Smith v. Downey
Smith v. Downey
2023 WL 8627794 (D. Or. 2023)
June 9, 2023
Russo, Jolie A., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The court addressed a motion to quash a subpoena and deposition notices served upon a non-party witness, Michael Stevens, who was a former counsel for one of the defendants. The court had previously allowed inquiry into fee arrangements but not privileged attorney-client matters, and the subpoena requested potentially privileged material.
Additional Decisions
JANA SMITH, Plaintiff,
v.
MARK DOWNEY, CHARLES OLSEN. ARIELL HARTWELL, MARK SIMON and SHERMAN SMITH, Defendants
v.
MARK DOWNEY, CHARLES OLSEN. ARIELL HARTWELL, MARK SIMON and SHERMAN SMITH, Defendants
3:21-cv-454-JR
United States District Court, D. Oregon
Filed June 09, 2023
Counsel
Frank Hamlet Wall, Frank Wall, LLC, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff.Mark Downey, Portland, OR, Pro Se.
Robert Roosevelt Parker, Jr., Law Office of Robert R. Parker Jr. LLB LLC, Portland, OR, for Defendants Ariell Hartwell, Mark Simon.
Russo, Jolie A., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
*1 Plaintiff, Jana Smith, brings this action seeking relief for the defendants’ “discriminatory hostile housing environment, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, conversion, retaliation, ouster, false imprisonment, trespass, failure to maintain, unlawful and deceptive trade practices and other common law claims arising out of plaintiff's lease of [a Portland, Oregon] premises.” (ECF 26) at ¶ 8. Before the Court are plaintiff's motions for entry of default against defendant Ariell Hartwell and to compel discovery from defendants Mark Simon and Ariell Hartwell. In addition, non-party proposed witness Michael Stevens moves to quash a subpoena duces tecum and two deposition notices served upon him by plaintiff.
A. Entry of Default
Plaintiff initiated this action March 24, 2021. Summons issued as to defendant Ariel Hartwell on June 11, 2021, and defendant Hartwell filed an answer, pro se, on June 24, 2021.
On January 26, 2022, plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint which was granted on February 20, 2022.
On February 28, 2022, attorney Robert Parker filed a notice of appearance on behalf of defendant Hartwell. Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint on March 7, 2022. Although plaintiff does not indicate in her motion for entry of default whether service has been made on defendant Hartwell regarding the first amended complaint,[1] Hartwell now has counsel who filed a notice of appearance and is a registered CM/ECF user. The electronic filing of the first amended complaint in CM/ECF results in a notice of electronic filing upon defense counsel. See L.R. 5-2 and the CM/ECF user manual at section 6; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(3) (electronic filing by a represented party generally required); Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E) (service accomplished by sending to registered ECF user). Accordingly, defense counsel had notice of both the amended complaint and the motion for entry of default and neglected to respond within the appropriate time limits. Cf. Stokes v. Hacker, 309 F.R.D. 472, 475 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (the amended complaint was not served electronically on defense counsel through the court's CM/ECF system due to failure to file an appearance and thus excused the untimely answer). However, service on Hartwell was accomplished due to defense counsel's notice of appearance and electronic filing so that plaintiff was aware of counsel's participation but did not certify the parties made a good faith effort to resolve the motion before filing. See L.R. 7-1(1)(A). Accordingly, the motion for entry of default is denied. See L.R. 7-1(a)(3).
B. Quash
On April 17, 2023, plaintiff served proposed witness Michael Stevens, former counsel for defendant Charles Olsen, a notice of deposition and subpoena to produce documents. Stevens responded by asking plaintiff's counsel to limit the discovery requests to non-privileged matters and for time to confer. Stevens asserts plaintiff's counsel replied by stating this Court already approved the inquiries noted in the subpoena and notice and agreed to reset the deposition. Stevens seeks to quash both the subpoena and the noticed deposition.
*2 This Court has previously allowed inquiry regarding fee arrangements but has not allowed inquiry into privileged attorney client matters. The subpoena requests: “All emails, texts, correspondence w/“Charles Olsen” re representation in eviction action 20LT02065; cc of retainer agreement; copies of bank acc't statement(s) showing Olsen's payment of legal fees.” The subpoena seeks potentially privileged material beyond the fee arrangement. In addition, Stevens argues the fee arrangement is not relevant to this matter and to the extent it has any relevance, the burden of production outweighs the relevance.
Stevens also asserts the $50 provided by plaintiff's counsel for the notice and subpoena is insufficient. A records-only subpoena must be accompanied with a payment of $40. 28 U.S.C. § 1821. The notice of deposition also required $40 plus mileage which in this case is about $18.40. In addition to using improper forms, Stevens points out that plaintiff's counsel failed to confer with opposing counsel or serve a copy of the subpoena on opposing counsel for other parties in this litigation. See L.R. 30-2, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4).
Plaintiff has not responded to the motion to quash. Accordingly, the motion to quash is granted. In addition, plaintiff's counsel has previously disregarded the rules of this court. See, e.g., Order dated March 30, 2023 (“Counsel has been repeatedly reminded to comply with the Local Rules and fails to do so.”). The defects in the notice and subpoena include failure to follow the Court's local rules. Proposed witness Stevens requests a sanction in the amount of two hours of attorney time at $350/hour for time spent in responding to the defective discovery requests.[2] The Court finds the time expended in responding to the discovery request and hourly rate are reasonable. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1), the Court imposes a sanction on plaintiff's counsel of $700 minus the $50 already provided for a total sanction of $650.[3]
C. Compel
*3 Plaintiff moves to compel responses to discovery requests directed at defendants Ariel Hartwell and Mark Simon as well as their Counsel Robert Parker. Specifically, plaintiff seeks answers to requests for admission served on April 1, 2023, and production of documents requested on April 10, 2023. Plaintiff notes she conferred with opposing counsel who indicated no objection to the motion. Indeed, defendants and their counsel have not responded to the motion. Accordingly, the motion to compel is granted and defendants Hartwell and Simon, as well as their counsel, shall produce the documents requested and provide the answers sought in the requests for admissions dated April 1, 2023, and April 10, 2023, as requested in attachments A and B to the motion (ECF 71) within 14 days from the date of this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion for entry of default (ECF 65) is denied. Proposed witness Michael Stevens’ motion to quash (ECF 68) is granted and plaintiff's counsel shall pay Stevens $650 as a sanction for imposing an undue burden and expense upon Stevens with his discovery requests. Plaintiff's motion to compel (ECF 71) is granted as noted above.
DATED this 9th day of June, 2023.
Footnotes
Entry of default is not appropriate if plaintiff has failed to serve the second amended complaint—the operative complaint—on a defendant even if plaintiff has served the first amended complaint. Arnold v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2018 WL 3777136, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2018).
Proposed witness Stevens declares he spent 2.3 hours of time on the matter and is routinely awarded $350 per hour for his work in fee petitions.
The Ninth Circuit established the test for Rule 45(d)(1) sanctions in Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!, 705 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2012). First, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged its existing rule that “undue burden” is “the burden associated with compliance.” Id. at 427 (citing Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[T]he burdens of complying with the subpoena are the ones that count.” Id. at 428. While Mount Hope requires that greater emphasis be placed on the recipient's burden than on the issuer's motive, see In re Morreale Hotels LLC, 517 B.R. 184, 193 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014), the Ninth Circuit has rejected the broad view that “literally everything done in response to [an illegitimate subpoena] constitutes ‘undue burden or expense’ within the meaning of [Rule 45(d)(1)].” Mount Hope, 705 F.3d at 427 (first alteration in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit clarified that undue burden exists “when a party issues a subpoena in bad faith, for an improper purpose, or in a manner inconsistent with existing law.” Legal Voice v. Stormans Inc., 738 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013). Duong v. Groundhog Enterprises, Inc., 2020 WL 2041939, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2020).
Plaintiff here failed to appropriately follow the local rules in seeking the subject discovery, failed to use appropriate forms, sought attorney/client privileged material, failed to provide the appropriate fee, and failed to appropriately confer with the proposed deponent to limit the matters of inquiry all to Stevens’ burden while asserting, in apparent bad faith, that the Court has already allowed such inquiries. Plaintiff has not responded to dispute theses issues. Accordingly, given plaintiff's previous failures to follow the local rules, the Court exercises its discretion to sanction plaintiff's counsel in the amount of a reasonable attorney fee necessary to respond to and quash the discovery requests.