*1 This case is before the Court on the Second Motion For Sanctions (Doc. 42) filed by NCR Corporation (“Defendant”) and the Motion To Sanction Defense Attorney For Deposition Misconduct (Doc. 53) filed by Nouraddine Haji (“Plaintiff”).

Plaintiff alleges that his former employer, NCR Corporation (“Defendant”), discriminated against him on the basis of religion and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). (Doc. 1). Defendant answered Plaintiff's complaint on July 19, 2017. (Doc. 6). During the discovery period, Defendant served interrogatories and requests for production on Plaintiff through his then-counsel on October 2, 2017.[1] (Doc. 42 at 2-3; see also Docs. 11, 12). Defendant emailed its discovery requests directly to Plaintiff on November 20, 2017 (Doc. 46 at 26-27), and Plaintiff indicated he would produce documents shortly thereafter. (See id.). During a teleconference before the undersigned on January 2, 2018, Plaintiff agreed to an extension of his deadline to respond to Defendant's discovery requests to no later than January 12, 2018 “whether he has retained new counsel or not.” (Doc. 23 at 1). Plaintiff failed to provide responses by the agreed-upon deadline. (Doc. 42 at 3; see also id. at 29 (email on January 16, 2018 from counsel for Defendant, addressed to Plaintiff, which attached discovery requests and noted that Plaintiff still had not responded by the January 12 deadline)). On January 19, 2018, Defendant filed its first Motion For Sanctions, which sought dismissal of Plaintiff's case, or alternatively, an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to outstanding discovery requests. (Doc. 25). On February 16, 2018, the undersigned awarded Defendant reasonable expenses and attorney's fees caused by Plaintiff's failures to respond under Federal Rule Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 37(d)(3). (Doc. 32 at 5). The undersigned denied Defendant's request for dismissal “without prejudice to its right to seek dismissal if Plaintiff does not comply with his discovery obligations going forward.” (Id.). The Court directed Plaintiff “to provide full and complete responses to Defendant's interrogatories [ ] and requests for production of documents [ ] NO LATER THAN MARCH 2, 2018.” (Id. at 6). The undersigned directed Plaintiff as follows:

(Id.). As referenced in the undersigned's Order, Plaintiff provided some responses to the outstanding discovery requests on January 31, 2018. (See Doc. 42 at 4; see also Doc. 46 at 2). Defendant found these responses deficient and filed a Second Motion For Sanctions on March 6, 2018. (Doc. 42). Plaintiff responded to the motion on April 2, 2018. (Doc. 46). Defendant then filed a supplemental brief to its motion, which raises two additional issues. (Doc. 50). Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's supplemental brief on May 7, 2018. (Doc. 58). On May 21, 2018, Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion. (Doc. 61).

*2 Additionally, on April 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion To Sanction Defense Attorney For Deposition Misconduct. (Doc. 53). Defendant responded to that motion on May 4, 2018 (Doc. 57), and Plaintiff timely replied (Doc. 59). Both motions are now ripe for consideration.

I. Defendant's Motion (Doc. 42)

Defendant's motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit pursuant to Rules 41(b) and 37 “for [his] repeated failure to comply with discovery.” (Doc. 42 at 2). In the alternative, Defendant requests an order requiring Plaintiff to (1) pay attorney's fees and expenses including the court reporter's fees associated with Plaintiff's last-minute cancellation of his deposition, (2) supplement his discovery responses, (3) produce his diary and participate in a conference with the Court “to discuss the scope of discoverable information in the diary[,]” and (3) appear for a second deposition for the purpose of questioning Plaintiff about his diary entries. (Doc. 61 at 15; see also Doc. 42 at 4). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to submit complete and timely responses to Defendant's interrogatories and requests for the production of documents. Further, the Court determines that while dismissal is inappropriate at this time, an award of reasonable attorney's fees is warranted for Plaintiff's repeated noncompliance with the rules of discovery and Orders of this Court. The Court also determines that Plaintiff's diary is responsive and relevant and therefore must be produced in a manner more specifically outlined below. Finally, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to an award of same-day cancellation fees assessed on the day of Plaintiff's cancelled deposition.

A. Motion To Dismiss For Failing To Comply With Discovery

Defendant contends that this Court should sanction Plaintiff's insufficient responses to discovery requests by dismissing his case pursuant to Rules 37 and 41. (Doc. 42 at 22). Defendant argues that dismissal is appropriate because, despite two orders from this Court directing Plaintiff to comply with discovery obligations, Plaintiff has failed to provide complete and timely responses to Defendant's discovery requests. (Id. at 22-23). Plaintiff responds by arguing that defense counsel engaged in deception and “continuously [ ] put obstacle[s] on my way to prevent me from meeting deadlines set by the court.” (Doc. 46 at 14). While Plaintiff's deficiencies regarding his discovery responses are addressed at more length below, the Court determines that dismissal is unwarranted at this time.

Under Local Rule 41.3(A)(2), NDGa, this Court “may, with or without notice to the parties, dismiss a civil case [ ] if ... [a] plaintiff ... shall, after notice, ... fail or refuse to obey a lawful order of the court in the case[.]” See Reece v. Lockheed Martin Aero. Co., Civil Action File No. 1:08-CV-3703-JTC-RGV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138388, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2009) (citing LR 41.3(A)(2), N.D. Ga.). For a court to dismiss an action with prejudiceCwhether on its own motion or on the motion of a defendantChowever, it may do so “only when: (1) a party engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds that lesser sanction would not suffice.” Betty K Agencies, LTD v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Rule 37(b) also permits a trial court to dismiss an action “in whole or in part” if a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).

*3 Here, Plaintiff's refusal to provide complete and timely responses to Defendant's discovery requests has prolonged the discovery period and impeded the efficient resolution of this case. However, the undersigned is not satisfied that the extreme remedy of dismissal is warranted at this stage of the proceeding. Eades v. Dep't of Human Res., 298 Fed. Appx. 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished per curiam decision) (noting that dismissal of a case for want of prosecution with prejudice is a “sanction of last resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances, and generally proper only where less drastic sanctions are available”); see also French v. M&T Bank, 315 F.R.D. 695, 696 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (“Dismissal under Rule 37 ‘is an extreme remedy and should not be imposed if lesser sanctions will suffice.’ ”) (quoting Navarro v. Cohan, 856 F.2d 141, 142 (11th Cir. 1988)).

Defendant compares the facts of this case with Reece, a decision in which this Court dismissed the plaintiff's case for his pattern of delay and noncompliance with court orders during the discovery process. Id., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138388, at *13. While Plaintiff's conduct shares some of the conduct cited by this Court in Reece, such as failing to comply with discovery orders as discussed below, the plaintiff in that case also refused to return calls attempting to schedule a Rule 26(f) conference, took nearly three months to confer, refused to make himself available for deposition without any notice, and “failed to respond altogether to defendant's Request for Production of Documents[.]” Id. Here, Plaintiff has evidenced at least a minimal level of participation. For example, Plaintiff has remitted some documentation responsive to Defendant's requests for production, (see Doc. 46 at 2), he has made himself available for deposition (see Doc. 57-1), and he engaged in efforts to unlock a USB memory card produced responsive to one of Defendant's document requests (see Doc. 46 at 12, n. 8; see also Doc. 42-7 at 1-2). Unlike the plaintiff in Reece, who failed to show up for his deposition and caused defense counsel and the court reporter to wait for his arrival for more than an hour, Plaintiff at least contacted defense counsel the morning of the scheduled deposition to communicate his inability to attend due to injury. (See Doc. 50 at 6). Finally, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff appears on some level to have sustained communication with defense counsel regarding discovery requests. (See Doc. 46 at 14-16; see also Doc. 42-1 at 2, 4; Doc. 42-7 at 2). Even Plaintiff's minimal level of cooperation stands in contrast to the behavior of the plaintiff in Reece, who refused to return defense counsel's calls and waited three months before finally agreeing to attend a discovery conference. Id., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138388, at *12-14.

In short, Plaintiff's “behavior in this case at this juncture does not rise to the level of willful contempt necessary to justify the extreme sanction of dismissal.” Air W.E. Communs., LLC v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Civil Action File No. 1:10-CV-02767-JEC-JCF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191771, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2012) (explaining that when addressing dismissal under Rules 37 and 41, “the trial court must reflect on the range of sanctions available and conclude that dismissal is the only option that would spur litigation to its completion”); see also Reece, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138388, at *12 (noting that “extreme circumstances [are] necessary to support the sanction of dismissal”) (quoting Eades, 298 Fed. Appx. at 864).

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failing to comply with discovery is DENIED without prejudice to its right to seek dismissal if Plaintiff continues to neglect his discovery obligations. Having concluded that dismissal is not warranted, the undersigned now turns to Defendant's alternative request seeking more complete responses to its discovery requests and an award of reasonable attorney's fees.

B. Defendant's Motion To Compel More Complete Discovery Responses

*4 Alternatively, Defendant asks the Court to treat its motion as a motion to compel requiring Plaintiff to submit more complete responses to its Interrogatories 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, and 16 and Requests for Production of Documents 1, 5, 7, 16, 20, 23, and 26. (Doc. 42 at 4-21). Defendant also requests an award of attorney's fees for preparation of its motion. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff sets forth various arguments as to why his discovery responses were complete. (See Doc. 46 at 14-16). The Court addresses each of Defendant's asserted deficiencies in turn.

Defendant's first contention involves Request For Production No. 1 and Interrogatory No. 5. Request No. 1 seeks:

(Doc. 42 at 4-5). Similarly, Interrogatory No. 5 asks Plaintiff to list each of his employers subsequent to Defendant, including “the name and address of employer, beginning ending dates of employment, supervisor, position(s) held, rate(s) of pay, reason for termination of employment, and the gross amount of wages/income[.]” (Id. at 16).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's responses to these requests are incomplete because “he has provided no pay stubs for the time between his April 15, 2016 pay stub from Transport Corporation of America [“Transportation Corp.”] and his March 25, 2017 pay stub from Averitt Express [“Averitt”] (leaving an eleven-month gap in his employment records)” despite indicating in a separate response that he was continuously employed during that period. (Doc. 42 at 5-6; see also id. at 16 (arguing that Plaintiff omitted beginning and end dates of employment and pay information)). Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to produce W-2s for his 2017 employment at Averitt and his 2015 employment with Transportation Corp. (Id. at 6). Defendant avers that Plaintiff has failed to explain any gap in his employment. (Id.). In response, Plaintiff states that he provided all requested information regarding his income. (Doc. 46 at 5). In addition to asserting information about his correspondences with defense counsel, Plaintiff adds that he was injured “and couldn't perform any work from May 2016 through early March 2017” and that he did not file 2016 income taxes—information he relayed to defense counsel in January 2018. (Id.).

The Court finds that Plaintiff's responses to Request No. 1 and Interrogatory No. 5 are incomplete. An email summarizing Plaintiff's teleconference with defense counsel suggests that at one point Plaintiff agreed to provide federal income tax returns and W-2 forms from each of his employers since 2012. (See Doc. 42-1 at 6).[2] Plaintiff has not provided a convincing explanation for failing to produce the W-2s from his employment with Transportation Co. in 2015 and Averitt in 2017. Nor does his excuse for failing to produce pay information from Knight Transportation withstand scrutiny; Plaintiff concedes he was paid for his time at orientation, and he therefore must provide information regarding that income and any related documents within his possession, custody or control.

To the extent Plaintiff was unable to work from May 2016 to March 2017, he should have so indicated in his responses to Defendant's request instead of merely omitting a 2016 tax return. (See Doc. 42 at 5). Defense counsel's email summary appears to conflict with Plaintiff's assertion that he relayed information of his period of disability during their telephone conversation, as the email indicates that Plaintiff agreed to provide proof of income for all years since 2012. (See Doc. 42-1 at 6). In any event, while Plaintiff's period of disability would explain the gap between early 2016 and 2017, his proof of income before and after that period are still discoverable. As Defendant accurately points out, the amount of income Plaintiff made from subsequent employers is relevant to the calculation of Plaintiff's potential damages. See Lathem v. Dep't of Children and Youth Svcs., 172 F.3d 786, 794 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Generally, a Title VII plaintiff can recover back pay only for the period the plaintiff is available and willing to accept substantially equivalent employment elsewhere; courts exclude periods where a plaintiff is unavailable to work such as periods of disability, from the back pay award.”). Plaintiff's responses to Request No. 1 and Interrogatory No. 5 are therefore deficient because he has still failed to produce proof of income for the period subsequent to his employment with Defendant.

*5 Defendant's motion to compel more complete responses to Request For Production No. 1 and Interrogatory No. 5 is GRANTED. Plaintiff must produce documents responsive to Defendant's request within his possession, custody or control within 14 days of the entry of this Order, and he must respond fully to the interrogatory within that same time frame.

Defendant's Request For Production 5 seeks “all documents relating to employment held by Plaintiff five (5) years prior to being hired with Defendant.” (Doc. 42 at 6). Plaintiff initially responded to this request by stating that he worked for “Coca-Cola Enterprise ... over 15 years ago” and that he would submit a request to obtain his W-2 as proof of employment. (Id.). Plaintiff did not supplement his response. (Id.). Interrogatory No. 3 asks Plaintiff to “[i]dentify each of Plaintiff's employers in the five (5) years prior to his employment with Defendant, including the address, dates, position, rates of pay and reason for cessation of employment.” (Doc. 42 at 14). Plaintiff's response to this interrogatory included an address, an approximate annual salary, an approximate hiring date of “around 1998,” and a statement that he was “fired for disagreement.” (Id.).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's discovery responses concerning his previous employment is deficient because “he has not provided the dates for which he worked for this employer, his rate of pay, or his title, all of which are specifically requested in this Interrogatory.” (Id.; see also id. at 7 (“Plaintiff has not provided any documents or evidence of his prior employment.”)). Further, Defendant asserts that its own subpoena to Coca-Cola Enterprises was unsuccessful in obtaining any information because the company responded that it was not incorporated until 2010 and possessed no information about Plaintiff. (Id. at 7, 14). Defendant maintains that information regarding Plaintiff's employment prior to working for Defendant is relevant to “whether Plaintiff made similar complaints or requested similar accommodations.” (Id. at 8). In response, Plaintiff argues that “I wouldn't have been able to get any document[s] from Coca-Cola Enterprise since it doesn't exist anymore.” (Doc. 46 at 7). Regarding Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiff simply states: “I honestly don't remember about much about the exact amount I was paid, position held, or the reason for the disagreement when I was let go.” (Id. at 11). Plaintiff then states that his responses to this interrogatory are contained within his discovery responses “delivered on January 31, 2018, and again on February 27, 2018.” (Id.).

The Court finds that Plaintiff's responses to Request For Production No. 5 and Interrogatory No. 3 are incomplete. At a time that his responses were already past due, Plaintiff represented that he would supply information as proof of income for his employment with Coca-Cola. (See Doc. 42 at 7). His failure to do so without an adequate reason constitutes unnecessary delay and leaves Defendant without the opportunity to obtain the information on its own. Defendant's request that Plaintiff provide the proper identity, dates, position, and reason for termination—along with any documents within Plaintiff's possession relating to the same—is not overly burdensome. Such information is reasonably in the control of Plaintiff especially where, as here, Defendant's efforts to obtain the information have been unsuccessful, and Plaintiff has already stated that he would provide responsive documents. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5130, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63643, at *27 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2006) (compelling the plaintiff to provide the identity of former employer, dates of employment, and reasons for her termination and noting that “Plaintiff's failure to amend her response to Interrogatory no. 2 by including [her former employer] and the reasons for her termination cannot reasonably be attributed to a mistake or memory lapse”); Montgomery v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-489-PPS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19408, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 2004) (awarding sanctions where the plaintiff failed to provide complete answer to the defendant's interrogatory requesting identity of previous employers, dates of employment, wage or salary, total earnings, and reasons for leaving); Fisher v. Blue Ridge Group Homes, Civil Action No. 1:09cv282, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48066, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2010) (finding that “[a] response of ‘I don't remember’ [to the defendant's interrogatory] is not sufficient’ ” and noting that “plaintiff has a duty to search for information so an answer can be given that is full and complete”).

*6 Defendant's motion to compel more complete responses to Request For Production No. 5 and Interrogatory No. 3 is GRANTED. Plaintiff must produce documents responsive to Defendant's request within his possession, custody or control within 14 days of the entry of this Order, and he must respond fully to the interrogatory within that same time frame.

Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff's response to Request For Production No. 7, which seeks:

(Doc. 42 at 8). Plaintiff's answer to this request was, “I haven't received any medical treatment relating to the wrongful termination [a]s I wasn't in any position to afford it financially.” (Id.). Additionally, Defendant's Interrogatory No. 10 asked Plaintiff to identify “every doctor, physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, health or medical practitioner, hospital, clinic, health care provider, counselor or institution from whom Plaintiff as sought or received treatment during the last ten (10) years.” (Id. at 19). Plaintiff's supplemental responses delivered on February 27, 2018 included the names and contact information for some of his healthcare providers. (Id. at 9; Doc. 46 at 7). Additionally, Plaintiff maintains that he filled out the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) release forms that authorized Defendant to obtain the information on its own. (Doc. 46 at 7).

Plaintiff's answers to Request No. 7 and Interrogatory No. 10 are incomplete. Plaintiff's responses, both of which stated that he had not received any medical treatment related to his employment, evidence a misunderstanding of the scope of Defendant's request. (Doc. 42 at 19). Defendant requested “all ... records” of Plaintiff's medical treatment for the past ten years. (Id.). While Plaintiff's supplemental response identifying contact information for some of his healthcare providers gets closer to Defendant's requests, Plaintiff provides no explanation for his failure to timely provide that information in his initial response. To the extent Plaintiff was unable to obtain the sought-after records for a good reason, he should have so indicated to Defendant in his answer to Defendant's discovery requests, but he did not do so. (Id.). The Court notes that Plaintiff's argument that he signed authorizations does not excuse him from responding to the discovery requests at issue. See, e.g., Bujnicki v. Am. Paving & Excavating, Inc., 99-CV-0646S(Sr), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8869, at *46 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004) (“Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff has provided defendants with an authorization to obtain the requested records from their source, plaintiff is required to produce all responsive documents in her possession.”).

Defendant's motion to compel more complete responses to Request For Production No. 7 and Interrogatory No. 10 is GRANTED. Plaintiff must produce documents responsive to Defendant's request within his possession, custody or control within 14 days of the entry of this Order, and he must respond fully to the interrogatory within that same time frame.

*7 Request For Production No. 16 asks Plaintiff to “[p]roduce all documents, writings and tangible items relating to the allegation that Plaintiff requested medical leave and that such leave was denied, as alleged in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Complaint.” (Doc. 42 at 10). Plaintiff responded by stating that he had surgery in April 2011 “at a local hospital to my right hand.... [I]f you need [a] copy of the surgery proof, let me know.” (Id.). According to Defendant, Plaintiff has provided no further documentation of his surgery. Information regarding Plaintiff's alleged medical condition is undoubtedly critical to Defendant's ability to defend Plaintiff's allegation that he “requested medical leave and was denied.” (Doc. 1 at 3). Further, the requested documentation will allow Defendant to determine when the alleged unlawful denial of leave occurred; Plaintiff's Complaint states that it occurred in 2012 while his response states it occurred in 2011. (Compare Doc. 1 at 3 with Doc. 42 at 10; see also Doc. 46 at 8 (referencing his employer's denial of medical leave for hand surgery in 2011)). Plaintiff argues that the materials he delivered on January 31, 2018 contain “all the concerns that I raised with [ ] NCR's Human Resources about Alan Thomas refusing to grant me days off for surgery on April 2011.” (Doc. 46 at 8). While the information Plaintiff has already provided regarding his requests to Defendant's HR department are responsive, documentation regarding his surgery is also responsive, and Plaintiff should have provided it to Defendant as well. Plaintiff's response to this request is therefore deficient.

Defendant's motion to compel a more complete response to Request For Production No. 16 is GRANTED. Plaintiff must produce documents responsive to Defendant's request within his possession, custody or control within 14 days of the entry of this Order.

Defendant's Request For Production No. 20 requested, inter alia, “all ... recordings ... made, obtained, or received as a result of or in preparation for each witness statement and affidavit ... regarding each of the allegations contained in your Complaint.” (Doc. 42 at 11). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's response to this request was deficient because he delayed in submitting a password-protected USB memory card submitted with other materials on February 27, 2018, which contains a recording Plaintiff made at NCR, and he further delayed by failing to provide Defendant's counsel with the correct password. (Id. at 11-12). Plaintiff asserts that the recording on the USB memory card is “[t]he only outstanding item” responsive to Request No. 20. (Doc. 46 at 9). He has offered no reason for his delays in turning over the memory card or its correct password. Delays like these have cost Defendant substantial time and effort. However, Defendant concedes it received the correct password on March 6 “just hours before Defendant filed this motion” and is now able to review the materials contained on the memory card. (Id. at 12, n. 8). Thus, Plaintiff's response to Request no. 20 appears to be complete.

Because Plaintiff has responded adequately to this Request, albeit untimely, Defendant's motion to compel a more complete response to Request For Production No. 20 is DENIED.

Request For Production No. 26 seeks “[a]ll documents relating or referring to all of Plaintiff's attempts to obtain employment at another employer, or earn any income since February 17, 2015[.]” (Doc. 42 at 13). Similarly, Interrogatory No. 4 asks Plaintiff to identify “every job application or employment inquiry Plaintiff has made since February 17, 2015[.]” (Id. at 15). Plaintiff asserts that a job search history report generated by the Georgia Department of Labor (“Georgia DOL”) and produced on January 31, 2018 contains the entirety of responsive information to Request No. 26, and that defense counsel told him that he was permitted to provide the information in lieu of a written response to Interrogatory No. 4. (Doc. 46 at 10-11).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's responses to these discovery requests are incomplete because the Georgia DOL document identifies the dates “only for certain applications[,]” and it does not indicate “where else he applied[ ] and whether he turned down any job offers.” (Doc. 42 at 15). Further, Defendant argues that this information is relevant because Plaintiff is seeking damages for back pay, and Defendant must be able to determine the thoroughness of Plaintiff's job search efforts in mitigating the income loss due to his termination. (Id. at 15-16). In the email following the parties' February 14, 2018 teleconference, previously referenced above, defense counsel stated that Plaintiff should “provide us with all of the documents in your possession regarding every job application or employment inquiry you have made since February 17, 2015” along with “additional documents from the Georgia [DOL].” (Doc. 42-1 at 6). Neither of the parties have provided the Court with information indicating there are “additional” Georgia DOL documents that are discoverable beyond what Plaintiff already turned over in January 2018. Further, Defendant has not offered a reason to rebut Plaintiff's assertion that he already provided all responsive documents to Request No. 26. Thus, it appears that at this juncture, Plaintiff has complied with Defendant's Request No. 26 and Interrogatory No. 4. See, e.g., JCW Software, LLC v. Embroidme.com, Inc., Case No. 10-80472-CIV-ZLOCH/ROSENBAUM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58404, at *14 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2011) (dismissing motion to compel where moving party “presented no reason to believe that additional responsive information existed”).

*8 Defendant's motion to compel more complete responses to Request For Production No. 26 and Interrogatory No. 4 is DENIED.

Defendant's Interrogatory No. 7 asks Plaintiff to identify previous lawsuits and legal proceedings in which Plaintiff has been involved. (Doc. 42 at 17). Plaintiff's initial response was that he had “never been involved [in] any criminal or bankruptcy proceeding. [T]her[e] has been on[e] lawsuit against Lowe[']s hardware. It was at a county level. [T]he matter in which the case was concluded was and is still confidential.” (Id.). Later, Plaintiff supplemented his response by indicating a case number, date of filing, and case subject matter—personal injury. (Id.). Defendant argues that both Plaintiff's responses were deficient because he “failed to list several suits in which he has been involved.” (Id. at 18). The undersigned agrees because it appears evident that Plaintiff has withheld information regarding his litigation history from Defendant by disclosing only one of his previous lawsuits.

To the extent Plaintiff felt this request was overbroad or implicated privileged information, he should have so indicated in his answer to the interrogatory instead of including only one of his previous lawsuits and neglecting to mention any others. However, public information surrounding Plaintiff's previous lawsuits constitutes discoverable information. See Jacobs v. Comerford, Case No. 3:13cv52/RV/EMT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167341, at *16 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2013) (sanctioning the plaintiff by dismissing the case because he failed to disclose prior litigation history), adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167345 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2013); see also Anderson v. City of Naples, Case No. 2:10-cv-111-FtM-36SPC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127867, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2010) (granting motion to compel answer to interrogatory asking the plaintiff to identify lawsuits in which he had been a party); Rodriguez v. Carey Int'l, Inc., Case No. 03-22442-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32125, at *34 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2004) (granting motion to compel documents related to “any other lawsuits to which Plaintiffs have been a party” because “any evidence that Plaintiff may have a history of filing contrived lawsuits may be relevant to Plaintiff's credibility”) (citation omitted).

Regarding Plaintiff's contention that he was asked to submit details of a confidential agreement in his Lowe's case to Defendant, the Court determines that Plaintiff is not required to do so as he has already identified for Defendant the date of filing, case number, and subject matter. (Doc. 42 at 17). While Plaintiff must respond to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 7—or else provide the Court with a valid objection as to why such information will not lead to admissible evidence—he is not required to disclose the details of any confidential agreements entered into with Lowe's.[3]

*9 Defendant's motion to compel a more complete response to Interrogatory No. 7 is therefore GRANTED. Plaintiff must respond fully to the interrogatory within 14 days from the entry of this Order.

Interrogatory No. 16 asks Plaintiff to “identify any periods that [he] was unavailable for work since February 17, 2015, including the reason for his unavailability and whether he received any benefits or compensation of any kind during those periods.” (Doc. 42 at 20). Plaintiff's response stated: “I have never been unavailable for work. I was so desperate for a job, I had to change my job field.” (Id.). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Motion For Extension Of Time, filed in this case on August 14, 2017 (Doc. 7), suggests otherwise. (Doc. 42 at 21). In that motion, Plaintiff sought to stay proceedings for thirty days to prepare to travel to Somaliland due to the death of an elderly uncle. (Doc. 7 at 1). Defendant argues that “it seems impossible for Plaintiff to travel abroad and still be available [for work]. Thus, although Plaintiff does not identify any lack of availability, the circumstantial evidence suggests that Plaintiff's response to this Interrogatory may be inaccurate, or at the very least, incomplete.” (Doc. 42 at 21). Plaintiff offers no reason to explain why his family emergency did not necessitate any absence from work. (Doc. 46 at 14).

The undersigned agrees with Defendant that a family emergency of the significance described in Plaintiff's Motion For Extension Of Time would seem to require him to miss work. As noted above, information about Plaintiff's income after his termination by NCR may impact his potential back pay damages and therefore is discoverable. See, e.g., Guimbard v. H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Ctr. & Research Inst., Inc., Case No. 8:12-CV-1670-T-EAJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199301, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2013) (ordering production of proof of income because that information is relevant to damages from back pay). If in fact Plaintiff's emergency did not prevent him from being available for work, he should have responded with a reason for why that is the case. If his emergency did present him with an unavailable employment period, he should have identified that period and offered the attendant information requested by Defendant's interrogatory. In the absence of either response, Plaintiff's answer to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 16 was deficient.

Defendant's motion to compel a more complete response to Interrogatory No. 16 is GRANTED. Plaintiff must respond fully to the interrogatory within 14 days from the entry of this Order.

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently responded to Request For Production No. 23 “in light of his failure to produce documents that are clearly related to his responses to Defendant's interrogatories.” (Doc. 42 at 12). Specifically, Defendant contends that this request required Plaintiff to produce documents associated with Interrogatory Nos. 3, 7, and 10. (Id. at 12-13). In response, Plaintiff argues that defense counsel's email of outstanding discovery items did not include the documents Defendant seeks in this request. (Doc. 46 at 10). Plaintiff also argues that he provided “attorneys' names and contact information that I consulted regarding this case” in his production of documents delivered on February 14, 2018. (Id.).

*10 As discussed above, Plaintiff provided incomplete responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3, 7 and 10 and has not provided documentation in support of those interrogatories. Defendant's motion to compel a more complete response to Request for Production No. 23 is therefore GRANTED. Plaintiff must respond fully to the interrogatory within 14 days from the entry of this Order.

As referenced above, some of Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's interrogatories and document requests are incomplete and Plaintiff has therefore violated the undersigned's order directing him “to provide full and complete responses to Defendant's interrogatories [ ] and requests for production of documents[.]” (Doc. 32 at 6). However, Plaintiff has provided adequate responses to Interrogatory No. 4 and Request Nos. 20 and 26.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to submit complete responses to Interrogatories 3, 5, 7, 10, and 16 and Requests For Production 1, 5, 7, 16, and 23 no later than 14 days from the entry of this Order.[4] Plaintiff is once again cautioned that if he fails to comply with this Order, Defendant may file a motion to compel and/or for additional sanctions, including dismissal of this action, and the undersigned may recommend to the District Judge that this action be dismissed.

C. Attorney's Fees

Having determined that many of Plaintiff's discovery responses are incomplete but dismissal is unwarranted, the Court addresses Defendant's request for attorney's fees associated with the filing of its motion. (Doc. 42 at 2). District courts have “broad authority under Rule 37 to control discovery[.]” Gratton v. Great Am. Communs., 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). Rule 37(d) provides that “[i]nstead of or in addition to” a sanction of dismissal, “the court must require the party failing to act ... to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to provide discovery responses to Defendant by the parties' initial agreed-upon deadline of January 12, 2018 as ordered by this Court on January 2, 2018. (Doc. 32 at 2). Further, as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the undersigned's order that he submit “full and complete responses to Defendant's interrogatories [ ] and requests for production of documents [ ] NO LATER THAN MARCH 2, 2018.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff's incomplete responses include his failure to produce his diary or to notify Defendant of its existence with an appropriate objection even though it appears to contain information expressly requested by Defendant as discussed below. Plaintiff's failure to provide full, timely, and complete discovery responses constitutes a violation of this Court's Order. (See Doc. 32 at 2, 6).

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide substantial justification for his violations. Plaintiff protests that defense counsel was unresponsive to his efforts to clarify discovery and impeded his ability to meet deadlines. (See Doc. 46 at 1-2). However, in addition to Defendant's initiation of a teleconference before the undersigned, the record also reflects numerous attempts by defense counsel to contact Plaintiff regarding responsive production to Defendant's requests for documents and interrogatories. (See id. at 19-34). Plaintiff's accusation of blackmail is unconvincing at best. All defense counsel appeared to be requesting was “the case name and number and date filed” of Plaintiff's lawsuit against Lowe's. (Doc. 42-1 at 5). Plaintiff also asserts that his failures to comply with discovery deadlines were due to his former attorney's direction to refrain from communicating with opposing counsel. (Doc. 46 at 1). This assertion is meritless because the undersigned specifically directed Plaintiff to comply with discovery “whether he has retained new counsel or not.” (Doc. 23 at 1). Moreover, Plaintiff attaches emails to his response, which were addressed directly to defense counsel and illustrate that Plaintiff sought to set up a phone call with counsel on January 16, 2018. (See Doc. 46 at 24-34). These communications are inconsistent with Plaintiff's assertion that he was hesitant to communicate with opposing counsel because of direction he received from his former attorney.

*11 Finally, Plaintiff's frequent refrain that all responsive documents in his possession were contained in the delivery he made to defense counsel's office in January 2018 fails because, as discussed at length above, much of Plaintiff's discovery is thus far incomplete. At bottom, Plaintiff's arguments fail to offer a substantial justification for his late and incomplete responses during the discovery process and his violation of this Court's orders. While the “extreme remedy” of dismissal is unwarranted at this juncture, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by Plaintiff's failure to timely and fully comply with his discovery obligations as ordered by this Court. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3). Accordingly, Defendant's motion for sanctions in the form of attorney's fees is GRANTED.

As to the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded, the Court notes that Defendant has presented a declaration prepared by defense counsel, who stated, “Based on my review of time records, Defendant has expended $4,097.00 in reasonable expenses associated with its Motion to Compel.” (Doc. 42-9 at 4). Defendant has also included documentation of the time counsel expended on this motion, which totals the same amount. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff may file a response in opposition to Defendant's statement of its requested attorney's fees no later than seven days after the entry of this Order. See, e.g., Kelly v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2566-ECS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137006, at *12-13 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2009) (awarding attorney's fees under Rule 37(d)(3) and directing defendant to provide documentation of its expenses and plaintiff to submit a response). Defendant may file a reply in support of its request for fees no later than seven days after Plaintiff files his response.

D. Additional Issues

The undersigned now turns to issues raised by Defendant's supplemental brief submitted after Plaintiff's deposition. (See generally Doc. 50).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff intentionally withheld his diary, which contains “information regarding ... his feelings that he was treated unjustly” and was responsive to Defendant's discovery requests. (See Doc. 50 at 2). Plaintiff argues that defense counsel “failed to demonstrate concrete evidence that the content[s] of my diary/journal has relevant notation[s] or entries that are beneficial to the defense of his client, NCR.” (Doc. 58 at 6). The undersigned finds that Plaintiff's diary was responsive to Defendant's requests and appears to contain relevant information such that Plaintiff must produce it in the manner specified below.

Plaintiff first referenced a “book that I was keeping [ ] as my diary” in his deposition. (Doc. 57-1 (“Pl. Dep.”) at 84:3-4). Defense counsel asked Plaintiff how he was able to remember the date on which he annotated an email to human resources regarding the denial of a promotion with handwritten notes. (Id. at 88:12-15). In response, Plaintiff testified as follows:

(Id. at 89:1-90:25). Further testimony indicates that Plaintiff made notes in his diary regarding dates and references to emails he sent to various of Defendant's employees regarding how he was being treated. (See id. at 83:11-14; 83:20-22; 84:6-12; 151:17-18).

As a threshold matter, the undersigned determines that at least some portion of Plaintiff's diary is responsive to Defendant's document request. Request No. 19 seeks “every diary, journal, calendar or log that you maintained from your date of hire by [Defendant] until the present that relates to, refers to, or pertains to any of the allegations in your Complaint.” (Doc. 50 at 3). Request Nos. 11, 12, and 14 seek “all documents” related to the denial of a promotion due to ethnicity and Plaintiff's contacts with the human resources department.[5] (Id. at 4). According to his own testimony, Plaintiff made “meticulous” notes about his dealings with human resources employees and his email communications while employed. (Pl. Dep. at 88:12). As such, according to Plaintiff's own testimony, it appears that notes existing in Plaintiff's diary were responsive to Defendant's requests but were not produced.

Moreover, the undersigned finds that the notes Plaintiff references are relevant and therefore discoverable. The proper scope of discovery is “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Information sought is relevant “if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. Here, according to Plaintiff's testimony, his diary contains notes he added to email communications made during the course of his employment with Defendant related to his dealings with human resources. (See Pl. Dep. at 84:6-12 (“[E]very time when I send an e-mail I will notate it in my diary, the reason I sent it and what was the outcome and I will notate it. So I get from my book, my diary book, and I put it on the e-mail. So this was not something that I made up after I left. This was exactly from my diary book.”); id. at 83:11-14 (“I have a book that I keep as my own note. Whenever I – whenever I meet, I was actually bringing the note for my reminder. So I would go back and I added it.”); id. at 83:20-22 (“I was adding those notes whenever I – whenever I contacted with human resource or a management level, I would add it.”); id. at 84:3-4 (referencing annotations from a “book that I was keeping [ ] as my diary”)). The diary's notes are therefore “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence” regarding the allegation that he “was denied for promotion and open positions” because of his “ethnicity and religion[,]” (see Doc. 1 at 2) and his allegation that Defendant's human resources department was unresponsive to his concerns of discrimination and a hostile work environment. (Id. at 3).

*13 Plaintiff argues that “there is no one [diary] entry that is relevant to the defense attorney's discovery of document.” (Doc. 58 at 6). This assertion is inconsistent with Plaintiff's deposition testimony, which is replete with statements that indicate he made notes in his diary about the facts of this case during his employment with Defendant as referenced above. The Court declines to assign any merit to Plaintiff's contention that defense counsel confused him into uttering testimony concerning the relevance of his diary; Plaintiff testified about the existence of relevant notes made in his diary, and there is no indication that defense counsel attempted to generate fabricated testimony. See, e.g., Elof Hansson Paper & Bd., Inc. v. Caldera, Case No. 11-20495-CV-WILLIAMS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192131, at *38 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 2013) (rejecting the plaintiff's contention that witnesses were confused and bullied by counsel at their depositions). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Defendant is entitled to discovery of the relevant portions of Plaintiff's diary. See Evans v. Mobile Cty. Health Dep't, CA 10-0600-WS-C, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8530, at *36 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2012) (compelling production of emails in Title VII race discrimination case where deposition testimony revealed that they contained complaints of disparate treatment); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 270 F.R.D. 456, 459 (D.N.D. Aug. 20, 2010) (ordering in camera inspection of unredacted documents, including diaries, to determine which documents are discoverable); Peach v. City of Kewanee, Case No. 05-4012, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77379, at *17 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2006) (compelling production of portions of diaries that were responsive to the movant's document request and relevant under Rule 26(b)); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Colo. 2004) (ordering production of diary entries relevant to the plaintiff's Title IX claim after conducting an in camera review of the entire unredacted diary); White v. Office of Pub. Defender, 170 F.R.D. 138, 150 (D. Md. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff's “200-page autobiographical manuscript, a substantial portion of which covered events bearing directly on her claims” was “unquestionably discoverable”).

The Court is conscious of Plaintiff's concern that the diary contains matters of a personal nature that may be irrelevant to this case. Under the circumstances, the undersigned determines that submission of Plaintiff's unredacted diary entries to the Court for in camera review will facilitate Defendant's interest in discoverable information while mitigating Plaintiff's privacy concerns. Plaintiff is directed to limit his production of the diary in question to entries dating from his date of hire by Radiant Systems to the date of filing his complaint in this matter. After reviewing the diary contents in camera, the Court will remit the relevant and unprivileged portions, if any, to both parties and be prepared to entertain a renewed motion to reopen Plaintiff's deposition for questions related to the diary, if appropriate.

Defendant's motion to compel production of Plaintiff's diary is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit to the Court copies of all unredacted entries from his diary dating from the day he was hired by Radiant Systems to the date he filed his complaint no later than fourteen days from the date of entry of this Order. Plaintiff must submit these copies by mailing those documents to the undersigned at 106 U.S. Courthouse, 121 Spring St. S.E., Gainesville, GA 30501.

Defendant's supplemental brief also requests payment of court reporter fees, which were assessed when Plaintiff cancelled his deposition on April 9, 2018. (Doc. 50 at 6). On that date, Plaintiff emailed defense counsel at approximately 6:00 a.m. to inform him that Plaintiff needed to reschedule due to the need to seek treatment for a recent back injury. (Id.; Doc. 58 at 7). The Court declines to require Plaintiff to pay court reporter fees. In Plaintiff's supplemental response brief,[6] he admits that he did not notify defense counsel of his need to cancel until the day the deposition was scheduled. (Id. at 7-8). However, he appears to have notified defense counsel of his injury as soon as he realized he would be unable to attend and presumably a few hours before the deposition was convened. (Id. at 7-8; see also Doc. 50 at 6). Moreover, the record demonstrates that the parties convened Plaintiff's deposition shortly thereafter without any apparent difficulty. (See Doc. 58 at 8). Under the circumstances, and taking into account Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned declines to award Defendant same-day cancellation fees.

*14 Accordingly, Defendant's request for an order requiring Plaintiff to pay same-day cancellation fees assessed by the court reporter on the day he missed his deposition is DENIED.

II. Plaintiff's Motion To Sanction Defense Attorney For Deposition Misconduct (Doc. 53)

Plaintiff moves this Court to sanction defense counsel pursuant to Rule 30(d) for alleged misconduct associated with Plaintiff's deposition. (See generally Doc. 53). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that defense counsel: violated Rule 30(b)(5)(A) by failing to conduct the deposition before an officer appointed under Rule 28 (id. at 4); engaged in “hostile, uncivil, and vulgar conduct” by calling him “sleazy” and questioning the motivation for his legal claim (id. at 5); blackmailed him to obtain discovery information (id. at 6); behaved aggressively by yelling and pacing (id.); and improperly asked him questions about his medical condition (id.). After a careful consideration of Plaintiff's allegations and the deposition transcript, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is due to be denied.

Rule 30(d)(2) allows the Court to “impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expense and attorney's fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3). Here, Plaintiff has provided an insufficient basis on which to conclude defense counsel engaged in conduct that impeded, delayed, or frustrated Plaintiff's examination.

First, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff's deposition was taken in Georgia “before a court reporter certified by the State of Georgia (Certification No. B1790) and the court reporter swore Plaintiff in to initiate the deposition.” (Doc. 57 (citing to Pl. Dep. at 10)). Thus, Plaintiff's deposition did not violate Rule 28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(a)(1)(A) (“[A] deposition must be taken before [ ] an officer authorized to administer oaths either by federal law or by the law in the place of examination”). Further, the Court notes that while Plaintiff alleges defense counsel engaged in “hostile, civil, and vulgar” conduct, blackmail, and aggressive behavior at the deposition, Plaintiff does not cite to any examples of such conduct in the transcript, much less to his own objections to defense counsel's conduct under Rule 30(c)(2). See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) (allowing objections on the basis of conduct during the examination). Nor does Plaintiff point to any occasion on which he sought to terminate the deposition on grounds that it was being conducted in bad faith as he was permitted to do under Rule 30(d)(3)(A). See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(A). Plaintiff has also failed to support his accusation that defense counsel called him “sleazy” during questioning. (See Pl. Dep., transcript index at 43 (“sleazy” is absent from transcript index)). As such, Plaintiff's accusations that defense counsel engaged in misconduct during the deposition do not find a basis in the record, and the Court declines to award sanctions based on these unsupported allegations.

Plaintiff's accusation that defense counsel “us[ed] confidential medical records to embarrass” is both conclusory and baseless. (Doc. 53 at 6). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant's conduct caused him “mental anguish, ... stress and anxiety, emotional pain and suffering, emotional distress and physical injuries[.]” (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff also alleges that he was discriminatorily denied medical leave for finger surgery. (Id. at 3). As such, questions concerning Plaintiff's medical treatment related to these conditions, or the absence thereof, were appropriate for deposition questioning. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). See Hood v. Burke Cty. Sch. Dist., CV 115-159, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12867, at *8-9 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2016) (finding that “all records concerning Plaintiff's care and treatment [by her physician” were discoverable “because Plaintiff seeks recovery for emotional distress and alleges a serious medical condition qualified her for FMLA leave”); Stewart-Patterson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., Case No. 12-20902-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173140, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2012) (declining to exclude testimony that was relevant to the question of whether the plaintiff mitigated resulting from alleged medical negligence); Norris v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Case No. 05-80280-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134023, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2009) (finding that “Plaintiff has placed her mental condition at issue and that Defendant has shown good cause that her medical records related thereto are pertinent to, and discoverable in, this litigation”); McMickens v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., Civil Action No. 00-0088-CB-S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27607, at *6-7 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2003) (finding the plaintiff's medical information relevant to extent of the plaintiff's injury).

*15 Further, the conclusory nature of Plaintiff's accusation does not provide the Court with any basis to find that defense counsel's questions about Plaintiff's medical history as it related to his claim were improper. (Doc. 53 at 6). In fact, Plaintiff volunteered information about his medical conditions at the deposition on multiple occasions without protest. (See, e.g., Pl. Dep. at 270:24-272:24; 281:7-283:10; 280:12-24). And just as was true regarding his allegations of defense counsel's aggressive conduct, Plaintiff can identify no point in the transcript where he objected to defense counsel's questions about his medical records. See Middlebrooks v. Sacor Fin., Inc., Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-0679-SCJ-JSA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140843, at *74-75 (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2018) (denying the plaintiff's motion for sanctions based on defense counsel's questions about her medical condition because, inter alia, the plaintiff volunteered information about her condition in response to counsel's questioning), adopted by 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140218 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2018).

Finally, Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant subjected him to a longer deposition than is permitted by the Rules is meritless. Rule 30(d)(1) provides that “a deposition is limited to one day of 7 hours.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1). The record indicates that Plaintiff's deposition commenced at 10:10 a.m. and concluded at 5:28 p.m. despite breaking for lunch for thirty minutes and breaking at least one additional time. (See Pl. Dep. at 2, 149, 227, 297). There is thus no support for Plaintiff's allegation that the duration of his deposition was improperly extended.

Because Plaintiff has failed to provide support for his motion to sanction defense counsel, the motion is DENIED.

Defendant's motion for sanctions, or in the alternative, to compel (Doc. 42) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. To the extent the motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint for failing to comply with discovery it is DENIED without prejudice. Defendant's alternative motion to compel more complete discovery responses is DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 4 and Requests For Production 20 and 26, and it is GRANTED as to Interrogatories 3, 5, 7, 10, and 16 and Request For Production Nos. 1, 5, 7, 16, and 23. Plaintiff must produce documents responsive to Defendant's Requests for Production 1, 5, 7, 16, and 23 within his possession, custody or control within 14 days of the entry of this Order, and he must respond fully to Interrogatories 3, 5, 7, 10, and 16 within that same time frame.

Defendant's request for attorney's fees is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file a response in opposition to Plaintiff's attorney's fees request no later than seven days from the date of entry of this Order. Defendant's reply, if desired, must be filed within seven days of Plaintiff's response in opposition.

Defendant's supplemental motion to compel Plaintiff to produce his diary (Doc. 50) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of in camera review before the undersigned. Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit to the Court copies of all unredacted entries from his diary dating from the day he was hired by Radiant Systems to the date he filed his complaint in this matter no later than fourteen days from the date of entry of this Order. He must submit these copies by mailing those documents to the undersigned at 106 U.S. Courthouse, 121 Spring St. S.E., Gainesville, GA 30501.

Defendant's supplemental request for same-day deposition cancellation costs assessed by the court reporter (Doc. 50) is DENIED.

Plaintiff's Motion To Sanction Defense Attorney For Deposition Misconduct (Doc. 53) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of November, 2018.