*1 On July 12, 2022, plaintiff C.B. filed a motion asking the court to compel defendant Riverside County Sheriff's Department to respond to plaintiff's requests for production of documents. Docket no. 135. The parties' positions are set forth in a joint stipulation (“JS”). Plaintiff's position is supported by the declaration of his counsel David Clay Washington (“Washington Decl.”) and exhibits thereto. Defendant's position is supported by the declaration of its counsel Melissa M. Ballard (“Ballard Decl.”) and exhibits thereto. On July 19, 2022, plaintiff filed his supplemental memorandum (“P. Supp. Mem.”), supported by the supplemental declaration of his counsel Washington and exhibits thereto.

The parties came before the court for a hearing on August 9, 2022. After considering the arguments advanced and the record before it, the court now grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel for the reasons that follow.

On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff C.B., by and through his guardians ad litem W.B. and B.T., filed a complaint against Moreno Valley Unified School District, District Superintendent Martinrex Kedziora, District Director of Safety and Security Darryl Scott, Former Principal Scott Walker, District Campus Security Officers Manuel Arellano and Demetrius Owens, County of Riverside, Riverside County Sheriff's Department (“RCSD”), County Sheriff Chad Bianco, Deputy Sheriff Norma Loza, and Does 1 through 10. Docket No. 1, Compl.

C.B. is a Black, twelve-year-old student with disabilities. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13. C.B. attended Landmark Middle School and Mountain View Middle School. Id. ¶ 16. At the time of the incidents at issue, C.B. was between ten and eleven years old, approximately 70 pounds, and in the sixth grade. Id. ¶ 13. C.B. has diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder, but his parents suspect that he may have additional undiagnosed emotional and behavioral issues. Id. ¶ 14. This action concerns four incidents where C.B. was handcuffed by Campus Security Officers (“CSOs”) and School Resource Officers (“SROs”) over the course of four months.

The Complaint alleges twelve causes of action: (1) unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Scott, Walker, Loza, Owens, Arellano, and Does 1-10; (2) Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County and RCSD; (3) violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, against the District, Kedziora, the County, RCSD, and Bianco; (4) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. against the District, Kedziora, the County, RCSD, and Bianco; (5) violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 11135, et seq. against the District, Kedziora, the County, RCSD, and Bianco; (6) violation of the California Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq. against the District and Kedziora; (7) violation of Article I, § 7(A) and Article IV, § 16(A) of the California Constitution against the District and Kedziora; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against all defendants; (9) false imprisonment against all defendants; (10) battery against all defendants; (11) assault against all defendants; and (12) negligent supervision against the District, Kedziora, Scott, and Walker.

*2 On June 17, 2021, the court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the District and Kedziora, denied a motion to dismiss filed by Arellano, Scott, Walker, and Owens, and granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss filed by the County, RCSD, Bianco, and Loza. The court dismissed Bianco as a defendant; dismissed plaintiff's claims against the District and Kedziora for race and disability discrimination, violation of the Unruh Act, violations of the California Constitution, IIED, false imprisonment, battery, assault, and negligent supervision; and found that Arellano, Scott, Walker, and Owens are not entitled to discretionary act immunity or qualified immunity. See id.

As relevant here, plaintiff served defendant RCSD with his First Set of Requests for Production on November 24, 2021. Washington Decl., Ex. 1. On January 31, 2022, defendant served its objections and produced six responsive documents. Id. ¶ 3, Ex. 2. On March 23, 2022, plaintiff initiated the meet and confer process, after which plaintiff granted defendant a 30-day extension to supplement the production. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Defense counsel withdrew from the case on April 19, 2022. Docket nos. 121, 126. Thereafter, plaintiff attempted to meet and confer with defendant's new counsel on May 18, 2022 and June 8, 2022, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. Id. ¶¶ 6-10; Ballard Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. On July 8, 2022, defendant served supplemental responses and produced over 1600 pages of documents. Ballard Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff maintains defendant's document production remains deficient and asks the court to compel defendants to supplement their production accordingly.

Plaintiff seeks to compel responses to RFP Nos. 2-4, 103, 107, and 113. JS at 12-47. Plaintiff characterizes the requests at issue as falling into three categories (1) complaints made by students of Moreno Valley School District against defendants concerning disability and race discrimination, and claims for excessive force (RFP Nos. 2-4); (2) personnel files of defendants Loza and Toscano (RFP Nos. 103,107); and (3) Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”) in the form of emails based on a search of specific terms (RFP No. 113). Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed. 2d 253 (1978). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)).

A party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). The responding party must respond in writing and is obligated to produce all specified relevant and nonprivileged documents, tangible things, or electronically stored information in its “possession, custody, or control” on the date specified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Alternatively, a party may state an objection to a request, including the reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A)-(B).

A. Defendant Must Produce Documents Concerning Complaints Dating Back Five Years Prior to the Alleged Constitutional Violations

*3 Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 2, 3, and 4 seek documents and communications concerning complaints against RCSD regarding disability discrimination, race discrimination, and excessive force, and that involved students, from January 1, 2011 to the present. JS at 12-21. Plaintiff proposes narrowing the requests to “only those complaints that resulted in final disposition, relate only to incidents occurring on school grounds, and relate to race discrimination, mental or emotional disability discrimination, and/or the use of excessive force.” JS at 16. Defendant objects that the requests are overly broad, burdensome, and seek irrelevant information that is private and privileged. JS at 21-27.

Prior complaints of bad conduct and investigations may be relevant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and discoverable in federal civil rights cases alleging municipal liability based on a failure to supervise or discipline municipal employees engaged in misconduct. See, e.g., Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 620 (N. Cal. 1995); Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296-97 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (granting the discovery of prior citizen complaints against defendant officers); Ramirez v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 412 (C.D. 2005) (finding police records relevant to systemic failures or a pattern or practice or prove the City's notice of an officer's previous alleged misconduct or City's response to such misconduct). “The theory for permitting discovery concerning prior complaints and investigations is that it may lead to evidence of pattern, intent and absence of mistake, or support a plaintiff's claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978).” Phillips v. City of New York, 277 F.R.D. 82, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1990); Pacheco v. City of New York, 234 F.R.D. 53, 54-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006))).

First, the records sought here are relevant to plaintiff's Monell claim. Plaintiff bases his Monell claim on a theory that RCSD's widespread custom and policies and its failure to train led to the constitutionally violative conduct on the part of the two deputy defendants. See Compl. To succeed in asserting a Monell claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must prove that “action pursuant to official municipal policy caused [his] injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1354, 179 L.Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A municipality's “policy of inaction” that results in constitutional deprivations is “the functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior complaints of the nature sought by plaintiff could help establish RCSD's pattern or practice of race or disability discrimination in situations where the deputies' professional conduct is called into question. Such documents would bear upon RCSD's notice of deputies' previous alleged misconduct and responses to such alleged misconduct.

Further, the highly relevant nature of the complaints plaintiff seeks outweighs defendants' privacy concerns to the extent that documents should not be withheld based on privacy. This does not mean that such concerns are not legitimate; however, here they may be sufficiently addressed by either redactions to documents containing sensitive personal information or by production under the protective order in this case (docket no. 132). See Nehad v. Browder, 2016 WL 2745411, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2016) (“Defendants' arguments regarding privacy can be addressed by an appropriate protective order, and by redacting the officers' sensitive personal information to protect against potential threats to safety.”); Doe v. Gill, 2012 WL 1038655, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012) “(officers' privacy concerns may be sufficiently protected with the use of a “tightly drawn” protective order). To the extent defendant is withholding any responsive records on the basis of privilege, it must document those materials in a privilege log to give plaintiff an opportunity to assess the privilege asserted. See Fed. R. Civ. P 26(b)(5).

*4 The primary issue here is whether plaintiff's requests for documents concerning complaints is unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case. Defendant's burden and hardship objections point to claimed difficulty in identifying “every elementary, middle and high school within the Responding Party's scope of services including public and private schools, in addition to every school district that has contracted with Responding Party for School Resource Officer (“SRO”) services at middle schools and high schools since 2011.” JS at 21-23. Defendant asserts that although it tracks claims against RCSD, the claims are “not searchable by allegation” making it burdensome to identify responsive records. Id. These statements regarding burden are those defendant made in further response to RFP Nos. 2-4. But defendant does not support them with a declaration or other evidence that would further explain the actual burden. Defendant provides no facts in terms of time, money, or procedure required to produce the requested documents. See Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 667, 672 (D. Kan. 2005) (the party opposing discovery has “the burden to show facts justifying their objection by demonstrating that the time or expense involved in responding to requested discovery is unduly burdensome”) (citation omitted).

The Court recognizes that at this stage it may be cumbersome to determine the exact amount of time and resources needed to comply with plaintiff's discovery requests. Nonetheless, it appears no effort was made to even estimate the number of files or gather any other relevant information that might speak to the burden of compliance. The court has no doubt that some substantial effort will be required to gather the requested documents, but by itself that does not make the effort unduly burdensome or disproportionate to the needs of the case. See Awalt v. Marketti, 2012 WL 6568242, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012) (“the fact that Monell claims implicate a potentially large number of events taking place in an organization over a period of time, they naturally, and necessarily require extensive and often burdensome discovery”).

On this record, and given the relevance of the information sought, the court will require defendant to produce responsive documents, subject to the limitations plaintiff suggested, and with an additional temporal limitation. Courts have repeatedly found that the burden and expense of such discovery requests is balanced by directing defendants to produce an amount of records that is limited in scope, including temporally, but still sufficient to enable a plaintiff to establish a Monell claim. That period has consistently been a four to five-year time frame, and the court finds five years to be appropriate here as well. See e.g. Aguilera v. Ramos, 2021 WL 6427925, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2021) (limiting production to five years time period prior to the incident date); Curtin v. Cnty. of Orange, 2017 WL 10543664, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2017) (ordering production of records dated five years prior the incident); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 1994 WL 612785 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1994) (same).

Accordingly, defendant must produce documents responsive to RFP Nos. 2, 3, and 4, limited to those dated from five years immediately preceding the alleged constitutional violations to the present, and limited to those complaints that resulted in final disposition, relate only to incidents occurring on school grounds, and relate to race discrimination, mental or emotional disability discrimination, and/or the use of excessive force.

B. The Court Will Not Order Further Production from the Defendant Deputies' Personnel Files

With RFP Nos. 103 and 107, plaintiff requests the complete personnel files of defendants Loza and Toscano. Plaintiff later agreed to narrow the requests to their training histories and records related to accusations and investigations of dishonesty, untruthfulness, racial discrimination, disability discrimination, and the use of excessive force dating back ten years. JS at 28. Defendant contends it has produced training histories for both deputies, and that no other responsive documents exist. JS at 36-37.

Defendant maintains its production renders this dispute moot. But plaintiff is concerned that defendant continues to object on the basis of privacy in the event that plaintiff would “contest RCSD's further responses.” JS at 37. At the hearing, defendant explained it has maintained this objection simply because the actual requests, for the complete personnel files, are broader than what the parties agreed defendant needed to produce. Given this agreement, and given that defendant has stated it has produced all responsive documents within the agreed limitations, the court finds no basis to compel any further production to RFP Nos. 103 and 107.

C. The Parties Must Further Meet and Confer About Plaintiff's Request for ESI

*5 In RFP 113 plaintiff seeks emails and attachments transmitted from RCSD's domain (@riversidesheriff.org) containing the following terms: birdo; black AND restraint!; “african american” AND restraint!; (disabilit! OR disabled) AND restraint!; black AND handcuff!; “african american!” AND handcuff!; (disabilit! OR disabled) AND handcuff!; black AND (SRO! OR “school resource officer!”); “african american!” AND (SRO! OR “school resource officer!”); black AND (CSO! OR “campus security officer!”); “african american!” AND (CSO! OR “campus security officer!”); (disabilit! OR disabled) AND (SRO! OR “school resource officer!”); (disabilit! OR disabled) AND (CSO! OR “campus security officer!”). JS at 39-40. Defendant contends that plaintiff's request is highly burdensome because defendant is unable to download data larger than 10GB, and the requested searches yield results that are significantly over this limit. JS at 45-46; Ballard Decl. ¶ 13.

The court agrees with defendant that plaintiff's proposed search results must be narrowed further. Plaintiff argues that his “email requests directly relate to Defendant's racial and disability discriminatory practices and the resulting handcuffing and detention of Plaintiff.” P. Supp. Mem. at 4. But the search terms, as phrased, are most certainly going to produce documents which may not be relevant to the issues in this case. For example, the search phrase “african american! AND (CSO! OR ‘campus security officer!’)” will yield any records where the terms “african american” and “CSO” or the terms “african american” and “campus security officer” exist in the body of the document. These documents may not necessarily relate to issues of discrimination on the basis of race, disability or the use of excessive force, and will have to be reviewed for responsiveness. And at any rate, given defendant's alleged hardship in downloading data larger than 10GB, plaintiff plainly must further limit the scope of the search.

Accordingly, the parties must meet and confer regarding further limiting the scope of the search. This must be an open exchange aimed at agreeing to searches that will result in a sufficient but not overwhelming number of relevant hits. Pending such meet and confer, plaintiff's motion to compel with respect to RFP 113 is denied without prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel as set forth above.