*1 On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff Alexander Torres (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) action against Los Angeles Sheriffs Department (“LASD”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), and Defendant officers (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff seeks redress for injuries suffered by Plaintiff as a result of his wrongful conviction for murder. Id. Notably, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant officers manufactured evidence and suppressed exculpatory evidence, acting pursuant to the County and LASD's unconstitutional policies and practices, “including their failures to discipline and supervise officer misconduct, their allowance of evidence suppression and fabrication, their encouragement of officers to secure convictions at the expense of residents' constitutional rights, and their tolerance of self-organized gangs of deputies engaged in illegal acts.” Compl. ¶ 5.

On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel, which is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation (“JS”). Dkt. 80. The parties are at an impasse regarding three (3) discovery disputes: (1) whether the Defendant officers must testify and answer discovery regarding the tattoos they received while serving as Los Angeles Sheriff's Department deputies; (2) whether Defendants must provide documents responsive to Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 47 and 72, which seek evidence of LASD's notice of deputy gang/deputy subgroup activity and its efforts to prevent such activity; and (3) whether the Defendants officers must provide documents responsive to RFP No. 48, which seek discovery regarding the officers' financial status for Plaintiff's punitive damages claims. JS at 7, 13–14, 22. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED in part, and GRANTED in part.

Generally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is broadly defined to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). However, a court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed” if “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

*2 “A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, ... production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), (iv). “[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “In moving to compel the production of documents, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating ‘actual and substantial prejudice’ from the denial of discovery.” Grossman v. Dirs. Guild of Am., Inc., No. EDCV 16-1840-GW (SPx), 2018 WL 5914242, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). In other words, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the sought discovery is relevant. Cabrales v. Aerotek, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1531-JGB-KKX, 2018 WL 2121829, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2018).

In addition, “[r]elevancy alone is no longer sufficient to obtain discovery, the discovery requested must also be proportional to the needs of the case.” Centeno v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-653 DAD (SAB), 2016 WL 7491634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (citing In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016)). However, ultimately, “[i]t has long been settled in this circuit that the party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why discovery should not be allowed.” United States ex rel. Poehling v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. CV 16-8697 MWF (SSX), 2018 WL 8459926, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”)).

A. DEPUTY GANG TATTOOS

The Defendant officers have refused to answer testimony or provide discovery on the tattoos regarding tattoos they received while serving as LASD deputies on the basis that such testimony and discovery is not relevant to Plaintiff's claims and any relevance is outweighed by their constitutional right to privacy. JS at 9–13.

“Federal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Keith H. V. Long Beach Unified School Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted). The “resolution of a privacy objection ... requires a balancing of the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts often find that privacy concerns can be sufficiently mitigated by a protective order or careful redactions. See, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding third-party privacy interests could be protected through redaction); In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. CV 02-1475-DT(RCX), 2004 WL 1970058, at *5 n.12 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2004) (finding privacy interests were adequately protected by a protective order already in place in the litigation).

Here, Plaintiff has some need for the discovery. As noted above, Plaintiff's Monell[1] claim alleges that the Defendant officers' misconduct that led to his wrongful conviction was attributable in part to LASD's unconstitutional policies and practices, “including...their tolerance of self-organized gangs of deputies engaged in illegal acts.” Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff makes detailed allegations concerning the existence of the gangs, LASD's tolerance of the gangs, and the gangs' effect on the culture and work of LASD officers. Id. ¶¶ 97–170. Whether the Defendant officers have any tattoos associated with any deputy gangs is surely relevant to whether they were members of, influenced by, or aware of operating deputy gangs, which could go toward proving that their actions were in part attributable to the LASD's tolerance of the deputy gangs. Indeed, Plaintiff cites cases from this district where courts have found deputy gang tattoos relevant to similar Monell claims. See Edwards v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:18-CV-2434 MCE-AC, 2019 WL 3564168, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019); Sheldon Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV-18-5838-PJW, 2020 WL 5500071, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020).

*3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not obtained or revealed any evidence “from which the Court can infer that any deputy that had [sic] substantial involvement in the case [or] had any connection or material effect on plaintiff's conviction had any relation the allegations of deputy gang affiliations in this matter.” JS at 12. Defendants essentially describe their theory of defense—that Plaintiff was convicted not due to any misconduct, but due to Plaintiff's own conduct, compelling evidence against Plaintiff, and inadequate representation from his attorney. Id. at 11–12. However, it is not necessary or proper for the Court to weigh the relative strengths of the parties' theories in order to determine whether certain items are discoverable. Indeed, the point of discovery is for the parties to “discover” evidence—this process would be meaningless if parties could not obtain discovery unless they already had some amount of evidence to justify their requests. Ultimately, Plaintiff has explained how the Defendant officers' tattoos are relevant to his Monell claim, and explained why he believes that the Defendant officers could have these tattoos—Plaintiff notes that the Defendant officers were stationed at posts where deputy gangs were active at the time they were active. Id. at 7–9. This is sufficient to show that Plaintiff has a need for the discovery.

However, this need must be balanced against the Defendant officers' privacy rights. Defendants cite cases from outside this circuit and outside the discovery context for the proposition that the Defendant officers have a constitutional privacy interest in tattoos that are not readily visible. See Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing reasonable expectation of privacy in chest tattoos covered by a t-shirt even if the tattoos may be exposed when the person occasionally wears a tank top); United States v. Anthony, No. 4:18-CR-00012, 2019 WL 471984, *3 (W.D. Va. 2019) (recognizing reasonable expectation of privacy in tattoos not located on head, face, neck, arms, or hands); United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, No. 1:06-CR-0323-CC, 2007 WL 9723628, *1 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd, 556 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that defendant had reasonable expectation that tattoos on portions of body covered by clothing would be kept private); United States v. Hanson, No. 05-CR-106-C, 2005 WL 2716506, *3, *8 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (holding it was unreasonable search for officer to lift suspect's shirt to look for chest tattoos). These cases all involved the question of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated when officers forcibly inspected individuals' bodies, and thus are not particularly instructive in the situation we have here, where officers are objecting to verbal questioning about their tattoos in a civil litigation. While the unconsented viewing of an individual's physical body surely implicates a constitutional privacy right, the right is not implicated to the same degree where a civil litigant merely seeks verbal or written descriptions of tattoos that are relevant to the litigation. Indeed, as Plaintiff notes, at least one other court in this district has held information about officers' tattoos to be discoverable in similar litigation. See Edwards, 2019 WL 3564168, at *10 (noting that defendant officers' tattoos were discoverable and relevant to the plaintiff's Monell claim to the extent Plaintiff would request physical evidence, but holding the plaintiff had not shown good cause to compel the actual inspection of the tattoos at the deposition).

Ultimately, the Court finds that Plaintiff has some need for the discovery, and that the discovery implicates the Defendant officers' privacy rights to some degree. However, on balance, the privacy interest is not so significant as to preclude all discovery relating to the Defendant officers' tattoos, particularly where there is already a protective order in place in the litigation. Dkt. 63. The Court finds that Plaintiff's proposed compromise is appropriate, modified as follows:

B. DEPUTY GANG DISCOVERY

1. Summary of dispute

*4 Plaintiff seeks further responses to RFP Nos. 47 and 72, which read as follows:

JS at 13–14.

Defendants object to the requests as overbroad and seeking privileged documents. Id. at 13–21.

2. Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff's requests seek documents relevant to his claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations of deputy gangs are speculative and have no factual ties to the incident that is the subject of this lawsuit, citing to the fact that the detectives who investigated the case have “never been part of any sub-group.” JS at 18–19. However, whether any Defendant officers have been part of any sub-group would seem to be a fact yet to be determined, after gathering all the relevant evidence through discovery. Defendant cannot defend against a discovery request simply by refuting the truth of Plaintiff's allegation. Furthermore, the subject of deputy gangs is relevant to Plaintiff's Monell claim whether or not any Defendant officer was a member of a deputy gang. Plaintiff's theory is that the LASD's tolerance of deputy gangs “communicated to the Defendant Officers that the LASD had intentionally abandoned its responsibility of supervising deputies.” Compl. ¶ 98. Under this theory, the LASD's awareness and treatment of deputy gangs bears on Plaintiff's Monell claim regardless of whether the individual Defendant officers were actually members. As noted above, the Court need not and will not assess the strength of the merits of Plaintiff's argument here. Rather, the Court merely notes that the requested evidence is obviously relevant to Plaintiff's theory of liability, which is clearly articulated in Plaintiff's Complaint.

As to whether these requests seek documents that are not proportional to the needs of the case, the Court finds that Defendants mischaracterize Plaintiff's requests. Defendants argue that the LASD has “been around for over 100+ years, has 10,000+ employees, and provides law-enforcement services to 10,000,000 in Los Angeles County.” JS at 18. However, Plaintiff does not seek documents from LASD's hundred-year history, from all 10,000 employees, or in relation to all 10,000,000 constituents. Rather, both requests in dispute are rather narrow. The first seeks documents from the six-year period surrounding Petitioner's wrongful conviction, and the second seeks information about specific LASD stations proximate to the events in dispute. Under these circumstances, the Court does not find the requests to be particularly overbroad—especially where Defendants have not described the actual practical burden imposed by these requests. Indeed, it appears that Defendants may misunderstand the scope and substance of Plaintiff's requests; despite the fact that Plaintiff's requests do not reference other lawsuits in any way, Defendants discuss “other lawsuits” in their briefing and apparently responded to Plaintiff that they undertook a search for “civil lawsuits” from a time period unrelated to the one specified in Plaintiff's requests. JS at 17–18. Ultimately, Defendants' boilerplate proportionality objection and general citation to the size of LASD are insufficient to specifically describe how “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Institutional Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).... In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.”).

*5 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff seeks privileged documents. Defendants only specifically identify one allegedly privileged item—“[a] copy of all records relating to the comprehensive study of deputy cliques and or deputy gangs generated by former Los Angeles County Sheriff Jim McDonnel.” JS at 20–21. Defendants assert the attorney-client/work-product, self-critical analysis, and deliberative process privileges as to the entirety of this study and all related records. Id. The Court finds that Defendants have not satisfied their burden to show that the entire study and all related documents are protected by any of the asserted privileges.

First, Defendants' argument that the report was created in anticipation of litigation and thus should be protected by attorney-privilege fails because both the declarations submitted by Defendants and former Sheriff McDonnel's public statements reveal that the study was not primarily motivated by the threat of any specific anticipated litigation. See JS Exhibit 11, Dkt. 80-11 (McDonnel's statements indicating that the study was being undertaken to restore public confidence and craft internal policy); JS Exhibit 12, Dkt. 80-12 (declarations submitted in support of claim of privilege in a separate case which discuss the motivation for the study, but do not discuss any specific anticipated litigation); United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that in circumstances where documents served a dual purpose, courts must consider whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the document “would not have been created in substantially similar form but for the prospect of litigation”). Second, Defendants' argument that the report is protected by the self-critical analysis fails because Defendants do not argue that they were required by law or court order to prepare this report. See Dowling v. Am. Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the justification for the “self critical analysis privilege” “obviously does not exist when the party has engaged in the self-evaluation voluntarily”). Finally, Defendants' argument that the report is protected by the deliberative process privilege fails because Defendants themselves describe the document as a “historical study and inquiry regarding deputy tattoos and deputy cliques[,]” indicating that the document is primarily, if not entirely, factual, rather than opinion-based. F.T.C. v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting deliberative process privilege does not protect purely factual material that does not reflect deliberative process). Notably, Defendants do not identify an agency policy or decision that was adopted as a response to this report.

Defendants halfheartedly point to a separate case where another magistrate judge found this report to be privileged after being presented with the same declarations provided by the Defendants in this case. JS at 7. However, Defendants do not actually attach the magistrate judge's opinion, or even identify its location on the electronic docket for the case. Id. This Court was able to locate an order that appears to be the one Defendants allude to. However, in this order, the magistrate judge found the report protected by the official information privilege, which Defendants do not assert here. See Lisa Vargas v. County of Los Angeles et al, 2:19-cv-03279-MEMF-AS, Dkt. 98 at 2. In any case, the magistrate judge appeared to rely at least in part on the fact that the study was not yet complete and suggested that Defendants might be required to produce relevant records once the study concluded. Id. (“Accordingly, the Court sustains Defendants' assertion of the official information privilege in response to RFP No. 21. Defendants may withhold production of responsive records relating to any ongoing study until the study has concluded.”). There is no allegation here that the study is still ongoing.

*6 Ultimately, the Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden to show that the entire McDonnel study and all related documents are privileged.[2] It is unclear whether Defendants are alleging that this report is the sole item responsive to Plaintiff's requests. To the extent that Defendants allege they have no further responsive documents, they should explicitly aver as much to Plaintiff; absent convincing evidence that Defendants are withholding documents or that their search was inadequate, Plaintiff should accept Defendants' certification as having fulfilled their discovery obligations. See Khan v. Boohoo.com USA, Inc., No. CV-20-03332-GW-JEMX, 2021 WL 3882970, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2021) (“Defendants fail to present any declaration setting forth facts that Plaintiffs' search was inadequate. Defendants state, ‘It appeared that counsel for Plaintiffs may have asked their client whether responsive documents exist.’ ...This is pure speculation. Every document production would be mired in disputes over search adequacy if it were sufficient that a propounding party merely believed without any factual or evidentiary showing that documents have been withheld.”); but see Strategic Partners, Inc. v. FIGS, Inc., No. CV 19-2286-GW (KSX), 2021 WL 4813646, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) (“Although the Court generally presumes the accuracy of a party's representation that its document production is complete, here, SPI has presented convincing “contrary evidence” that additional documents likely exist such that FIGS is not yet relieved of its discovery obligations as to its HAI claim.”).

To the extent Defendants have more documents responsive to Plaintiff's requests that they believe are privileged, and therefore merely assert a general privilege objection as to these documents, the Court cannot find that any documents are privileged because, despite Plaintiff's specific requests for a privilege log, Defendants have failed to produce a privilege log or otherwise described the other privileged documents as required by Fed. R. of Civ. P. 26(b)(5). Nor has the County set forth in a declaration opposing this motion why any further specific documents are privileged. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held “blanket refusals inserted into a response to a Rule 34 request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. District Court of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Amatrone v. Champion, No. 15–CV–01356–JST, 2017 WL 1064976, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (finding “boilerplate responses” were “insufficient responses” to defendant's requests for documents). Given that Defendants have failed to support their broad claims of privilege with an accompanying declaration, or even identify the documents that would be presumptively privileged, the Court cannot meaningfully balance the privilege against the needs of the case.

*7 Furthermore, because Defendants have failed to provide a privilege log or otherwise identify the documents for over a year after the requests were propounded, the Court is inclined to find Defendants have waived their privilege objections. See Burlington, 408 F.3d at 1149 (finding that “in the absence of mitigating considerations,” the fact that privilege log was five months after discovery requested would alone warrant a finding that party had waived privilege objections, even under holistic standard considering multiple factors). However, the parties have not provided records of the parties' communication on the issue of the privilege log, nor have the parties made comprehensive arguments on this specific issue. Accordingly, the Court cannot properly weigh the factors articulated in Burlington, and therefore does not presently find that Defendants have waived all objection as to privilege. However, the parties are admonished to work together to resolve any disputes as to privilege without court intervention. If the parties bring this same privilege issue before the Court again, the Court will not only apportion costs and fees appropriately, but may also impose other sanctions on either party, or both. The County, in particular, should note that courts in this district have overruled objections that similar requests seek privileged material, particularly where the party opposing disclosure fails to show case-specific harm. See Lallemand v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. LACV1700781-JAK-SSX, 2018 WL 6136816, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2018).

C. FINANCIAL DISCOVERY

1. Summary of dispute

Plaintiff seeks further responses to RFP No. 48, which reads as follows:

JS at 22–23.

Defendants argue that such broad and intrusive discovery is inappropriate at this stage, where no evidence of conspiracy or malicious intent by any Defendant has been unearthed. JS at 24–25. Defendants argue that this discovery should be delayed until after a jury has concluded that punitive damages are appropriate. Id.

2. Applicable law

As an initial matter, the Court notes that courts often find a defendant's financial information relevant and proportionate to the issue of potential punitive damages, and that the majority of federal courts allow discovery into a defendant's financial condition without a prima facie showing that a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. See, E.E.O.C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 394–95 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (collecting cases); see also LL B Sheet 1, LLC v. Loskutoff, [3] No. 16 CV-02349-BLF-HRL, 2016 WL 7451632, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (“[T]he majority of federal courts to have considered this issue have declined to postpone the disclosure of financial condition and net worth information.”). This is, in part, because “damages information at [the discovery stage] may assist the parties in coming to a settlement.” Id. Conversely, a minority of federal courts require a plaintiff to “first allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages” before allowing this discovery. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. at 394–95 (collecting cases). This Court is inclined to follow the majority approach.

3. Analysis

*8 Defendants correctly note that a district court has discretion to bifurcate discovery and delay discovery on punitive damages until after dispositive motions. JS at 24–25 (citing Ziemkiewicz v. R±L Carriers, Inc., No. CIV.A.RDB-13-00438, 2013 WL 2299722, at *3 (D. Md. May 24, 2013) (bifurcating discovery with respect to the issues of liability and possible punitive damages with punitive damages discovery to be conducted after the court's ruling on dispositive motions); Bassil v. Webster, No. 2:20-CV-05099-SB-PDX, 2021 WL 1235258, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021) (bifurcating discovery on issues of liability and damages with damages discovery to take place after adjudication of dispositive motions)). However, whether discovery should be bifurcated is a case management decision that rests in the hands of the trial judge; indeed, both cases cited above involved motions to bifurcate brought before the district judge presiding over the case. The undersigned magistrate judge has no authority to modify the district judge's existing scheduling order, which does not bifurcate discovery or provide for any non-expert discovery to be provided after the dispositive motion deadline or trial. Dkt. 77; see L.R. 16-14 (“Any application to modify an order entered pursuant to Rule 16 shall be made to the judicial officer who entered the order.”); Watts v. Allstate Indemnity Co., No. 2:08-cv-01877 LKK KJN, 2012 WL 5289314 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012) (finding that a magistrate judge does not have authority to amend a district judge's scheduling order); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca Distribs., No. CIV.S-04-2611 FCD DAD, 2006 WL 2034689, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2006) (“Of course, the magistrate judge is not empowered to modify the district judge's scheduling order.”).

Notwithstanding the fact that case management and the potential bifurcation of discovery are usually issues for the trial judge, Defendants do cite a few district court cases where magistrate judges have denied motions to compel discovery into defendants' financial condition on the grounds that discovery related to punitive damages was premature. In these cases, the magistrate judges simply balanced the need for the discovery against the privacy rights of the defendants and found that the need for the discovery did not outweigh the privacy concerns implicated at the time of the requests.

For example, in Garcia v. City of Imperial, the magistrate judge found that the defendants' privacy rights outweighed the plaintiff's need for discovery where Plaintiff relied only on the fact that he had requested punitive damages in the complaint and had not “submitted any evidence that tends to show that either of the individual Officers ‘acted maliciously and with wanton and willful disregard of the Constitutional rights of [the plaintiff].’ ” 270 F.R.D. 566, 573 (S.D. Cal. 2010), objections sustained in part and overruled in part, No. 08CV2357 BTM PCL, 2010 WL 3719081 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010). Several subsequent district court cases have distinguished this case to find that financial information is discoverable, noting that Garcia involved an “extra layer of liability analysis” implicated by the question of qualified immunity as to the police officer defendants. Vieste, LLC v. Hill Redwood Dev., No. C-09-04024 JSW DMR, 2011 WL 855831, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011); see also LL B Sheet 1, LLC, 2016 WL 7451632, at *2.

To be sure, this case, too, involves officer defendants, and may implicate questions of qualified immunity. However, Defendants do not explicitly argue that this “extra layer of liability” should factor into the Court's analysis here. In fact, the Garcia court itself never referenced qualified immunity or explained how it was factoring qualified immunity into its analysis. Rather, the court merely appeared to follow the minority view of federal courts—that a plaintiff is required to first allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. The court cited California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D., for the proposition that Plaintiff must “make some showing of entitlement to such damages before the Court considered ordering disclosure of such private information.” Garcia, 270 F.R.D. at 572–73. However, while the court in California Psychiatric Transitions found that the plaintiff had produced some evidence showing that the defendants could be liable for punitive damages, the court had already found that Plaintiff's request for punitive damages in the complaint met the “standard of the majority approach”—that no prima facie showing of punitive damages is necessary to discover information related to defendants' financial condition. 258 F.R.D. at 394–95. The court only cited the plaintiff's additional evidence to find that the plaintiff had also met the “standard under the countervailing approach[,]” which requires alleging specific facts. Id. By citing this portion of California Psychiatric Transitions, the Garcia court apparently adopted and applied the minority standard—as noted above, this Court is inclined to follow the majority approach.[4]

*9 In any case, even assuming this Court should require Plaintiff to allege specific facts showing entitlement to punitive damages as the Garcia court did, the Court finds that this case is distinguishable from Garcia in that Plaintiff's allegations here, if proven true, could entitle him to punitive damages. Garcia involved allegations of excessive force stemming from an incident where the officers shot the plaintiff in the back with a taser during the investigation of a minor graffiti charge. Garcia, 270 F.R.D. at 568. Given that the standard for excessive force claims is an objective one, there was a reasonably likely scenario where Plaintiff succeeded on his claims without a subjective finding that defendants had acted maliciously or willfully, as to justify punitive damages—not to mention the unspoken “extra layer of liability” presented by qualified immunity issues. The Garcia court found that Plaintiff had not alleged facts that could warrant an extra finding of maliciousness or willfulness. Id. In the instant case, a court has already found that Plaintiff was wrongfully convicted of murder; Plaintiff's claims specifically allege that Defendants conspired to maliciously prosecute him and falsify evidence, acting pursuant to LASD policies that allowed and even encouraged such misconduct. Compl. ¶¶ 174–263. Given that Plaintiff's claims are almost exclusively based on a theory that Defendants acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for his constitutional rights, there is no “extra layer of liability” here; the issue of liability for punitive damages, and likely the issue of qualified immunity, are inextricably intertwined with the core allegations underlying Plaintiff's claims. The close nexus between these issues weighs against delaying discovery relating to punitive damages, as the Garcia court did.

Defendants also cite Lallemand, where the district judge upheld a magistrate judge's ruling that discovery requests relevant to punitive damages were premature. 2018 WL 6136816, at *14. The district judge noted that the magistrate judge's order reflected an appropriate balancing of the competing interests of the need of the seeking party and the privacy rights of the individuals. Id. Here, the balancing of interests is different than those in Lallemand. In Lallemand, the magistrate judge found the individual defendant's privacy interests outweighed the need for discovery in part because the court had viewed footage that indicated that punitive damages were unlikely. Lallemand v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 17-0781 JAK (SSX), 2018 WL 6136814, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018). The Court does not have the same benefit of information here.

Furthermore, other factors distinguish the requests in this case from those in Lallemand. For example, the requests in Lallemand were directed at the County only; the magistrate judge specifically noted that the information could be better obtained directly from the individual defendants, as Plaintiff is attempting to do here. Lallemand, 2018 WL 6136814 at *12. The magistrate judge also found the requests to be “patently overbroad[,]” as they requested “[e]very WRITING maintained, received, or generated [the County] or available to [the County], which mentions, constitutes, concerns, or is related to the financial condition of any of the individual defendants in [the] case.” Id. Here, Plaintiff specifically identifies each category of document he seeks, and primarily seeks documents concerning present assets.

Ultimately, the Court finds that Garcia and Lallemand are distinguishable from this case. Absent any special circumstance or additional layer of legal liability that would render Plaintiff's request for punitive damages too speculative, the Court joins with the majority of federal courts to hold the information is discoverable at this stage without a prima facie showing of entitlement to punitive damages. In any case, Plaintiff's Complaint clearly and explicitly alleges facts that could warrant a finding of punitive damages, if proven true. Importantly, the Court notes that there is a protective order in place in this action that mitigates Defendants' privacy concerns. Dkt. 63; see Vieste, LLC, 2011 WL 855831, at *2 (allowing discovery into defendants' financial condition, finding that a protective order adequately protected the defendants' privacy); Skye Orthobiologics, LLC v. CTM Biomedical, LLC, No. CV-20-3444-MEMF-PVCX, 2022 WL 17345909, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2022) (same). Defendants have not articulated why the protective order is inadequate in this case.

As to when the discovery must be provided, in the absence of any order from the district judge bifurcating discovery or extending the discovery deadline, this Court orders that the discovery must be provided by the current discovery deadline (February 5, 2024).

*10 Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff seeks mortgage information and bank statements from the past four years and the previous three tax returns from each Defendant; the Court will modify these requests to seek only information concerning the past two years, as other courts have done in similar cases. See Vieste, LLC, 2011 WL 85583, at *3 (limiting time period for requests seeking financial condition of defendants to the previous two years). Accordingly, Defendants need only produce documents from January 1, 2022 to the present.

C. COSTS AND FEES

Fed. R. Of Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) provides that “if the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added).

Here, the Court notes that, while Plaintiff requests fees in the final sentence of the joint stipulation, neither party substantively addresses the issue of costs and fees. In any case, the Motion to Compel was granted in part, which demonstrates, to an extent, that both parties had at least colorable arguments. Furthermore, though the Court may have ruled largely in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff did not include certification or documentation of its meet and confer efforts within the joint stipulation. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court could apportion fees in Plaintiff's favor, the Court declines to do so in light of any potential failure to fully comply with meet and confer obligations. However, as noted above, should the same issues be brought before the Court again, the Court will apportion costs and fees of the motion, and may impose other sanctions.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: