Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ.
Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ.
2020 WL 13610150 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
May 26, 2020

Austin, Andrew W.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Third Party Subpoena
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Summary
The court denied Colin Shillinglaw's motion to quash and ordered him to produce all materials responsive to Plaintiffs' Second Subpoena. The court also noted that any ESI should be produced in accordance with the court's recent orders on Jim Doak's and Brian Nicholson's Motions to Quash.
Additional Decisions
Jane DOE 1, et al.
v.
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY
6:16-CV-173-RP-AA Consolidated with 6:17-CV-228-RP-AA, 6:17-CV-236-RP-AA
United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Waco Division
Signed May 26, 2020

Counsel

Chad W. Dunn, Brazil & Dunn, LLP, Austin, TX, Eleeza Nickole Johnson, Andrea Michelle Mehta, James R. Dunnam, Dunnam, Dunnam, et al., Waco, TX, George (Tex) Quesada, Jody Rodenberg, Laura Benitez Geisler, Sean J. McCaffity, Sommerman McCaffity Quesada & Geisler, LLP, Dallas, TX, K. Scott Brazil, Brazil & Dunn, Houston, TX, for Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, Jane Doe 4, Jane Doe 5, Jane Doe 6, Jane Doe 7, Jane Doe 8, Jane Doe 9, Jane Doe 10.
Chad W. Dunn, Brazil & Dunn, LLP, Austin, TX, James R. Dunnam, Dunnam, Dunnam, et al.et, Waco, TX, for Jane Doe 12, Jane Doe 13, Jane Doe 14, Jane Doe 15.
James R. Dunnam, Dunnam, Dunnam, et al., Waco, TX, K. Scott Brazil, Brazil & Dunn, Houston, TX, Chad W. Dunn, Brazil & Dunn, LLP, Austin, TX, for Jane Doe 11.
Geoffrey D. Weisbart, Julie A. Springer, Mia A. Storm, Sara E. Janes, Danielle K. Hatchitt, Weisbart Springer Hayes, LLP, Austin, TX, Holly Gene McIntush, Thompson & Horton, LLP, Austin, TX, James E. Byrom, Lisa Ann Brown, Matthew A. Reed, Ryan Hewlett Newman, Thompson & Horton, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Baylor University.
Geoffrey D. Weisbart, Julie A. Springer, Sara E. Janes, Weisbart Springer Hayes, LLP, Austin, TX, Holly Gene McIntush, Thompson & Horton, LLP, Austin, TX, Lisa Ann Brown, Thompson & Horton LLP, Houston, TX, for Baylor University.
Geoffrey D. Weisbart, Julie A. Springer, Sara E. Janes, Weisbart Springer Hayes, LLP, Austin, TX, Holly Gene McIntush, Thompson & Horton, LLP, Austin, TX, James E. Byrom, Lisa Ann Brown, Thompson & Horton, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Baylor University.
Austin, Andrew W., United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER

*1 Before the Court is a motion to quash filed by non-party Colin Shillinglaw. Dkt. 383. Colin Shillinglaw served as Baylor's Director of Operations for Head Football Coach Art Briles until Shillinglaw's termination in May 2016. Dkt. 756-1 at 5. Plaintiffs served Shillinglaw with a subpoena duces tecum, containing 57 requests for production. (Dkt. 383 at 2). Shillinglaw filed a Motion to Quash the Subpoena (Dkt. 383) and Plaintiffs responded (Dkts. 420). In late 2019, the Court ordered all third party movants with outstanding motions to advise whether their motions had become moot by passage of time, intervening discovery rulings, or some other reason. Dkt. 726. Shillinglaw filed an advisory stating that he has had no communications with Plaintiffs since filing the motion to quash. Dkt. 728. On December 6, 2019, the Court invited third parties to file any updated briefing on a pending motion, no later than December 13, 2019. Dkt. 744. The deadline has passed and Shillinglaw has not filed any further briefing.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“The scope of discovery is broad and permits the discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.’ ” Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)). “A discovery request is relevant when the request seeks admissible evidence or ‘is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2004)). “Once the party seeking discovery establishes that the materials requested are within the scope of permissible discovery, the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show why the discovery is irrelevant, overly broad, unduly burdensome or oppressive, and thus should not be permitted.” Allen v. Priority Energy Servs., L.L.C., No. MO16CV00047DAEDC, 2017 WL 7789280, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2017) (citing Export Worldwide, Ltd. v. Knight, 241 F.R.D. 259, 263 (W.D. Tex. 2006)). A court must quash or modify a subpoena that subjects a person to an undue burden. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv). “To determine whether the subpoena presents an undue burden, we consider the following factors: (1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818. Further, “if the person to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” Id. Rule 26 “confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1))
III. Shillinglaw's Motion to Quash
The parties do not dispute that Shillinglaw holds some relevant, responsive documents. Shillinglaw raises three objections.
A. Notice and Service Under Rule 45
*2 Shillinglaw objects that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice and service requirements for a subpoena under Rule 45, thus depriving Baylor of adequate notice to submit any objections and imposing an undue burden on Shillinglaw. Dkt. 383 at 3. Under Rule 45(a)(4), “[i]f the subpoena commands the production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or the inspection of premises before trial, then before it is served on the person to whom it is directed, a notice and a copy of the subpoena must be served on each party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(4). Shillinglaw asserts that he was seved with the subpoena on June 20, 2018, but Baylor was not served until June 27, 2018. Dkt. 383 at 3. Plaintiffs offer evidence that they did comply with Rule 45. However, the Court's review of the record shows that Plaintiffs served Baylor with their Notice of Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Shillinglaw on June 12, 2018, (Dkt. 375 at 5) and served Shillinglaw with the subpoena on June 20, 2018 (Dkt. 383 at 2). See also Pls.’ Ex. C, Dkt. 420-3. Plaintiffs properly served Baylor with notice before they served Shillinglaw with the subpoena.[1]
B. Deadline to Respond
Shillinglaw objects that he was served with the subpoena just nine days before its deadline to respond, and requests more time to respond. Dkt. 383 at 3 (citing Armendariz v. Chowaiki, 2015 WL 13373576, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 11, 2015) (holding 20 days to be an unreasonable amount of time)). In general, a responding party should confer with a requesting party to agree on a reasonable extension. Given the passage of time, however, this issue is moot.
C. Plaintiffs’ Discovery Conduct
Shillinglaw's motion is almost entirely a recitation of procedural objections, and contains (too much) vague innuendo suggesting that Plaintiffs are engaging in some sort of discovery misconduct, without offering any specificity. Most colorfully: “Plaintiffs’ Subpoena is so riddled with procedural errors that it clearly indicates Plaintiffs are attempting to undermine this Court, its prior rulings, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole in order to obtain documents the Court has deemed protected as a matter of public policy as well as not proportional or relevant to the needs of the above-captioned case.” Dkt. 383 at 1. Counsel would do well to leave the hyperbole in the editor's trash can, and stick to the facts. Indeed, it would appear that Shillinglaw's counsel did not meaningfully confer in good faith prior to filing the motion. See W.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-7(i). The Court again urges all parties involved in this suit—including non-party movants—to focus their briefing on the legal issues in dispute and their specific request for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rule 26(c) requires “a showing of good cause” for a protective order. In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998). Shillinglaw has not met his burden. Accordingly the Court DENIES Shillinglaw's Motion to Quash Plaintiffs’ Subpoena (Dkt. 383). The Court ORDERS Shillinglaw to produce all materials responsive to Plaintiffs’ Second Subpoena consistent with the terms of this Order on or before June 19, 2020. For guidance on questions that may arise during production, Shillinglaw is directed to review the Court's recent orders on Jim Doak's Motions to Quash (Dkt. 834) and Brian Nicholson's Motion to Quash (Dkt. 842).

Footnotes

Even if Plaintiffs had served Baylor with notice seven days late, that error would not have affected the substantial rights of the parties. Since Baylor and Shillinglaw were served, Baylor has filed a series of motions seeking protection regarding both the scope of discovery and discovery from former employees, including Shillinglaw. Shillinglaw does not identify any way in which Baylor's rights would have been affected. “While prior notice to the opposing party is required for a subpoena duces tecum, a ‘court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.’ ” Duke v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., 594 F. App'x 829, 832 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Busbee v. Sule, 603 F.2d 1197, 1199 (5th Cir. 1979)).