*1 Before the Court is Cleveland Integrity System Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena [Doc. No. 110]. It is at issue. See Def.’s Notice Regarding Third-Party Cleveland Integrity Services Inc.’s Mot. Quash Subpoena [Doc. No. 111]; Pl.’s Opp'n CIS's Mot. Quash Subpoena [Doc. No. 115]; Cleveland Integrity Services Inc.’s Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Quash Subpoena [Doc. No. 116].

Intervenor Cleveland Integrity Services, Inc. (“CIS”) asks the Court to quash a subpoena duces tecum requesting the contact information of CIS's inspectors provided to Defendant Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. during the relevant period.[1] Specifically, the subpoena requests that CIS:

Subpoena [Doc. No. 115-1], at 6.[2] CIS argues that, although Plaintiff and Kinder Morgan have purportedly settled,[3] only four of CIS's inspectors have opted into this suit and the subpoena at issue improperly seeks information about the other 178 CIS inspectors who performed work for Kinder Morgan.

A subpoena may “command each person to whom it is directed to ... produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person's possession, custody, or control....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). “A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).

A court may quash or modify a subpoena if it: “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3). “It is well settled ... that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rules 26(b) and 34.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kirk's Tire & Auto Servicenter of Haverstraw, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 658, 662 (D. Kan. 2003); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 11-cv-02007-MSK-KLM, 2012 WL 1801979, at *7 (D. Colo. May 16, 2012) (“Rule 26 governs the scope of discovery, in the context of a Rule 45 subpoena or otherwise.”). Rule 26(b) allows discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden upon a witness is a case specific inquiry that turns on ‘such factors as relevance, the need of the party for the documents, the breadth of the document request, the time period covered by it, the particularity with which the documents are described and the burden imposed.’ ” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 211 F.R.D. at 662 (quoting Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 169 F.R.D. 44, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).[4]

*2 The Court finds that the subpoena should be quashed because it prematurely seeks contact information about putative opt-in plaintiffs before the Court has conditionally certified the collective action and approved the sending of notice. Thus, the information sought is not relevant at this time. Typically, courts order the production of contact information after conditional certification. See, e.g., Hancock v. Lario Oil & Gas Co., No. 219CV02140JARKGG, 2019 WL 3494263, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2019). In the Court's January 18, 2022 Order denying Plaintiff's settlement approval motion, the Court instructed the parties that, to proceed with their settlement, they “should refile their motion requesting conditional certification and approval of the proposed notice to putative class members.... After the to-be-determined opt-in period expires, the parties may file a motion for final certification and approval of the settlement.” Order [Doc. No. 176], at 6. As another court in this judicial district explained:

Saenz v. Erick Flowback Servs. LLC, No. CIV-14-593-D, 2014 WL 7005358, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 23, 2014). Additionally, another court recently held that subpoenas directed at vendor companies requesting information about putative plaintiffs was premature before the collective action was conditionally certified. Field v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., No. 4:20-CV-00575, 2020 WL 4937122, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2020). Field explained the “more well-reasoned[,]” “practical approach” is to “wait until the motion for conditional certification is granted before kicking off non-party discovery aimed at discovering information about the class.” Id. at *2. This Court agrees.[5]

Plaintiff's arguments fail to convince the Court otherwise. Plaintiff asserts that the parties have agreed that the settling inspectors are similarly situated. Pls.’ Opp'n 3. The Court does not agree that a stipulation can override the Court's certification of a collective. See Foust v. CPI Sec. Servs., Inc., Case No. CIV-16-1447-R (W.D. Okla. Feb. 14, 2019) Order [Doc. No. 82], at 3 (holding that the parties’ stipulation as to final certification “does not obviate the Court's duty to make a final certification determination.”). Additionally, without citing any supporting authority, Plaintiff argues that CIS has waived its objections to the subpoena because CIS previously provided anonymized pay data regarding all of the 182 inspectors. The Court fails to see how production of this anonymous data about CIS's inspectors waives the production of personal details about those inspectors.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Cleveland Integrity System Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena [Doc. No. 110] is GRANTED. The subpoena [Doc. No. 115-1] is QUASHED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of January, 2022.