*1 Before the Court in the above-entitled matter is Defendant Baylor University's (“Baylor”) Amended Motion for Protection Relating to the Scope of Discovery in this Litigation, (Mot., Dkt. 517), Plaintiffs' Response, (Dkt. 527), Baylor's Reply, (Dkt. 530), and Plaintiffs' Supplement, (Dkt. 549). Baylor makes two requests. First, Baylor seeks a protective order prohibiting discovery regarding the following issues or subjects:

(Proposed Order, Dkt. 527-2, at 1 (“Requests 1–12”)).

Second, Baylor seeks an order that this Court's prior rulings limiting certain discovery, (see, e.g., Dkts. 146, 302, 222, and 176), apply to all forms of discovery, including but not limited to depositions and any associated document requests and/or subpoenas, including the following restrictions:

(Proposed Order, Dkt. 527-2, at 1 (“Requests 12–15”)). Having considered the parties' submissions, the record, and the governing law, the Court enters the following order.

“The scope of discovery is broad and permits the discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.’ ” Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). “A discovery request is relevant when the request seeks admissible evidence or ‘is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 392 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2004)). A district court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). This rule “confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). “The burden is upon [the party seeking the protective order] to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)); Robinson v. Dall. Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 3:14-CV-4187-D, 2016 WL 1273900, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2016).

*2 The Court appreciates the efficiency of raising all of these proposed discovery orders in a single filing. The Court will grant a protective order on one narrow issue: Baylor's communications with investigators from the NCAA, the Big XII, and the Texas Rangers. The Court will detail its reasoning in denying the protection Baylor requests regarding settlement agreements with certain former officials. The Court will deny all other proposed restrictions on discovery. The Court addresses each of these decisions in turn.

In an order issued on July 26, 2017, this Court granted Baylor protection from producing Baylor's “communications with investigators” from the NCAA, the Big XII, and the Texas Rangers.” (Order, Dkt. 146, at 13). The order granted protection to Baylor only; it did not address discovery from third parties. (See id.) The Court explained that confidentiality agreements with these entities does not bar discovery into a particular matter. (Id. at 8). However, under Rule 26, “the existence of such agreements requires the Court to consider the impact of requiring Baylor to violate those obligations in determining whether Plaintiffs' request is proportional to the needs of the case.” (Id. at 8–9). Considering Baylor's communications with the NCAA, the Big XII, and the Texas Rangers, the Court found that the relevance of these communications to Plaintiffs' claims was unclear. (Id. at 9). The Court concluded that confidentiality during ongoing criminal and institutional investigations outweighed the value of such evidence to Plaintiffs' claims. (See id.).

Baylor states that Plaintiffs have since sought discovery of these communications and related internal Baylor communications through third parties. (Mot., Dkt. 517, at 5 n. 12 (citing Subpoenas, Dkts. 381-1–381-12; Pls. Mot. Compel Briles, Dkt. 468, at 3–4)). Request 14 seeks an order that “Baylor's communications with the NCAA, the Big XII and the Texas Rangers are not discoverable [from any party].” (Proposed Order, Dkt. 517-2, at 1).

The strong public policy interests in preserving the integrity and confidentiality of ongoing criminal and institutional investigations applies for all parties involved in this case, including third parties. Baylor's motion before the Court identifies specific discovery requests which would compromise those interests. (See Mot., Dkt. 512, at 5 n. 12). Moreover, in their responsive briefing, Plaintiffs have not indicated any new grounds which would alter the Court's assessment that confidentiality during ongoing criminal and institutional investigations outweighs the value of such evidence to Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that Baylor has demonstrated that a protective order is necessary in this narrow instance. The Court will grant an order that Baylor's communications with the NCAA, the Big XII and the Texas Rangers are not discoverable from any party to this case, including third parties.

However, should Plaintiffs' discovery efforts give rise to information suggesting that disclosure of certain communications would outweigh the burden to Defendant or the named individuals and would play an important role in resolving material issues, Plaintiffs are welcome to re-urge the issue with the Court.

In the same order on July 26, 2017, this Court granted Baylor protection from Plaintiffs' request to produce settlement agreements with Ian McCaw, Art Briles, and Tom Hill. (Order, Dkt. 146, at 13). That order granted protection to Baylor only; it did not address discovery from third parties. (See id.). The Court explained that “at th[at] time, permitting the discovery of the settlement agreements between Baylor and Art Briles, Tom Hill, and Ian McCaw would not be in keeping with the proportionality requirements of Rule 26, as the relevance of those agreements to this lawsuit is outweighed by the strong public policy interests in preserving the confidentiality of settlement agreements.” (Id. at 10).

*3 Baylor states that Plaintiffs have since sought discovery of these settlement agreements through third parties. (Mot., Dkt. 512, at 6 n. 13 (citing Briles Mot. Quash, Dkt. 483)). Request 15 seeks an order that “Baylor's settlement agreements with certain Baylor officials are not discoverable [from any party], with the exception of the settlement agreement of Ken Starr.” (Proposed Order, Dkt. 527-2, at 1 (citing Order, Dkt. 146 at 10)).

The strong public policy interests in preserving the confidentiality of settlement agreements apply for all parties involved in this case, including third parties. Baylor's motion before the Court identifies specific discovery requests which would undermine those interests. (See Mot., Dkt. 512, at 6 n. 13). However, because investigations depend on confidentiality in a way that private settlement agreements do not, the Court reaches a different conclusion regarding the settlement agreements. Plaintiffs persuasively argue that the confidentiality of certain settlement agreements has now been compromised by public news coverage. (Mot. Compel Briles, Dkt. 468, at 2). Moreover, Art Briles advised the Court that he has declined to produce his settlement agreement only out of respect for this Court's prior order, (Order, Dkt. 146, at 10), and that he “has no personal desire to conceal any agreement he might have with Baylor.” (Briles Mot. Quash, Dkt. 450, at 3).

Given that the terms of certain settlements have become public, that some former Baylor officials have even volunteered to provide their settlement agreements, and the relevance of the settlement agreements to Plaintiffs' claims may have evolved over the course of this litigation, the Court declines to issue a blanket protective order barring production of the settlement agreements by third parties. Any party to this case retains the right to seek a protective order from a specific discovery request, for cause shown, on an individual basis.

The Court will deny all of the remaining proposed restrictions on discovery. (Requests 1–13). The Court finds that Baylor has not shown that these discovery requests are not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” in this case. See Crosby, 647 F.3d at 262. The Court further finds that Baylor has not met its burden to show the necessity of a protective order regarding this material. In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d at 306. The Court concludes that Baylor has not demonstrated good cause for a protective order. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36. Any party to this case retains the right to seek a protective order from a specific discovery request, for cause shown, on an individual basis.

Accordingly, the Court orders that Baylor's Amended Motion for Protection Relating to the Scope of Discovery in this Litigation, (Dkt. 517), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Specifically, IT IS ORDERED that Baylor's motion is GRANTED with respect to Request 14. The Court ORDERS that Baylor's communications with the NCAA, the Big XII and the Texas Rangers are not discoverable from any party to this case, including third parties.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Baylor's motion is DENIED with respect to all other requested restrictions on the scope of discovery (Requests 1–13, 15).

All relief not specifically granted by this Order is DENIED.

SIGNED on October 10, 2018.