*1 On December 28, 2016, defendants Atria Management Company, LLC and Atria Senior Living, Inc. (collectively “Atria”) filed a motion to compel plaintiff Sara Ramirez to sit for deposition no later than January 30, 2017 (docket no. 59). The motion is supported and opposed by a Joint Stipulation (“JS-59”), along with declarations and exhibits.

On January 3, 2017, defendants filed a motion for a protective order (docket no. 62). Defendants ask the court to preclude plaintiffs from asking about fifteen subjects listed in plaintiffs' Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition on Defendant. The motion is supported and opposed by a Joint Stipulation (“JS-62”), as well as declarations and exhibits.

Also on January 3, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel further responses to certain discovery requests (docket nos. 63, 64). Plaintiffs ask the court to compel defendants to provide further responses to: requests for production (“RFP”) numbers 1, 7-11, 13-15, 39, 44-46, 53, and 59-60; and Interrogatory numbers 1 and 5. This motion too is supported and opposed by a Joint Stipulation (“JS-64”), declarations, and exhibits.

These three motions came before the court for telephonic hearing on January 24, 2017. For the reasons that follow, the court grants in part and denies in part the motions.

Defendants removed this wage and hour action to federal court on May 2, 2016 after plaintiff Destiny Gallegos filed a class action complaint in California state court. On August 4, 2016, the court denied plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court. Plaintiff Gallegos was the sole named plaintiff in this proposed class action until October 11, 2016, when plaintiffs Sara Ramirez and Jesse Perez were added as plaintiffs in a First Amended Class Action Complaint.

Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of each and all other persons similarly situated. Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants are a privately-held, for-profit senior housing company based in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiffs are former hourly-paid employees of defendants' California facilities. Plaintiffs claim defendants have violated various state statutes, including but not limited to: unpaid overtime; unpaid minimum wage; meal period violations; rest break violations; non-compliant wage statements and failure to maintain accurate payroll records; wages not timely paid upon termination; unpaid business-related expenses; and unlawful business practices.

In light of a breakdown in communications between Gallegos and plaintiffs' counsel – Capstone Law APC (“Capstone”) – the court granted Capstone's motion to withdraw as Gallegos's counsel on November 23, 2016. Capstone continues to represent plaintiffs Ramirez and Perez.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Relevancy, for the purposes of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

*2 “A party seeking class certification must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the requirements of at least one of the categories under Rule 23(b).” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013). “For a named plaintiff to obtain class certification, the court must find: (1) numerosity of plaintiffs; (2) common questions of law or fact predominate; (3) the named plaintiff's claims and defenses are typical; and (4) the named plaintiff can adequately protect the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Here, plaintiff seeks to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Compl. at 7. Rule 23(b)(2) allows for a class to be certified if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) allows for class certification if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Prior to class certification under Rule 23, discovery lies entirely within the discretion of the court. Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Our cases stand for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and that some discovery will be warranted.”) (footnote omitted). Courts generally recognize the need for pre-certification discovery relating to class issues. See id.; Del Campo v. Kennedy, 236 F.R.D. 454, 459 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In seeking pre-certification discovery, the plaintiff bears the burden to either make a prima facie showing that the Rule 23 class action requirements are satisfied, or to show “that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations.” Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985). “[T]he need for discovery, the time required, and the probability of discovery providing necessary factual information” are also relevant factors “bearing on the correctness of the trial court's exercise of discretion.” Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). Thus, discovery is likely warranted where it will help resolve factual issues necessary for the determination of whether the action may be maintained as a class action, such as whether there are grounds for a class or subclass. Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975).

A. Defendants' Motion to Compel Ramirez's Deposition

Defendants ask the court to order that plaintiff Ramirez sit for deposition no later than January 30, 2017. There is no dispute that Ramirez should sit for deposition. Rather, the parties have had problems scheduling her deposition, largely due to the family emergency discussed in the court's January 12, 2017 order regarding a prior motion to compel. Nonetheless, Ramirez was scheduled to be deposed on January 26, 2017.

Although her deposition presumably already occurred, making the issue now moot, in case it did not go forward, and as discussed at the hearing, the court will GRANT defendants' motion to compel (docket no. 59). If plaintiff Ramirez did not sit for deposition, the parties may raise the matter with the court.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Further Responses

Plaintiffs move to compel defendants to provide further responses to sixteen requests for production of documents and two interrogatories. The requests for production relate to defendants' organizational charts, employee handbooks, training materials, new hire documents, job descriptions, labor budget and staffing policies, rest break complaints, wage statements, payroll records, timekeeping data, timekeeping and payment policies and practices, and software parameters. The interrogatories relate to a list of potential putative class members and information regarding defendants' timekeeping system.

*3 The parties' discovery disputes largely stem from one overarching dispute regarding whether plaintiffs are entitled to class-wide discovery beyond what pertains to only the named plaintiffs and the facilities where they were employed by defendants. Plaintiffs seek documents and responses providing information about all of defendants' California facilities and applicable to all members of the proposed class. Plaintiffs contend the propounded discovery requests are relevant to their class allegations and class certification. JS-64 at 18-21. Defendants seek to limit discovery to only information applicable to the named plaintiffs and the corresponding facilities – Irvine and San Dimas – where the named plaintiffs were employed by defendants. Defendants argue plaintiffs are not entitled to obtain the requested discovery because “[p]laintiffs have provided no evidence in support of the alleged class-wide practices,” the discovery is burdensome, and Atria employees have valid privacy objections. Id. at 21-29. Defendants also raise overbreadth, vagueness, and privilege or work-product information objections for some RFPs. Id. at 29-36.

1. Class Discovery Is Warranted

Generally, the Ninth Circuit has favored “allowing class contact discovery unless it is apparent that [p]laintiff cannot maintain the action on behalf of the class. Goundar v. Redfin Corp., 2014 WL 12524649, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). Indeed, “the better and more advisable practice for a District Court to follow is to afford the litigants an opportunity to present evidence as to whether a class action is maintainable.” Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942 (quoting Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313) (internal quotations omitted). “And, the necessary antecedent to the presentation of evidence is, in most cases, enough discovery to obtain the material, especially when the information is within the sole possession of the defendant.” Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 (citations omitted).

As set forth above, the Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to permit class discovery where a plaintiff has either made a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied, or has shown discovery is likely to substantiate the class allegations. Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1424; Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 (upholding denial of class certification where class discovery not permitted because, inter alia, evidence showed “that regardless of the discovery that might have been undertaken” certain requirements of Rule 23 “could never be met”). But although it would be an abuse of discretion to deny class discovery where a plaintiff has made either showing, the Ninth Circuit has not held trial courts lack discretion to permit class discovery unless such a showing has been made. See Kaminske v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2010 WL 5782995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (upholding discretion of magistrate judge to require prima facie showing, but noting “there is nothing in Doninger and Mantolete that suggests that a prima facie showing is mandatory in all cases, and it may very well be the case that courts routinely do not require such a showing”). Nonetheless, in light of defendants' arguments here, the court looks at the Mantolete factors to determine whether allowing the class-wide discovery plaintiffs seek would be a futile waste of resources as defendants contend.

Plaintiffs assert their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) includes factual allegations sufficient to establish a prima facie case for a class action under Rule 23. JS-64 at 18-20. Further, plaintiffs argue the discovery sought is in defendants' sole possession and goes directly to plaintiffs' class allegations, suggesting this discovery would substantiate the class allegations even if a prima facie case were not established. Id. at 20-21. Defendants counter that plaintiffs fail to satisfy either requirement, specifically contending that deposition testimony of Perez and Gallegos undercut not only the proposed class claims, but also their individual allegations. Id. at 21-22.

The court finds plaintiffs have at least made a minimal showing that there are class-wide issues that may permit class certification, and certainly warrant allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue reasonable class-wide discovery that may substantiate their allegations and illuminate the class-wide issues. Among other things – as alleged in the FAC and in defendants' Answer, and as reflected in certain documents produced and testimony given – there appear to be relevant class-wide issues pertaining to the ability to take rest breaks, the application of the Atria Rewards program, and unpaid wages for time new hires spent drug testing. See JS-64 at 10-12. Although defendants argue Perez's and Gallegos's deposition testimony undercuts their cases, the court's review of their testimony reflects otherwise, at least with respect to the issues just identified. See Crossman Decl. (docket no. 65-11), Ex. B (Perez Depo.) at 115-16, 163-72, Ex. C (Gallegos Depo.) at 107-12.

*4 In addition, the discovery plaintiffs seek is reasonably calculated to substantiate their class allegations on such issues as commonality and typicality. The RFPs in dispute are each related to various class claims alleged in the FAC. The defendants' organizational charts may substantiate class claims that defendants' facilities operate uniformly with corporate policies and leadership. Employee handbooks, training materials, new hire documents, job duties and descriptions each relate to Atria's wage and hour policies. Further, documents pertaining to labor cost budgeting and staffing similarly relate to whether putative class members were prohibited from taking their breaks due to work obligations. Wage statements, payroll records, rest break complaints, and timekeeping data or software are pertinent to plaintiffs' class claims that they were underpaid or owed wages from hours worked.

Moreover, even if certain of the discovery sought is not necessary for plaintiffs to make their case for class certification, if the class is certified, plaintiffs may need the information to prove their case at trial, including class-wide damages. Discovery is not bifurcated in this case, and with a now-extended discovery cutoff of May 30, 2017, plaintiffs may not have the opportunity to obtain additional discovery after the matter of class certification is determined. Consequently, plaintiffs reasonably seek all such discovery now.

Accordingly, the court finds that class discovery is both permissible and warranted. That does not mean, however, that it should not be limited in some respect, as the court next considers.

2. The Scope of Class Discovery

Defendants acknowledge that some discovery pertaining to class certification is warranted, and maintain they have already produced all such discovery plaintiffs reasonably require. But they argue plaintiffs have failed to show the matters about which they complain extended beyond the two facilities where plaintiffs worked, or beyond the positions held by the plaintiffs.

In proposed class actions, the court may limit the scope of discovery to only locations where plaintiffs worked “absent some evidence to indicate company-wide violations.” Nguyen v. Baxter Health Corp., 275 F.R.D. 503, 507-08 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Thus, in Nguyen, where the defendant produced evidence of company-wide policies consistent with California law, and where the plaintiff had no evidence that supervisors at any facility other than the single facility where she worked failed to follow company guidelines regarding meal breaks and wage statements, the court found no basis to permit discovery beyond that single facility. Id. at 508.

The situation here is different. Plaintiffs Gallegos and Perez worked at defendants' San Dimas facility, while plaintiff Ramirez worked at defendants' Irvine facility. As plaintiffs come from two facilities where they allege similar violations occurred, there is at least some indication things like the alleged rest break violations were not isolated to a single facility, or even to the two facilities now known. Further, things like the Atria Rewards program and defendants' alleged failure to pay new hires for time spent drug testing are not matters that occurred only at specific facilities; they concern company-wide policies. Thus, the court will permit discovery concerning all defendants' facilities, not just those in San Dimas and Irvine.

The court similarly finds plaintiffs entitled to discovery concerning jobs, and putative class members who held jobs, other than those held by plaintiffs here, namely, the jobs of Residence Services Assistant (“RSA”) and Server. It is likely true, as defendants argue, that many of the other positions in the company would be less likely to, for example, experience the same alleged rest break violations. But again, the Atria Rewards and drug testing issues are not position-specific. Further, Perez and Gallegos held different positions, yet both testified to taking almost no rest breaks. In light of this, there is no reason to assume all other positions were unaffected. Given that, as discussed above, plaintiffs are seeking discovery not just for class certification but also for trial and to establish damages, the court finds contact and payroll information for all putative class members is relevant and warranted.

*5 Notably, defendants do not argue they would face any particular burden in undertaking the act of producing much of the class-wide discovery plaintiffs seek, including class contact and payroll information and documents. Instead, they argue they would be burdened if plaintiffs' counsel were able to contact defendants' employees, as that could result in other lawsuits against defendants. The court finds this an unpersuasive reason to deny plaintiffs' counsel the ability to fully investigate their case. Indeed, defendants' counsel's assertions that his interviews with employees have revealed no violations argues in favor of giving plaintiffs' counsel the same opportunity, particularly as employees may be inclined to speak more freely to counsel representing someone other than their employer.

Accordingly, as a general matter the court will grant plaintiffs' motion to compel production of information extending beyond plaintiffs themselves, including information concerning positions others than RSA and Server, and facilities other than those in San Dimas and Irvine. The court will address any limitations that may be warranted for particular requests below.

3. Absent Class Members' Right to Privacy

Before reaching the specific requests, the court also considers more broadly whether defendants' objection on the basis of the putative class members' right to privacy warrants denying certain of plaintiffs' discovery requests. Plaintiffs propose that information concerning absent class members be discovered and produced pursuant to the opt-out procedure discussed in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th 554, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (2007). JS-64 at 4. Defendants contend plaintiffs are not entitled to class-wide discovery because putative class members have a right to privacy. Id. at 101-102.

The court finds current and former employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal employment information. See Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1; see also Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 352 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (recognizing that employees have a right to privacy). “But the protection which is afforded to privacy claims is a qualified protection, rather than an absolute one.” Alvarez v. Hyatt Regency Long Beach, 2010 WL 9505289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010) (citing Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 958, 967, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 400 (2008)). To determine if an invasion of that privacy is justified “the court must balance that right of privacy against the need for discovery.” Id. (citing Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 360, 370, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 150 P.3d 198 (2007)).

The court finds the privacy rights of the putative class member employees sufficient to require notice, and the opportunity to opt-out, prior to disclosure of their payroll and any other employment records. Whether such opt-out procedure is also required for class contact information is a closer question. See Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1259, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 701 (2008) (describing employment records as “vastly more private” than general contact information). Atria's current and former employees have a right to privacy over information they gave to defendants as a condition of employment. See Belaire-West, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 561 (“It is most probable that the employees gave their address and telephone number to their employer with the expectation that it would not be divulged externally except as required ...”). Even so, the disclosure of putative class members' contact information does not amount to a serious invasion of privacy because it is not particularly sensitive. See id. at 561-62. The identity of potential class members is generally discoverable, and the disclosure of this information is “neither unduly personal nor overly intrusive.” Id. at 562 (citing Pioneer, 40 Cal. 4th at 373). Further, Atria's current and former employees are potential percipient witnesses to this wage and hour action, as in Belaire-West. Lastly, California public policy favors the prompt payment of wages due to an employee, which leads the balance of interests to favor disclosure of class-wide information. See Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists, 63 Cal. App. 4th 563, 571, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (1998).

*6 Here, the court determines putative class members should be given notice and an opportunity to opt out before any of their personally identifying information is disclosed. Notice is needed as to their payroll and other employment records in any event, and it is more appropriate here than in some cases for the class contact information too since so many different jobs are involved. Further, plaintiffs agree to such notice. Thus, before putative class members' contact information or their payroll or other employment records may be produced, putative class members must be given notice and the opportunity to object in writing to the disclosure. See Belaire-West, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 562. This opt-out notice procedure will adequately protect the privacy rights of the current and former employees involved.

Accordingly, the court directs the mailing of Belaire-West style mailings. Defendants shall send each putative class member a written notice advising them of this lawsuit and its core allegations and explaining who may be a member of the proposed class. The notice and mailings shall give putative class members an opportunity to object in writing to the disclosure of their contact information and their payroll and other employment records. Putative class members who do not opt out of disclosure will have their information subject to discovery.

4. Particular Requests

RFP number 1 calls for all “organizational charts or other documents” reflecting or describing” defendants' “organizational structure,” including references to defendants' officers, board of directors, subsidiaries, and parent companies. JS-64 at 36. Plaintiffs argue a structural organizational chart may help to determine the scope of subclasses in this suit. Id. at 39-40. Defendants responded to the propounded discovery by stating it was not relevant beyond information pertaining to the Irvine and San Dimas facilities, as to which defendants stated no such documents existed. Id. at 38-39.

The court finds defendants' organizational charts are relevant to the proposed class claims. In particular, the charts could provide useful information as whether all of defendants' California facilities are managed together and subjected to the same corporate leadership or policies as the San Dimas and Irvine locations. See Rahman v. Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group, Inc., 2007 WL 1521117, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2007) (ordering defendants to produce requested documents relating to corporate structure). Further, as defendants do not, nor could they reasonably, identify any particular burden in providing such documents, the court finds their production to be proportional to the needs of the case.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to compel production is GRANTED as to RFP number 1. Defendants are ordered to produce all documents responsive to this request, and to produce verified supplemental responses unambiguously stating they have done so or that no such documents exist. If defendants withhold any documents based on privilege, they must clearly state this and produce a privilege log describing such documents.

Plaintiffs also contend defendants have incorrectly limited their responses to RFP numbers 7-11 and 13-15 to only the individual named plaintiffs and the facilities where they worked. JS-64 at 50-51, 54-55, 64-66. In addition to the class-wide discovery and locations objection, defendants also object on the basis of overbreadth, undue burden, and ambiguity.

RFP numbers 7-10 seek exemplars of defendants' employee handbooks, employee training materials, and documents provided to, and signed by, newly hired employees. Id. at 40-47. RFP number 11 requests documents sufficient to identify the job descriptions and duties of defendants' covered employees. Id. at 51. RFP numbers 13-15 call for all documents concerning defendants' budgeting for labor costs and employee staffing at its California facilities. Id. at 55-61.

*7 These requests are relevant to plaintiffs' claims. Employee handbooks, training materials, and new hire documents relate to the FAC's allegations of various wage and hour violations committed by defendants. Job description information is, inter alia, relevant to the issue of the typicality of the named plaintiffs' representation in this class suit. See Payala v. Wipro Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL 6094158, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016). Labor budgeting and employee staffing documents are relevant to the issue of whether wage and hour violations resulted from a lack of funding or staffing for coverage to allow employee breaks. See Falcon v. Starbucks Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 (S.D. Tex. 2008). That individual plaintiffs may be unfamiliar with defendants' labor budgets, or even whether defendants had labor budgets, is neither surprising nor relevant. Their knowledge of such alleged budgets had no bearing on whether it affected their jobs. The propounded discovery is likely to produce information to help determine whether a class or subclasses exist, and may support or substantiate plaintiffs' class certification motion and the merits of their claims. See Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 2016 WL 736213, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016); see also Putnam v. Eli Lilly & Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d 812, 813 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (permitting the pre-class certification discovery to determine the location of potential class members, dates of employment, and differences in job duties).

Defendants agree to comply with RFP numbers 7-10, and thus these requests are not really in dispute. See JS-64 at 51. Defendants argue RFP number 11 is overbroad, as it would require production of any email potentially relating to job duties. This is incorrect. RFP number 11 merely calls for documents sufficient to identify the job description and duties of each covered position. Collecting such documents should not be overly onerous.

Defendants also argue RFP numbers 13-15 are unduly burdensome, but do not really explain how, except to refer to the numerous facilities at issue. The court agrees that if these requests were construed to require production of every document pertaining each staffing decision and schedule at each facility, the request would be disproportionate to the needs of the case. But that is not what these requests call for. They in fact call for documents concerning defendants policies, practices, and procedures for labor budgeting and employee staffing, including the number of employees who must be on duty at any given time in the facilities. It should not be unduly burdensome to respond to such requests.

Therefore, plaintiffs' motion to compel production is GRANTED as to RFP numbers 7-11 and 13-15. Defendants are ordered to produce all documents responsive to these requests, and to produce verified supplemental responses unambiguously stating they have done so or that no such documents exist. If defendants withhold any documents based on privilege, they must clearly state this and produce a privilege log describing such documents.

Plaintiffs argue RFP numbers 39, 44-46, 53, 59, and 60 are relevant because they are directly related to various claims, including rest break violations, overtime, and underpayment alleged in the FAC. Documents pertaining to these requests are also relevant because they would facilitate the calculation of any damages allegedly suffered by plaintiffs. Defendants counter that such requests are unduly burdensome and overly broad in light of the likely large number of facilities that defendants would have to account for and Perez's and Gallegos's deposition testimony. JS-64 at 71, 87-88, 95-96.

RFP number 39 seeks documents relating to rest break complaints by defendants' covered employees. Id. at 66. RFP numbers 44-46 and 53 request wage statements or pay stubs, payroll records, and timekeeping data of covered employees from defendants, although they provide information revealing the identity of any employee may be redacted. Id. at 71-82. RFP numbers 59 and 60 call for documents concerning defendants' timekeeping system or software to record time worked by covered employees and rules or other parameters by which defendants' system or software determined meal break violations or premiums. Id. at 88-91.

*8 With regard to rest break complaints requested in RFP number 39, these internal complaints are the “exact behaviors [p]laintiffs are alleging that could provide evidence of [p]laintiffs being similarly situated to other putative class members.” Romo v. GMRI, Inc., 2013 WL 11310656, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013). Defendants argue it would be unduly burdensome to require them to scour all 37 facilities and Atria email for complaints. The court agrees it would be unreasonable to require defendants to review every email for any such complaint. But it would not be burdensome for defendants to make a reasonable inquiry for complaints at its main offices of each facility, some of which may have collected such complaints and placed them in a readily accessible location. A search of emails by keywords may also be conducted. After defendants have made such a search, the steps taken may be discussed among counsel and at the 30(b)(6) deposition on this topic (discussed below). If the parties are unable to reach agreement on whether defendants have made a reasonable inquiry and search, they may raise the matter with the court.

RFP numbers 44-46 and 53 are the type of evidence “routinely held discoverable in wage and hour labor litigation.” Id. at *5 (considering wage statements and payroll and time sheet records) (italics omitted). These RFPs are relevant because they would reveal information that may substantiate allegations in the FAC relating to regular rate pay, overtime, meal and rest breaks, and unpaid work-related expenses. But given how voluminous such documents are likely to be, and that as of yet plaintiffs cannot know whether they will seek to certify a class or subclasses of employees in positions other than RSA and Server, at this point the court will limit the production in response to RFP numbers 44-46 and 53 to those pertaining to RSAs and Servers. The court recognizes, as discussed above, that plaintiffs' theory of underpayment based on the Atria Rewards program is not position-specific, and they require payroll records to substantiate this theory. Nonetheless, at this point they may test the theory with RSA and Server records, and then seek an additional production later as facts warrant. In addition, as noted, plaintiffs have indicated defendants may redact these documents of information identifying the employee. Particularly as such redaction may be burdensome, the parties must meet and confer to determine if defendants will produce redacted versions of such documents in light of the Belaire-West notice.

As for defendants' timekeeping software in RFP numbers 59 and 60, defendants state they contract with a third party vendor, Kronos, for their timekeeping system, and therefore plaintiffs must seek such information from Kronos. In light of the Interrogatory number 5 and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition (both discussed below), the court will not compel defendants to respond to these requests at this time. See Kilbourne v. Coca-Cola Co., 2015 WL 10943827, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015) (finding timekeeping information is of limited relevance where plaintiff has already been provided cumulative and duplicative discovery and is outweighed by burden imposed on defendant). If plaintiffs are unable to get the information they require from the interrogatory, deposition, and any subpoena from Kronos, they may raise this issue again with the court.

Therefore, plaintiffs' motion to compel production is GRANTED as to RFP numbers 39, 44-46, and 53, subject to the limitations prescribed above. Defendants are ordered to produce all documents responsive to these requests subject to the stated limitations, and to produce verified supplemental responses unambiguously stating they have done so or that no such documents exist. If defendants withhold any documents based on privilege, they must clearly state this and produce a privilege log describing such documents.

Interrogatory number 1 requests a class list of each and every covered employee employed by defendants during the relevant time period, calling for the name, job, and contact information of each. JS-64 at 96-97. Plaintiffs seek this information to enable them to contact putative class members, who are percipient witnesses on matters such as the alleged denial of rest breaks by defendants. Id. at 99-101.

*9 The discovery plaintiffs seek here is not unusual. “The disclosure of names, addresses, and telephone numbers is a common practice in the class action context.” Artis, 276 F.R.D. at 352; accord Algee v. Nordstrom Inc., 2012 WL 1575314, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012). Thus, in Artis, an employment discrimination class action, the court found the plaintiff was “entitled to the contact information of putative class members.” Artis, 276 F.R.D. at 352; see also Algee, 2012 WL 1575314, at *2, 4 (finding plaintiff entitled to contact information for all of the approximately 60 putative class members in wage and hour class action); Putnam v. Eli Lilly & Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d 812, 813-14 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (ordering disclosure of contact information of all 348 potential class members in unpaid overtime class action); Wiegele v. Fedex Ground Package System, 2007 WL 628041, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2007) (upholding motion compelling disclosure of contact information for 250-500 current and former employees in putative wage and hour class action).

The putative class members here are estimated to number in the thousands from 37 different facilities. Defendants argue the court should, at a minimum, limit the list to RSA employees; however, the court has discussed above why that is not warranted here. Although production of the full class list prior to class certification is often not done where the class is numerous, because (as also discussed) discovery here is not bifurcated and the full discovery cutoff is fast approaching, plaintiffs need the entire class list now so they can prepare for trial as well as class certification. Given that class members will be given the opportunity to opt out via the Belaire-West procedure, which is not always the case for mere class contact information, the court finds production of the full class list is warranted.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to compel a further response is GRANTED as to Interrogatory number 1, subject to the Belaire-West opt-out notice procedure described above.

Interrogatory number 5 calls for defendants to identify, with great specificity, the database, software, programs, or other systems used to maintain and process timekeeping and payroll data. JS-64 at 102. Plaintiffs argue this interrogatory is relevant because it may reveal information relating to how pay rates are calculated and other payroll issues. Id. at 106. Defendants counter the information sought is disproportionate to the case's needs since Ramirez and Gallegos testified they properly kept their time and were unaware of putative class members who did otherwise. Id. at 106-107. Defendants also stated they advised plaintiffs that it is a Kronos timekeeping system, and a 30(b)(6) witness will testify to timekeeping policies and procedures. Id. at 107.

As discussed above with respect to RFP numbers 59 and 60, defendants have stated their timekeeping system is handled by third-party vendor Kronos, and therefore much of the information plaintiffs seek is in Kronos's possession, which plaintiffs may subpoena. In addition, plaintiffs may obtain defendants' understanding of the system through the 30(b)(6) deposition. Even so, defendants should be able to readily provide plaintiffs with limited additional information regarding their timekeeping system, beyond that it is a Kronos system. To even subpoena Kronos, plaintiff would likely need the specific name of the system or software.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to compel a further response is GRANTED as to Interrogatory number 5 only to the extent that defendants must provide a substantive response identifying by name and/or model the specific Kronos system or software used. If plaintiffs require additional information after the 30(b)(6) deposition, they may return to the court.

C. Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order

*10 On December 7, 2016, plaintiffs served a Notice of Deposition, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30, requesting that Atria designate persons to testify on December 20, 2016 on 63 subjects. Crosman Decl., Ex. A. The parties met and conferred, pursuant to Local Rule 37-1, on December 19, 2016. Crosman Decl., ¶8. The parties agreed to consolidate forty-eight topics noticed into the following three general categories: (1) payroll and pay policies applicable to plaintiffs and other California non-exempt employees during the relevant time period; (2) defendants' human resources policies applicable to the putative class during the relevant time period; and (3) the job duties of Resident Services Assistants during the relevant time period. Defendants have selected three witnesses to testify to these topics.

Atria filed a Motion for Protective Order, contending that the fifteen remaining topics noticed for deposition are improper because they are overbroad and not proportional to the needs of the case. JS-62 at 12-13. Further, defendants argue plaintiffs are not entitled to the information in the noticed topics because plaintiffs have failed to substantiate their individual claims, let alone established that they are entitled to class-wide discovery. Id. at 13-16. Plaintiffs maintain Rule 30(b)(6) allows for a wide scope of depositions, the subjects sought request relevant information, and that they have established their right to class-wide discovery in their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Id. at 17-31.

The fifteen Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics at issue in this discovery motion are described as follows:

Crosman Decl., Ex. A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows a party to file a motion for a protective order, and the court may “issue an order to protect a ... person from ... undue burden,” including an order “forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 81 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1984), the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 26(c) as conferring “broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Rule 26(c)(1) permits courts to, “for good cause, issue an order to protect a party ... from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)) (holding that “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”).

Although fifteen noticed deposition topics are at issue, plaintiffs group these fifteen topics into four subjects: (1) defendants' management structure and covered employee job descriptions; (2) implementation of defendants' policies and practices regarding labor budgets and staffing; (3) complaints and communications regarding meal and rest breaks and waivers; and (4) defendants' timekeeping and payroll software. JS-62 at 24. The court will use these categories. For the reasons discussed above, the court finds these topics are relevant. Although defendants argue much of this discovery is unwarranted, many of their arguments are the same as those against class-wide discovery, which the court rejected above. Nonetheless, in light of the other discovery sought and the potential burden to defendants to fully address certain of these topics through witnesses, the court will partially grant defendants a protective order, as follows.

As to the first category, defendants should designate someone to discuss their management structure, if none of the three witnesses already selected can. But in light of defendants' claim that numerous witnesses would be needed to testify to all the employee job descriptions, and in light of the above order to produce documents with such descriptions, the court will grant defendants a protective order to the extent that they need not separately designate a witness on this topic. Nonetheless, plaintiffs may question the designated witnesses on this topic, and they must answer to the extent they are able.

*12 The court will not grant defendants a protective order as to the second category. Defendants must designate someone to testify as to defendants' implementation of their policies and practices regarding labor budgeting and staffing. Such witness need not be able to testify as to what occurred at each facility, but must be able to testify as to this generally at Atria.

As to the third category, defendants argue each facility had its own way of handling complaints, but acknowledge the designated witness on human resources matters likely could testify to the general complaint and reporting policies and practices. The court finds this topic relevant, except that no witness should be expected to testify to all particular complaints received. To this extent, the court will grant defendants a protective order. Otherwise, defendants must designate a witness on this topic. They may start with the person already designated and, if that witness proves unable to fully testify, designate someone else.

The same is true for the fourth category. Defendants state the payroll witness already designated may be able to testify as to how to read payroll statements. Plaintiffs ask for a witness to testify to the payroll system in use and to decipher the payroll codes. This is reasonable. Thus, the court will not grant defendants a protective order as to the fourth category.

Accordingly, accepting the categories as posited by plaintiffs, the court GRANTS defendants motion for a protective order only to the limited respect discussed above with respect to categories one and three, and otherwise DENIES the motion.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendants' motion to compel (docket no. 59) is GRANTED as set forth above;

2. Plaintiffs' motion to compel (docket nos. 63, 64) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth above; and

3. Defendants' motion for a protective order (docket no. 62) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth above.