*1 Pending before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Louisiana-Pacific Corporation (“LP”) to seal document (Docket No. 197), which is GRANTED.[1] Also pending is LP's emergency motion (Docket No. 196) to lift the stay of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Amerisafe Consulting and Safety Services, LLC (“Amerisafe”) entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Docket No. 196-2) upon Amerisafe's motion to quash to that court (Docket No. 196-1). A response in opposition to that motion was filed by Defendant James Hardie Building Products, Inc. (“JHBP”).[2] For the reasons stated herein, LP's emergency motion to lift stay (Docket No. 196) is DENIED. The parties are further put on notice that any subsequent discovery orders in which the Court finds there to be very little substance for a party's position will likely result in the Court exercising its discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5) to order payment of attorney's fees and other expenses.

Judge McCalla's amended scheduling order of August 15, 2018 clearly permitted only fact witness depositions. Docket No. 168 at 1. LP does not dispute that Amerisafe's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Delwyn Kubeldis, has been identified by JHBP as an expert. Although the undersigned Magistrate Judge does not have the benefit of the comments made by Judge McCalla referenced in the August 29 email from Sam Miller to Rocky King (Docket No. 199-3 at 2), even without that information, is unpersuaded by LP's suggestion that expert depositions may be permitted because Judge McCalla's amended scheduling order does not expressly prohibit such depositions. If LP had some question, or believed there to be some good faith disagreement about the scope of Judge McCalla's order, the more proper approach would have been to seek clarification (either by an express motion to that effect or by a request for a status conference), rather than consume the time and resources of two courts with a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that is outside the scope of discovery permitted by the plain language of Judge McCalla's prior orders. Given LP's contention that the Rule 30(b)(6) witness has key factual knowledge as well, LP could also request, either of JHBP or of Judge McCalla, that it be permitted to treat the witness as a fact witness at the preliminary injunction hearing, even though offered by JHBP as an expert. Further, although LP asserts that it substantially narrowed the scope of its intended questions of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, the Court does not agree that the remaining topics are all factual in nature and are within the limited scope of discovery for purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing.[3]

*2 In short, there were a number of other options that LP could have at least explored instead of a Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena that on its face disregards the boundaries of discovery drawn by the Court for purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing. Nevertheless, because LP chose to proceed in the manner it did, and because the undersigned is constrained by the scope of Judge McCalla's earlier order, LP's emergency motion is DENIED.

It is SO ORDERED.