*1 Philosophers have long grappled with the question of what happens when an irresistible force collides with an immovable object. The litigants in this case personify this paradox. They have resisted every court admonition that they must work cooperatively to either settle their dispute or ready this case for trial; and they have been immovable in their desires to paint the other in the worst possible light. Each is guilty. To move the proceedings forward, the court ordered one final round of briefing to address any remaining discovery issues. The parties filed their motions and, if desired, their responses. The motions are now ripe for review.

I. Background

An understanding of the allegations in Andersen's amended complaint is necessary to the court's consideration of the discovery responses at issue. In brief, Andersen and Thompson are both members of a community interested in a treasure hidden by eccentric art dealer, Forrest Fenn. As part of their involvement, both Andersen and Thompson took to YouTube to discuss the treasure and the search for it. Although they had times when they treasured one another, even dating briefly, the gold of Andersen and Thompson's relationship turned out to be nothing but pyrite[1], and the two began saying nasty things about each other on YouTube. It is these YouTube videos and their content that form the basis for Andersen's four claims against Thompson.

In Count 1, Andersen alleges that Thompson violated copyright laws by cutting and pasting portions of her YouTube videos into his own videos, overdubbed with harassing commentary. In Count 2, Andersen alleges that Thompson invaded her privacy by placing her in a false light. She alleged that Thompson began “stalking in her personal matters” by “smearing her name by mischaracterizing personal matters or by trying to solicit comments by persons that Andersen no longer associated with (ex-husband, prior law firm, ex-boyfriends, etc.).” She indicates that Thompson publicized her divorce records, her lawsuit regarding the treasure, and police reports; and publicly accused her of being a liar, thief, and professionally unethical.

In Count 3, Andersen alleged that Thompson intentionally inflicted emotional distress. In addition to his harassing statements on YouTube, Andersen alleged that Thompson sought a frivolous temporary restraining order against her in retaliation for lawsuits she filed against him. Because of Thompson's behavior, Andersen alleged that she “suffered from periods of depression, resorted occasionally to drinking alcohol, and gained weight by these Defendants.” Lastly, in the alternative to Count 3, Andersen asserts a defamation claim against Thompson. She contends that Thompson maliciously made public comments and accused her of filing false and frivolous litigation; attempting to steal the treasure; having mental health issues; being a liar, thief, and perjurer; and violating professional responsibility rules, among other things. For each count, Andersen seeks injunctive and monetary or statutory relief, as appropriate.

II. Law & Analysis

*2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) states:

Courts construe Rule 26(b)(1) broadly. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). However, the scope of discovery is intended to focus on the actual claims or defenses that are at issue in the litigation. See, e.g., Sierrapine v. Refiner Products Mfg., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 604, 609 (E.D. Cal. 2011). As such, the party seeking discovery is required to make a threshold showing of relevance before production of information can be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit [discovery] if it determines that ... the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).”); see also Rivera v. DHL Glob. Forwarding, 272 F.R.D. 50, 57 (D.P.R. 2011) (holding that, regardless of generic, conclusory objections, there must be some evidence that the requested discovery is not frivolous). This applies with equal force to discovery requests made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34, and 36. See In re Dow Corning Corp., No. 95-CV-20512-DT (Chapter 11), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110644, at *16-17 (E.D. Mich. June 15, 2010). “The district court has broad discretion to control and restrict discovery where necessary to protect from abuse.” Id. (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1975)).

Those responding to discovery also must support their objections to the requests. Boilerplate objections to discovery requests are “known and detested by courts and commentators – and receiving parties – around the nation. Wesley Corp. v. Zoom T.V. Products, LLC, No. 17-10021, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5068, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2018). An objection is boilerplate when it “merely states the legal grounds for the objection without (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond to the request.” Id. at *9-10 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Andersen's Motion to Compel – Interrogatories

Andersen summarily asserts that Thompson's responses to her interrogatories are “largely unresponsive,” but she admits to asking more interrogatories than permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. She has identified a subset of interrogatories that she wants answered. See ECF Doc. 101 at 2. Because Thompson was only obligated to respond to the first 25 interrogatories and did so, the court will only consider Andersen's motion to compel in regard to Thompson's contested responses to the first 25 interrogatories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories.”). Accordingly, the court will only consider Thompson's responses to Interrogatories 3-5, 11-12, 14-16, and 22-24.

*3 Thompson's answers to Interrogatories 3, 11, 12, and 15 are nonresponsive, insufficient and/or vague. Thompson must properly answer those Interrogatories. See Wesley Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5068, at *9-10.

As to Interrogatories 4-5, 14, 16, and 22-24, Andersen's motion to compel is GRANTED and Thompson's objections, if made, are OVERRULED. Interrogatory 5 does not require a “Yes” or “No” answer and seeks the factual basis for statements Thompson allegedly made regarding Andersen, both of which make it a proper interrogatory and not a request for admission or a legal conclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(4). Further, although Thompson's response to Interrogatories 4 and 14 are partially responsive, they fail to convey any substantive information as to what public records, if any, Thompson reviewed. See Advantage Industrial Systems, LLC v. Aleris Rolled Products, Inc., No. 4:18-CV-00113, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136305, at *23-24 (W.D. Ky. July 31, 2020) (finding an interrogatory response insufficient for providing a general response without substantive information). Likewise, Interrogatories 16, 22, and 23 request basic factual information and/or legal justifications, which, although implicating Thompson's understanding of the law, do not in fact call for legal conclusions. See Reichenbach v. City of Columbus, No. 2:03-CV-1132, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3058, at *7-8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2006) (finding that a request regarding the party's compliance with a regulation called for a legal conclusion because it neither referenced not sought factual information). However, “contention interrogatories,” which “seek to clarify the basis for or scope of an adversary's legal claims,” are generally permissible. Starcher v. Correctional Med. Systems, Inc., 144 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Cundiff v. Postel, No. 3:06-CV-437, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13863, at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008) (discussing the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 26(b)(3) and 33(b), which permit discovery that calls for opinions, contentions and admissions relating not only to fact but also to application of law to fact.). Lastly, Thompson's relevancy objection to Interrogatory 24 is OVERRULED. Andersen's interrogatory seeks information that may be relevant to her claim of punitive damages because the profitability of Thompson's YouTube videos is an aspect of his net worth.

Thus, Thompson must file supplementary responses providing substantive responses (even if he believes “Plaintiff is already aware” – which is an invalid objection – of his response) to Interrogatories 3-5, 11-12, 14-16, and 22-24. Thompson's amended responses must be provided to Andersen and filed with the court no later than March 7, 2023.

B. Andersen's Motion to Compel – Requests for Admission

As a preliminary matter, Andersen contends that Thompson failed to timely file his response to her requests for admission and the requests should, accordingly, be deemed admitted. ECF Doc. 102. Although it is true that Rule 36(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., indicates that an admission request “is admitted” if not responded to within 30 days, Andersen has offered insufficient factual support for her requested relief. Andersen acknowledges that she emailed Thompson asking him to resend a July 2022 email containing his response, but she alleges that he sent her responses dated the same day as the email containing them: January 26, 2023. Id. Because the parties were instructed to only include the relevant discovery materials as attachments to their motions, Andersen's possible support was limited. But even the discovery response Andersen attached is undated (and unsigned) by Thompson. Thompson, however, has not contested its validity. Accordingly, the court will consider Thompson's response as timely filed.

*4 Rule 36(a) permits a party to serve written requests for admission of items within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) on the other party, provided those requests relate to “facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either;” and, the genuineness of any described documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). “[A] request for admission which involves a pure matter of law, that is, requests for admissions of law which are related to the facts of the case, are considered inappropriate.” Reichenbach, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3058, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Andersen's motion to compel is DENIED IN PART because Thompson's admission or denial (or responses construed as such) as to Requests 2-7, 9-10, 19, 21, 23, 30, 33, 56, 60, 61, 67, 68, 71, 81, 84, 86, 85(2)[2], 88-89, 91, 94-97, 99, 103-106, 108, and 111-112 is sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a); United States v. Smith, 42 F.R.D. 338, 339 (W.D. Mich. Jun. 29, 1967) (“The spirit and purpose of the Rule is that all undisputed contentions are to be admitted to limit the issues before reaching the trial stage.”).

However, a number of Andersen's other requests fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 36(a), being sufficiently vague or ambiguous that the phrasing of the request makes it unclear whether the request calls for a legal conclusion or not. For example, Request 11 asks Thompson to admit that “Thompson is not competent to offer opinions relative to Andersen's legal matters generally or relative to her divorce.” Andersen's use of the term “competent” is ambiguous; it could either refer to Thompson's legal competency (i.e., his mental ability to participate in the proceedings) or his general expertise or “competency” to express opinions on legal matters. Other requests are flawed because they unambiguously ask Thompson to admit a legal conclusion, such as Request 87 that “Thompson has defamed Andersen to third party documentary companies,” or are irrelevant to the litigation, such as Request 41 that “Thompson currently lives with his girlfriend at her home.” On the court's review of the requests, Thompson's objections are SUSTAINED and/or Andersen's motion to compel is DENIED based on the following requests’ failure to comply with Rule 36(a): Requests 11-14, 16, 20, 24, 32, 36-44, 48, 74-78, 87, 107, and 109.

Of the remaining requests, Thompson's objections, if made, are OVERRULED and Andersen's motion is GRANTED IN PART because the requests fit within the broad relevancy standard applied during the discovery process, are not vague or do not request legal conclusions, and are otherwise proper. Consequently, Thompson is ORDERED to file amended responses to the following requests: 1, 8, 15, 17-18, 22, 25-29, 31, 34-35, 45-47, 49-55, 57-59, 62-66, 69-70, 72-73, 79-80, 82-83, 85(1), 90, 92-93, 98, 100-102, and 110. Thompson must provide his amended responses to Andersen and file them with the court no later than March 7, 2023.

The question of how to remedy the deficiencies in Thompson's responses is more difficult. Andersen urges us to deem them admitted because fact discovery closed on October 31, 2022; she argues that permitting amendment at this point would prejudice her because “Thompson cannot establish good cause for waiting approximately 6-7 months, after the discovery cut-off and on the eve of trial assignment to cure his bad faith “responses” and “objections” to the RFAs.” ECF Doc. 102 at 1-5. However, it was not until October 24, 2022 that Andersen requested a conference to discuss the issues – a mere week before the close of fact discovery. The court then held a conference on November 16, 2022 and ordered the parties to meet and confer over disputed discovery issues (as required by the court's case management order). Moreover, it was not until the court's subsequent conference and order on January 20, 2023, that Andersen formalized her issues with Thompson's responses in a motion to compel. Thus, it was in part due to Andersen's own delays in bringing her disputes over the sufficiency of Thompson's responses to the court's attention through the proper process (i.e. meet and confer, informal court intervention, and then a motion), that also contributed to the delay. That said, the court is aware that the parties’ communications have been less than golden and discovery has been laborious.

*5 Generally, the Sixth Circuit has found that it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny motions to compel after the close of discovery. Craig-Wood v. Time Warner NY Cable LLC, 549 F. App'x 505, 508 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In general, a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying an untimely motion to compel that violated unambiguous discovery deadlines.”). Here, the court has discretion to address discovery issues after the discovery cut-off date because of both parties’ conduct during the discovery period. They are both responsible for not completing their discovery within the allotted period. Also, because Andersen has requested that Thompson be ordered to properly respond to plaintiff's interrogatories, she will not be prejudiced in any way if the court also permits pro se litigant Thompson the opportunity to amend his responses to Andersen's Rule 36 requests at the same time he is supplementing his interrogatory answers.

To alleviate any potential prejudice to Andersen from her late receipt of Thompson's further discovery responses, the court will also permit Andersen one week to review the answers; and, if she finds it necessary she may either submit, without need to seek leave of court, up to FIVE additional interrogatories and up to TEN additional requests for admission. If no further discovery is requested, all discovery shall be deemed complete after that one-week period.

C. Andersen's Motion for Sanctions – Requests for Production

Andersen indicates that, despite the court's order to Thompson to “resend the disc containing his responsive production to Andersen at the address she provided during the hearing by Monday, January 23, 2023,” as of January 30, 2023, she had yet to receive any disc containing Thompson's responses. See ECF Doc. 100, ECF Doc. 103. Thompson has not opposed this motion or otherwise indicated that he complied with the court's order. Accordingly, the court ORDERS Thompson to SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT for failing to comply with the court's order. Thompson must file his response with the court no later than March 7, 2023.

D. Thompson's Motions

Thompson filed two motions contesting Andersen's discovery responses. However, in his motion regarding Andersen's responses to his requests for admission, Thompson has not alleged any errors by Andersen in her responses; thus, the court cannot meaningfully address his motion and it is DENIED. See Little Hocking Water Ass'n v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 2:09-CV-1081, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134073, at *10-11 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2011) (noting that a party's failure to specify particular documents requested rendered the court unable to “meaningfully evaluate” the party's motion to compel); ECF Doc. 104.

Thompson also filed a motion regarding the sufficiency of Andersen's responses to his interrogatories, summarily stating that he moves for Andersen to file more definite statements. ECF Doc. 105. However, he again has not identified any specific errors in Andersen's responses. Id. In the court's own review of Andersen's responses, it does not find any insufficient responses. Thus, in that respect, Thompson's motion to compel is DENIED.

Thompson also requests leave to amend his witness list. As explained at the court's last conference with the parties, discovery is closed and, thus, Thompson may not subpoena individuals for the purpose of seeking discovery from them. However, nothing prevents Thompson from serving people to testify at trial, assuming they are within the subpoena power of the court. Accordingly, Thompson's motion to expand his witness list so that he can obtain discovery from them is DENIED. Thompson, may, in compliance with any trial order issued by Judge Nugent, subpoena individuals to appear and testify at trial, provided he has disclosed the names of such persons to plaintiff in compliance with discovery requests or the disclosure obligations imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

III. Conclusion

*6 Accordingly, Andersen's motion to compel Thompson's responses to her interrogatories (ECF Doc. 101) is GRANTED IN PART as to Interrogatories 3-5, 11-12, 14-16, and 22-24, and is DENIED IN PART as to any interrogatories beyond the 25 interrogatories permitted under the federal rules. The court orders Thompson to provided amended responses to Andersen and the court specifically to Interrogatories 3-5, 11-12, 14-16, and 22-24, not later than March 7, 2023.

Andersen's motion to compel Thompson's responses to her request for admission (ECF Doc. 102) is GRANTED IN PART as to Requests 1, 8, 15, 17-18, 22, 25-29, 31, 34-35, 45-47, 49-55, 57-59, 62-66, 69-70, 72-73, 79-80, 82-83, 85(1), 90, 92-93, 98, 100-102, and 110. But it is DENIED IN PART as to Requests 2-7, 9-14, 16, 19-21, 23-24, 30, 32-33, 36-44, 48, 56, 60-61, 67-68, 71, 74-78, 81, 84, 85(2), 86-89, 91, 93-97, 99, 103-109, and 111-112.

The court ORDERS Thompson to provide Andersen and the court with amended responses to Requests 1, 8, 15, 17-18, 22, 25-29, 31, 34-35, 45-47, 49-55, 57-59, 62-66, 69-70, 72-73, 79-80, 82-83, 85(1), 90, 92-93, 98, 100-102, and 110, not later than March 7, 2023.

Because the court's review of Andersen's responses to Thompson's discovery requests did not identify any specific errors and because Thompson's motions did not allege any specific errors, Thompson's motion to compel in regard to his requests for admission (ECF Doc. 104) and his motion to compel more definite answers to his interrogatories (ECF Doc. 105) are DENIED.

Lastly, the court ORDERS THOMPSON TO SHOW CAUSE as to why he failed to comply with the court's prior order to mail to Andersen his responsive documents to her requests for production. Thompson's response must address whether or not he mailed the responsive disc as discussed at the court's last hearing and, if so, provide proof of its mailing. Thompson must file the response not later than March 7, 2023.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Also known as fool's gold.

At points, the Requests for Admission use duplicate numbers. To clarify which number is referenced a parenthetical indicating whether it is the first or second such numbered item has been included.