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Snyder v. Alight Sols., LLC

2022 WL 17185009 (C.D. Cal. 2022)

June 23, 2022

Scott, Karen E., United States Magistrate Judge

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Summary

The Court denied Plaintiff's motion to compel a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant, finding that Topics 1, 4, and 5 were not relevant to the claims of wrongful termination and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parties were able to come to an agreement on the deposition of Kaleen Robinson, but the remaining topics were found to be unnecessary or irrelevant.

LEAH SNYDER
v.
ALIGHT SOLUTIONS LLC, et al

Case No. 8:21-cv-00187-CJC-KES

United States District Court, C.D. California

Filed June 23, 2022

Counsel

Maria Barr for Jazmin Dorado, Courtroom Clerk, ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: None Present
Not Present, Court Reporter, ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT: None Present

Scott, Karen E., United States Magistrate Judge

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): Order Denying Motion to Compel Depositions Under FRCP 30(b)(1) and 30(b)(6) (Dkt. 88)

I. INTRODUCTION

*1 Plaintiff Leah Snyder (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Alight Solutions, LLC (“Defendant”) wrongfully terminated after she posted photos on social media that showed her at the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6, 2021. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 12). Following a motion to dismiss, the remaining claims in this lawsuit are: (1) wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy, and (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See Dkt. 30.)

Plaintiff filed the instant motion, seeking to compel (1) Kaleen Robinson's Rule 30(b)(1) deposition; and (2) Defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (Dkt. 88 [“Motion”].) The parties filed a joint stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2 setting forth their respective positions, (Dkt. 89 [“JS”]), and they have also filed supplemental briefs (Dkts. 92, 93).

The Court asked the parties to meet and confer to consider certain issues. (Dkt. 95.) Following that meet and confer process, the parties were able to come to an agreement on many of the issues raised in the Motion, including the deposition of Ms. Robinson. (Dkt. 96.) However, the parties still dispute whether Defendant should be compelled to designate a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to be deposed on three topics of inquiry identified in the amended notice of deposition (i.e., topics 1, 4, and 5.).

Plaintiff argues that these topics are proper under Rule 30(b)(6) and seek relevant information for purposes of Rule 26(b)(1), while Defendant raises a number of objections to them. As explained further below, the Court sustains Defendant's relevance objections, and the Motion is DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Legal Standards.

The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is defined as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). District courts also have broad discretion to limit discovery to prevent its abuse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(i-iii) (instructing that courts must limit discovery where the party seeking the discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action” or where the proposed discovery is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,” “obtain[able] from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” or where it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)”).

It is not literally possible to depose an entity like an LLC. Instead, information from an LLC must be sought from natural persons who can speak on behalf of the entity. Hooker v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 204 F.R.D. 124, 125 (S.D. Indiana 2001). Rule 30(b)(6) therefore provides in relevant part:

*2 In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).

A party who notices a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition should apply fairness and reasonableness to the scope of the matters that the witness is required to testify about. For “Rule [30(b)(6) ] to effectively function, the requesting party must take care to designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are intended to be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute.” Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Minn. 2000). “Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses must be prepared and knowledgeable, but they need not be subjected to a ‘memory contest.’ ” Alexander v. F.B.I., 486 F.R.D. 137, 143 (D.D.C. 1998).

While an entity must make a good faith effort to prepare a 30(b)(6) witness to “fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter ... that task becomes less realistic and increasingly impossible as the number and breadth of noticed subject areas expand.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 1511901 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000) (“An overbroad Rule 30(b)(6) notice subjects the noticed party to an impossible task.”).

B. Topic 1.

This topic seeks testimony on the following subject: “Whether Defendant has ever allocated and/or considered time employed by Hewitt Associates, LLC [“Hewitt”], and/or AON towards time employed by Defendant for purposes of: (a) seniority, (b) retirement benefits, (c) continuation of employment practices, and (d) employee preferences in selection of jobs? And if the answer is “yes,” then under what circumstances.” (Dkt. 90-2.)

Plaintiff contends that Hewitt and AON are Defendants' predecessors in interest and that Plaintiff worked for all three companies for a total of approximately 20 years. (JS at 4.) Plaintiff's counsel argued at the hearing that her history of employment is relevant to whether Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated Plaintiff (because the longer she was employed, the greater Defendant's duty to investigate the facts before firing her), and is also relevant to Plaintiff's claim for damages (although that theory was not sufficiently explained).

Defendant objects to this topic on the grounds that it (1) is not relevant, (2) is overbroad, burdensome, and oppressive, (3) seeks confidential and proprietary information, (4) is vague and ambiguous, (5) lacks particularity, and (6) assumes facts not in evidence. (Dkt. 91, Ex. 14.) Defendant contends that topic 1 is not relevant because Plaintiff alleges wrongful termination, not that she was disfavored under any “seniority” system or denied a transfer or reassignment. (Dkt. 91 at 108.) At the hearing, Defendant conceded that credit for past employment at either Hewitt and/or AON might be relevant to Plaintiff's claim for damages with respect to lost retirement benefits. However, Defendant contends that a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is not proportional to the needs of the case because it already provided Plaintiff with copies of its retirement plan documents showing that Defendant does not consider such prior employment in calculating retirement benefits.

*3 The Court agrees with Defendant. Subsections (a), (c), and (d) have no relevance to Plaintiff's claims, and (c) and (d) are too vague to permit meaningful witness preparation. As to (b), while how Defendant determined eligibility for retirement benefits or the amount of benefits might be relevant to Plaintiff's claim for damages, Plaintiff has not shown that the documents Defendant provided do not sufficiently address this topic and that a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is therefore necessary. When asked to address this issue specifically (Dkt. 95), Plaintiff's supplemental brief raised other arguments (Dkt. 96). Further, despite Plaintiff's hearing argument, how long Plaintiff was employed by Defendant has no bearing on the duty owed by an employer under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, if an, in an at-will employment relationship.

C. Topic 4.

Topic 4 is a “yes” or “no” question: “Is Plaintiff eligible for rehire by Defendant? And, if the answer is ‘no,’ then what are the facts which make her ineligible for rehire.” (Dkt. 90-2.)

Plaintiff's counsel explained at the hearing that this topic is relevant to Plaintiff's damages because prospective employers might inquire with Defendant about Plaintiff's eligibility for rehire and, if they are told that she is not eligible for rehire, then that would make it more difficult for Plaintiff to mitigate her damages by obtaining gainful employment.

Defendant objects to topic 4 on the ground that it (1) is not relevant, (2) is overbroad, burdensome, and oppressive, (3) is vague and ambiguous, and (4) lacks particularity. (Dkt. 91, Ex. 14.) Defendant contends that rehiring Plaintiff is not an issue. In an effort to resolve this dispute, however, Defendant informed Plaintiff that there is nothing in its Human Resources system designating Plaintiff as ineligible for consideration of any position. (JS at 18.) At the hearing, defense counsel confirmed that Defendant does not provide information beyond dates of employment in response to reference checks.

Plaintiff also argues that testimony on this topic is relevant to impeachment because Defendant has refused to reinstate her. But “eligibility for rehire” means a that person possesses the requisite qualifications for a particular job, not that the employer would necessarily hire such a person.

The Court sustains Defendant's relevance objection. Plaintiff has failed to articulate any reason why her eligibility for rehire is relevant to the claims and/or defenses in this case.

D. Topic 5.

This topic seeks: “The identity, contact information and position of investor/partner Blackstone's employee Matt, as identified in deposition of Paulette Dodson, taken March 16, 2022 [40:19-24 and Exhibit 39], and the facts which support the conclusion of Amy Wulfstieg in writing to Ms. Dodson that Blackstone was ‘comming [sic] out strong on this.’ ”

Defendant argues that Matt's contact information was provided via a document produced to Plaintiff in November 2021, and has directed Plaintiff's counsel to the document. At the hearing, counsel confirmed that he has the contact information, so a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is not necessary on this topic.

As to the facts known to Ms. Wulfstieg that caused her to write the email referenced, Defendant cannot prepare a witness to testify as to the personal knowledge or subjective perceptions of Ms. Wulfsteig because (1) she no longer employed by Defendant, and (2) anyone else would just be speculating. (JS at 19.)

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.