*1 Plaintiff Kimberly Flanagan has brought a motion to compel (doc. # 87) against defendants Cook County Adult Probation Department (“APD”), Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County (“OCJ”), Phillip Loizon, Cindy Komar, Matt Sobieski, Archie Shaw, and Delores Shaw (“the defendants”). Her motion seeks to require defendants to produce a document known as the Laner Report, which is a report of an investigation conducted by the law firm of Laner Muchin, Ltd. at the request of the OCJ into alleged misconduct at the APD. Plaintiff contends the Laner Report is responsive to her First Set of Requests for Documents (doc. # 87, Exh. A).

The defendants – with one exception – object to producing the Laner Report, claiming that it: (1) is protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, and (2) is neither responsive to any of plaintiff's discovery requests nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence (doc. 92: Resp. to Mot. to Compel). One defendant, Mr. Loizon, has filed a separate response (doc. # 94), arguing – as does Plaintiff – that the document is not privileged and should be produced. We have received a copy of the Laner Report, which we have reviewed in camera. For the following reasons, we deny Ms. Flanagan's motion.

Ms. Flanagan works for the APD. She filed this lawsuit against defendants, who are her employer and various supervisors and co-workers (we note that one of those defendants, Mr. Loizon, no longer is employed by the County). Ms. Flanagan alleges discrimination based on race, color, national origin and sex, as well as retaliation for filing various administrative complaints and two previous employment discrimination lawsuits (doc. # 1: Complaint). Both of her previous lawsuits involved allegations of employment discrimination against some of the defendants to the current lawsuit and/or other employees of the Cook County Adult Probation Department and the Office of the Chief Judge.

Defendants have produced more than 6,000 documents during discovery (Pl. Mot. to Compel ¶ 3). During a deposition of one of the individual defendants, plaintiff learned of the existence of the Laner Report. Defendants initiated the investigation that resulted in the creation of the Laner Report in response to an article in the Chicago Tribune, which alleged misconduct by employees of the weapons units of the APD. None of the individuals whom plaintiff has deposed, including Mr. Loizon, have read the Laner Report; nor do they know details about the contents of the Report (Pl. Mot. to Compel ¶¶ 4, 5, 7).

Courts have broad discretion to oversee and manage matters related to discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26(b)(1) permits the discovery of any “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Discoverable information is not limited to evidence admissible at trial, but includes information that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.

*2 The attorney-client privilege protects communications made in confidence by a client and a client's employees to an attorney, acting as an attorney, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Sandra T.E. v. South Berwyn School District 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). The work-product doctrine protects documents prepared by attorneys in anticipation of litigation for the purpose of analyzing and preparing a client's case. Id.; See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). We address in turn the questions of relevance and privilege.

After reviewing the Laner Report in camera, we find that it is neither responsive to plaintiff's discovery requests nor relevant to her claims. The Report is not responsive because it has nothing to do with any of plaintiff's discovery requests, including those she mentions specifically in her brief: “any defendants’ work records (No. 5); instances in which plaintiff complained about defendants (No. 9); and documents related to retaliation by defendants (No. 1)” (Mot. to Compel at 1).

In addition, the Laner Report has nothing to do with any of the claims or allegations plaintiff makes in this case. Specifically, the Laner Report is not relevant to plaintiff's allegations of race and sex discrimination and retaliation against her or other female employees, including verbal and physical harassment by Mr. Loizon and other defendants (Mot. to Compel at 2). Mr. Loizon independently argues that the Report is relevant to a separate civil rights lawsuit he has filed against the OCJ (Loizon Resp. at 14). However, to the extent that Mr. Loizon seeks production of the Report for use in that case, he is free to raise the issue in front of the judge handling that matter. We express no view as to whether the Laner Report might be responsive or relevant to any discovery request he might make in that action.[1]

Even if the Laner Report was relevant to any of plaintiff's claims, that alone would be insufficient to require its production if the Report is privileged. Plaintiff's motion does not address the issue of privilege; in her Reply she adopts Mr. Loizon's response, which argues that the Laner Report is not privileged. Our in camera review persuades us that the Laner Report is protected by the attorney-client privilege, because it was created for the purpose of providing defendants with legal advice concerning the allegations raised in the Tribune article. Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 618.

Mr. Loizon argues that the Laner Report is not privileged because a press release the OCJ issued the same day the Tribune article was published suggests that the investigation into the Tribune allegations was merely a “fact-finding mission,” and that the OCJ retained the Laner Muchin law firm for that reason, not to provide legal advice or in anticipation of litigation (Loizon Resp. at 5-6). Mr. Loizon also argues that the press release does not indicate that the investigation is privileged, because it states that “any evidence of illegal activity discovered during the investigation will be turned over to the appropriate authorities. If the investigation determines that best practices require modification of departmental procedures and policies, those recommendations will be evaluated and implemented” (Id. at 6-7). Mr. Loizon – without citation to authority – contends that because the press release suggested that the OCJ would take any steps necessary to implement policies to address any wrongdoing that might be covered by the investigation, the Report could not be privileged. Mr. Loizon speculates that the real reason the Report is not being produced is because it contains information that will reflect badly on the OCJ (Loizon Resp. at 8).

*3 Our in camera review of the document leads us to conclude that the Report is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Report was created for the purpose of obtaining legal advice regarding the allegations against the APD in order to determine what the potential legal liability might be to the OCJ because of these allegations and how the APD and the OCD might ameliorate any unlawful policies and procedures that gave rise to the allegations.

In reaching that conclusion, we have considered Mr. Loizon's contention that this situation presented in this case is distinguishable from the one addressed in Sandra T.E. because (1) the investigation there was conducted only after one of the defendants pleaded guilty to the abuse that was at the center of the lawsuit, and (2) the attorneys in that case provided so-called “Upjohn warnings” to the individuals they interviewed, confirming that the investigation was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Mr. Loizon assumes that the individuals interviewed by Laner Muchin attorneys were not given a similar warning because he himself did not receive one during either of his two meetings with the law firm. Mr. Loizon also points out that in Sandra T.E., the appeals court cited to the terms of the retainer agreement, which established an attorney-client relationship between the investigating law firm and the defendant (Loizon Resp. at 12).

None of these asserted distinctions renders inapplicable here the basic premise of Sandra T.E., which is that when lawyers are hired to provide legal services – including a factual investigation into allegations of unlawful activity – the attorney-client privilege applies to the communications made to advance that investigation. The fact that we have not been provided with a retainer agreement to review does not deprive us of the ability to determine that the Report is privileged. In addition to what we have seen in our review of the Laner Report that establishes the Report is privileged, statements contained in the press release showing the purposes for hiring the law firm (investigating alleged misconduct and providing legal assessment and advice) further confirm the privileged purpose for which the Report was created.

Moreover, the failure to provide Upjohn warnings does not automatically eliminate the possibility of privilege any more than the fact of stamping every page of the document “privileged” conclusively establishes that fact. We look instead to the substance of the document at issue to determine its entitlement to protection, and in this case, we find that the work done and legal analysis given by Laner Muchin fit within the framework established by Sandra T.E., and thus. that the Report is protected by the attorney-client privilege.[2]

*4 Finally, the fact that the press release stated the OCJ it would submit evidence of any illegal activity uncovered by the Report to the proper authorities does not indicate an intent to release the Report itself. There are a number of ways the OCJ could address findings of misconduct uncovered by the investigation – if any – without releasing the actual report and its legal findings. Plaintiff (and Mr. Loizon) ignore that while a fact may not be privileged from disclosure, the communications between an attorney and client reflecting legal analysis of that fact are indeed privileged. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).[3]

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Plaintiff's motion to compel (doc. # 87).