2). Plaintiff opposes these requests, arguing that the Motion is an “attempt to improperly delay resolution of this matter,” given that the Service has already admitted in its Answer that it currently possesses documents responsive to Plaintiff's request and that such documents are not exempt from disclosure. (DE 13 at 2). As such, instead of granting the Service's requested relief, Plaintiff submits that the Court should resolve this action on his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (DE 12; DE 13 at 2). In its Reply, the Service represents that it does not seek to delay resolution of this matter but instead “to allow this case to proceed as a typical FOIA case, rather than as a typical civil action.” (DE 17 at 1).
In a FOIA case, the issues are (1) whether the producing agency conducted a reasonable search for responsive records; and (2) whether the agency withheld non-exempt responsive records. See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 500 (11th Cir. 2011). These issues are ordinarily resolved upon summary judgment motion. See Miscavige v. I.R.S., 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993) (“FOIA cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the documents in issue are properly identified.”). Generally, when an agency's summary judgment motion is supported by affidavits substantiating that it adequately searched for and produced responsive documents, no discovery is necessary in a FOIA action. However, in the event that discovery is needed, such requests should not be submitted until there is a pending motion for summary judgment. See Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 369 (affirming the denial of a request for discovery in a FOIA case before the government moved for summary judgment).
*2 Based on the foregoing and the Parties’ written submissions, I will grant the Service's Motion in part. I will vacate the litigation deadlines set in the Pretrial Scheduling Order, thereby excusing the Parties from compliance therewith, and the Parties shall submit summary judgment briefing in accordance with the below schedule. I decline to grant the Service's request to stay any discovery unless and until the Court determines that discovery is necessary. Instead, if, after the Service files its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff propounds discovery that the Service maintains is improper, it may file an appropriate motion and I will take up the issue at that time. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff is reminded that discovery requests absent a pending motion for summary judgment shall be denied as premature. See Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 369.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Parties To Be Excused from Discovery and Trial-Related Requirements of Pretrial Scheduling Order (DE 11) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. The litigation deadlines set forth in the Pretrial Scheduling Order (DE 8) are hereby VACATED.
3. Motions for Summary Judgment shall be due on or by November 30, 2020; Responses in Opposition shall be due on or by December 30, 2020; and Replies shall be due on or by January 6, 2020. The Parties are advised that no extensions of these filing deadlines will be granted absent a showing of highly compelling circumstances, supported by specific facts explaining why the briefing schedule could not be met despite the exercise of diligence.
4. In lieu of trial, a hearing on the Motion(s) for Summary Judgment shall be set, if necessary, upon the filing of a proper motion by either Party once the Motion(s) are fully briefed.
5. Discovery, if appropriate, may be conducted between November 30, 2020 and December 30, 2020. The Parties are advised that they must timely file appropriate motions if discovery disputes arise.
SIGNED in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, Florida, this 23rd day of October, 2020.