*1 Pending before the Court is a Rule 72 Objection by Defendants Young Woo Bae, Chan Hee Bae and Bae's Woodberry, LLC (collectively, the “Bae Defendants”) [Doc. No. 104] (the “Bae Defendants' Objection”)[1] and a Rule 72 Objection by Defendants Stanley Kyungjin Cho, Ellen Jung Mee Kim, and Shadetree Management, LLC (collectively, the “Shadetree Defendants”) [Doc. No. 105] (the “Shadetree Defendants' Objection”), both to Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis's August 21, 2020 Order [Doc. No. 103] (the “Order”).

By Order dated November 6, 2020, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Bae Defendants and dismissed this action against them [Doc. No. 125]. Accordingly, the Bae Defendants' Rule 72 Objection is DENIED as moot.

As to the Shadetree Defendants' Objection, upon plenary, de novo review of the Order, the Shadetree Defendants' Objection, the arguments held in open court before the Magistrate Judge, the memoranda in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and for the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Order as to the Shadetree Defendants is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. The Shadetree Defendants' Objections are therefore DENIED and OVERRULED and the Order is AFFIRMED as to the Shadetree Defendants.

In this action, Plaintiffs Binta P. Mamadou (“Mamadou”) and Visions Braid Bar, LLC (“VBB”), a limited liability company formed by Mamadou, have sued Defendants for discrimination and tortious interference with prospective economic relations based on their alleged refusal to lease commercial property because of Mamadou's race and West African ancestry. [Doc. Nos. 1, 38].

On June 29, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel against Shadetree Defendants seeking production of certain documents. [Doc. Nos. 43-44]. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought an Order: (1) compelling Shadetree Defendants to produce “complete and fulsome responses to Plaintiffs' discovery demands;” (2) “requiring the Shadetree Defendants' counsel, Mr. Jason Huh, to engage a vendor of Plaintiffs' counsel's choosing to image his clients' computer storage devices at his own expense to protect against further spoliation;” (3) “permitting the jury that is eventually empaneled in this matter to make adverse inferences about missing emails and information;” and (4) “awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiffs to compensate Plaintiffs' counsel for time spent seeking compliance with discovery demands.” [Doc. No. 44] at 1. On July 6, 2020, Shadetree Defendants filed their opposition in response to the Motion to Compel. [Doc. No. 46]. On July 9, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief. [Doc. No. 47]. On July 22, 2020, Magistrate Judge Davis ordered “that by Wednesday, July 29, 2020 at 12:00 p.m. Plaintiff shall inform the Court whether the Shadetree Defendants produced the responsive documents above” and “[i]f the Shadetree Defendants fail to comply with this Order, the Court will hold a teleconference on Wednesday, July 29, 2020 at 12:00 p.m. to resolve the Motion to Compel[.]” [Doc. No. 48]. On July 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Continued Discovery Deficiency. [Doc. No. 63]. On July 29, 2020, Magistrate Judge Davis ordered “that the Motion to Compel is GRANTED as to the Shadetree Defendants complying with instruction L in Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production of Documents if the Shadetree Defendants do not have the requested information .... It is further ORDERED that the remainder of the Motion is held in Abeyance until 5:00 p.m. July 30, 2020 ....” [Doc. No. 64]. On August 7, 2020, Plaintiffs filed another Notice Regarding Continued Deficiencies. [Doc. No. 70]. On the same day, Magistrate Judge Davis ordered that the Shadetree Defendants “file a written explanation pursuant to Instruction L by 5:00 p.m. on August 11, 2020[,]” that “[f]ailure to do so shall result in Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel being granted in its entirety[,]” and “[i]f the Shadetree Defendants fail to comply by that deadline, Plaintiffs shall file a notice stating such.” [Doc. No. 73].

*2 Magistrate Judge Davis held a hearing on the motions on August 21, 2020 and issued an Order that same day, which stated in relevant part that:

In response, Bae Defendants and Shadetree Defendants, each filed their own individual Rule 72 Objections. In turn, Plaintiffs filed their respective Responses to the Objections. [Doc. Nos. 111-12]. On September 21, 2020, Bae Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 106]. Oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held on October 21, 2020, following which the Court issued an order granting Bae Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all claims against them. [Doc. No. 125].

Rule 72(a) permits a party to submit objections to a magistrate judge's ruling on non-dispositive matters such as discovery orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

When presented with an objection under Rule 72, the district court is to review the objected-to order under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14244, 2007 WL 676222, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 28, 2007). The Fourth Circuit has held that the “clearly erroneous” standard is deferential and that findings of fact should be affirmed unless review of the entire record leaves the reviewing court with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Harman v. Levin, 772 F.2d 1150, 1153 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Meanwhile, a decision is considered “contrary to law” “when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statues, case law, or rules of procedure.” Attard Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80785, 2010 WL 3069799 at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2010) (citing DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)). And in this respect, this Court has noted that for questions of law, “there is no practical difference between review under Rule 72(a)'s contrary to law standard and [a] de novo standard.” Bruce v. Hartford, 21 F. Supp.3d 590, 594 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citing Robinson v. Quicken Loans Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56210, 2013 WL 1704839, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 19, 2013)).

*3 In its Objection, Shadetree Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred as a matter of law because he: (1) “granted an adverse inference when all documents within Shadetree Defendants' possession, control, or custody had already been produced to Plaintiffs,” and (2) “by rubberstamping Plaintiffs requests for fees without determining their reasonableness.” Shadetree Defs.' Obj. at 1-2.

Upon a careful review of the Magistrate Judge's August 21, 2020 Order, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Upon the granting of a motion to compel, a court is generally required to impose costs and attorney's fees, unless (1) “the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action,” (2) “the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified,” or (3) “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (5)(A). A party's response to a motion to compel is substantially justified if it is “ ‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

Here, the Magistrate Judge held Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Request for Costs, [Doc. No. 43] (the “Motion to Compel”), in abeyance for a week to allow Shadetree Defendants the opportunity to produce the responsive documents in accordance with the order's instructions. See [Doc. No. 48] (July 22, 2020 order holding the motion to compel in abeyance until July 29, 2020). In the Magistrate Judge's July 29, 2020 order, he warned Shadetree Defendants that failure to comply with his order would result in sanctions. [Doc. No. 64]. On August 7, 2020, the Magistrate Judge continued to hold the Motion to Compel in abeyance to allow Shadetree Defendants to “file a written explanation pursuant to Instruction L by 5:00 p.m. on August 11, 2020” and further stated that failure to do so would result in the Motion to Compel to be granted in its entirety. [Doc. No. 73] (the Magistrate Judge allowed Shadetree Defendants to file a notice stating why it failed to comply with the deadline). On August 14, 2020, the Magistrate again held the Motion to Compel in abeyance. [Doc. No. 93]. The Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees were ultimately granted on August 21, 2020 after a hearing. [Doc. Nos. 102-03]; see also Pls.' Resp. to Shadetree Defs.' Rule 72 Objs. [Doc. No. 112] (the “Response”) at 11.

During the hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that the Plaintiffs had waived any objections to the request for attorneys' fees when they conceded that they failed to timely serve objections. Response at 11. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiffs' request for a “jury instruction that permits the jury to make adverse inferences about missing emails and other information concerning the Shadetree Defendants” and “$29,000 in attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiffs in seeking compliance with discovery demands.” Order at 1-2.

In his ruling, the Magistrate Judge had before him all of the facts concerning Shadetree Defendants' refusal, or lackluster progress, in providing Plaintiffs with missing emails and other information concerning the Shadetree Defendants. See [Doc. Nos. 44, 47, 63, 70, 91, and 97] (citing to Plaintiff's briefs detailing Shadetree Defendants' failure to fully comply with discovery requests and orders). Additionally, he held four separate hearings on Plaintiffs' motion (on July 22, July 28, August 7, and August 21, 2020), during which he granted all parties an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, Rule 37 empowers magistrate judges to award “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees” when granting a motion to compel, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a), and to sanction a party that fails to comply with a discovery order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 7(b)(2)(A)(1). See also Anderson v. Found. For Advancement, 155 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating a four-part test in assessing whether sanctions are appropriate, i.e. bad-faith, amount of prejudice, need for deterrence, and whether less drastic sanctions would have been effective). Upon a detailed review of the Court's award of attorney's fees, the Court has determined that the award is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law and is based on an adequate calculation.

*4 While “reasonable minds could certainly differ as to the reasonableness of [Shadetree Defendants'] position,”[3] this rationale fails “to meet the high burden of demonstrating that the Magistrate Judge's [Order] was ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’ ” Certusview Techs., LLC v. S&N Locating Servs., LLC, No. 2:13CV346, 2014 WL 12603191, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (noting that, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”)); see also Hegedus v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 2016 WL 5660239, at *1 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2016) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573) (“If the order is ‘plausible in light of the record,’ it should not be disturbed, even if the reviewing court ‘would have weighed the evidence differently.’ ”). Accordingly, because the Court, after reviewing “the entire evidence,” is not left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), Shadetree Defendants' Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Order is OVERRULED.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Bae Defendants' Rule 72 Objection [Doc. No. 104] be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Shadetree Defendants' Rule 72 Objection [Doc. No. 105] be, and the same hereby is, OVERRULED; and the Order is AFFIRMED as to the Shadetree Defendants.

The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this all counsel of record.

Alexandria, Virginia