*1 On October 11, 2016, defendants filed a motion to compel further discovery (docket no. 34). Defendants ask the court to compel plaintiff Destiny Gallegos to: provide further responses to ninety-one requests for production of documents (“RFPs”); provide further responses to seven interrogatories; and appear for her deposition. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion on October 18, 2016. Docket no. 35. Defendants then filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition on October 25, 2016. Docket no. 36.

The Motion came before the court at a hearing held on November 8, 2016. After hearing arguments from counsel, the court took the matter under submission. For the reasons that follow, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion to compel.

Defendants Atria Management and Atria Senior Living (collectively “Atria”) removed this case to federal court on May 2, 2016 after plaintiff Destiny Gallegos filed a class action complaint in California state court. On August 4, 2016, the court denied plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court. Plaintiff Gallegos was the sole named plaintiff in this proposed class action until October 11, 2016, when plaintiffs Sara Ramirez and Jesse Perez were added as plaintiffs in a First Amended Class Action Complaint.

Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of each and all other persons similarly situated. Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants are a privately-held, for-profit senior housing company based in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiffs are former hourly-paid employees of defendants' California facilities. Plaintiffs claim defendants have violated various state statutes, including but not limited to: unpaid overtime; unpaid minimum wage; meal period violations; rest break violations; non-compliant wage statements and failure to maintain accurate payroll records; wages not timely paid upon termination; unpaid business-related expenses; and unlawful business practices.

Here, defendants move to compel plaintiff Gallegos to provide further responses to ninety-one requests for production of documents. Mtn. at 9-23. These requests generally seek production of documents that can be grouped into three categories: (1) documents relating to communications or investigations concerning the claims of the putative class (RFP Nos. 1-7, 9-22, 24-27, 35-90, 93); (2) documents regarding Gallegos's retainer agreement with her counsel (RFP No. 28) and Gallegos's past bankruptcies, lawsuits, or other employment-related grievances (RFP Nos. 91, 92); and (3) documents relating to telephonic, electronic, or social media correspondence during Gallegos's employment with defendants (RFP Nos. 29-34). See Levy Decl., Ex. K.

Defendants also move to compel Gallegos to provide supplemental responses to Interrogatory numbers 4-10. The court addresses these interrogatories in three groups. First, Interrogatory number 4 calls for Gallegos to identify “all social media accounts” used to communicate about her employment or the allegations in her complaint. See Levy Decl., Ex. I at 3.

*2 Second, Interrogatory number 5 calls for Gallegos to “[i]temize and describe in detail the precise amount of damages YOU claim that YOU suffered because of any alleged unlawful conduct” by defendants. Id. Interrogatory number 6 relatedly seeks information that would “[i]dentify the method of computation used to determine the amount listed in response to Interrogatory No. 5.” Id. Interrogatory number 7 calls for Gallegos to “state all facts in support of” her allegations in the complaint pertaining to her individual allegations. Id. Interrogatory number 8 calls for Gallegos to “identify all potential witness with knowledge of facts” pertaining to the allegations in the complaint. Id.

And in the third group, Interrogatory number 9 calls for Gallegos to “state all facts” she is aware of pertaining to each department in the defendants' facility where she was employed. Id. Interrogatory number 10 relatedly calls for Gallegos to state facts she is aware of pertaining to any other California facility that defendants operate. Id. at 4.

Additionally, defendants move to compel Gallegos to appear for a deposition.Mtn. at 33-34. Defendants state Gallegos has already been noticed for deposition on three separate occasions: June 30, 2016; August 24, 2016; and September 28, 2016. Mtn. at 33; see also Levy Decl., Ex. K, P, U.

Defendants filed the instant Motion after plaintiff responded to the requests for production by producing ten pages of documents, while otherwise making general objections based on privilege, invasion of privacy, relevance, overbreadth, and undue burden. See Levy Decl., Ex. N. In response to defendants' first set of interrogatories, plaintiff made similar objections while also indicating Gallegos did not possess information to completely answer the interrogatories due to the ongoing nature of discovery and the investigation. See Levy Decl., Ex. O.

The local rules of this court generally require that any motion to compel be filed in the form of a joint stipulation. L.R. 37-2. Plaintiff argues the Motion should be denied as procedurally improper, because it fails to comply with Local Rule 37 in that it was not properly noticed and defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith in light of their purported knowledge that Gallegos would no longer be offered as class representative. Opp. at 6-8.

*3 Plaintiff is correct that the Motion is improperly labeled a “Joint Stipulation,” since only defendants' portions appear. However, pursuant to Local Rule 37-2.4, defendants have established that plaintiff failed to provide her portion of the joint stipulation in a timely manner in accordance with Local Rule 37-2.2. Defendants note that they provided the proposed joint stipulation to plaintiff's counsel on October 3, 2016, but no response was provided until plaintiff's counsel communicated with defendants on October 11, 2016 that plaintiff would not participate in providing her portions of a joint stipulation, and the Motion was filed that same day. Reply at 3; see 1st Supp. Levy Decl. (docket no. 34-19) ¶ 2. Plaintiff thus failed to comply with Local Rule 37-2.2 because she did not deliver to defendants her portion of the joint stipulation within the seven day period allotted. As a result, the court determines defendants' failure to file a joint stipulation is excused. See L.R. 37-2.4 (“The Court will not consider any discovery motion in the absence of a joint stipulation or a declaration from counsel for the moving party establishing that opposing counsel ... (b) failed to provide the opposing party's portion ... in a timely manner in accordance with L.R. 37-2.2[.]”) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff's argument that the Motion provides deficient notice is also overruled. Although incorrectly labeled as a joint stipulation, it was still plainly a motion to compel; the title of the document did not deprive plaintiff of notice of the motion. Plaintiff contends the notice was also deficient because defendants “erroneously noticed the hearing for Courtroom 1” instead Courtroom 4 and failed to identify the Motion as a “Discovery Matter.” Opp. at 6-7. The court disagrees that plaintiff lacked proper notice of the hearing location and time, as plaintiff's counsel was subsequently notified by defense counsel that the instant Motion was to be heard before Magistrate Judge Pym in Courtroom 4. 2nd Supp. Levy Decl. (docket no. 36-1) ¶ 2, Ex. 1. Defendants took steps to ameliorate its seemingly inadvertent error and ensure that plaintiff's counsel had proper notice of the hearing, at which plaintiff's counsel in fact appeared.

The court additionally rejects plaintiff's claim that defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith. Plaintiff's argument is based on defendants' filing of the Motion despite allegedly knowing that Gallegos no longer wanted to actively participate in the case and the related difficulty plaintiff's counsel had in communicating with Gallegos during and after August 2016. Opp. at 7-8. But defendants were not informed about the communication difficulties between plaintiff's counsel and Gallegos and the likelihood of Gallegos's dismissal from the action until September 28, 2016, as both parties acknowledge. Opp. at 4; Reply at 3. Moreover, plaintiff's counsel communicated with defendants on multiple occasions in August and September to discuss deficiencies in Gallegos's discovery responses, yet defendants were not apprised of the communications issue until the date of the noticed September 28, 2016 deposition. See Crosman Decl. ¶ 3. Even before Gallegos's communications issues arose, defendants had previously scheduled, then rescheduled, depositions on June 30, 2016 and August 24, 2016, while also accommodating extensions for Gallegos's discovery responses numerous times. See Levy Decl., Exs. L, M. Lastly, defendants complied with Local Rule 37-1 because they provided written notice outlining the deficiencies in Gallegos's discovery responses on August 11, 2016. See Levy Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. R. Plaintiff's counsel declined to hold an in-person conference, but met telephonically with defendants' counsel on September 2, 2016 and suggested Gallegos would produce additional discovery documents. Levy Decl. ¶¶ 19-20, Ex. T. Therefore, the court finds defendants' efforts have satisfied the meet and confer requirements under the Local Rules.

The court therefore rejects plaintiff's argument that the Motion must be denied because it is procedurally improper. The court thus turns to the merits.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Relevancy, for the purposes of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

*4 “A party seeking class certification must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the requirements of at least one of the categories under Rule 23(b).” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013). “For a named plaintiff to obtain class certification, the court must find: (1) numerosity of plaintiffs; (2) common questions of law or fact predominate; (3) the named plaintiff's claims and defenses are typical; and (4) the named plaintiff can adequately protect the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Here, plaintiff seeks to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Compl. at 7. Rule 23(b)(2) allows for a class to be certified if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) allows for class certification if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Prior to class certification under Rule 23, discovery lies entirely within the discretion of the court. Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Our cases stand for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and that some discovery will be warranted.”) (footnote omitted). Courts generally recognize the need for pre-certification discovery relating to class issues. See id.; Del Campo v. Kennedy, 236 F.R.D. 454, 459 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Discovery is likely warranted where it will help resolve factual issues necessary for the determination of whether the action may be maintained as a class action, such as whether there are grounds for a class or subclass. Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975).

Here, defendants argue the first category of the requests for production – RFP numbers 1-7, 9-22, 24-27, 35-90, and 93 – propounded on Gallegos are directly related to plaintiffs' class claims. Mtn. at 9. RFP number 1, for example, calls for all documents pertaining to defendants' policies, handbooks, or policy manuals that applied to Gallegos's grievances. Levy Decl., Ex. K at 6. Each of the other RFPs in this category call for documents relating to Gallegos's contentions and class claims of various wage and hour law violations alleged in the complaint or communications relating to the allegations. Id. at 6-21.

Plaintiff issued identical objections to these requests, stating each was protected from discovery by privilege and the right to privacy, while the information sought was also “neither relevant to the subject matter or this action and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Levy Decl., Ex. N at 2-3. In its Motion, defendants argue Gallegos's responses to these RFPs are deficient because they fail to indicate whether plaintiff withheld responsive documents, and if so, on what bases for the privilege objections. Mtn. at 9. In her Opposition to the Motion, plaintiff contends she submitted verified responses stating she had no documents responsive to defendants' RFPs, while no documents were withheld pursuant to the general objections. Opp. at 9-10. Further, plaintiff's counsel asserts the Motion should be denied because they moved to withdraw representation from Gallegos, which would lessen the relevance of her requested documents. Id. at 10. The court disagrees.

Typicality requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). For typicality to be met, named plaintiffs' claims need not be identical to those of the putative class members. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). Instead, plaintiffs' claims need only be “reasonably coextensive” with the claims of the putative class. Id. The inquiry focuses on the claims themselves, not on the factual predicates from which the claims arise. Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. “The test of typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’ ” Id.

*5 Plaintiff's counsel contends the RFPs propounded on Gallegos will soon be irrelevant. But for the moment, Gallegos remains a named plaintiff, despite plaintiff's counsel filing a Motion to Withdraw representation of Gallegos. See Docket no. 37. Assuming, however, that Gallegos will no longer be proposed as a class representative in this action, information regarding her claims and allegations remains relevant to the putative class claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Cedeno v.Thrifty Payless, Inc., 2011 WL 8609402, at *8 (D. Or. May 9, 2011) (finding production of information sought is likely to produce substantiation of class allegations and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence relevant to class certification). Documents that Gallegos can produce relating to her claims of wage, rest break, meal period, overtime, and other violations would likely reflect upon aspects of the claims of the putative class, including “whether other members have the same or similar injury, [or] whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to [plaintiff].” Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, notwithstanding Gallegos's uncertain status, the information defendants request remains relevant. Although it would not necessarily be proper for defendants to seek such documents from other putative class members at this point, because Gallegos initiated this action and was the only named plaintiff until a month ago, it is appropriate for defendants to seek such documents from her.

In objections, Gallegos also claimed any responsive documents were already in defendants' possession. See e.g., Levy Decl., Ex. N at 13 (“It is Plaintiff's information and belief that additional responsive documents are in the sole custody of Defendants.”). To the extent plaintiff claims Gallegos is absolved of her discovery obligations because she is unduly burdened by any obligation to reproduce documents defendants may possess, the court disagrees. Plaintiff has made no showing of undue burden in relation to producing responsive documents to RFPs in this category. See Holmes v. Toor, 2006 WL 1550201, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2006) (defendants must produce documents that are in their possession, custody, or control, even when equally available to plaintiff, unless defendants make a showing that doing so is unduly burdensome). Gallegos must produce responsive documents in her possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether she believes defendants already have these documents. See Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

Plaintiff's primary argument as to why she should not be compelled to further respond to these requests is that she has already stated she has no further responsive documents to produce. But that is not in fact what plaintiff stated in her responses. Rather, she stated she conducted a diligent search in which she “did not locate any non-privileged, responsive documents.” See Levy Decl., Ex. N. This suggests she may have withheld documents in her possession based on an asserted claim of privilege. “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). Plaintiff did not comply with that requirement here. Further, plaintiff has not produced a privilege log.

Rule 26(b)(5)(A) requires parties withholding otherwise discoverable information on the ground of privilege must expressly claim the privilege and “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed ... in a manner that ... will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). Plaintiff's boilerplate assertion failed to meet this requirement. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005) (boilerplate objections inserted into a response are insufficient to assert a privilege); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Formally claiming a privilege should involve specifying which documents or class of documents are privileged and for what reasons, especially where the nature of the requested documents does not reveal an obviously privileged matter.”). Although there is no requirement that the descriptions of the documents withheld be produced in a particular format, a privilege log is the most usual format. See Friends of Hope Valley v. Frederick Co., 268 F.R.D. 643, 650-51 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Plaintiff must produce a log or similar description of the nature of any documents withheld if she has withheld any documents based on an asserted privilege.

*6 The court appreciates plaintiff's counsel's representations that counsel is not aware of any documents withheld, and that counsel has been having communication problems with plaintiff. But this is not sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's discovery obligations. At this time, and certainly when the discovery requests were served and responses were due, plaintiff was and is a party to this case represented by counsel. Consequently, plaintiff is obligated to fully comply with her discovery obligations as to these and the other discovery requests discussed below.

Accordingly, defendants' motion to compel production is GRANTED as to RFP numbers 1-7, 9-22, 24-27, 35-90, and 93. Plaintiff Gallegos is ordered to produce all documents responsive to these requests, and to produce verified supplemental responses unambiguously stating she has done so or that no such documents exist. If Gallegos withholds any documents based on privilege, she must clearly state this and produce a privilege log describing such documents.

Defendants also argue RFP numbers 28 and 91-92 are relevant. Mtn. at 10, 13; Reply at 5. RFP number 28 seeks the retainer agreement between Gallegos and her counsel. Levy Decl., Ex. K at 10. RFP number 91 seeks all documents pertaining to any bankruptcy Gallegos filed in the last ten years. Id. at 22. RFP number 92 seeks all documents relating to lawsuits, complaints, grievances, or other employment-based claims made by Gallegos or by others on her behalf. Id.

The court agrees with plaintiff's counsel, however, that these requests are irrelevant in light of the Motion to Withdraw representation of Gallegos. See Opp. at 10-12. Defendants argue the retainer documents are directly relevant to Gallegos's adequacy as a putative class representative. Mtn. at 13 (citing Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2009)). But it is now highly unlikely Gallegos will be proposed as a class representative. While Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a class representative “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” if Gallegos is not proposed as a class representative, her adequacy will not be at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); Gregurek v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 2009 WL 4723137 at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (rendering defendant's argument that class representative cannot satisfy adequacy requirement as moot in light of court's decertification of the class).

Similarly, information specifically relating to only Gallegos's bankruptcy or legal history against other employers does not pertain to any of the alleged injuries and violations in the instant putative class action suit. Instead, RFP numbers 91-92 would reveal only information unique to Gallegos and unrelated to the instant claims. Again, because Gallegos is unlikely to be proposed as a class representative, her past history regarding bankruptcies or other employment-related issues are neither relevant to the putative class's claims or defendants' defense nor proportional to the needs of the case.

Accordingly, defendants' motion to compel documents responsive to RFP numbers 28 and 91-92 is DENIED, without prejudice to defendants seeking such documents should circumstances change such that Gallegos is later proposed as a class representative.

Each of RFP numbers 29-34 pertain to cellular telephone, electronic, or social media communications made by Gallegos relating to either her employment by defendants or to the allegations in the complaint. Levy Decl., Ex. K at 10-11. Defendants assert the requested information is highly relevant to the claims of the putative class, especially since defendants purportedly had a policy allowing cellular phone use during employee breaks, but prohibiting such use while on the job. Mtn. at 15-16; see id. at 22. Plaintiff objects that these requests are overbroad and unduly burdensome, privileged, and constitute an invasion of privacy interests. Levy Decl., Ex. N at 24-27.

*7 As an initial matter, the court finds each of these requests are relevant, regardless of Gallegos's future status as class representative, because they directly relate to plaintiffs' claims that defendants violated rest break or meal period statutes. RFP numbers 30-32 and 34 seeks text messages, emails, and social media communications concerning the allegations in the complaint and Gallegos's employment with defendants. Communications concerning the subject matter of the complaint, and that may reveal percipient witnesses, are plainly relevant. RFP number 29 seeks cell phone records showing calls Gallegos made during her work shifts while employed with defendants. RFP number 33 somewhat similarly seeks Gallegos's Facebook Timeline and all postings thereto from June 2013 to the present. To the extent the documents sought with RFP numbers 29 and 33 may show Gallegos was on the phone or Facebook during her work shifts, and thus may have been on breaks, they are relevant to her claims that she did not receive breaks while she was employed by defendants.

The court does not find RFP numbers 29-32 and 34 to be overly broad or unduly burdensome. These requests are narrowly tailored to only seek either the time and duration (but not content) of communications made during Gallegos's work shifts, or to seek the content of communications concerning Gallegos's allegations relating to her employment by defendants. Plaintiff fails to specifically show how each request is overly broad or burdensome. See Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The party resisting discovery must show specifically how ... each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.”).

The same is not true of RFP number 33. Although simply printing out a Facebook Timeline may not be unduly burdensome, it is not clear why all postings plaintiff made to Facebook since June 2013, including postings made well after her employment with defendants ended, would be relevant. Although it would be easy to limit the time period to June 2013 to November 2015, the request would still call for postings – which may include the contents of postings – made outside of work hours and having nothing to do with the subject matter of this case. The contents of the postings could be redacted, but to make such redactions would likely be burdensome. Given that there is only the potential that Gallegos made postings to Facebook during her work hours, requiring her to respond to such a broad request would not be proportional to the needs of the case, particularly given that Gallegos is no longer a likely class representative.

Gallegos also objects to these requests as invading her right to privacy; however, this objection is also overruled with respect to RFP numbers 29-32 and 34. For RFP number 29, pertaining to records reflecting phone calls made by Gallegos during work shifts, defendants only seek information limited to when the phone calls were made, not to the contents of the conversations. Mtn. at 16. An individual only has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of telephone calls, not to records that such conversations occurred. See U.S. v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977). Moreover, defendants' legitimate interest in these records outweighs any privacy interest plaintiff may have. See Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (denying motion to quash subpoena of telephone records and cell site information because disclosure does not represent a significant intrusion of privacy); Kamalu v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2013 WL 4403903, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (denying motion to quash subpoena of cell phone records because records were relevant to defendant employer's defense).

As for RFP numbers 30-32 and 34, these requests call for communications directly relevant to this case. Gallegos's objection as to these requests is overruled because her privacy interest is diminished since she placed this information at issue by initiating this lawsuit. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 433, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P. 2d 557 (1970) (“[A] plaintiff should not be permitted to establish a claim while simultaneously foreclosing inquiry into relevant matters.”).

*8 But as for RFP number 33, the court finds plaintiff's privacy interest outweighs defendants' need for the information. As discussed, the request calls for plaintiff's entire Facebook Timeline and postings made thereto over a number of years. Producing this information would likely require plaintiff to reveal the content of communications, most of which would likely have nothing to do with this case, but would instead concern personal matters.

Therefore, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to compel as to RFP numbers 29-32 and 34, but DENIES it as to RFP number 33. Plaintiff Gallegos is ordered to produce all documents responsive to RFP numbers 29-32 and 34, and to produce verified supplemental responses unambiguously stating she has done so or that no such documents exist.

Interrogatory number 4 calls for Gallegos to identify social media accounts she utilized to communicate about her employment by defendants or regarding the allegations in the complaint. Levy Decl., Ex. I at 3. Plaintiff responded to this interrogatory by making numerous objections before ultimately responding “None.” Levy Decl., Ex. O at 5-6. For the same reasons as discussed above for RFP Numbers 29-32 and 34, information about Gallegos's social media accounts and communications are relevant to the claims of the putative class, and plaintiff's objections are not well taken.

The court finds, however, that by responding “None,” plaintiff has given an adequate substantive response to this interrogatory. Thus, the court DENIES defendants' motion to compel a further response from Gallegos to Interrogatory number 4.

Interrogatory numbers 5-8 pertain to information about damages suffered by Gallegos due to defendants' conduct, the calculation of such damages, facts in support of Gallegos's allegations, and the identity of potential witnesses to the facts alleged in the complaint. Levy Decl., Ex. I at 3. Defendants argue these interrogatories call for merely basic information about aspects of Gallegos's allegations. Mtn. at 27. Meanwhile, in addition to the General Objections, plaintiff objects that the interrogatories are premature, overly broad, unduly burdensome, vague, and ambiguous. See Levy Decl., Ex. O at 6-10.

Interrogatory numbers 5-8 are each relevant to the putative class claims under Rule 26. The estimate of Gallegos's damages and the calculation thereof – the subjects of Interrogatory numbers 5-6 – go directly to the injuries Gallegos allegedly suffered from defendants' violations. Indeed, damages computations are required initial disclosures that should have been made without a discovery request under the Federal Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (“[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties ... a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party[.]”). Plaintiff can answer questions relating to damages based on the information she has to date and later supplement with any further information she might obtain. See Cable & Computer Technology, Inc. v. Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 652 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“[A]lthough it is too early for plaintiff to provide expert opinions on the subject of damages, plaintiff may, at this time, answer [the] interrogatory ... based on the information it has to date.”).

Next, Interrogatory number 7 merely asks Gallegos to support her allegations and claims in the complaint with specific facts. Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), such information would be directly relevant to the class claims asserted.

*9 Lastly, Interrogatory number 8 asks Gallegos to provide the identity of witnesses with knowledge of the allegations in the complaint, which is indisputably within the scope of relevant discovery. See People v. Dixon, 148 Cal. App. 4th 414, 443, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33 (2007) (“The disclosure of names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery.”). The court also rejects plaintiff's argument that such information is premature, since Rule 26 requires witness information to be provided with a party's initial disclosures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (“[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties ... the name ... of each individual likely to have discoverable information ... that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment[.]”).

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to compel a further response from Gallegos to each of Interrogatory numbers 5-8. Plaintiff must provide substantive responses to these interrogatories, which plaintiff may later supplement as needed.

Interrogatory Numbers 9 and 10 call for Gallegos to “state all facts” she is aware of pertaining to each department in the Rancho Park facility (where Gallegos was employed), and to any other Atria facility in California. Levy Decl., Ex. I at 3. Defendants contend the interrogatories merely ask for basic information in the case, and that since plaintiff only worked part-time, her knowledge of defendants' facilities goes to her adequacy as a class representative. Plaintiff counters that Gallegos's responses are adequate, and that her adequacy as a class representative is no longer at issue.

Since Gallegos is no longer likely to be proposed as a class representative, the court need not decide whether these interrogatories call for information relevant to her adequacy. But they certainly do not call for information relevant to anything else. Further, these interrogatories are overly broad, as calling for plaintiff to state everything she knows about the facilities and departments would, if read literally, call for even the most inconsequential information and could not reasonably be answered completely.

Therefore, the court DENIES defendants' motion to compel a further response from Gallegos to Interrogatory numbers 9 and 10.

Defendants lastly seek to compel Gallegos's appearance to sit for a deposition. Mtn. at 33-34. Plaintiff's counsel argues Gallegos's deposition should not be compelled because of the impending withdrawal of Gallegos as a named plaintiff. Opp. at 13. Defendants note Gallegos has been involved in this litigation since its inception, and her allegations form the bases of the complaint. Mtn. at 34.

The court agrees Gallegos should be compelled to sit for a deposition even if she will no longer serve as a named plaintiff going forward. See Dysthe v. Basic Research, L.L.C., 273 F.R.D. 625, 628-29 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (granting defendants' motion to compel deposition of one of the action's original named plaintiffs whose dismissal was “likely” because of his motion for voluntary dismissal). A current plaintiff is not excused from being deposed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Indeed, defendants are entitled to take the deposition of a named plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's intention to withdraw from the case, especially where the plaintiff's claims formed the basis of the class action and the plaintiff has been a named plaintiff from the start of the action. Dysthe, 273 F.R.D. at 629. A named plaintiff simply cannot avoid the obligation to sit for a deposition merely by filing a request to withdraw. See Roberts v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 2013 WL 4239050, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2013) (citing Fraley v. Facebook, Inc. 2012 WL 555071, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012).

*10 Here, Gallegos initiated the instant case in March 2016. Until the two other named plaintiffs – Jesse Perez and Sara Ramirez – were added as plaintiffs on October 11, 2016, Gallegos was the sole named plaintiff for nearly seven months from the start of the action. Moreover, defendants have attempted to notice Gallegos's deposition on three separate occasions, but on each occasion Gallegos has either had to reschedule or simply failed to appear altogether. Gallegos failed to appear for her deposition before any discussion of withdrawal of representation occurred. The need for compelling Gallegos's deposition is even greater here than in Dysthe, since Gallegos was the sole named plaintiff for most of this action and thus has a “unique status in this litigation” that justifies her deposition. Dysthe, 273 F.R.D. at 629. Even if Gallegos withdraws from this case, her withdrawal may be properly conditioned on her sitting for a deposition to avoid prejudice against defendants. See Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 2015 WL 473270, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015). Gallegos's testimony is relevant because she remains a percipient witness in this action regardless of whether she continues as a putative class member. See Dysthe, 273 F.R.D. at 629.

Thus, defendants' motion to compel plaintiff Gallegos appearance for her deposition is hereby GRANTED.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion to compel (docket no. 34) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth above. Unless a different date is agreed by the parties, plaintiff Gallegos shall provide supplemental responses, produce responsive documents, and sit for deposition as set forth above on or before December 5, 2016.

Plaintiff is cautioned that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, she is required to comply with her discovery obligations as set forth above, even if she is at some point no longer represented by counsel in this litigation, and even if she at some point withdraws as a named plaintiff in this action. Failure to comply with the court's order may result in plaintiff being sanctioned, which could include monetary, evidentiary, or terminating sanctions.