*1 This matter comes before the Court to consider two related motions filed by the Plaintiff, Adrianne Popeck. The first motion is Popeck's motion for issuance of a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[1] The motion seeks to prevent service by the Defendants, Rawlings Company, LLC (Rawlings) and Debra Ford, of five subpoenas duces tecum– – two to be served on Popeck's banks, Fifth Third Bank and PNC Bank[2] and three to be served on various gaming establishments she has frequented, i.e., Twin Spires, Horseshoe Casino Southeast and Belterra Casino and Hotel Resort.[3]

Exhibit A attached to each of the bank subpoenas demands production of seven years of the Popeck's banking records beginning from January 1, 2010 to the present to include all: signature cards; monthly statements; automated teller machine (ATM) or point-of-sale (POS) transaction records; documents that reflect the date, time, location and sequence or transaction number for each POS or ATM transaction; names, addresses and telephone numbers of each owner, operator or servicer of any non-Fifth Third or non-PNC Bank ATM previously identified; and finally, all documents or other records that reflect any claims of fraud, identity theft or unauthorized transactions for all accounts individually or jointly owned by Popeck.

Exhibit A attached to each of the gaming establishment subpoenas likewise demands production seven years of Plaintiff's gaming records involving each establishment beginning on January 1, 2010 to the present to include all: records about frequent player awards programs or loyalty programs that Popeck participated in and her current status therein; rewards and comps earned or provided to Popeck; rewards and comps used by Popeck; gaming activity reports or statements involving Popeck; dates and times of play by Popeck; types of gambling play done by Popeck; information regarding amounts wagered, won or lost by Popeck; IRS form 1099s provided to Popeck; and finally, win/loss statements provided to Popeck.

Popeck now argues in support of her motion that all five of the subpoenas are grossly overbroad, not only in their 7-year temporal scope, but also to the extent that they seek information entirely unrelated to her claims of wrongful termination, disability discrimination, retaliation and violation of federal and state wage laws. She contends that these subpoenas are nothing more than a blatant “fishing expedition” by Rawlings and Ford, who hope to falsely portray her to the jury as a spendthrift and a gambler who improperly used her FMLA and intermittent disability leave time, not due her medically documented irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) symptoms, or the need to seek ongoing treatment for them, but rather to gamble.

Popeck does not dispute that she “patronized gaming establishments on occasion” or that she had user accounts with such gaming establishments. She insists, however, that: (1) absolutely no factual basis exists to believe that she missed work due to her gaming hobby, as various supervisory Rawlings employees, such as Debra Ford and Diana Chapman, previously have conceded under oath upon deposition; and (2) the gaming records now sought absolutely would not, even when examined in conjunction with her banking records, prove that she improperly took leave on any particular date using her IBS disability as a pretext to gamble, given that, first, various of her friends used her player rewards cards with her consent so that the mere documented use of a rewards card would not indicate her presence at a casino on any given date; and second, Rawlings employee, Diana Chapman, admits that she “shredded” her weekly handwritten notes that documented Popeck's use of intermittent disability leave, the only documents that accurately revealed the actual dates and times that Popeck took disability-related leave, where Rawlings otherwise accumulated such leave use in 4-and-8 hour blocks of time in order to administratively calendar it in its ADP pay system.

*2 As for her banking records, Popeck explains that she has already voluntarily provided Rawlings and Ford with all of her bank deposit records in an effort to confirm that her income was substantially reduced when Rawlings, unlawfully in her view, reduced her pay for the times that she took disability-related leave for her IBS condition. Popeck protests that Rawlings and Ford now apparently seek to question all of her personal expenditures over seven years, despite the fact that no financial impropriety or fraud has been alleged against her by the Defendants, nor did she by her employment stand in any fiduciary duty with respect to them.

The claim by Rawlings and Ford that they need to examine all of her private bank records for seven years to “double check her credibility,” in Popeck's view, simply confirms that they are fishing to find possibly questionable expenditures in an effort to unfairly paint her as a spendthrift who brought about her own financial difficulties due to her own ill-chosen financial decisions. Because the subpoenas are unduly broad, overly burdensome and entirely disproportionate to the needs of the case considering their minimal probative value of the information sought, Popeck requests that the Court issue a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c). See Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Assoc.—MEA—NEA, 556 F. Supp. 316, 318-19 (W.D. Mich. 1983)(“Protective orders are generally available pursuant to Rule 26 upon a showing of good cause. Where justice requires, a protective order may issue to protect the party from embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. However, good cause is not established merely by showing that discovery may involve inconvenience and expense.”); Isaac vs. Shell Oil Co., 83 F.R.D. 428 431 (E.D. Mich. August 23, 1979) (“[A]n overly broad request for discovery which constitutes no more than a fishing expedition will not be allowed.”)

Rawlings and Ford forcefully respond that Plaintiff's motions “are high on drama, low on legal authority or reason, and attempt to misrepresent the record ....”[4] They maintain that Popeck has by her pleadings and deposition testimony directly put at issue her finances. Consequently, Defendants insist that they are entitled to discover all of the requested information to rebut her claims, most recently set forth in her second amended complaint, that Rawlings' alleged reduction of her pay for disability leave resulted in her 2015 bankruptcy and caused her considerable financial hardship, economic injury and emotional distress[5] These repeated allegations by Popeck in the view of Rawlings and Ford entitle them to conduct needed discovery on Plaintiff's finances to conclusively resolve whether “her gambling or her lifestyle, contributed to these problems.”[6] EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7488, *5-8 (D. Neb. 2007).

Rawlings and Ford deny any appeal to “class prejudice” by their intended investigation of Popeck's gambling, but instead maintain that their sole desire is to determine whether gambling contributed to her financial problems, and whether she visited Horseshoe Casino or Belterra on the days that she used FMLA or ADA time away from work supposedly due to her IBS. Such gaming records according to the Defendants also relate to Popeck's credibility given her insistence that she ceased her gambling habits immediately prior to her bankruptcy and has not significantly gambled since. Only by comparing Popeck's banking and gaming records can Rawlings and Ford adequately determine whether she was gaming at Horseshoe Casino or Belterra on the days she took FMLA or ADA disability leave.

*3 The second motion at issue relates to the effort of the Defendants to serve a deposition subpoena on Popeck's bankruptcy attorney, Walter Hudson, in an effort to obtain documents that she provided to him as part of her 2015 Chapter 7 bankruptcy.[7] The subpoena demands that Hudson bring with him “all documents provided to him by ...[Popeck] regarding each of the accounts listed by her in her Petition for U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Kentucky, Case No. 3:15-BK-32456, Debtor Adrianne L. Popeck.” The Notice to take Video Deposition defines documents to include “all written, typed, printed, electronic, or computerized statements, communications or other matter.”[8]

Popeck insists that Rawlings and Ford cannot show any particularized need for documents contained in her bankruptcy attorney's files. She points out that at her first deposition in June 2016, she provided the Defendants with her bankruptcy petition. Because the files of her attorney include his notes, mental impressions and annotations, Popeck argues that the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protect such matters from disclosure. Further, she adds that the files do not contain any documents detailing her gaming activities, which her attorney has confirmed by separate review, but rather focus on the status of her various debts at the time the Chapter 7 petition was filed – – information already set forth in that petition. Yet, Defendants waited until shortly before the closure of discovery to go on this latest fishing expedition according to Popeck.

Because the challenged subpoenas are unrelated to any specific claim or defense, and are designed to harass her while turning the present lawsuit into a referendum on her personal financial decisions, Popeck asks that the Court enter a Rule 26(c) protective order to preclude issuance of the subpoenas to her two banks and the three identified gaming establishments. She additionally requests that the court quash the subpoena to her bankruptcy attorney on the basis that the files sought by the Defendants are confidential attorney work product.

Rawlings and Ford in response to the motion to quash the subpoena to attorney Hudson explain that they intend to obtain Popeck's credit card statements, loan and gambling records – – all of which that Popeck testified she had turned over to Hudson to enable him to prepare her Chapter 7 petition. These documents Defendants explain cannot be obtained pursuant to Rule 34, but rather must be obtained by subpoena. While Rawlings might be able to obtain the total amount of credit card, gambling or other debt identified in Popeck's Chapter 7 petition, it argues that the defense is entitled to examine the underlying documents “to glean information about the specific charges relating to her lifestyle choices.”[9] Rawlings adds by way of example “if Plaintiff's credit card statements show significant charges to HH Gregg and others around the time she requested a loan from Rawlings, such charges at least contributed to – – if not caused – – her financial distress.”[10] For these reasons, Rawlings and Ford ask that the motion for protective order and motion to quash both be denied.

Consideration of the above arguments requires a review of the nature of the parties' dispute as alleged by Popeck. Popeck is a former employee of the Defendant, Rawlings Company, LLC (Rawlings). Beginning in March 2009, Popeck worked at Rawlings' facility in LaGrange, Kentucky, first as an Auditor and later as an Audit Manager in its Medicare group. After some three years of employment, in September 2012, she was promoted to the Audit Manager position. The following year, however, during the summer of 2013, her treating physician diagnosed Popeck with chronic IBS, a digestive disorder characterized by intense abdominal cramping, frequent diarrhea and depression.

*4 Popeck that December in 2013 submitted a written Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., request for intermittent leave to her employer. In her request, she explained that her doctors advised that her IBS symptoms would manifest themselves in the early morning and late afternoon, which would require her to receive permission on those occasions to arrive later than usual and sometimes to leave earlier than usual when her symptoms were particularly severe. Rawlings granted Popeck unpaid FMLA leave to deal with her medical issues, but she maintains that the Director of the Audit Department, Kelly Young, began to selectively enforce company rules and to single her out for discipline as a form of disparate treatment arising from her FMLA use.

In August 2014, Young and Ford called a meeting with Popeck at which time they advised her that she was being demoted from her job as Medicare Audit Manager to the subordinate position of Auditor. Popeck went to the company owner, George Rawlings, to complain about her demotion, imposed after years of highly favorable performance. Popeck claims that after she told Rawlings that she believed she had been singled out by Young due to her use of FMLA leave, Rawlings allegedly told Popeck to leave his office. She spent the remainder of her time at the company in the Auditor position.

Popeck also claims that although she qualified for FMLA leave, Young and Audit Manager Diana Chapman required her to make up the FMLA time by staying late, coming in early or working through her lunch hour. Chapman according to Popeck kept written notes that tracked Popeck's use of leave time to the minute even going to the extent by March 2015 to requesting a daily message from Popeck to keep her advised on whether Popeck had “worked extra time to make up for something.”[11]

In 2014, Popeck applied to Rawlings for a disability accommodation due to the imminent expiration of her FMLA time for the year. According to Popeck, she discussed the matter with Ford who confirmed that Popeck was covered by Kentucky disability accommodation law, which the company would honor. This disability accommodation, according to Popeck, served as a gap-filler for her that year until she successfully renewed her request for FMLA intermittent leave in late 2014. When this second FMLA intermittent leave was exhausted in the summer 2015, Popeck resumed use of her disability accommodation. Popeck had her treating doctor update her medical file that August for the purpose of such disability accommodation with the information being transmitted to the company. Popeck claims that during this time she continued to do additional work outside normal work hours to make up her “debt” to the company for the time that she missed due to disability accommodation.

By October 2015, Chapman advised Popeck that she no longer needed to provide daily notifications, except for her FMLA/ADA time. That same month, Ford issued a written reprimand to Popeck for missing work. Defendant Ford allegedly told Popeck that she did not believe that Popeck's medical records justified the missed days. Popeck submitted various questions Ford asked about Popeck's IBS and its impact on her availability for work to her treating physician. Popeck's doctor responded with additional information, which apparently did not satisfy Ford, who contacted Popeck's gastroenterologist, Dr. Sheila Rhodes, on October 14 to ask when Popeck's medication would be sufficiently regulated to avoid further full-day work absences, and precisely when during the day that Popeck could be expected to experience her symptoms. Upon receipt of this information, Defendant Ford allegedly advised Popeck on November 10, 2015 that Popeck was being disciplined and would be eventually discharged so that the company could “find someone who can be in that chair 100% of the time.”[12]

*5 Ford advised Popeck by email later that same day that effective immediately Popeck would not be permitted to miss any more work days or regular work hours absent a positive leave balance. Popeck alleges that she immediately went to George Rawlings to relate these events and to request the assignment of a different Human Resources Generalist, but Rawlings declined her request, which led Popeck to file an administrative complaint with the Kentucky office of the EEOC. Defendant Ford later that month supposedly told Popeck that Ford did not believe that Popeck had a disability since her major life activities in Ford's view were not affected by IBS. Popeck alleges that soon thereafter Ford had Popeck's co-workers keep watch on her and report to Ford anytime that Popeck was not at her desk.

Popeck claims that despite this series of events she remained a top performer for her department of the company in the categories of “most audits touched,” “highest [audits] completed,” “hit rate” and “highest $$.” Nevertheless, on December 8, 2015, Popeck was not at work by 8 AM due to her aggravated IBS symptoms, which she alerted Chapman to by text message. That afternoon, defendants advised Popeck that she was being discharged from employment based on her attendance record. Popeck filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Education and Work force Development Cabinet, Division of Unemployment Insurance the following day on December 9, 2015. In response, Defendant Ford transmitted a written statement to the Division on December 23, 2015 advising that, contrary to Popeck's representation, she had not submitted adequate paperwork to establish a disability. This statement by Ford resulted in an initial denial of unemployment benefits, which Popeck successfully appealed when no fact witnesses for the company appeared to testify at the administrative hearing.

On February 3, 2016, Popeck filed suit against Rawlings in the Circuit Court of Oldham County, Kentucky.[13] In her original complaint, Popeck alleged in Count 1 that Rawlings in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), KRS, §§ 344.040 and 344.280, discriminated against her on the basis of her disability, unlawfully revoked its prior reasonable accommodation of a modified work schedule without a showing of undue hardship or expense and discharged her from employment on December 8, 2015 in favor of its desire to replace her with a nondisabled person.

Count 2 alleged that Defendants Rawlings and Ford violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq by treating Popeck's use of FMLA leave as a negative factor in its employment actions, as shown by decision to demote her to auditor and its ongoing refusal to restore Popeck to her position of Audit Manager following her initial use of FMLA leave and finally by its retaliation, through written discipline and ultimately discharge, for her “absenteeism,” based on counting lawful FMLA leave use as being absent. Count 3 of the original complaint alleged that the two Defendants jointly violated Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) §§ 341.990(6)(a) and 446.070 when they knowingly made false statements to the Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance in an effort to avoid paying unemployment benefits. Popeck also sought punitive damages in her first complaint, as well.

Five months after the Defendants removed her lawsuit to federal court in March of 2016, Popeck filed a First Amended Complaint that added two additional claims along with a request for a declaration of rights.[14] Count 4 of the new complaint alleged disability discrimination based on Rawlings practice of deducting from her pay for time Popeck spent at disability-related doctor appointments or at her home for IBS symptom-related recovery time in violation of the KCRA. Count 5 alleged that Defendants violated both the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 C.F.R. § 541 et seq and Kentucky wage law, KRS § 337.060, by causing her to suffer impermissible salary deductions that suppressed her weekly pay below $455 per week during the time she was lawfully entitled to disability accommodation in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 and contrary to her agreed upon weekly salary, thereby entitling her to the amounts wrongfully withheld and an equal amount of statutory liquidated damages. Finally, she sought a declaration of rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2201 that Rawlings retroactively forfeited exempt employee status as to all company Auditors and Audit Managers due to its ongoing practice of improper salary deductions from the wages of disabled employees through misuse of the unpaid FMLA exemption of 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b)(7) thereby reducing her and other employees' salaries below the $455 federal minimum threshold for salaried employees.

*6 Popeck more recently on January 5, 2017 filed a Second Amended Complaint to add an additional claim of retaliation.[15] As Popeck explained the new claim in her successful motion for leave to file her latest complaint, testimony given after she filed her First Amended Complaint established retaliation by the principal of Rawlings Company, George Rawlings, who according to Popeck, when he learned directly from Popeck about the unlawful deductions from her salary, instead of remedying the situation, caused the company Human Resources Department to investigate her medical paperwork, which led to the unlawful revocation of her disability accommodation and ultimately to her termination soon after Mr. Rawlings learned from the Human Resources that there was going to be a lawsuit. These are the circumstances that led to the addition of Count 6 of the Second Amended Complaint, a count of retaliation for protected activity in violation of the KCRA, FMLA, ADA, and Kentucky's Wages and Hours Act.

Popeck's Rule 26(c) motion for a protective order and her motion to quash pursuant to Rule 45(d) are governed by the same standards. Spartanburg Reg'l Healthcare Sys. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., No. 1:05–MC–107, 2005 WL 2045818, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug.24, 2005)(“ Protection from subpoenas under Rule 45 “ ‘tracks the provisions of Rule 26(c)’ which provides for the issuance of protective orders.”)(quoting Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 525, 529 (D.Del.2002)). See also, Babcock Power, Inc., et al., v. Stephen T. Kapsalis, et al., No. 3:13-CV-717-DJH-CHL, 2016 WL 797592 at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb 26, 2016)( “Although irrelevance or overbreadth are not specifically listed under Rule 45 as a basis for quashing a subpoena, courts ‘have held that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26.’ ”) TCYK, LLC v. Does 1-47, No. 2:13-CV-539, 2013 WL 4805022, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2013) (quoting, in part, Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 265 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D. Ohio 2011)).

A party that seeks the issuance of a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) bears the burden to show good cause for the issuance of such an order. In re Skelaxin Metaxalone Antitrust Lit., 292 F.R.D. 544, 549-50 (E.D. Tenn. 2013). See also, Nix v. Sword, 11 Fed.Appx. 498, 500 (6th Cir. May 24, 2011) (“The burden of establishing good cause for a protective order rests with the movant.”). To show good cause, the moving party must articulate specific facts that show a clearly defined and serious injury resulting from the discovery sought; mere conclusory statements will not be sufficient. In re Skelaxin, 292 F.R.D. at 549. Rule 26(c) “assumes that a party has the right to issue a discovery request in the first place. Id.

Good cause will not be shown merely because the disputed discovery may be inconvenient or expensive. Isaac v. Shell Oil Co., 83 F.R.D. 428, 431 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (citing United States v. Amer. Opticor Co. 39 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1966)). Good cause, however, may be shown where a party demonstrates that the disputed discovery requests seek irrelevant information. Abraham v. Trinity Health Corp., No. 12-14402, 2013 WL 2051160 at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2013).

As with most matters involving discovery, the District court is granted broad discretion to grant or deny protective orders under Rule 26. Parker & Gamble Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). Because entry of a protective order is contrary to the basic policy in favor of broad discovery, the party that seeks a protective order has the burden to make a strong showing why discovery should be denied. Cockrill v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, No. 3:13-0031, 2013 WL 1966304 at *3 (M.D.Tenn. May 10, 2013) (citing Skellerup Industries, Ltd v. City of Los Angeles, 163 F.R.D. 598, 600-01 (C.D.Cal. 1995)). Nevertheless, as a party's showing of the need for discovery diminishes, the harassment and oppression required to be shown to justify relief under Rule 26(c)(1) diminishes in equal measure, as well. Serrano v. Cintas Corp, 699 F.3d 884, 901 (6th Cir. 2012)(quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2036 (3d ed. 2012).(“Thus even very slight inconvenience may be unreasonable if there is no occasion for the inquiry and it cannot benefit the party making it.”). Ultimately, the Court when making its determination must balance competing factors such as: (1) relevance, (2) need, (3) confidentiality, and (4) harm. Anderson v. Old National Bancorp, No. 5:02-CV-00324-R, 2010 WL 5463397 at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 29, 2010).

*7 Upon consideration, the Court concludes that Popeck has met her burden as to both motions. The subpoenas at issue are all facially overbroad in the view of the Court, and seek information and/or records of minimal relevance to the claims and defenses of the parties. Defendants offer no meaningful explanation why they require a full seven years of banking and gaming records beginning in 2010, a full three years prior to the beginning of events that resulted in the present lawsuit. Were the Court to order production of these records, they would not establish whether Popeck on any particular date or given time was, or was not, physically at a gaming establishment or otherwise involved with online gaming. Defendants offer no facts, nor even a single, meaningful example of an occasion on which Popeck abused her disability leave as a pretext in order to surreptitiously gamble. The gaming and banking records that Defendants seek, even were they to be provided in their entirety, would not resolve Defendants' suspicions for two very important reasons.

The first reason is that the gaming records sought would show at most only that someone, possibly Popeck, but also possibly one or more of her friends, made use of her gaming player rewards card on any given date. In other words, the most that could be conclusively established is that a particular card was used on a particular date, not that a particular individual used that same card. Defendants acknowledge this limitation, but suggest that, after they establish at trial that her player rewards card was used on a particular work date, the burden should shift to Popeck to come forward with rebuttal testimony from her friends to establish which one of them used her card with her permission. This scenario means that Popeck would be required to show the jury that she was not the individual who used the player rewards card on that particular date.

Popeck understandably protests that this entire exercise by Rawlings and Ford is merely a transparent effort to put her character on trial and diminish her in the eyes of the jury for reasons entirely unrelated to the actual claims and defenses at issue. The Court agrees. Rawlings two senior managers, Deborah Ford and Diane Chapman both acknowledged during their depositions that they had no specific facts to indicate that Popeck was actually gambling when she took FMLA leave or disability accommodation leave. Yet, Defendants apparently hope to pour through an entire seven years of gaming records to look for work leave dates on which Popeck's player rewards cards were used at either Horseshoe Casino, Belterra or Twin Towers between 2013 and 2015 for the admitted purpose of challenging her as to each of those potential dates, all the while imposing the burden upon her to come forward with the testimony of presently unknown individuals to rebut the Defendants' self-created presumption that use of the rewards cards equates to her use of them, absent rebuttal testimony to the contrary.

This scenario would unavoidably transform both discovery and the trial of this matter into a referendum on gaming, a referendum based at this point on nothing more than a bare suspicion unsupported by any proffer or other factual basis. The prospect of unfair prejudice in such a situation is overwhelming given the minimal relevancy of the requested gaming and banking records.

This point brings up a second, serious problem for the Defendants. It has been established that automated payroll data processing at Rawlings required that use of leave be entered at either 4-hour or 8-hour increments. This ADP procedure meant that when Popeck used less than 4-hours of disability-related leave on any given date, her supervisor, Ms. Chapman, manually recorded the date and times that Popeck made use of her intermittent FMLA or disability accommodation leave so that these smaller amounts of time could be administratively accumulated for later entry. Chapman now admits that she “shredded” these handwritten notes, which were the only accurate written record of Popeck's actual use of intermittent disability leave.

*8 The computerized ADP records do not and will not accurately reflect all of the specific dates and times that Popeck made use of her disability-related incremental leave. Thus, merely comparing the dates and times that Popeck's ATM cards were used to the dates and times that her player rewards cards were used will not resolve the underlying question of whether Popeck was actually away ostensibly on disability-related leave when her ATM card and player rewards card were used.

Given these circumstances: (1) the extreme overbreadth of the time period of records sought; (2) the absence of any factual basis to presently suggest that Popeck was secretly gambling when away on disability-related leave; (3) the inability of the banking and gaming records to meaningfully establish the underlying question for which such records are purportedly sought; (4) the substantial possibility of unfair prejudice to the Plaintiff through the repeated introduction of minimally relevant gaming records; and (5) the failure of the Defendants to show that the requested discovery is proportional to the needs of the case considering its minimal relevance to the central issues in the present action – – all persuade the Court that Popeck has fully met her burden under Rule 26(c)to show good cause for the requested protection. Witt v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 307 F.R.D. 554, 569 (D. Colo. 2014)(“All discovery is subject to the [proportionality] limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(c).”)(quoting Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 350, 360 (D.Md.2012)); Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun “Michael” Chung, No. 3:15-CV-4108-D, 2017 WL 896897, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017) (“[A] court can—and must—limit proposed discovery that it determines is not proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit ...”).

Rawlings and Ford offer an alternative justification for their efforts to obtain the Plaintiff's gambling and bank records. They reason that because Popeck appears determined to argue that allegedly improper deductions from her paycheck led to her Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing in 2015, they are entitled to comprehensively review all of her expenditures for seven years with an eye to determining whether, in fact, her own bad financial choices i.e., unwarranted or excessive personal expenditures, led to her claimed financial ruination. The Court disagrees with this reasoning for number of reasons.

First, a plaintiff in an FMLA action is limited by the remedy section in 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) to the recovery from the defendant employer of “damages equal to... any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or ... any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation.” Id.; Bordeau v. Saginaw Control & Eng'g, Inc., 446 F. Supp.2d 766, 769-70 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Section 2617 provides the exclusive remedies for an employer's violation of the FMLA. See, Rosania v Taco Bell of America, Inc. 303 F.Supp.2d 878, 881-82 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Accordingly, an FMLA plaintiff such as Popeck is not entitled to recover compensatory or consequential damages, or for her emotional distress or punitive damages. Rosania, 303 F. Supp.3d at 882(collecting cases). See Brumalough v Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[B]ecause the FMLA specifically lists the types of damages that an employer may be liable for, and it includes damages only in so far as they are the actual monetary losses of the employees such as salary and benefits and certain liquidated damages, the FMLA does not permit recovery for emotional distress.”).

*9 It is true that the same conclusion does not appear to be true for retaliation claims under the FLSA. Such claims are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” In Moore v Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2004) our Circuit Court joined the 7th Circuit in holding that § 216(b) encompasses compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress. Id. (“ Although the circuits are divided on the question of whether the statute permits punitive damages, compare Travis, 921 F.2d at 111–12, with Snapp, 208 F.3d at 934, consensus on the issue of compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress seems to be developing. We now join our sister circuits in finding that the damages awarded by the jury in this case fall within the ambit of § 216(b).”). Punitive damages do not appear to be available for FLSA retaliation claims according to at least one recent District Court decision in Kentucky. Williams v. King Bee Delivery, LLC, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187-88 (E.D. Ky. 2016)(adopting the reasoning of Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928 (11th Cir. 2000) to reject the recovery of punitive damages for an FLSA retaliation claim.)

The practical upshot of this statutory language is that if Rawlings and/or Ford are liable for anything, their financial liability under the FMLA is limited to Popeck's actual monetary losses that directly arise from the allegedly wrongful withholding from her salary. Whether Popeck filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, or the emotional impact that such a filing had upon her, are at best tangential matters for which recovery appears to be permitted only under the FLSA as interpreted in Moore. Consequently, whether Popeck wisely invested and spent her wages once received is a matter that the Court views as being largely irrelevant to the federal claims she brings, as is the question of whether any alleged improper deductions from those wages played some role, small or otherwise, in her independent decision to file for bankruptcy.

To hold otherwise, and permit unfettered discovery of Popeck's expenditures and “lifestyle,” as Rawlings and Ford now propose to do over a seven-year time frame, would not only exponentially expand discovery, but would also derail the orderly progress of trial. The jury would be mired in irrelevant financial minutia. A perfect example of what the Defendants intend by their proposed bank subpoenas is revealed in their own Response, in which they hypothesize the possibility of ill-advised “H.H. Gregg” expenditures by Popeck prior to her bankruptcy at a time when she was claiming financial distress due to the deductions from her salary.

Such a proposed line-item review of Popeck's bank and credit card statements for the purpose of questioning her financial acumen is entirely disproportionate to any possible minimal relevance of the information or testimony to be obtained by such an exacting review. Just as Popeck may not obtain financial recovery for her bankruptcy by attempting to attribute it solely to the Defendants, those same defendants may not explore and call into question every expenditure or financial decision that Popeck has made since 2010 in an effort to blame her for her own financial undoing.

Little is to be gained by either party from such a time-consuming, diversion to obtain irrelevant information. The key question is whether Rawlings had a duty under the cited federal statutes to pay Popeck's salary without making the challenged deductions; and assuming the company did have such a duty, whether it knowingly, or otherwise, violated those same federal statutes by making the deductions. If it did, then Popeck is entitled under the FMLA to recover the monies wrongfully withheld from her as a direct result of the violation. What she might have done with such monies had they been timely paid, or whether she would or would not have filed for Chapter 7 relief are matters beyond the scope of her federal claims. For this separate, additional reason, the Court concludes once again that Popeck has shown good cause to obtain a protective order under Rule 26(c) as to the five subpoenas at issue.

*10 The final matter involves the motion to quash the subpoena to be issued to Popeck's bankruptcy attorney, Walter Hudson. Defendants demand all documents provided to Hudson by Popeck regarding each of the accounts that she listed in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. As noted, Popeck maintains that she has already provided the Defendants with her bankruptcy petition. She adds that her attorney's files do not contain any documents that detail her gaming activities, but certainly do include such protected attorney work product as her attorney's notes, mental impressions and annotations. Rawlings and Ford insist that their sole goal in requesting the attorney file of Popeck's bankruptcy counsel is to obtain her credit card statements, loan and gambling records “to glean information about the specific charges relating to her lifestyle choices.”[16]

The Court has already expressed its views concerning the irrelevancy of Popeck's “lifestyle” and the unfair jury prejudice that would unavoidably result if the Defendants were permitted to shift the focus of the trial proceedings from the salary-related claims and defenses to the Plaintiff's lifestyle. Defendants do not deny that they have already been provided with Popeck's bankruptcy petition, which sets forth her declared debts at the time the petition was filed. There accordingly appears to be little need for the additional documents sought. A line-item review of credit card and bank statements in an effort to impugn Popeck's financial decision-making is entirely disproportionate to whatever hypothetical relevance such matters may have. For these reasons, the Court likewise concludes that Popeck has shown good cause to quash the subpoena to be issued to her bankruptcy attorney.

The motion of the Plaintiff for entry of a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) and related motion to quash pursuant to Rule 45(d) are GRANTED in their entirety. Appeal of the present order is limited to the terms and the time limitations of Rule 72 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.