eDiscovery Assistant

Torres v. Los Angeles Sheriffs Dep't

2024 WL 1600317 (C.D. Cal. 2024)

March 19, 2024

Fitzgerald, Michael W., United States District Judge

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Summary

Plaintiff filed a motion to compel responses from Defendants regarding three discovery disputes, including whether Defendants must provide documents related to LASD's notice of deputy gang/deputy subgroup activity and its efforts to prevent such activity. The Magistrate Judge issued a Discovery Order, granting in part Plaintiff's motion and compelling Defendants to respond to the document requests. Defendants filed a Motion for Review of the Magistrate Judge's Order, which was denied by the Court.

Additional Decisions

Alexander Torres
v.
Los Angeles Sheriffs Department et al

Case No. CV 22-07450-MWF (MARx)

United States District Court, C.D. California

Filed March 19, 2024

Counsel

David B Owens, Steven E. Art, Wallace B. Hilke, Loevy and Loevy, Chicago, IL,Elizabeth C. Wang, Loevy and Loevy, Boulder, CO, Jan Stiglitz, Law Office of Jan Stiglitz, San Diego, CA, Michael D. Seplow, Paul L Hoffman, Schonbrun Seplow Harris Hoffman and Zeldes LLP, Culver City, CA, for Plaintiff.
Angela Marie Powell, Marie B. Maurice, Marina Samson, Rickey Ivie, Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell and Diggs, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
Stephen G Frye, Law Office of Stephen Frye, Pasadena, CA, for Material Witness.
Phyllis Wei-Erh Cheng, Attorney at Law, Valley Village, CA, for Mediator.

Fitzgerald, Michael W., United States District Judge

Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER [89]

*1 Before the Court is a Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order (the “Motion”), filed on February 2, 2024 by Defendants Bahman Atabaki, R. Barton, David Castillo, Alfredo R. Castro, County of Los Angeles (the “County”), Ryan DeYoung, Darren Diviak, Jimmie Gates, Larry Lincoln, Los Angeles Sheriffs Department (“LASD”), Michael O Shea, Ralph Salazar, and Steve Tillmann. (Docket No. 89). Plaintiff Alexander Torres filed an Opposition on February 12, 2024. (Docket No. 95). Defendants filed a Reply on February 20, 2024. (Docket No. 98).

The Court has read and considered the parties' submissions and held a hearing on March 4, 2024.

The Motion seeks review of the Magistrate Judge's Order (the “Discovery Order) compelling Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's document requests. (Docket No. 84). The Motion is DENIED. The Discovery Order is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant section 1983 action against Defendants for injuries suffered by Plaintiff as a result of his wrongful conviction for murder. (See Complaint (Docket No. 1)). Plaintiff alleges that LASD officers fabricated eyewitness identifications and suppressed evidence of alternative suspects who were questioned about the crime in order to convict him. (Id. ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that those officers acted pursuant to the County's and LASD's “unconstitutional policies and practices, including their failures to discipline and supervise officer misconduct, their allowance of evidence suppression and fabrication, their encouragement of officers to secure convictions at the expense of residents' constitutional rights, and their tolerance of self-organized gangs of deputies engaged in illegal acts.” (Id. ¶ 5).

On December 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel responses (“MTCR”) focusing on three discovery disputes: “(1) whether the Defendant officers must testify and answer discovery regarding the tattoos they received while serving as Los Angeles Sheriff's Department deputies; (2) whether Defendants must provide documents responsive to Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 47 and 72, which seek evidence of LASD's notice of deputy gang/deputy subgroup activity and its efforts to prevent such activity; and (3) whether the Defendants officers must provide documents responsive to RFP No. 48, which seek discovery regarding the officers' financial status for Plaintiff's punitive damages claims.” (Discovery Order at 1 (citing MTCR (Docket No. 80) at 7, 13–14, 22).

The Magistrate Judge subsequently issued the Discovery Order, granting in part Plaintiff's motion with respect to testimony about the individual Defendants' tattoos, granting Plaintiff's motion with respect to documents seeking evidence of LASD's notice of deputy gang/deputy subgroup activity and its efforts to prevent such activity, and granting in part Plaintiff's motion with respect to providing documents seeking discovery regarding the officers' financial status for Plaintiff's punitive damages claims. (Discovery Order at 19). This Motion followed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

*2 A district judge retains ultimate responsibility for the disposition of a case and consequently “may accept, reject, or modify” any order made by a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Under Rule 72(a), district judges may “modify or set aside any part of” a magistrate judge's order “that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “The reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City of S.F., 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).

“The clearly erroneous standard applies to the magistrate judge's factual findings while the contrary to law standard applies to the magistrate judge's legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo.” China Nat'l Metal Prods. Imp./Exp. Co. v. Apex Digit., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2001). A factual finding is clearly erroneous where the court has “ ‘a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 965, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)). A magistrate judge's conclusions of law are “contrary to law” if the magistrate judge applies an incorrect legal standard, misapplies the applicable standard, or fails to consider an element of the applicable standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Thai v. Cnty. of L.A., No. 15-CV-583-WQH (NLS), 2022 WL 1017888, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2022) (citing Hunt v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1989)). The application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts is a “mixed question of law and fact,” and thus subject to de novo review. See United States v. Zhou, 838 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2016).

“When reviewing discovery disputes, however, the Magistrate [Judge] is afforded broad discretion, which will be overruled only if abused.” Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Deputy Gang Discovery

RFP No. 72 requests “[d]ocuments obtained by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, including its Internal Affairs Bureau, relating to the investigation of any deputy gang alleged to operate out of Lakewood Station, Paramount Substation, Lynwood Station, Compton Station, Lennox Station, or Century Station.” MTCR at 14.

Defendants do not cite to any issues with the Magistrate Judge's conclusions of law, but rather Defendants argue that RFP No. 72 has no reasonable time and scope limitations, not proportional to the needs of the Monell claim allegations and that the Discovery Order and RFP No. 72 are contrary to each other. (Motion at 8, 10).

The relevance standard is very broad and parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). Relevant information “need not be admissible at trial,” but must be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. The Magistrate Judge appropriately reasoned that RFP No. 72 is relevant to Plaintiff's Monell claim. Plaintiff's theory is that the LASD's tolerance of deputy gangs “communicated to the Defendant Officers that the LASD had intentionally abandoned its responsibility of supervising deputies.” (Complaint ¶ 98). The Magistrate Judge found that under this theory, “the LASD's awareness and treatment of deputy gangs bears on Plaintiff's Monell claim regardless of whether the individual Defendant officers were actually members.” (Discovery Order at 7).

*3 “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., No. CV 13-779-DOC (JCGX), 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014). The Magistrate Judge reasonably concluded that RFP No. 72 is proportional “to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). The Magistrate Judge concluded that RFP No. 72 seeks “information about specific LASD stations proximate to the events in dispute” which narrows the discovery from “LASD's hundred-year history, from all 10,000 employees, or in relation to all 10,000,000 constituents” and found that it is not overbroad “especially where Defendants have not described the actual practical burden imposed by these requests.” (Discovery Order at 7–8).

At the hearing, Defendants also argued that just because two Defendants in this case have common tattoos associated with their employment at LASD that Plaintiff should not be granted such a broad discovery request. But after review of the record, Defendants did not make this argument in the MTCR. Defendants had the burden to describe in the MTCR how “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Finally, after thorough review of the Motion and record, the Court determines the Discovery Order and RFP No. 72 are not contrary to each other. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Magistrate Judge's resolution of the factual disputes pertaining to RFP No. 72 was clearly erroneous. If Defendants are truly confused by the Discovery Order, they may seek additional clarification from the Magistrate Judge. (In this Court's experience, most requests for “clarification” are improper attempts at reconsideration; the party understands the order perfectly but just doesn't like it.)

B. Financial Discovery

RFP No. 48 requests the following:

All Documents relating to your total financial net worth, including, but not limited to:

a. All Documents relating to any assets in your possession with value in excess of $2,500;
b. Copies of all monthly statements for the period July 1, 2020 through the present for all bank accounts, retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and/or securities in which you have any ownership interest;
c. Copies of any insurance policy in which you are either the beneficiary or have any other ownership interest;
d. A copy of the deed to your residence(s). If you do not own your home, please produce a copy of a current lease;
e. A copy of the title to your automobile(s), as well as a copy of all Document relating to financing, ownership, and any equity you may have in said automobile(s);
f. All Documents relating to any ownership interest in any real estate, including copies of any deeds or titles;
g. A copy of your last four pay stubs relating to any employment in which you are engaged, including but not limited to with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department;
h. All Documents relating to any mortgage applications signed by you in the past four years; and
i. Copies of your three most recent state and federal tax returns;
j. All Documents reflecting the transfer of assets exceeding $10,000, including but not limited to such transfers in the form of a gift, or into a trust.

MTCR at 22–23.

Defendants do not argue that that Magistrate Judge made a legal error, but instead argue that the Discovery Order is a summary adjudication of a central issue without reviewing any evidence from Defendants and that the Magistrate Judge made a remote inference that “if ‘Plaintiff was found to be wrongfully convicted’ then Defendants' must have done something ‘malicious’ and be subject to punitive damages because Plaintiff alleges such. (Motion at 12). That argument is mistaken:

*4 First, the Magistrate Judge determined — based on case law — that “courts often find a defendant's financial information relevant and proportionate to the issue of potential punitive damages, and that the majority of federal courts allow discovery into a defendant's financial condition without a prima facie showing that a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.” (Discovery Order at 13 (citing E.E.O.C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 394–95 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (collecting cases); LL B Sheet 1, LLC v. Loskutoff, No. 16 CV-02349-BLF-HRL, 2016 WL 7451632, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (“[T]he majority of federal courts to have considered this issue have declined to postpone the disclosure of financial condition and net worth information.”)). The Magistrate Judge reasonably decided to follow the majority approach.

Second, the Magistrate Judge also relied on case law in determining that that the Magistrate Judge cannot bifurcate discovery and rejecting Defendants' argument that RFP No. 48 should be delayed until after a jury has concluded that punitive damages are appropriate. (See Discover Order at 14–15 (citing cases)).

Third, the Magistrate Judge, in arguendo, addressed Defendants' argument that RFP No. 48 is premature and should be bifurcated by applying the minority approach — that a plaintiff is required to first allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Discovery Order at 15). The Court determines that the Magistrate Judge did not resolve any central issues to the case by distinguishing this case from cases where the courts found that the “need for the discovery did not outweigh the privacy concerns implicated at the time of the requests.” (Id.). Therefore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Magistrate Judge's resolution of the factual disputes pertaining to RFP No. 48 was clearly erroneous.

Nonetheless, this Court can take actions that the Magistrate Judge cannot because this Court must determine its own trial procedure. The practice of this Court is to make a mild bifurcation in which the amount of punitive damages is determined separately – but immediately following – receipt of a verdict against Plaintiffs and finding liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, in support of that practice, this Court stays for now any discovery related to the financial condition of a Defendant that is related solely to the amount of any future punitive damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.