In re Application of 2770095 Ontario, Inc Case No. 2:21-mc-01004-CBM-JC United States District Court, C.D. California Filed January 10, 2022 Chooljian, Jacqueline, United States Magistrate Judge Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE APPLICATION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (DOCKET NO. 1) I. Summary *1 On June 30, 2021, 2770095 Ontario, Inc. (“277 Ontario” or “Applicant”) filed an Application to Conduct Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (“Application”) with supporting declarations of Martin Juarez Audiffred (“Audiffred Decl.”), Norman J. Groot (“Groot Decl.”) and Michael Jason Lee (“Lee Decl.”) with exhibits (“Lee Ex.”). (Docket No. 1). The Application seeks an order authorizing the issuance of subpoenas for the taking of the depositions of, and the production of documents from Emblaze One Inc. (“Emblaze”) and Jaspreet Mathur (“Mathur”) (collectively “Respondents”) for use in a foreign proceeding.[1] On July 23, 2021, Respondents filed an Opposition to the Application (“Opp.”) with exhibits. (Docket No. 8). On July 30, 2021, the Applicant filed a Reply with exhibits (“Reply Ex.”).[2] (Docket No. 9). Based upon the parties' submissions in connection with the Application and for the reasons explained below, the Court denies the Application without prejudice at this juncture. II. Background The Application arises out of an approximately $1,100,000.00 loss suffered by Affinitas Medios de Pago S.A.P.I. de C.V. (“Affinitas”), which has assigned its legal rights to pursue collection thereof to the Applicant. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 9-10). Affinitas, which is based in Mexico City, Mexico, is a payment facilitator that sources and manages payment solutions for internet merchants. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 3). Affinitas helps clients “integrate and manage their web-based sales of goods and services which primarily support the on-line gaming industry internationally.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 4). Affinitas engages third-party payment processors to act as intermediaries between banks and Affinitas's merchant clients to process payments. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 5). “A payment processor often has many clients whose customers pay for ... products and services with debit and/or credit cards. The payment processor receives card payments through an e-commerce, electronic gateway. The funds from such e-commerce payments are held, allocated and accounted for in separate e-commerce merchant accounts.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 5). The payment processor typically has an arrangement with a bank, which processes a merchant's transactions “through the electronic gateway, settles and clears the amounts in the merchants' accounts, and then transmits the ... funds, less the bank's fee, to the payment processor via bank transfer.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 6). Typically, facilitators such as Affinitas will not know the payment processor's bankers. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 6). Thus, “there are four main parties to a typical merchant transaction: (a) the merchant; (b) the facilitator (Affinitas); (c) the payment processor... ; and (d) a bank (which sends and receives funds from the customers' purchases).” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 7). *2 In the spring of 2020, various merchants hired Affinitas to implement and manage their online payment processing needs. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 9). Affinitas, in turn, began looking for an appropriate payment processor for its merchant clients, and was eventually referred to New Line Processing LLC (“New Line”), a Williamsville, New York-based company that represented itself to Affinitas as a payment processing brokerage house that would act as an intermediary between facilitators and payment processors. (Audiffred Decl. ¶¶ 9-10). New Line recommended Zed Payments (“Zed”) provide payment processing through its representative, a Canadian named Maxwell Dean Morgan (“Morgan”). (Audiffred Decl. ¶¶ 10-12). Morgan represented to Affinitas that Zed “had formed direct relationships with reputable banks that were able to process the financial transactions of Affinitas'[s] merchants. Morgan further represented to Affinitas that he was the operating mind on the business side of Zed..., that Zed ... was commercially registered in the Philippines and that Zed ... provided payment processing services globally.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 11). Based on these representations, Affinitas agreed to do business with Zed with Affinitas effectively acting as a reseller of Zed's payment processing services. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 14). Throughout June 2020, Affinitas coordinated with Zed and New Line to complete the technical integration of the Zed payment processing solution for Affinitas's merchants. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 15). Morgan and “Michael A. Harris” managed the technical integration for Zed.[3] (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 15). On or about June 16, 2020, the technical integration between Affinitas's merchant accounts and Zed's payment processing was completed, Affinitas's online payment processing capabilities went live, and Affinitas's merchants started generating online sales of their goods and services. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 16). On July 17, 2020, Affinitas and Zed signed a written agreement formalizing their working relationship. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 16). Between June and August 2020, Affinitas did not receive timely payments from Zed. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 17). By August 2020, the total outstanding balance due to Affinitas' clients had grown to over $1,037,397.40, consisting of “missing” wire transfers and “outstanding” transfers. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 17). The “missing” wire transfers, which amounted to $290,343.27, consisted of amounts Zed claimed had been sent to Affinitas's clients and for which Morgan provided Affinitas with “ ‘wire transfer confirmation’ documents,” but which the clients had not received. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 17). The “outstanding” transfers, which amounted to $747,054.13, represented those funds due and owing to Affinitas's merchants which had not been remitted and which were not claimed to have been remitted. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 17). Additionally, by the terms of the parties' agreement, Affinitas's clients were entitled to the return of $183,079.35 in reserve funds, which were due by February 2021, but have not been paid. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 18). Morgan represented to Affinitas that “banking issues” caused the delayed payments and that the intermediary financial institutes had placed holds on the funds; however, Morgan did not provide the detailed information Affinitas requested about the missing payments. (Audiffred Decl. ¶¶ 19-21). Morgan also did not disclose to Affinitas the identities of the banks at issue, so Affinitas could not verify Morgan's representations. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 21). On July 17, 2020, New Line provided Affinitas with wire transfer confirmations for two payments purportedly sent from Zed and Morgan to New Line that day. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 24). The “purported wire transfer confirmations concerned two wire payments due to Affinitas'[s] merchants and appeared to be generated by TD Canada Trust Bank (‘TD Bank’) relating [to] an account held in the name of 2513086 Ontario Inc. (‘251 Ontario’).” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 25). Affinitas later learned that Morgan was directly tied to 251 Ontario. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 25). Despite the representations of New Line and Morgan, Affinitas's clients never actually received the two wire transfers. (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 26). On July 30, 2020, New Line “produced to Affinitas what it claimed to be ‘tracing’ information related to some of the missing or outstanding funds. Here, too, these records related to TD Bank, but actually referenced confirmations from April 2012 (years before the relevant events) among other indicia of forgery.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 26). Morgan eventually claimed that a previously unidentified entity known as “Blade Payments” was “responsible for the delays, purportedly acting as a ‘rogue’ business partner that he claimed owned 251 Ontario.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 27). However, Affinitas believes Morgan “concocted Blade Payments to serve as a scapegoat” along with “likely fake company representatives that he purported to be communicating with [at Blade Payments] named Devin Crosby, Nathan Joseph, Damon Porter and Cheryl Richards.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 27). *3 Morgan pledged to repay the roughly $1,000,000.00 owed to Affinitas pursuant to a payment schedule; however, “only one payment was ever made – approximately $110,000 wired from yet another new entity named 2416336 Ontario Inc. (‘241 Ontario’) on August 21, 2020.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 28). These “funds were tied to a TD Bank account, and [the Applicant] has since ... discovered that 241 Ontario is an active Ontario corporation with Morgan serving as its sole registered officer and director.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 28). Ultimately, “communications between the parties broke down completely.” (Audiffred Decl. ¶ 28). On February 18, 2021, the Applicant filed an application in Canada seeking production from TD Bank of the account records of 251 Ontario and 241 Ontario. (Groot Decl. ¶ 3). On March 4, 2021, TD Bank produced documents regarding several bank accounts tied to 251 and 241 Ontario “including 251 Ontario's Account No. 7202235 (‘Account 235’) and 241 Ontario's 7200478 (‘Account 478’).” (Groot Decl. ¶ 5). The documents showed that the only significant deposits into 251 Ontario's Account 235 were received from Emblaze, an entity Mathur controlled.[4] (Groot Decl. ¶ 7). Likewise, wire transfers from Emblaze were the primary source of deposits into 241 Ontario's Account 478 during the relevant times. (Groot Decl. ¶ 9). Additionally, the Applicant identified four companies “connected to” Affinitas's losses – Baazel Max Advertising, Elevation Management, ND Group LLC and Roberge Oil Markings – that the Applicant believes “were used as dummy companies to obtain merchant accounts under false pretenses from United States-based acquiring banks, and these merchant accounts were used to process gaming transactions unbeknownst to the acquiring banks.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 6). After receiving large sums of money from Emblaze, 251 Ontario sent funds to Affinitas merchants. (Groot Decl. ¶ 8). For example, on July 21, 2020, 251 Ontario received $82,482.50 from Emblaze in Account 235 and the following day 251 Ontario disbursed $78,398.37 from that account to an Affinitas merchant account. (Groot Decl. ¶ 8). Emblaze stopped making large deposits to 251 Ontario on or around August 21, 2020. (Groot Decl. ¶ 8). Beginning in July 2020, 241 Ontario sent large wire transfers to Deltec Bank and Trust Limited (“Deltec”), a financial institution operating in Nassau, Bahamas. (Groot Decl. ¶ 10). Such wire transfer funds were received from Emblaze and 251 Ontario. (Groot Decl. ¶ 10). For example, on August 5, 2020, 241 Ontario's Account 478 received $94,366.50 from 251 Ontario's Account 235 and less than 30 minutes later, that amount was wired from 241 Ontario's Account 478 to Deltec. (Groot Decl. ¶ 10). On August 20, 2020, 241 Ontario's Account 478 received $111,982.50 from Emblaze and the following day, the sole $110,000.00 repayment was wired to Affinitas from 241 Ontario's Account 478. (Groot Decl. ¶ 11). “In other words, the partial repayment of the debt to Affinitas was directly sourced from Emblaze ...through the same source as payments from 251 Ontario to Affinitas'[s] merchants.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 11). Applicant 277 Ontario was created for the purpose of pursuing collection of the liquidated loss of approximately $1,110,000 suffered by Affinitas, which, as previously indicated, has assigned to Applicant all legal rights, causes of action, and authority to pursue collection of the loss. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 9-10). On June 11, 2021, the Applicant sued Morgan, 241 Ontario, 251 Ontario and others (not including Emblazon and Mathur) in 277 Ontario Inc. v. Morgan, et al., Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Case No. CV-21-00663862-0000 (“Canadian action”), alleging claims of fraud, breach of trust, conversion, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment, among others, and seeking punitive, exemplary, and aggravated damages against Morgan and the other defendants. (Groot Decl. ¶ 12; Lee Decl. ¶ 4; Lee Ex. A). *4 “On June 14, 2021, the Honorable Justice Myers of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ... granted an ‘Anton Piller Order,’ that permitted [the Applicant] to enter and remain in the residence of defendants for the purpose of identifying, inspecting, removing and preserv[ing] certain evidence believed to be at risk of destruction or spoliation.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 13). That same day, “the Superior Court of Justice granted a Mareva injunction against certain defendants requiring the disclosure and freez[ing] of assets, and [the] appearance of certain defendants for examination under oath on June 25, 2021 for the purpose of tracing and accounting [for] the missing funds.” ((Groot Decl. ¶ 14). On June 18, 2021, Morgan submitted a partial accounting and affidavit identifying “ ‘Emblaze One Inc. owned by Jaspreet Mathur residing in California’ as the ‘actual processor’ of Affinitas'[s] claimed funds.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 15; Lee Decl. ¶ 6; Lee Ex. B). Morgan was ordered to produce banking statements, transactions records, and other financial documentation, but failed to do so. (Groot Decl. ¶ 15). In a June 28, 2021 deposition, Morgan identified Emblaze One operated by Mathur as the actual payment processor of the Affinitas's merchants' transactions. (Reply Ex. A at 14-16). “Morgan also represented under oath that remittances to a United Kingdom entity named Khera Investment Solutions Ltd. were made at the direction of Respondents.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 17; see also Reply Ex. A at 68). “There were a total of nine remittances during the time frame of June 25, 2020 through August 14, 2020 totaling $1,485,413.76. This is the precise time period that the approximately $1.1 million first went missing.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 17; see also Reply Ex. A at 68). The Applicant seeks to depose Emblaze and Mathur and also seeks the production of various documents from them.[5] (Application at 1; Lee Decl. ¶¶ 14-18, Exs. C-G). III. Discussion and Order Section 1782 “authorizes, but does not require, federal district courts to assist in the production of evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal.” Khrapunov v. Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2019); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004). It provides that “[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal....”[6] 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). “Section 1782's statutory language has been distilled to permit district courts to authorize discovery where three general requirements are satisfied: (1) the person from whom the discovery is sought ‘resides or is found' in the district of the district court where the application is made; (2) the discovery is ‘for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal’; and (3) the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or ‘any interested person.’ ” Khrapunov, 931 F.3d at 925 (citations omitted); In re Dubey, 949 F. Supp. 2d 990, 992 (C.D. Cal. 2013). *5 It is clear that the Applicant satisfies the first and third requirements, and Respondents do not seriously argue otherwise. It is undisputed that Emblaze and Mathur reside or are found in this judicial district. (See Lee Decl. ¶¶ 11-12); see also In re Hedrick House Ltd., 2020 WL 3965999, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“[I]t is undisputed that [Emblaze and Mathur] are residents of the Central District.”). Moreover, the Applicant – the Plaintiff in the Canadian action – qualifies as an interested person. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 256 (“No doubt litigants are included among, and may be the most common example of, the ‘interested person [s]’ who may invoke § 1782[.]” (citation omitted)); Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. FibroGen, Inc., 793 F.3d 1108, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Akebia is a party to the foreign proceedings underlying this case.... Accordingly, Akebia has a ‘reasonable interest’ in obtaining judicial assistance and, therefore, may apply for judicial assistance pursuant to § 1782.”); In re Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 of Japan Display, Inc., 2021 WL 4391882, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (“Petitioner qualifies as an ‘interested party’ in the foreign proceedings because it is a plaintiff in those proceedings.”). However, the parties dispute whether the Application satisfies the second general requirement – that the requested discovery is “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The Applicant contends the requested discovery satisfies the “for use” requirement because it seeks information from Respondents to further understand the nature of the Canadian action Defendants' business dealings and finances and to assist in tracing and recovering the missing Affinitas funds. (Application at 14; see also Lee Decl. ¶¶ 7-8). Respondents counter that the Application is too broad to satisfy the “for use” requirement.[7] (Opposition at 7-8). “[A] request for discovery under § 1782 that is plainly irrelevant to the foreign proceeding will fail to meet the statutory ‘for use’ requirement[.]” In re Schlich, 893 F.3d 40, 52 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv. Vehicles v. KMPG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 120 n.7 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive how information that is plainly irrelevant to the foreign proceeding could be said to be ‘for use’ in that proceeding.”); Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 2015) (A “request that fails to show that the materials sought will be of any use in the foreign proceeding would not satisfy the ‘for use’ requirement.”). Here, however, the Court cannot conclude that the Applicant's requests call for plainly irrelevant information. Clearly some of the Applicant's requests seek information relevant to the Canadian action. See Mees, 793 F.3d at 299 (“[W]here a foreign proceeding is pending, seeking discovery to prove one's claims satisfies the ‘for use’ requirement.”); In re Multiflora Int'l Ltd., 2021 WL 2662122, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]he requested discovery is for use in three Guatemalan lawsuits against Christian Rasch and other former administrators of [a]pplicants, which are proceedings before a foreign tribunal. In reviewing section 1782 applications, courts should ‘generally refrain’ from determining whether the requested discovery will be admissible in the foreign proceedings. Here, [a]pplicants want information on allegedly fraudulent transactions completed by Christian Rasch when he managed the Multiflora Companies. Some of the transactions at issue include the transfers of money to Caban, which is controlled by Christian Rasch's daughter. The alleged transactions are directly relevant to [a]pplicants' fraud and related claims against Christian Rasch and other former administrators. Thus, [a]pplicants have adequately shown that the discovery they seek is for use in a foreign proceeding.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, in the instant matter, the Court finds the Applicant has satisfied the “for use” requirement. *6 “[E]ven where an applicant satisfies § 1782's statutory prerequisites, the district court still retains substantial discretion to permit or deny the requested discovery.” Khrapunov, 931 F.3d at 926. The § 1782 discretionary factors include, primarily, [1] whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding”; [2] “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”; [3] whether the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States”; and [4] whether the request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave. NE, Bellevue, Wash., 634 F.3d 557, 571 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264-65). The Court's “discretion is guided by the twin aims of section 1782: providing efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.” In re Medical Inc. Ass'n Smile Create, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 2877406, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Sampedro v. Silver Point Cap., L.P., 958 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2020). Here, since Emblaze and Mathur are not participants in the Canadian action, the first discretionary factor supports granting the Application. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 (“[W]hen the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding..., the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad. A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction over those appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence. In contrast, nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign tribunal's jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.” (citations omitted)); Pott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (“Factor one necessarily favors Pott as Icicle is not a party to the foreign action.”). The second discretionary factor “ ‘focuses on whether the foreign tribunal is willing to consider the information sought.’ ” In re Medical Inc. Ass'n Smile Create, __ F. Supp. 3d at __, 2021 WL 2877406 at *3 (citation omitted); see also Pott, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (“Intel factor two directs courts to consider the nature of the foreign proceeding and the receptivity of the foreign tribunal to the evidence sought.”). This factor also weighs in favor of the Application since there is no evidence suggesting the Canadian courts would be unreceptive to the requested discovery. See In re Medical Inc. Ass'n Smile Create,__ F. Supp. 3d at __, 2021 WL 2877406 at *3 (“In the absence of evidence that Japanese courts would object to Applicant's discovery of the information sought in the subpoena, or that Japanese courts object more generally to the judicial assistance of U.S. federal courts, the Court finds that [the second] factor weighs in favor of authorizing service of the subpoena”); In re Tagami, 2021 WL 5322711, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“Where there is no evidence suggesting that foreign courts would be unreceptive to the requested discovery, the second discretionary factor weighs in favor of the application.”); In re Pioneer Corp. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2018 WL 4961911, *5 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“ ‘When the parties do not produce evidence showing that a foreign court would reject evidence obtained under Section 1782, courts tend to allow discovery.’ ” (citation omitted)). *7 The third factor also weighs in favor of the Application since there is no evidence suggesting the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65; see also In re Medical Inc. Ass'n Smile Create, __ F. Supp. 3d at __, 2021 WL 2877406 at *3 (“Courts have found that [the third] factor weighs in favor of discovery where there is ‘nothing to suggest that [the Applicant] is attempting to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions.’ ” (citations omitted)); In re Tagami, 2021 WL 5322711 at *3 (“[A]bsence of evidence of attempted circumvention weighs in favor of an application.”). Respondents primarily base their arguments on the fourth factor, which considers whether the requested discovery is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. “Requests are unduly intrusive and burdensome where they are not narrowly tailored, request confidential information and appear to be a broad ‘fishing expedition’ for irrelevant information.” In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (footnote omitted); see also In re Premises, 634 F.3d at 563 (A “district court should deny the request if the district court suspects that the request is a fishing expedition or a vehicle for harassment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mee, 793 F.3d at 302 (A “district court evaluating a § 1782 discovery request should assess whether the discovery sought is overbroad or unduly burdensome by applying the familiar standards of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). “[U]nduly intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. Respondents argue the Application should be denied because the “proposed discovery is grossly disproportionate to the needs of the Canadian litigation” and amounts to “nothing more than a fishing expedition or vehicle for harassment.”[8] (Opp. at 2-4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). More specifically, Respondents assert that “the documents sought are directly pointed towards competitors of Affinitas in the payment processing industry” and the “proposed subpoenas may result in Affinitas obtaining documents or information that could give it a competitive edge over those other parties.” (Id. at 9-10). Additionally, Respondents argue that the requests implicate serious confidentiality concerns. (Id. at 10-11). The Applicant disagrees, arguing the requests are narrowly tailored and suggesting “any discovery under the subpoenas will not be onerous” for the Respondents. (Application at 17). The Applicant also suggests that any confidentiality concerns can be remedied with a protective order. (Reply at 7; Reply Exs. B-C). *8 Since Respondents have not provided any evidence supporting their arguments, and as the Applicant's evidence is lacking in key respects, it is difficult to comprehensively assess some of the parties' arguments. Nevertheless, a review of the requested discovery supports the Respondents' contention that the requests are overbroad and not, as the Applicant contends, narrowly tailored. Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. For example, one document request seeks “ALL COMMUNICATIONS concerning, referring to or relating to any account held in the name of 241 ONTARIO, 251 ONTARIO, DUMMY COMPANIES, EDWARDS, HARRIS, KHERA, MORGAN, BLADE PAYMENTS, NEW LINE, and/or ZED PAYMENTS.” The request defines “ ‘COMMUNICATION(S)’ ” as “any dissemination of information by transmission or a statement from one person to another or in the presence of another, whether by writing, orally or by action or conduct, including but not limited to, written notes, electronic communications with attachments, verbal conversations and visual notations.” 241 ONTARIO, 251 ONTARIO, BLADE PAYMENTS, KHERA, NEW LINE and ZED PAYMENTS are all defined to include the named entity as well as “its subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, agents, managers, members, attorneys, accountants, investigators, representatives and anyone else acting on its behalf” and BLADE PAYMENTS also includes four specifically-identified individuals – “Devin Crosby, Nathan Joseph, Damon Porter and Cheryl Richards.” The “DUMMY COMPANIES” are defined as “Baazel Max Advertising, Elevation Management, ND Group LLC and Roberge Oil Markings, and their subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, agents, managers, attorneys, accountants, investigators, representatives and anyone else acting on their [behalf].” Likewise, the individuals named in the request – Morgan, Tricia Edwards and Michael A. Harris aka Karan Talwar – are defined to include not just themselves but also their “employees, agents, attorneys, accountants, investigators, representatives and anyone else acting on [their] behalf.”[9] (See Lee ¶ 14; Lee Ex. C). Thus, this single request seeks all written, oral and other communications from January 1, 2020 to the present (see id.) related to any account held by the named companies and individuals as well as any individual employed by them.[10] Given the vast overbreadth of the matters sought by the Applicant as exemplified by the above, the Court denies the Application without prejudice to the extent it requests the issuance of document subpoenas. Intel, 542 U.S. at 265; see also In re Hedrick House Ltd., 2020 WL 3965999 at *2 (“The breadth of HHL's request cause me more than some reservations that HHL is seeking information from Respondents for a purpose more substantial than a mere fishing expedition. In such a circumstance the authority is clear: the application should be denied.”); In re Fagan, 2019 WL 8011742, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (denying application in part because “the Application's request for bank records and related information is intrusive and burdensome, and Petitioner has not convincingly shown that he seeks this sensitive information for a purpose more substantial than a mere ‘fishing expedition.’ ” (citation omitted)); In re Pioneer Corp., 2018 WL 4961911 at *11 (“ ‘When a party chooses to serve overly broad discovery, it runs the risk that the discovery will be denied outright without an opportunity to narrow it.’ ” (quoting In re Matter of Petition for Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 by MacQuarie Bank Ltd., 2015 WL 3439103, *9 (D. Nev. 2015))). Further, since the document subpoenas form the basis for the topics as to which the Applicant seeks to depose Emblaze (and presumably Mathur) the Court likewise and for the same reasons denies the Application without prejudice to the extent it requests the issuance of deposition subpoenas. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Applicant appears to wish to seek the issuance of two document subpoenas (Lee Ex. D [to Emblaze]; Lee Ex. E [to Mathur]) which call for the production of nineteen categories of documents (Lee Ex. C) and two subpoenas calling for testimony from Emblaze (Lee Ex. F) and Mahur (Lee Ex. G). [2] The Reply Exhibits include two apparently identical revised versions of the document subpoena to Emblaze (Reply Exs. D, E), a revised version of the subpoena calling for testimony from Emblaze with a list of deposition topics (Reply Ex. F), and another copy of the revised version of the subpoena calling for testimony from Emblaze without the list of deposition topics (Reply Ex. G). The aforementioned duplicates were likely intended to be revised versions of the subpoenas calling for the testimony of and documents from Mathur (see Reply at 9) (describing attached Reply Exs. D-G). [3] Morgan later stated under oath that “Michael A. Harris is an alias used by [an individual named] Karan Talwar.” (Groot Decl. ¶ 16). [4] According to public records, Emblaze was a Canadian corporation until 2018 and since that time has operated as a United States-based corporation with a business and service address in Los Angeles, California. (Lee Decl. ¶ 11). Mathur is publically identified as Emblaze's Founder and CEO. (Lee Decl. ¶ 12). [5] Respondents complain that the Applicant seeks to compel them to appear for depositions at the office of its counsel in San Diego, which is more than 100 miles away from Mathur's residence and Emblaze's office, and that the proposed deposition subpoena to Emblaze includes no matters for examination. (Opp. at 7). The Applicant has submitted revised subpoenas setting the proposed deposition for Emblaze (and presumably Mathur – both deposition subpoenas are directed to Emblaze (see Reply Exs. F-G)) for Costa Mesa, California, and providing a list of proposed deposition topics for Emblaze. (Reply at 9; Reply Exs. D-G). Accordingly, the Court will not further address this issue. [6] In its entirety, Section 1782 states: (a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [¶] A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege. (b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to him. 28 U.S.C. § 1782. [7] Respondents cite no pertinent case law supporting this assertion. Rather, the only case Respondents cite is Hedrick House Ltd., in which Hedrick House Ltd (“HHL”) sought documents from Mathur and Emblaze. In re Hedrick House Ltd., 2020 WL 3965999 at *1; (see Opp. at 2-3). However, while that case concluded that HHL had not met the “for use” requirement, it did so because HHL had not shown that litigation was “within reasonable contemplation” rather than merely “speculative[.]” In re Hedrick House Ltd., 2020 WL 3965999 at *2; see also Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259 (proceedings need not be “pending” or “imminent” but must be “within reasonable contemplation”). While Hedrick House Ltd. also addressed purportedly overbroad discovery requests, it did so pursuant to the fourth discretionary factor courts consider – whether a request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome” – and not in its determination of the “for use” requirement. In re Hedrick House Ltd., 2020 WL 3965999 at *2. The Court agrees that, in this case at least, the overbreadth argument is appropriately addressed in determining whether the Application's document requests are unduly intrusive or burdensome. Accordingly, this issue will be discussed further below. [8] Respondents also argue “it is unclear whether 277 Ontario's Canadian complaint even asserts a viable claim” since “Affinitas's form contracts contain a mandatory forum selection clause providing for all disputes to be administrated or litigated in Mexico.” (Opp. at 1-2). However, Respondents have not demonstrated the existence of any forum selection clause related to the Canadian action and, in any event, the “Court need not weigh in on issues of foreign law, including the ‘likelihood of success of claims made in other fora.’ ” In re Peruvian Sporting Goods S.A.C., 2018 WL 7047645, *5 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 23 (D. D.C. 2010), appeal dismissed by, 2010 WL 5140467 (D.C. Cir. 2010) & 2011 WL 1765213 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see also Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e do not read [Section 1782] to condone speculative forays into legal territories unfamiliar to federal judges”). [9] Tricia Edwards is only mentioned once in the declarations the Applicant submitted, where she is conclusorily and unflatteringly described as “Morgan's equally deplorable co-fraudster” (Groot Decl. ¶ 12) – a description which is not helpful in resolving the issues before the Court. The Canadian action's “Notice of Action” identifies Edwards in more detail noting, among other things, that she “was the sole registered director and officer of” 251 Ontario. (See Lee Decl. ¶ 4; Lee Ex. A). [10] While there undoubtedly are documents and information within the very broad categories sought that would be appropriate for the Applicant to seek/obtain – items which, once obtained, might afford a basis to obtain broader categories of items – this Court declines to undertake the laborious task of narrowing the categories and leaves that to counsel. The Court suggests that counsel confer regarding the provision of a significantly narrower set of key items/information, perhaps expanding the same in stages as may be appropriate and perhaps subject to a protective order, to obviate the need to seek further judicial intervention.