*1 This matter is before the undersigned for consideration of Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 25), Plaintiff's Motion for Permission for Electronic Case Filing (Doc. 26), and Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Discovery Period (Doc. 31).

I. Defendant's Motion For Sanctions (Doc. 25)

A. Factual Background

Defendant served interrogatories and requests for production on Plaintiff, through his then-counsel, on October 2, 2017. (See Docs. 11, 12). Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's discovery requests, and after Plaintiff's counsel withdrew in November 2017 (see Doc. 16 and Doc. 18 at 3), Defendant emailed the discovery requests directly to Plaintiff on November 20, 2017 (Doc. 25-5 at 4; see also Doc. 25-3 at 6-7). Shortly thereafter, on November 26, 2017, Plaintiff indicated he would produce documents. (Doc. 25-5 at 4; see also Doc. 25-3 at 6).

In late November and again in mid-December, Defendant attempted to schedule a conference with Plaintiff but did not receive a response. (Doc. 25-5 at 4; see also Doc. 25-3 at 3-4). After Defendant sought Court involvement to schedule a conference which is a prerequisite to filing a motion to compel, the Court set a telephone conference for January 2, 2018. (Doc. 22). During the telephone conference, Plaintiff agreed to respond to Defendant's discovery requests no later than January 12, 2018, and discovery was extended until February 28, 2018. (See Doc. 23 (indicating responses due January 12, 2018 “whether [Plaintiff] has retained new counsel or not”)). Plaintiff did not respond to the discovery requests by January 12, 2018, so Defendant contacted Plaintiff concerning the overdue responses, and Plaintiff asserted he did not have the requests, despite having been provided with the requests at least twice. (Doc. 25-5 at 5; see also Doc. 25-3 at 2-5). Plaintiff did not then respond to Defendant's discovery requests. (Doc. 25-5 at 6).

Defendant therefore filed this motion on January 19, 2018. (Doc. 25). Defendant seeks dismissal of this action due to Plaintiff's failure to respond to its discovery requests. (Doc. 25-5 at 1). In the alternative, Defendant seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to the outstanding discovery requests, which include interrogatories and requests for production, and an award of its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, associated with the preparation of this motion. (Doc. 25-5 at 1, 12). Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion, which under the Local Rules indicates that it is unopposed. See LR 7.1B, NDGa. (“Failure to file a response shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion.”). On February 13, 2018, Defendant filed a supplemental brief in which it indicates that on January 31, 2018, Plaintiff provided some responses to its discovery requests, three months after they were initially due and only after Defendant filed its motion for sanctions. (Doc. 30 at 2). Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff's responses are “completely insufficient” and that Plaintiff “failed to adequately respond to many of NCR's requests without providing a legal justification.” (Id. at 3). Therefore Defendant contends that “[i]n the event the case is not dismissed, an order from the Court compelling Haji to respond is appropriate and necessary given that Haji has repeatedly demonstrated that he will not respond to NCR's discovery requests.” (Id.).

B. Analysis

*2 Rule 37(d)(1)(A)(ii) authorizes the imposition of sanctions when “a party after being properly served with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (d)(1)(A)(ii). A complete failure to respond to discovery may justify any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), including an order of dismissal. “Instead of or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3). “Dismissal under Rule 37 ‘is an extreme remedy and should not be imposed if lesser sanctions will suffice.’ ” French v. M & T Bank, 315 F.R.D. 695, 696 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (quoting Navarro v. Cohan, 856 F.2d 141, 142 (11th Cir. 1988)).

Because Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's motion for sanctions, he has not rebutted Defendant's contentions that he failed to respond to Defendant's discovery requests as Defendant has shown in its motion, nor has he offered an explanation for his failure to respond to Defendant's discovery requests by the date set forth during the January 2, 2018 teleconference, i.e., January 12, 2018, which was over two months after his responses were originally due under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A). “Since the plaintiff bears the burden of justifying his conduct, he must suffer the consequences of his silence.” Mills v. Anderson, No. CV606-88, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103906, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2008). The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff has been proceeding pro se since November, but “once a pro se [ ] litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Because Plaintiff completely failed to respond to Defendant's discovery requests by the time it filed its motion for sanctions, sanctions under Rule 37(d)(3) are warranted.

The Court finds that in light of Plaintiff's pro se status and his apparent efforts to respond to Defendant's discovery requests after Defendant filed its motion, the “extreme remedy” of dismissal is not appropriate at this point. Because Plaintiff's failure to respond was not substantially justified, however, and no other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust, the Court must award Defendant its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by Plaintiff's failure to respond. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3). Accordingly, Defendant's motion for sanctions is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to respond to Defendant's discovery requests is DENIED without prejudice to its right to seek dismissal if Plaintiff does not comply with his discovery obligations going forward.

Defendant's alternative requests for an order Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's outstanding discovery requests, including interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and for an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, associated with the preparation of this motion (Doc. 25-1 at 1, 12) are GRANTED. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to provide full and complete responses to Defendant's interrogatories (see Doc. 25-1) and requests for production of documents (see Doc. 25-2) NO LATER THAN MARCH 2, 2018. The Court understands that Plaintiff has submitted some partial responses to Defendant's requests but he must provide full and complete responses, and therefore he is directed to supplement his responses as appropriate. Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to comply with this Order, Defendant may file a motion to compel and/or for additional sanctions, including dismissal of this action, and the undersigned may recommend to the District Judge that this action be dismissed.

*3 As to the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded, the Court notes that Defendant has presented a declaration by its attorney, Henry Warnock, who stated, “Based on my review of time records, Defendant has expended $3,816.00 in reasonable expenses associated with its Motion to Compel.” (Doc. 25-4 at 4). Defendant is DIRECTED to present documentation in support of its expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in preparing its motion for sanctions NO LATER THAN MARCH 2, 2018. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a response to Defendant's documentation NO LATER THAN MARCH 16, 2018. See, e.g., Kelly v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2566-ECS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137006, at *12-13 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2009) (granting motion for sanctions under Rule 37(d)(3) and directing defendant to provide documentation of its expenses and plaintiff to submit response). After receipt of the parties’ submissions, the Court will determine the reasonable amount of fees to be awarded to Defendant.

II. Plaintiff's Motion For Permission For Electronic Case Filing (Doc. 26)

Plaintiff requests permission to participate in the Court's electronic filing system (“CM-ECF”) and “to consider waiving the fee for e-filing registration and any fee associated with it for the duration of [his] case with this court.” (Doc. 26 at 1). This Court has addressed this issue in its Standing Order 16-01 In re: Revised Electronic Case Filing Standing Order and Administrative Procedures governing electronic filing (see Appendix H to Local Rules, NDGa.). That authority dictates that “[p]ro se litigants who are not attorneys in good standing admitted to the Bar of this Court must file all documents with the Court in paper form.” (See App. H - 3; see also App. H - A22 (“Pro se filers shall file paper originals of all complaints, pleadings, motions, affidavits, briefs, and other documents”)). Plaintiff is not a member of the Bar of this Court, and therefore, this Court's Standing Order No. 16-01 and Administrative Procedures prohibit him from using the Court's electronic filing system.

The Administrative Procedures do allow the Clerk's Office “or any judge of this court” to “deviate from these procedures in specific cases, without prior notice, if deemed appropriate in the exercise of discretion, considering the need for the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of matters pending before the court.” (App. H - A7). Plaintiff asserts that his “job requires [him] to be away five days out of the 7 days week period,” he is receiving documents from Defendant's counsel and the Court belatedly, he has to take time off from work to file documents or respond to a motion, and he spends an average of $35 a day for parking, fuel, serving documents to the defendant's lawyers, and mileage. (Doc. 26 at 1). Those assertions fall far short of justifying a deviation from the Court's electronic filing procedures. Plaintiff has not shown that his asserted difficulties in using the mail to send and receive filings to and from counsel and the Court are necessarily more onerous than those experienced by any pro se plaintiff. To the extent that Plaintiff's work obligations interfere with his ability to litigate this case, Plaintiff is reminded that he chose to initiate this action and having done so, it is his obligation to prosecute it as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Local Rules. See, e.g., Oliver v. Cnty. of Chatham, No. CV417-101, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90362, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. June 13, 2017) (“Oliver is reminded that litigants have a duty to actively monitor the docket ..., and he must participate fully, complying with both the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (collecting cases)).

The Court also notes that the Court's Administrative Procedures provide that “[a]ccess to the electronic docket and documents filed in ECF is available to the public at no charge at the Clerk's Office during regular business hours.” (App. H - A25). Plaintiff may also subscribe to the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) system and pay a user fee in order to “remotely access[ ] certain detailed case information, such as filed documents and docket sheets in civil cases, but excluding review of calendars and similar general information.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that he does not have sufficient access to the filings in this case.

*4 Plaintiff's request to access and use CM/ECF (Doc. 26) is therefore DENIED. See, e.g., McMahon v. Cleveland Clinic Found. Police Dep't, 455 Fed. Appx. 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished decision) (affirming district court's denial of pro se plaintiff's access to CM/ECF to receive electronic notifications because the plaintiff did not show good cause); Oliver, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90362, at *1 (noting that “[p]ro se plaintiffs are unable to use this system absent court authorization, which is sparingly granted,” and denying pro se plaintiff's motion for CM-ECF access); Dunn-Fischer v. Dist. Sch. Bd., No. 2:10-cv-512-FtM-29SPC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98253, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2010) (denying pro se plaintiff's request for permission to access CM/ECF because “[i]t is the District's preferred policy to disallow pro se litigants access to electronic filing unless extenuating circumstances exist to justify waiving CM/ECF procedures,” and the plaintiff had not shown good cause); Jacobs v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 1:08-CV-3253-JTC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136257, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2009) (denying pro se plaintiff's motion to allow him to electronically access documents).

III. Plaintiff's Motion To Extend Discovery Period (Doc. 31)

Plaintiff moves the Court to extend the discovery deadline, currently scheduled to expire February 28, 2018 (see Doc. 23), for 90 days. (Doc. 31). In support of this request, Plaintiff makes a number of allegations concerning his previous attorney's performance in this action (see id. at 1-3), but those assertions fail to address why Plaintiff requires additional time for discovery given that his attorney withdrew from representation in November 2017 and discovery was subsequently extended until February 28, 2018. Even if his attorney did not pursue discovery before she withdrew, Plaintiff has not identified what discovery, if any, he has conducted since November, nor has he shown what discovery he anticipates conducting or shown why he has not already done so. He also asserts that “Defendant recently submitted first set of interrogatories and requests” and complains about the effort required to respond to those requests (Doc. 31 at 3-4 (emphasis added)), but Defendant has shown that it emailed those requests to Plaintiff almost three months ago on November 20, 2017 after his counsel withdrew (see Doc. 25-3 at 6-7), and Plaintiff clearly had those requests when the Court conducted its teleconference with him on January 2, 2018 and he agreed to respond to them (see Doc. 23). As discussed above, the Court has directed Plaintiff to provide full and complete responses to those requests no later than March 2, 2018, thus the discovery period is effectively extended to that date solely for the purpose of Plaintiff providing those responses. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to extend the discovery period beyond February 28, 2018 so that he may conduct discovery after that date, Plaintiff has not shown why that extension should be granted and therefore his motion is DENIED.

Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 25) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is DENIED without prejudice and its motions to compel discovery responses and for reasonable attorney's fees are GRANTED. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to provide full and complete responses to Defendant's interrogatories and requests for production of documents no later than March 2, 2018. Defendant is DIRECTED to file documentation to support its requested amount of attorney's fees no later than March 2, 2018, and Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file his response to Defendant's attorney's fees documentation no later than March 16, 2018. Plaintiff's Motion for Permission for Electronic Case Filing (Doc. 26) is DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Discovery Period (Doc. 31) seeking a 90-day extension of the discovery period, is DENIED. The discovery period is extended until March 2, 2018 solely for the purpose of Plaintiff responding to Defendant's interrogatories and requests for production of documents already served on Plaintiff.

*5 IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of February, 2018.