*1 On July 25, 2023, plaintiff C.B. filed a Motion to Compel: (1) production of defendant Moreno Valley Unified School District's (“MVUSD”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witnesses; (2) production of defendant Demetrius Owens and defendant Loniesha King for deposition; and (3) production of documents from defendant MVUSD and for sanctions. The motion is supported by the declaration of his counsel Maronel Bajaras (“Bajaras Decl.”) and exhibits, the declaration of his counsel Munmeeth Soni (“Soni Decl.”) and exhibits, and the declaration of Malhar Shah (“Shah Decl.”) and exhibits. On August 1, 2023, defendant filed an opposition. On August 7, 2023, plaintiff filed a reply, supported by the declaration of Munmeeth Soni (“Soni Reply Decl.”) and exhibit, and the declaration of Malhar Shah (“Shah Reply Decl.”) and exhibit.

The court held a hearing on plaintiff's motion on August 15, 2023. After considering the parties' written and oral arguments, and for the reasons discussed below and stated at the hearing, the court now grants plaintiff's motion to compel and request for sanctions.

A. The Case

Plaintiff C.B. is a Black twelve-year-old student with disabilities. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13. C.B. attended Landmark Middle School and Mountain View Middle School. Id. ¶ 16. At the time of the incidents at issue, C.B. was between ten and eleven years old, approximately 70 pounds, and in the sixth grade. Id. ¶ 13. C.B. has diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder, but his parents suspect that he may have additional undiagnosed emotional and behavioral issues. Id. ¶ 14. This action concerns four incidents where C.B. was handcuffed by Campus Security Officers and School Resource Officers over the course of four months.

Plaintiff initiated this action on February 2, 2022. In addition to defendant MVUSD, the named defendants include various MVUSD officials and employees (including defendants Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King), as well as the County of Riverside, the Riverside County Sheriff's Department (“RCSD”), and a Deputy Sheriff. The Complaint alleges twelve causes of action. Following a motion to dismiss, claims three and four remain against defendant MVUSD: (3) violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; and (4) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. The following claims also remain against four individual defendants (among others) who worked for MVUSD as its Director of Safety and Security, a principal, and campus security officers: (1) unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) false imprisonment; (10) battery; (11) assault; and (12) negligent supervision.

B. The Instant Discovery Dispute

1. Depositions of 30(b)(6) Witnesses

On November 7, 2022, plaintiff served defendant MVUSD with his notice of deposition and request for production of documents (“RFP”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 30(b)(6). Bajaras Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 1; Soni Decl. ¶ 3. The 30(b)(6) deposition was noticed for December 12, 2022, and listed 28 topics of examination, several of which contained numerous subtopics. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 1.

*2 The day after serving the deposition notice, plaintiff requested defendant MVUSD's availability to meet and confer regarding the noticed topics pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). Bajaras Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 2. Having received no response, on December 1, 2022, plaintiff sent defendant MVUSD an email again requesting to meet and confer. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 3. Defendant MVUSD did not respond. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 8.

Defendant MVUSD served objections to plaintiff's 30(b)(6) deposition notice on December 5, 2022. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 9. On December 7, plaintiff offered via email to reschedule the 30(b)(6) deposition to allow the parties to meet and confer as required. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 4.

On December 13, 2022, plaintiff called defendant MVUSD and left a voicemail regarding his attempts to meet and confer. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 11. Two days later, defendant MVUSD emailed plaintiff with proposed dates to meet and confer. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 6. The parties scheduled a telephonic meet and confer session to take place on December 21, 2022. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 7.

The parties met and conferred on December 21, 2022 regarding defendant MVUSD's objections to plaintiff's 30(b)(6) deposition notice and the RFP he served with the 30(b)(6) deposition notice. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 18. Defendant MVUSD agreed to produce 30(b)(6) witnesses for all topics and provide plaintiff their identities and availability after the holidays. Id.

On January 23, 2023, having received no word from defendant MVUSD, plaintiff sent another email requesting availability for the 30(b)(6) witnesses. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. 10. Defendant responded on January 24, 2023, stating it was working on getting available dates. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. 10.

The parties met and conferred telephonically on January 30, 2023, and resolved their disputes regarding the 30(b)(6) notice and RFP. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 23. Defendant MVUSD agreed to provide a list of witnesses and their corresponding topics with proposed deposition dates by February 3, 2023. Id. Defense counsel was then delayed by illness and plaintiff was informed that defendant would call to schedule the depositions early in the week of February 6, 2023. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 24, Ex. 11.

On February 8, 2023, having received no word from defendant MVUSD, plaintiff emailed defendant that if he did not receive proposed dates for every 30(b)(6) topic by February 10, 2023, plaintiff would serve a new notice of deposition with unilaterally chosen dates. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. 12. Defendant sent a partial list of witnesses with corresponding dates and topics on February 9, 2023. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 26, Ex. 13. Plaintiff informed defendant he would propound notices of deposition for those witnesses and agreed to a one-week extension for defendant to provide dates for the remaining witness and topics. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 27, Ex. 14.

On February 13, 2023, plaintiff served 30(b)(6) deposition notices for the four 30(b)(6) witnesses defendant had identified: (1) Shelley Crandall, February 21, 2023 for topics including 2(a); (2) Tanisha Grattan, February 24, 2023; (3) Scott Walker, March 8, 2023; and (4) Darryl Scott, March 10, 2023 for topics including 1 and 14. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 28, Ex. 15. These notices incorporated revised topics based on the parties' meet and confer efforts. Id.

On February 15, 2023, defendant MVUSD served objections to the deposition notice for Shelley Crandall, but did not withdraw the witness for the noticed topics or state the witness would not appear. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff deposed 30(b)(6) witness Shelley Crandall on February 21, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 4. Crandall testified she spent 15 minutes preparing for the deposition and did not speak to anyone other than defense counsel to prepare. Soni Decl. ¶ 5. She was unprepared to testify to all of the topics for which she was designated as a 30(b)(6) witness, including topic 2(a). Id. Topic 2(a) sought testimony about policies, procedures, protocols, practices, and trainings provided to defendant's campus supervisors about the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”). Bajaras Decl., Ex. 15. Crandall testified that she was not the person most qualified to testify about Section 504 trainings to campus supervisors. Soni Decl ¶ 5, Ex. 22 at 17-19.

*3 On March 1, 2023, defendant served objections to the deposition notices for Scott Walker and Darryl Scott, but did not withdraw the witnesses for the noticed topics or state they would not appear. Bajaras Decl. ¶¶ 30-31. Defendant served these objections despite having already discussed its objections during the parties' previous meet and confer sessions and having reported it had no remaining objections. Bajaras Decl. ¶¶ 29-31.

On March 2, 2023, plaintiff emailed defendant MVUSD a request to meet and confer regarding his then-anticipated motion to compel 30(b)(6) depositions for outstanding topics (as well as depositions for Demitrius Owens and Loniesha King, discussed in further detail in the section below). Bajaras Decl. ¶¶ 32-33, Ex. 16. On March 7, 2023, defendant MVUSD replied to plaintiff's March 2, 2023 email, stating that the 30(b)(6) deposition of Darryl Scott for March 10, 2023 would need to be rescheduled. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 34, Ex. 17. Plaintiff called defendant later that day to meet and confer. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 35. Defendant stated it would try to provide dates for the remaining 30(b)(6) topics and would try to see if Darryl Scott was still available for the March 10 deposition. Id. Later that afternoon, defendant left plaintiff a voicemail stating it was unable to confirm Darryl Scott's availability or get additional dates for the remaining 30(b)(6) topics. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 36, Ex. 18.

Plaintiff deposed 30(b)(6) witness Scott Walker on March 8, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 6. Shortly after the deposition began, defendant MVUSD withdrew Walker as the person most qualified to testify to various topics for which he was previously designated as the person most knowledgeable. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. 24. Walker testified that he had not reviewed any materials in preparation for the deposition aside from the deposition notice. Soni Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 24.

On March 9, 2023, defendant MVUSD confirmed again via email that Darryl Scott's deposition would need to be rescheduled. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 38, Ex. 20. Plaintiff replied that if he did not receive deposition dates for all remaining 30(b)(6) topics and fact witnesses within the next two weeks, he would be forced to move forward with his motion to compel. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 39, Ex. 21.

On March 17, 2023, plaintiff requested to meet and confer with defendant MVUSD regarding its patterns of withdrawing witnesses from their assigned 30(b)(6) topics and failing to prepare its witnesses to testify. Soni Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 25. On March 30, 2023, defendant responded and that it was still trying to schedule depositions for the remaining witnesses and did not address the concerns plaintiff raised. Soni Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 26. Plaintiff replied that in order to avoid a motion to compel and request for sanctions, he needed witness names and availability by April 3, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 27. Defendant responded on March 31, 2023 that it would provide witness availability before that deadline. Soni Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 28.

On April 3, 2023, defendant MVUSD emailed plaintiff a list of witnesses for some of the remaining 30(b)(6) topics, including for topics 1, 2, 14, 15, and 16. Soni Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 29. Plaintiff responded expressing concern that the witnesses may not be prepared to testify to their assigned topics. Soni Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 30. On April 10, 2023, plaintiff reminded defendant he was still waiting for witness availability for the outstanding 30(b)(6) topics, and provided defendant a 24-hour extension. Soni Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 31.

*4 The parties met and conferred on April 11, 2023, and defendant MVUSD agreed to provide an updated list of witness availability by April 14, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. 32. On April 14, 2023, defendant sent an updated list of witnesses for some of the remaining 30(b)(6) topics, including Darryl Scott for topics including 1, 2(a), and 14 and Dr. Robert Verdi for topics including 15. Soni Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 33. Defendant further stated it did not have a witness to testify to topic 16. Id. On April 26, 2023, plaintiff served 30(b)(6) deposition notices for the updated list of 30(b)(6) witnesses. On May 11, 2023, defendant served objections to the deposition notices for May 18, 2023 and May 22, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 22-23.

Plaintiff deposed 30(b)(6) witness Dr. Dana Dunams on May 12, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 24. After the deposition had begun, defendant withdrew Dunams as the person most qualified to testify to topic 2(k). Id.

Plaintiff deposed 30(b)(6) witness Darryl Scott on May 18, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 25. At the start of the deposition, defendant withdrew Scott as the person most qualified to testify to certain topics, including 1(a), 2(a), and 14. Soni Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. 34.

On May 24, 2023, defendant served objections to the deposition notice for Robert Verdi on June 1, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶ 26. The next day, plaintiff served an amended notice pursuant to the objections. Soni Decl. ¶ 27. The day after that, defendant served amended objections to the deposition. Soni Decl. ¶ 28. Defendant's objections and amended objections stated that defendant would designate a different witness for topic 15. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 26, 28.

On July 14, 2023, plaintiff emailed defense counsel his portion of a joint stipulation. Soni Decl. ¶ 38, Ex. 36. Defendants MVUSD, Owens, and King failed to return their portions. Soni Decl. ¶ 39.

At the hearing, defendant stated it has now identified Jason Ramirez to testify to topics 1(a) and 2(a), and Alton Chong to testify to topics 14 and 15. Defendant reiterated that it has no one to testify to topic 16.

2. Depositions of Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King

On November 4, 2022, plaintiff noticed depositions for defendant Demetrius Owens to take place on December 7, 2022 and defendant Loniesha King to take place on December 8, 2022. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 4. On December 5, 2022, plaintiff took the depositions off calendar with the expectation that defense counsel would provide dates for when the depositions could be rescheduled. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 16.

On December 16, 2022, plaintiff emailed defense counsel stating he had not received new proposed dates for the depositions of defendants Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. 8. Later that day, defense counsel responded that they had been coordinating with the deponents, but that their dates were not available because they were district employees on holiday break and school district offices were closed. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 17.

Having received no word from defendant MVUSD, on January 23, 2023 plaintiff sent another email requesting availability for defendants Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. 10. Defendant responded the next day that it was working on getting available dates. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. 10.

By March 2, 2023, defendant MVUSD still had not provided dates for Demitrius Owens and Loniesha King. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 33. That day, plaintiff emailed defendant MVUSD a request to meet and confer regarding his then-anticipated motion to compel their depositions (as well as 30(b)(6) depositions for outstanding topics discussed in further detail in the section above). Bajaras Decl. ¶¶ 32-33, Ex. 16. On March 7, 2023, defendant MVUSD replied to plaintiff's March 2, 2023 email. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 34, Ex. 17. Plaintiff called defendant later that day to meet and confer. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 35. During the call, defendant stated it would try to provide dates for the depositions of Demitrius Owens and Loniesha King and for the remaining 30(b)(6) topics. Id. Later that afternoon, defendant left plaintiff a voicemail stating it was unable to confirm Darryl Scott's availability or get additional dates for the remaining 30(b)(6) topics. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 36, Ex. 18.

*5 On June 28, 2023, plaintiff served amended deposition notices for defendant Demetrius Owens for July 7, 2023 and defendant Loniesha King for July 12, 2023. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 29, 30.

On June 30, 2023, defendant MVUSD served objections to plaintiff's first amended deposition notice of defendant Demetrius Owens, stating the deposition was noticed for a day neither defendant or his counsel were available, and that it would cooperate with scheduling a mutually agreeable date for the deposition. Soni Decl. ¶ 31. On July 6, 2023, plaintiff requested defendant Owens's availability by July 12, 2023 and stated that if it was not provided, plaintiff would move to compel. Soni Decl. ¶ 32, Ex. 35. Defendant agreed to provide his availability by that date. Id. As of the filing of plaintiff's reply, it appears plaintiff had not received defendant Owens' availability. Soni Decl. ¶ 34; see Reply at 4.

Meanwhile, on July 7, 2023, defendant MVUSD served objections to plaintiff's first amended deposition notice of defendant Loniesha King, stating the deposition was noticed for a day neither defendant or her counsel were available, and that it would cooperate with scheduling a mutually agreeable date for the deposition. Soni Decl. ¶ 33. As of the filing of plaintiff's reply, it appears plaintiff had not received defendant King's availability. Soni Decl. ¶ 34; see Reply at 4.

On July 14, 2023, plaintiff emailed defense counsel his portion of a joint stipulation. Soni Decl. ¶ 38, Ex. 36. Defendants MVUSD, Owens, and King failed to return their portions. Soni Decl. ¶ 39.

At the hearing, defendant stated Owens is available for deposition this week. But defendant further stated that counsel has lost contact with defendant King, who is no longer employed by MVUSD.

3. Plaintiff's Fourth Set of RFPs

On May 4, 2023, plaintiff served his fourth set of RFPs on defendant MVUSD, consisting of 91 requests for policy and training documents, documents and data reflecting removals, restraints, and arrests of District students, and documents relating to Plaintiff and his parents. Shah Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 38. After plaintiff granted two extension requests, defendant's responses were due on June 13, 2023. Shah Decl. ¶ 3.

Defendant MVUSD served its verified responses and objections on June 13, 2023, but did not produce any documents. Shah Decl. ¶ 4. The next day, defendant served amended verified responses and objections and a Dropbox folder of responsive documents. Shah Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 39. Plaintiff identified several deficiencies in defendant's responses including missing documents, documents provided in non-native formats, and documents without assigned bates numbers. See Shah Decl. ¶¶ 5-20.

On June 16, 2023, plaintiff requested to meet and confer with defendant MVUSD regarding the deficiencies in its responses. Shah Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. 40. The parties met and conferred on June 22, 2023. Shah Decl. ¶ 22. Defendant acknowledged various deficiencies and agreed to supplement some of its responses by June 26, 2023 and others by June 29, 2023. Id. Shah Decl. ¶¶ 22-26.

On June 26, 2023, defendant MVUSD informed plaintiff that contrary to its previous promises, it did not have the detailed timeline for the productions it had represented would be ready by that date. Shah Decl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff explained that given impending discovery deadlines, defendant's delay would force him to seek court intervention. Id. Plaintiff also offered to provide defendant more time if it agreed to prioritize producing certain documents by June 30, 2023. Shah Decl. ¶ 27, Ex. 40. Defendant ultimately stated it would inquire into whether such prioritization was possible and would provide plaintiff a status report by June 30, 2023. Shah Decl. ¶ 28, Ex 40. Plaintiff told defendant that if it did not provide a status report by that date, he would be forced to file a motion to compel. Id.

*6 By July 5, 2023, defendant MVUSD had not provided the status report or the supplemental productions as it had promised. Shah Decl. ¶ 29. That day, plaintiff emailed defendant that he would be filing a motion to compel production of the documents. Shah Decl. ¶ 29, Ex. 40.

On July 11, 2023, defendant produced additional documents, which were still deficient. Shah Decl. ¶ 30.

On July 14, 2023, plaintiff emailed defendant his portion of a joint stipulation. Soni Decl. ¶ 38, Ex. 36. Defendant MVUSD failed to return its portion. Soni Decl. ¶ 39.

At the hearing, defendant stated it has gathered documents responsive to ten of the outstanding requests, which it will produce, but does not have documents responsive to the other requests.

Plaintiff now seeks an order compelling: (1) production of defendant MVUSD's 30(b)(6) witnesses; (2) production of defendants Owens and King for deposition; and (3) production of documents from defendant MVUSD, as well as sanctions. The fact discovery cutoff is August 21, 2023. Docket no. 180.

The court first notes that plaintiff failed to file the motion to compel in the form of a joint stipulation as required by Local Rule 37-2. But the moving party is excused from this requirement where, as here, opposing counsel failed to timely provide their portion of the joint stipulation as required by Local Rule 37-1. See L.R. 37-2.4. Thus, the court considers the motion.

Plaintiff moves the court to order (1) defendant MVUSD to produce all remaining 30(b)(6) defendants for topics 1(a), 2(a), 14, 15, and 16; (2) defendant Demetrius Owens to appear for deposition; (3) defendant Loniesha King to appear for deposition; (4) defendant MVUSD to produce all documents responsive to plaintiff's RFP Nos. 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 137, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 172, 174, 175, 192, 196, 197, 198(a), 198(b), 198(c), 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, and 212; and (5) defendant MVUSD to produce documents MVUSD002559-002562 and MVUSD001073-001091 in their native formats. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions for defendant's failure to appear for deposition, serving boilerplate objections, and failure to produce documents responsive to his RFPs.

A. Depositions of 30(b)(6) Witnesses, Demetrius Owens, and Loniesha King

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(1) provides that, subject to certain limitations, “[a] party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court ....” Rule 30(b)(6) provides that, “[i]n its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent ... a governmental agency ... and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named entity must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the entity. Id. “The [entity] has a duty to educate its witnesses so they are prepared to fully answer the questions posed at the deposition.” Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 2006 WL 294799, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2006) (citing In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D.D.C. 2003)).

1. 30(b)(6) Witnesses

*7 Plaintiff first moves the court to order defendant MVUSD to produce all remaining 30(b)(6) witnesses for topics 1(a), 2(a), 14, 15, and 16.

As detailed above, plaintiff began attempting to schedule his 30(b)(6) depositions as early as November 2022. Defendant's overall non-responsiveness required plaintiff to obtain defendant's list of witnesses for each topic and to find dates for the depositions that would work for those witnesses. But after months of such efforts, after defendant had designated witnesses for topics 1(a), 2(a), 14, 15, and 16, it withdrew them on or shortly before the scheduled depositions. JS at 14. Specifically, defendant designated Shelley Crandall as the person most knowledgeable about topic 2(a), but she testified in her deposition that she was not the person most qualified to testify about that topic. Decl ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. 22 at 17-19. Defendant designated Darryl Scott as the person most knowledgeable about topics 1, 2(a), and 14, but withdrew him for those topics shortly after his deposition began. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 17, 25, Exs. 33-34. Defendant designated Robert Verdi as the person most knowledgeable about topic 15, but then filed objections and amended objections stating it would designate a different witness for that topic. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 17, 26, 28, Ex. 33. And defendant initially designated Marissa Smith for topic 16, but then stated it does not have a witness for this topic. Soni Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17, Exs. 29, 33. Defendant thereafter failed to identify witnesses for any of the outstanding topics, apparently until the August 15 hearing when it announced it now has identified witnesses for topics 1(a), 2(a), 14, and 15.

Defendant's opposition does not dispute that it must produce 30(b)(6) witnesses for topics 1(a), 2(a), 14, and 15, and defendant has now identified these witnesses. It explains its failure to do so earlier by noting that it attempted to produce witnesses who could cover as many topics as possible, which required adjustments and changes. Opp. at 3. And in fairness, the list of noticed topics was substantial. Faced with such a list, selecting witnesses to cover multiple topics made sense. But when those initial efforts did not prove effective, defendant was obligated to immediately find replacement witnesses; however, it failed to do so. Defendant's attempt to produce 30(b)(6) witnesses in a manner most convenient to it does not excuse its obligations clearly set forth by Rule 30(b)(6). By prioritizing efficiency for itself and then delaying in remedying designation errors, defendant has wasted plaintiff's time by forcing plaintiff to exhaustively pursue defendant to name witnesses, and to ultimately file the instant motion.

As plaintiff notes, defendant MVUSD has been stating its intention to produce the 30(b)(6) witnesses since January 2023, and Plaintiff is entitled to depose 30(b)(6) witnesses for topics 1(a), 2(a), 14, and 15. Therefore, as stated at the August 15 hearing, defendant is ordered to produce the witnesses it has now identified to testify on these topics – Jason Ramirez and Alton Chong – to testify at deposition on or before August 21, 2023. If defendant has not already provided dates for these depositions (as ordered at the August 15 hearing), plaintiff may select the dates.

*8 As for topic 16, the court is persuaded by defendant's argument that it does not have a witness to testify to this topic. Topic 16 concerns mechanisms or programs used by defendant MVUSD to track data on actions by SROs and the use of such data to detect concerns about use of force. Defendant maintains it does not track such data, but instead relies on the Sheriff's Department for such data. As such, the court will not require defendant to produce a witness on this topic. However, plaintiff may question witness Alton Chong about this topic to see if Chong can shed any light on what MVUSD does and does not track.

2. Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King

Plaintiff also moves the court to order defendants Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King to appear for deposition.

Plaintiff has been attempting to schedule depositions for defendants Demetrius Owens and Loniesha King since November 2022. As a courtesy to defendant, plaintiff took the depositions he originally noticed off calendar in order to find dates that would be mutually agreeable to all parties. But despite defendant MVUSD's repeated promises to provide their availability over the course of seven months, it has failed to do so. Defendant's only excuse it its opposition for its failure to produce Owens and King is that “a majority of District Personnel are on vacation and unavailable until after August 9, 2023.” Opp. at 3. But summer vacation is no excuse for the failure to provide their availability considering plaintiff has been requesting these depositions since fall of last year.

For the reasons above, and because defendant MVUSD does not appear to even oppose plaintiff's motion to compel their appearances, the court will order them to appear. Defendant has confirmed Owens's availability for this week, and therefore Owens must appear for deposition this week on the date agreed by the parties on August 15 (as ordered at the hearing), or if no agreement has been reached, on the date selected by plaintiff.

As for defendant King, even though defense counsel has lost touch with her, she remains a defendant in this case. As such, the court also orders defendant King to appear for deposition no later than August 21, 2023. Failure to appear may result in sanctions.

B. Plaintiff's Fourth Set of RFPs

Plaintiff moves the court to compel the production of all documents responsive to RFP nos. 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 137, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 172, 174, 175, 192, 196, 197, 198(a), 198(b), 198(c), 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, and 212.

Rule 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978).

Here, defendant MVUSD provided its responses to plaintiff's fourth set of RFPs in June 2023. After the parties met and conferred, it acknowledged its responses were deficient and agreed to supplement them by the end of June. While it produced some additional documents on July 11, 2023, plaintiff attests they are still deficient.

*9 Defendant does not oppose producing responsive documents. Indeed, in its opposition it stated it “continues its efforts to obtain and produce the remaining responsive documents.” Opp. at 4. It further explained that it has faced challenges in obtaining responsive documents because “some District personnel who are able to access District documents are on vacation and unavailable until after August 9, 2023.” Opp. at 3. At the hearing, it stated it has now gathered all responsive documents in its possession, as indeed it should have since, among other things, August 9 has now passed and there appears to be no reason why defendant cannot provide the additional responsive documents it has been promising to provide for several months.

For these reasons, defendant MVUSD is ordered to produce all documents in its possession, custody, or control responsive to RFP nos. 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 137, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 172, 174, 175, 192, 196, 197, 198(a), 198(b), 198(c), 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, and 212 by August 21, 2023. By August 21, 2023, defendant MVUSD shall also produce documents MVUSD002559-62 and MVUSD001073-91 in their native formats. As to any requests for which defendant does not have responsive documents, by August 21, 2023 it must provide verified supplemental responses stating it has no responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control.

C. Sanctions

Plaintiff asks the court to order defendant MVUSD to pay $10,000 or reasonable attorney's fees in sanctions for its discovery failures, on four bases: (1) for defendant's failure to appear for deposition, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2); (2) to plaintiff as the prevailing party on this motion that was necessitated by defendant's failures, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5); (3) for defendant's issuing boilerplate responses to the RFPs inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); and (4) for defendant's willful or bad faith conduct, under the court's inherent authority. Mot. at 20-21. Although defendant's boilerplate objections and were improper, the court will not sanction defendant simply based on those objections; however, the court considers them in the context of defendant's conduct as a whole.

The court first notes that this is not the first time plaintiff has requested sanctions for its failures to comply with its basic discovery obligations. In its order granting plaintiff's previous request, the court found that defendant had utterly failed to attend to its discovery obligations, despite multiple extensions and its repeated promises to provide responses. Docket no. 163. The court further found that defendant exhibited extreme bad faith by essentially ignoring its discovery obligations after promising at meet and confer sessions to fulfill them. Id.

Rule 37(a)(5) provides that the prevailing party on a discovery motion is entitled to an award of its reasonable expenses incurred in bringing or opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, except no payment should be ordered if: (1) the motion was filed before the moving party made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute; (2) the losing party's position was substantially justified; or (3) other circumstances make award of expenses unjust. Here, plaintiff is the prevailing party, and as set forth above, this motion and all the efforts that followed it have been entirely necessitated by defendant's failure to attend to its discovery obligations. Plaintiff made repeated efforts and accommodations for defendant to try to resolve this matter. Defendant did not even bother to oppose plaintiff's sanction request in its opposition.

The court may also “impose an appropriate sanction – including the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by any party – on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). As detailed above, defendant's failures to cooperate with plaintiff's scheduling efforts have delayed the depositions of 30(b)(6) witnesses, Demetrius Owens, and Loniesha King. Indeed, at this point defense counsel have lost contact with King, but apparently were in contact with her earlier when her deposition should have been taken.

*10 Further, “[f]ederal courts possess certain ‘inherent powers’ ” to manage their cases, which include “ ‘the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.’ ” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 197 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2017) (citations omitted). One such “permissible sanction” is an order “instructing a party that has acted in bad faith to reimburse legal fees and costs incurred by the other side.” Id. Such fee award may “shift only those attorney's fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue.” Id. at 108. Defendant here continues to engage in the same bad faith conduct for which it was previously sanctioned, namely, repeatedly promising to fulfill its basic discovery obligations and then utterly failing to do so.

Defendant continues to rely on the excuse that as a school district, it is difficult to accomplish certain tasks while school is not in session. But as the court has already admonished defendant, that does not begin to excuse its conduct here, particularly given the many months school was in session while these discovery disputes dragged on. Accordingly, defendant will be ordered to pay plaintiff for its attorney's fees that would not have been incurred but for defendant's bad faith discovery conduct.

Plaintiff's counsel Bajaras attests that Barajas & Rivera, APC (“B&R”) spent at least 20 hours of attorney time meeting and conferring with defense counsel in connection with the filing of the instant motion and trying to obtain testimony from 30(b)(6) witnesses, Demitrius Owens, and Loniesha King. Bajaras Decl. ¶ 40.

Plaintiff's counsel Soni confirms their hourly rate is $695, and that they have spent a total of 46 hours on matters related to this motion including 23 hours preparing plaintiff's Motion to Compel, 4 hours preparing plaintiff's Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing, 7 hours preparing plaintiff's Reply Brief in Support of His Motion to Compel, and 12 hours related to meet and confer efforts with defendant. Soni Reply Decl. ¶ 5. The total for this work comes to $31,970. Soni Reply Decl. ¶ 6.

Plaintiff's counsel Shah confirms their hourly rate is $470, and that they have spent a total of 47.1 hours on matters related to this motion, including 35.2 hours preparing and drafting supplemental briefs and 11.9 hours related to meet and confer efforts with defendant. Shah Decl. ¶¶ 32-36. The total for this work comes to $22,137. Shah Decl. ¶ 36.

In total, plaintiff's counsel spent more than 100 hours related to the instant motion, totaling more than $50,000 in fees. But plaintiff is not entitled to reimbursement for all these fees. Having noticed 28 topics for deposition, some of which contained up to 14 subtopics, a fair amount of meet and confer and reworking of who could testify was inevitable. Nonetheless, it should not have taken the months it did, and plaintiff should not have had to file the instant motion, which defendants do not really oppose. Looking just at the motion papers, plaintiff's counsel reasonably (and conservatively) expended at least 25 hours it should not have had to expend to prepare the motion papers on this matter. At the lower of the two hourly rates proffered here ($470), that amounts to $11,750. Although the court would be justified in ordering sanctions in an amount greater than $11,750, in consideration of the fact that defendant did (as the rules require) produce witnesses on numerous topics, and did produce a number of documents, the court now orders defendant to pay plaintiff only the $10,000 plaintiff requested in the alternative in his motion.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motion to Compel (docket no. 181) is granted as set forth above. Defendant MVUSD is also ordered to pay plaintiff sanctions in the amount of $10,000.00 toward its attorney's fees incurred in connection with this motion.