*1 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff's Sealed Third Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Privilege Logs from Providence (ECF No. 178). The matter was taken under advisement on February 1, 2024, at which time the Court denied the motion in part and ordered Defendant Providence to submit documents received from Dr. Yam for in camera review. ECF No. 178.

Having reviewed Defendant's submission, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part. A significant number of documents were duplicative of those already produced to Plaintiff following this Court's initial in camera review. ECF No. 120. Other documents, though not previously produced, were copied within multiple portions of the file. Where multiple copies of the same material existed in the file, the Court attempted to minimize overlap by only producing one version of the document.

Many of Defendant's challenges in the draft privilege log on file with the Court asserted relevance or personally identifying information as bases for withholding the documents. Where there existed a reasonable debate as to the relevance of a requested item, the Court produced the document. As to any personally identifying information, the Court redacted patient names, patient dates of birth, and any other potentially identifying patient information.

Defendant's privilege log also indicated the peer review and quality improvement privileges were applicable. In most instances, the Court found to the contrary. There is no evidence that Dr. Yam served on any peer review committee during the relevant time period. See, e.g., ECF No. 117-1 at 94, ¶ 25 (Dr. Yam disclaiming that any case reviews he did between 2016-2017 and 2018-2019 were completed as part of the peer review process); 100 at ¶ 6 (noting that Dr. Yam was not on a peer review committee in 2017 or 2018). Instead, as Dr. Yam averred during his deposition, his concerns about Defendant Dreyer's surgical practice, his other colleagues’ practices, and Defendant Providence's responses to these alleged instances of malpractice were documented “on his own time” outside of any formal review channels. Id. at 118, ¶¶ 11-14. This testimony is bolstered by context—most of the e-mails reviewed from Dr. Yam present as informal requests urging other medical officers to accept or investigate various cases for peer review rather than as formal documents produced as part of an ongoing peer review or quality improvement process.

Certain other documents within the file which are separate from Dr. Yam's complaints discuss a review of Providence St. Mary's neurosurgery department. It appears to the Court that these documents were primarily intended to inform neurosurgeons within the department of ongoing review efforts and to request the cooperation of those employees, rather than as being created for or maintained by a quality improvement or peer review committee.

Separately, Defendant asserts attorney client privilege as a basis for withholding CTRL 00004241, which the Court will produce forthwith. That assertion makes little sense, since in that very document Dr. Dreyer expresses confusion over whether Providence corporate counsel was retained to represent him and Dr. Yam or not.

*2 Finally, the parties are no doubt aware that there has been considerable motion practice regarding discovery in this case. Indeed, this is Plaintiff's third motion to compel and the Court's second in camera review. Innumerable related motions for protective orders and disputes about scheduled depositions have arisen throughout the course of this litigation. In its initial teleconference setting the scheduling order, the Court advised counsel that excessive discovery motion practice was disfavored in this forum due to its time consuming and expensive nature. At the risk of repeating itself, the Court does so again now. Counsel is forewarned that future motion practice over the scope of discoverable issues or production of discoverable materials will be subject to a searching judicial inquiry.

As the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion, each party shall bear their own costs and fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C).

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: